Yates v. Kijakazi, No. 2:2021cv01511 - Document 31 (D. Nev. 2023)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 25 Motion to Remand to Social Security Administration, granting 26 Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgement Late, and denying 27 Countermotion to Affirm the Agency Decision. The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Albregts on 7/28/2023. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - RGDG)
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Yates v. Kijakazi Doc. 31 1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 5 6 *** Susan Yates, Plaintiff, 7 8 9 Case No. 2:21-cv-01511-DJA v. Order Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 10 Defendant. 11 Before the Court is Plaintiff Susan Yates’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 25) 12 13 and Plaintiff’s motion to file her motion for summary judgment late (ECF No. 26). Also before 14 the Court is the Commissioner’s cross motion to affirm (ECF No. 27) and response (ECF No. 28). 15 Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 30). 16 The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to file her motion for summary judgment late. (ECF 17 No. 26). Because the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not provide clear 18 and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s ambulation testimony, it grants in part and denies 19 in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 25) and denies the Commissioner’s 20 countermotion to affirm (ECF No. 27). The Court finds these matters properly resolved without a 21 hearing. LR 78-1. 22 I. Background. 23 A. Procedural history. 24 Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and 25 supplemental security income on July 3, 2018, alleging disability commencing August 6, 2017. 26 (ECF No. 25 at 3). The Commissioner denied the claims by initial determination on December 27 17, 2018 and again on reconsideration on April 22, 2019. (Id.). Plaintiff requested a hearing 28 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on May 15, 2019. (Id.). The ALJ issued an Dockets.Justia.com 1 unfavorable decision on December 8, 2020. (Id.). On June 23, 2021, the Appeals Council denied 2 review, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency decision. (Id.). 3 B. The ALJ decision. 4 The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. 5 § 416.920(a). (AR 24-35). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 6 substantial gainful activity since August 6, 2017. (AR 26). At step two, the ALJ found that 7 Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, 8 peripheral neuropathy, carpal tunnel syndrome, diabetes mellitus, non-prolific retinopathy with 9 macular edema, and chronic kidney disease. (AR 26). At step three, the ALJ found that that 10 Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically 11 equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix I. 12 (AR 29). In making this finding, the ALJ considered Listings 1.02, 1.04, 11.14, 6.06-6.07, and 13 2.02-2.04 and SSRs 14-2p. (AR 29). 14 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has a residual functional capacity to perform 15 light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with additional limitations. 16 The claimant can lift twenty pounds occasionally, ten pounds frequently. She can stand, walk, or sit for six out of eight hours, each. She can occasionally use ramps and stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl. She can never reach overhead bilaterally and can frequently handle and finger. She cannot read fine print. She is able to avoid common workplace hazards but cannot work at heights or with moving mechanical parts. She is unable to handle small objects, such as screws. 17 18 19 20 21 (AR 29). 22 At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as an 23 24 administrative assistant, accounts receivable clerk, and office manager. (AR 34). Accordingly, 25 the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been disabled since August 6, 2017. (AR 35). 26 II. 27 28 Standard. The court reviews administrative decisions in social security disability benefits cases under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Akopyan v. Barnhard, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2002). Section Page 2 of 12 1 405(g) states, “[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 2 made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may 3 obtain a review of such decision by a civil action…brought in the district court of the United 4 States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides.” The court may enter, “upon the 5 pleadings and transcripts of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the 6 decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for a 7 rehearing.” Id. The Ninth Circuit reviews a decision of a District Court affirming, modifying, or 8 reversing a decision of the Commissioner de novo. Batson v. Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190, 9 1193 (9th Cir. 2003). 10 The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 11 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the 12 Commissioner’s findings may be set aside if they are based on legal error or not supported by 13 substantial evidence. See Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 14 2006); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit defines 15 substantial evidence as “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 16 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 17 Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 18 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). In determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are 19 supported by substantial evidence, the court “must review the administrative record as a whole, 20 weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 21 conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 22 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Under the substantial evidence test, findings must be upheld if 23 supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. When the 24 evidence will support more than one rational interpretation, the court must defer to the 25 Commissioner’s interpretation. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Flaten 26 v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). 27 28 “The decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the court.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. Page 3 of 12 1 1987) (citing Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1985)). When a court reverses an ALJ's 2 decision for error, the court “ordinarily must remand to the agency for further proceedings.” Leon 3 v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th 4 Cir. 2004) (“the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for 5 additional investigation or explanation”); Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 6 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that in appropriate 7 circumstances, courts are free to reverse and remand a determination by the Commissioner with 8 instructions to calculate and award benefits. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019 (9th Cir. 9 2014). The Ninth Circuit has devised a three-part standard, each part of which must be satisfied 10 in order for a court to remand to an ALJ with instructions to calculate and award benefits: (1) the 11 record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful 12 purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, 13 whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence 14 were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand. Id. at 15 1020. 16 III. 17 Disability evaluation process. The individual seeking disability benefits has the initial burden of proving disability. 18 Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir 1995). To meet this burden, the individual must 19 demonstrate the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 20 determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous 21 period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). More specifically, the individual 22 must provide “specific medical evidence” in support of his claim for disability. 20 C.F.R. 23 § 404.1514. If the individual establishes an inability to perform his prior work, then the burden 24 shifts to the Commissioner to show that the individual can perform other substantial gainful work 25 that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 26 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in determining whether an 27 individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). If 28 at any step the ALJ determines that she can make a finding of disability or non-disability, a Page 4 of 12 1 determination will be made, and no further evaluation is required. See 20 C.F.R. 2 § 404.1520(a)(4); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003). Step one requires the ALJ to 3 determine whether the individual is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). 20 C.F.R. 4 § 404.1520(b). SGA is defined as work activity that is both substantial and gainful; it involves 5 doing significant physical or mental activities usually for pay or profit. Id.; 20 C.F.R. 6 § 404.1572(a)-(b). If the individual is engaged in SGA, then a finding of not disabled is made. If 7 the individual is not engaged in SGA, then the analysis proceeds to step two. 8 9 Step two addresses whether the individual has a medically determinable impairment that is severe or a combination of impairments that significantly limits him from performing basic 10 work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). An impairment or combination of impairments is not 11 severe when medical and other evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of 12 slight abnormalities that would have no more than a minimal effect on the individual’s ability to 13 work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521; see also Social Security Rulings (“SSRs”) 85-28. If the individual 14 does not have a severe medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, then a 15 finding of not disabled is made. If the individual has a severe medically determinable impairment 16 or combination of impairments, then the analysis proceeds to step three. 17 Step three requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual’s impairments or 18 combination of impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 19 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. If 20 the individual’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal the criteria of a listing 21 and the duration requirement (20 C.F.R. § 404.1509), then a finding of disabled is made. 20 22 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the individual’s impairment or combination of impairments does 23 not meet or equal the criteria of a listing or meet the duration requirement, then the analysis 24 proceeds to step four. 25 Before moving to step four, however, the ALJ must first determine the individual’s RFC, 26 which is a function-by-function assessment of the individual’s ability to do physical and mental 27 work-related activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from impairments. See 20 C.F.R. 28 § 404.1520(e); see also SSR 96-8p. In making this finding, the ALJ must consider all the Page 5 of 12 1 relevant evidence, such as all symptoms and the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be 2 accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. 3 § 404.1529; see also SSR 16-3p. To the extent that statements about the intensity, persistence, or 4 functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical 5 evidence, the ALJ must evaluate the individual’s statements based on a consideration of the entire 6 case record. The ALJ must also consider opinion evidence in accordance with the requirements 7 of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. 8 Step four requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual has the RFC to perform his 9 past relevant work (“PRW”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). PRW means work performed either as the 10 individual actually performed it or as it is generally performed in the national economy within the 11 last fifteen years or fifteen years before the date that disability must be established. In addition, 12 the work must have lasted long enough for the individual to learn the job and performed at SGA. 13 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b) and 404.1565. If the individual has the RFC to perform his past work, 14 then a finding of not disabled is made. If the individual is unable to perform any PRW or does 15 not have any PRW, then the analysis proceeds to step five. Step five requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual can do any other work 16 17 considering her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). If she can 18 do other work, then a finding of not disabled is made. Although the individual generally 19 continues to have the burden of proving disability at this step, a limited burden of going forward 20 with the evidence shifts to the Commissioner. The Commissioner is responsible for providing 21 evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy 22 that the individual can do. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42 23 IV. Analysis and findings. 24 A. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file her motion for summary judgment late. 25 Plaintiff moves to file her motion for summary judgment late, explaining that counsel 26 inadvertently missed the September 19, 2022 deadline and instead filed the motion on October 27 18, 2022. (ECF No. 26). The Commissioner did not respond to Plaintiff’s motion. Under 28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B), the Court may extend time after it has expired if the Page 6 of 12 1 party failed to act because of excusable neglect. Under Local Rule 7-2(d), the failure of an 2 opposing party to file points and authorities in response to a motion constitutes a consent to the 3 granting of the motion. Additionally, there is a public policy in favor of deciding cases on their 4 merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the Court finds that 5 Plaintiff has demonstrated excusable neglect for missing the deadline to file her motion. Given 6 the fact that the Commissioner did not respond to the motion and the Ninth Circuit’s policy in 7 favor of deciding cases on their merits, the Court thus grants Plaintiff’s motion to file her motion 8 for summary judgment late. 9 10 B. Whether the ALJ properly rejected Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. 1. The parties’ arguments. 11 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly failed to give specific, clear and convincing 12 reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s pain and symptom testimony. (ECF No. 25). Plaintiff asserts that 13 the ALJ failed to identify the evidence which undermines Plaintiff’s testimony and points out that 14 it appears that the ALJ gives greater weight to periods when Plaintiff’s symptoms were less 15 severe. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly rejected her testimony as 16 inconsistent with the evidence regarding her vision, but the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s visual 17 limitations had no foundation other than the ALJ’s lay interpretation of medical evidence. 18 Regarding Plaintiff’s lumbar spine impairments, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ unfairly relied on 19 periods of relatively improved functioning. Regarding Plaintiff’s ambulation, Plaintiff points out 20 that while she did not use a cane at all times, she has recently suffered multiple falls which 21 required treatment. Regarding Plaintiff not attending physical therapy, Plaintiff points out that 22 she complained to her provider that physical therapy made her symptoms worse and thus, she had 23 a good reason for noncompliance. 24 The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly identified the aspects of Plaintiff’s 25 testimony that were inconsistent with the evidence in the record, identified and discussed that 26 record evidence, and explained why the record contradicts Plaintiff’s testimony. (ECF No. 27). 27 The Commissioner points out that the ALJ did not completely reject Plaintiff’s subjective 28 symptom complaints, but further limited her RFC as a result of those complaints. Regarding Page 7 of 12 1 Plaintiff’s complaints about her lumbar spine impairments and ambulation, the Commissioner 2 argues that the objective medical evidence did not support her claims of disabling weakness, pain, 3 and mobility issues. Instead, it often demonstrated that she appeared healthy, was not in acute 4 distress, did not have swelling or objective signs of pain, and had normal ranges of motion. And 5 while Plaintiff claimed to use a walker, on many occasions she had a normal gait and walked 6 without difficulty or without assistive devices. 1 Regarding Plaintiff’s vision, the Commissioner 7 asserts that Plaintiff repeatedly denied symptoms like blind spots, vision change, floaters, eye 8 pain, double vision, peripheral vision loss, or vision distortion. And Plaintiff retained the ability 9 to drive short, familiar routes. The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s RFC limitations were not the ALJ’s lay 10 11 interpretation of the medical evidence, but rather were proper because it is the ALJ’s 12 responsibility to synthesize Plaintiff’s limitations into an RFC. The Commissioner argues in 13 conclusion that state agency medical consultants Dr. Gupreet Chahal and Dr. R. Bitonte 14 determined that Plaintiff was not disabled and that those opinions support the ALJ’s decision to 15 discount Plaintiff’s subjective statements. Specifically, the Commissioner points out that these 16 doctors’ opinions were less restrictive than the ALJ’s RFC and that Plaintiff did not challenge 17 either doctor’s findings or the ALJ’s decision to credit them. Plaintiff replies that the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective limitation testimony was 18 19 lacking because the ALJ failed to adequately connect the dots between Plaintiff’s 20 evidence/treatment history and Plaintiff’s ability to perform work on a sustained basis. (ECF No. 21 30). Regarding Drs. Chahal and Bitonte’s opinions, Plaintiff asserts that their medical opinions 22 only apply to the first step of the two-step subjective-pain analysis and thus, the ALJ could not 23 rely on them to find Plaintiff’s testimony not credible. Instead, the ALJ was required to rely on 24 25 26 27 28 1 The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s complaints about the severity of her problems with grip strength, manipulative tasks, and lifting her arms above her head. However, Plaintiff did not bring these issues up in her motion and did not address them in reply. Because the Court only addresses fully developed arguments, it does not address the Commissioner’s arguments on this point here. See Kor Media Group, LLC v. Green, 294 F.R.D. 579, 582 n.3 (D. Nev. 2013). Page 8 of 12 1 Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, whether Plaintiff has a reputation for dishonesty, internal 2 contradictions in the testimony, or conflicts between Plaintiff’s testimony and Plaintiff’s conduct. 3 2. Analysis. 4 An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a plaintiff’s testimony 5 regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. “First, the ALJ must determine whether there 6 is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to 7 produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 8 2012) superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (internal quotation marks 9 omitted). “The claimant is not required to show that her impairment ‘could reasonably be 10 expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 11 reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.’” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 12 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 13 Second, “[i]f the [plaintiff] meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the 14 ALJ can only reject the [plaintiff’s] testimony about the severity of the symptoms if [the ALJ] 15 gives ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ for the rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 16 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “General findings are 17 insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence 18 undermines the [plaintiff’s] complaints.” Id. Further, “[w]hile an ALJ may find testimony not 19 credible in part or in whole, he or she may not disregard it solely because it is not substantiated 20 affirmatively by objective medical evidence.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 21 (9th Cir. 2006). 22 The Ninth Circuit recognized the clear and convincing evidence standard to be “the most 23 demanding required in Social Security cases” and “not an easy requirement to meet.” Garrison v. 24 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014). An ALJ’s failure to provide “specific, clear and 25 convincing reasons” for rejecting a plaintiff’s pain and symptom testimony constitutes legal error 26 that is not harmless because it precludes a court from conducting a meaningful review of the 27 ALJ’s reasoning and ensuring that the plaintiff’s testimony is not rejected arbitrarily. Brown- 28 Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 2015). In making an adverse credibility Page 9 of 12 1 determination, the ALJ may consider, among other factors: (1) the claimant’s reputation for 2 truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies in the claimant’s testimony or between her testimony and her 3 conduct; (3) the claimant’s daily living activities; (4) the claimant’s work record; and 4 (5) testimony from physicians or third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 5 claimant’s condition. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-959 (9th Cir. 2002). 6 The Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 7 Regarding the Plaintiff’s vision, the ALJ explained that the record confirms diabetes mellitus 8 related abnormalities, bilateral cataracts, and mild non-prolific retinopathy with macular edema. 9 (AR 31). But the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s testimony of general blindness to be inconsistent 10 with records demonstrating that Plaintiff did not report visual impairments like blind spots, vision 11 change, floaters, eye pain, double vision, peripheral vision loss, or visual distortion. The ALJ 12 cited to records demonstrating intact visual fields and to Plaintiff’s own testimony that she 13 remained able to drive. 14 However, the ALJ’s analysis is not clear and convincing with respect to Plaintiff’s 15 ambulation. Plaintiff testified that her low back pain and loss of foot sensation cause her 16 ambulation problems and that she uses a cane for ambulation outside the home. As contradictory 17 evidence, the ALJ points to the fact that Plaintiff lives in a third-floor apartment with no elevator 18 and that Plaintiff’s medical records between 2017 and July of 2020 demonstrate that Plaintiff 19 often appeared at appointments with normal ranges of motion and normal, unassisted gait and 20 ambulation. But the ALJ did not address Plaintiff’s recent falls—in August 2020 and December 21 2020—or the impact on those falls on the credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony. The Commissioner 22 also failed to address Plaintiff’s arguments on this point in response. 23 While Plaintiff’s medical records spanning between 2017 and July of 2020 often 24 contradict Plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of her ambulation problems, the ALJ did not 25 discuss Plaintiff’s testimony that her ambulation issues resulted in falls. Nor did the ALJ provide 26 clear and convincing reasons for rejecting that testimony. This is particularly absent because, 27 although the ALJ mentioned that Plaintiff lives on the third floor as a reason for discrediting her 28 Page 10 of 12 1 ambulation testimony, Plaintiff testified that she is waiting until her lease is up to switch to the 2 first floor because she has fallen down the stairs twice. (AR 715). 3 Finally, regarding the Commissioner’s arguments that the ALJ relied on Drs. Chahal and 4 Bitonte’s opinions to reject Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the Court does not find this to be the 5 case. The ALJ relied on Drs. Chahal and Bitonte’s opinions in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, not 6 as a reason to reject Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Indeed, the ALJ compared these opinions 7 with the record to determine their persuasiveness, rather than comparing them with Plaintiff’s 8 subjective complaints to determine Plaintiff’s credibility. 9 The Court thus finds that the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her 10 ambulation without addressing her testimony regarding her recent falls. The Court thus grants 11 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in part and denies it in part. Specifically, the Court 12 denies Plaintiff’s motion to reverse and order payment of benefits because the three-part standard 13 under which the Court can remand to the ALJ with instructions to calculate and award benefits is 14 not met here. Under the first factor, the record would benefit from further administrative 15 proceedings regarding Plaintiff’s ambulation testimony. And under the third factor, even if the 16 improperly discredited evidence regarding Plaintiff’s difficulty ambulating were credited as true, 17 it is not clear to the Court that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled. The Court 18 thus grants Plaintiff’s motion regarding her request to remand the matter for further 19 administrative proceedings and denies Plaintiff’s motion regarding her request for reversal and 20 payment of benefits. The Court also denies the Commissioner’s countermotion to affirm. 21 22 23 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file her motion for summary judgment late (ECF No. 26) is granted. 24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 25 25) is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted regarding Plaintiff’s request 26 for remand. This case is remanded to the Social Security Administration for rehearing to further 27 evaluate Plaintiff’s subjective testimony regarding her ambulation consistent with this order. The 28 motion is denied in part regarding Plaintiff’s request for reversal and payment of benefits. Page 11 of 12 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commissioner’s countermotion to affirm (ECF 2 No. 27) is denied. The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment accordingly and close 3 this case. 4 5 6 7 DATED: July 28, 2023 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Page 12 of 12
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