Ossowski v St. Joseph Transitional Rehabilitation Center, LLC, No. 2:2021cv01417 - Document 23 (D. Nev. 2021)
Court Description: ORDER Granting 7 Motion to Remand to State Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 8 Motion to Dismiss is Denied as moot. Signed by Judge James C. Mahan on 10/6/2021. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF -cc: Certified Docket Sheet and Order sent to Eighth Judicial Court - JQC)
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Ossowski v St. Joseph Transitional Rehabilitation Center, LLC Doc. 23 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 *** 7 JOAN OSSOWSKI, 8 Plaintiff(s), 9 10 11 Case No. 2:21-CR-1417 JCM (BNW) 2:21-cv-01417-JCM-BNW ORDER v. ST, JOSEPH TRANSITIONAL REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, Defendant(s). 12 13 14 Presently before the court is plaintiff Joan Ossowski1 (“Ossowski”) motion to remand, 15 (ECF No. 7). Defendant St. Joseph Transitional Rehabilitation Center (“St. Joseph”) filed a 16 response, (ECF No. 10), to which Ossowski replied (ECF No. 12). Also before the court is St. Joseph’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8). Ossowski filed a 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 response (ECF No. 9) to which St. Joseph Replied (ECF No. 11). I. Background The instant action arises from a state law tort claims that St. Joseph was negligent in its medical care of Ossowski. (ECF No. 1-1). On June 21, 2021, Ossowski filed her complaint in Nevada state court. (Id. at ¶ 1). After being served on July 8, 2021, St. Joseph removed to this court on July 29, 2021. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3). Ossowski now moves to remand. (ECF No. 7). 24 25 26 27 28 1 On September 28, 2021, attorneys for plaintiff Ossowski filed a Suggestion of Death Upon the Record (ECF No. 19) in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 informing the court that Ms. Ossowski died on or about July 4, 2021. Ms. Ossowski’s attorneys subsequently moved this court to substitute Kirby Ossowski as special administrator for the estate of Joan Ossowski, deceased, as plaintiff in place of Joan Ossowski (ECF No. 21). The court granted the motion on October 1, 2021 (ECF No. 22). The court now resumes its proceedings to rule on the present issue of remand. James C. Mahan U.S. District Judge Dockets.Justia.com 1 In the complaint, Ossowski alleged negligence relating to placement of a feeding tube 2 and a StatLock, which caused gastrointestinal leaking requiring subsequent surgery. (ECF No. 3 1-1 at ¶¶ 9-10). Apparently2, Ossowski made later claims relating to St. Joseph’s failure to 4 follow proper COVID-19 safety procedures and protocols which allegedly caused Ossowski to 5 contract COVID-19 as a patient. (See ECF Nos. 1-1 at ¶ 14, 7 at 7, 10 at 2). 6 II. Legal Standard 7 A. Removal and Remand 8 “‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power 9 authorized by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting 10 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 11 1441(a), “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States 12 have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district 13 court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is 14 pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 15 Because the court’s jurisdiction is limited by the constitution and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 16 1332, “[t]he threshold requirement for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is a finding that the 17 complaint contains a cause of action that is within the original jurisdiction of the district 18 court.” Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 340 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Toumajian 19 v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1998)). Thus, “it is to be presumed that a cause lies 20 outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of establishing the contrary 21 rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 22 (9th Cir. 2009). 23 Upon notice of removability, a defendant has thirty days to remove a case to federal court 24 once he knows or should have known that the case was removable. Durham v. Lockheed Martin 25 2 26 27 28 James C. Mahan U.S. District Judge The court is perplexed by the lack of any COVID-19 protocol nonfeasance claims in the original complaint attached to St. Joseph’s petition for removal. (ECF No. 1-1). In fact, St. Joseph begins its petition for removal with the hollow citation to ¶¶ 20-23 of the “Compl. Attached hereto as Exhibit A” when discussing the purported COVID-19 claims, when in reality, the Ex. A. Compl. ends with ¶ 16. The court presumes this was an error and that there is a missing referential amended state complaint but since both parties concede that COVID protocol nonfeasance claims are at issue, the court proceeds with its analysis, particularly since it ultimately has no bearing on the court’s final judgment. -2- 1 Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)). Defendants are not 2 charged with notice of removability “until they’ve received a paper that gives them enough 3 information to remove.” Id. at 1251. 4 Specifically, “the ‘thirty day time period [for removal] . . . starts to run from defendant’s 5 receipt of the initial pleading only when that pleading affirmatively reveals on its face’ the facts 6 necessary for federal court jurisdiction.” Id. at 1250 (quoting Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 7 425 F.3d 689, 690–91 (9th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original)). “Otherwise, the thirty-day clock 8 doesn’t begin ticking until a defendant receives ‘a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order 9 or other paper’ from which it can determine that the case is removable.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 10 11 § 1446(b)(3)). A plaintiff may challenge removal by timely filing a motion to remand. 28 U.S.C. On a motion to remand, the removing defendant must overcome the “strong 12 § 1447(c). 13 presumption against removal jurisdiction” and establish that removal is proper. Hunter, 582 F.3d 14 at 1042 (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam)). Due to this 15 strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of 16 remand to state court. Id. 17 B. Preemption and Federal Question Jurisdiction 18 The “well-pleaded complaint rule” governs federal question jurisdiction. This rule 19 provides that district courts can exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 only when a federal 20 question appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 21 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Thus, a plaintiff “may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance 22 on state law.” Id. Moreover, “an anticipated or actual federal defense generally does not qualify 23 a case for removal[.]” Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999). 24 The well-pleaded complaint rule, however, is not without exception. The “complete 25 preemption doctrine” allows district courts to exercise federal question jurisdiction over state law 26 claims when a federal statute completely preempts the relevant state law. Balcorta v. Twentieth 27 Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 28 consider the factual allegations in the complaint and the petition of removal to determine whether James C. Mahan U.S. District Judge -3- Courts 1 federal law completely preempts a state law claim. Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 702 2 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir. 1983). 3 Ordinary preemption is a defense and does not support Article III subject matter 4 jurisdiction, a prerequisite for removal. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 5 U.S. 804 (1986). In contrast, complete preemption is “really a jurisdictional rather than a 6 preemption doctrine, [as it] confers exclusive federal jurisdiction in certain instances where 7 Congress intended the scope of a federal law to be so broad as to entirely replace any state-law 8 claim.” Marin General Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 9 2009) (quoting Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, Inc. v. Cent. States Joint Bd. Health & Welfare 10 Trust Fund, 538 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). Complete 11 preemption is “rare.” Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008). 12 Congressional intent is the “ultimate touchstone” of any preemption analysis, express or 13 implied. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96, 98 (1992). In determining 14 Congressional intent to preempt, a court must “begin with the language employed by Congress 15 and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of the language accurately expresses the legislative 16 purpose.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992). “The first and most 17 important step in construing a statute is the statutory language itself.” Royal Foods Co., Inc. v. 18 RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Chevron USA v. Natural Res. 19 Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984)). 20 III. Discussion 21 A. The PREP Act 22 The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP”) was enacted on 23 December 30, 2005, as Public Law 109-148, Division C, Section 2. It amended the Public Health 24 Service Act, adding sections that address liability immunity and a compensation program. 3 The 25 PREP Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS Secretary”) to issue a 26 Declaration to provide liability immunity to certain individuals and entities (“Covered Persons”) 27 against any claim of loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the manufacture, 28 3 James C. Mahan U.S. District Judge These sections are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d and 247d-6e. -4- 1 distribution, administration, or use of medical countermeasures (“Covered Countermeasures”), 2 except for claims involving “willful misconduct” as defined in the PREP Act. Under the PREP 3 Act, a Declaration may be amended as circumstances warrant. 85 Fed. Reg. 21,012 (April 15, 4 2020). 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(4). The primary thrust of the PREP act with respect to liability 5 8 protections is as follows: Subject to the other provisions of this section, a covered person shall be immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure if a declaration under subsection (b) has been issued with respect to such countermeasure. 9 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1). 6 7 10 B. Covered Countermeasures and Federal Question 11 Ossowski’s claims derive from state tort law and specify that St. Joseph was negligent in 12 following proper safety protocols and procedures to isolate symptomatic COVID-19 patients, 13 inter alia. (ECF No. 7 at 7). St. Joseph alleges that these proper safety protocols are Covered 14 Countermeasures as provided by the PREP Act (ECF No. 10 at 7-8) and therefore valid federal 15 subject matter jurisdiction. 16 A Covered Countermeasure is defined by statute as (A) “a qualified pandemic or 17 epidemic product; (B) a security countermeasure; (C) a drug, biological product, or device 18 that is authorized for emergency use in accordance with…the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 19 Act; or (D) a respiratory protective device that is approved by the National Institute for 20 Occupational Safety and Health…and that the Secretary determines to be a priority for use 21 during a public health emergency declared under section 247d of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d 22 (emphasis added). 23 Isolation and social distancing measures are not Covered Countermeasures under a plain 24 reading of the statute. Nor have any of the subsequent HHS Secretary Declarations or 25 Amendments included these protocols as a Covered Countermeasure.4 While it is true that the 26 4 27 28 James C. Mahan U.S. District Judge See generally Amendment to Declaration under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg, 21,012 (Apr. 15, 2020); Second Amendment to the Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 35,100 (June 8, 2020); Third Amendment to the Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical -5- 1 Fourth Amendment added that Covered Countermeasures include not administering a 2 countermeasure, the necessary precondition of dealing in a Covered Countermeasure is still 3 required and is not present here. Even the most ambiguous of the above-listed Covered 4 Countermeasures—i.e. “security measures”—are defined in the statute (rather circularly) as a 5 “drug, biological product, or device.” 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b(c)(1)(B), which does not reasonably 6 equate to the practice of separating symptomatic COVID-19 patients from asymptomatic 7 patients. 8 St. Joseph avers that Ossowski is “attempt[ing] to use non-specific pleading in an attempt 9 to skirt the PREP Act.” (ECF No. 10 at 8). The court disagrees. St. Joseph does not direct the 10 court to any clear statutory language or official declarations by the HHS Secretary to support its 11 contention that isolating symptomatic COVID-19 patients is a Covered Countermeasure under 12 the PREP Act. Instead, St. Joseph points the court to an Advisory Opinion issued by the HHS 13 Office of General Counsel from January 8, 2021. 85 Fed. Reg. 21-01 (January 8, 2021). 14 St. Joseph obfuscates the clear fact that the advisory opinion “does not have the force or 15 effect of law”5 by plucking an obscure sentence in a prior HHS Secretary Amendment as 16 evidence of the advisory opinion’s “controlling weight” here.6 What St. Joseph conveniently fails 17 to convey is that the “incorporation” of advisory opinions mentioned in that amendment 18 predated the advisory opinion in question here—not to mention the potential ultra vires 19 ramifications of such an incorporation by HHS as an attempted end-run around the statutorily 20 designed, Congressionally-authorized agency powers vested in the HHS Secretary Declarations. 21 Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 52,136 (Aug. 24, 2020); Fourth Amendment to the Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19 and Republication of the Declaration, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,190 (Dec. 9, 2020); Fifth Amendment to the Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 7,872 (Feb. 2, 2021); Seventh Amendment to the Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,462 (Mar. 16, 2021); Eighth Amendment to the Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 41,977 (Aug. 4, 2021); Ninth Amendment to the Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 51,160 (Sept. 14, 2021). 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 The HHS OGC itself writes this as the final sentence of its order, as it is required to do since the statute did not grant the agency authority for advisory opinions to enjoy the force or effect of law. 6 James C. Mahan U.S. District Judge See Amendment four, at 85 Fed. Reg. at 79192, 79194). -6- 1 Furthermore, St. Joseph is incorrect that this HHS Advisory Opinion enjoys Chevron 2 deference.7 On its reading of the statute—and as far as the court is aware—Congress has not 3 delegated authority for the HHS to issue interpretations surrounding ambiguity of its own 4 declarations as carrying the force of law. Therefore, the court is required only to defer to the 5 “persuasiveness” of the agency’s interpretation under Skidmore.8 The court does not find the 6 advisory opinion to be persuasive in resolving the instant issue—primarily because the opinion 7 does not discuss the type of social distancing and isolation protocols at issue here and much of it 8 is devoted to the implementation of PPEs, which could more reasonably be construed as 9 “devices” potentially captured by a Covered Countermeasure. Here, the question concerns 10 policies and procedures employed by the nursing facility, especially surrounding the separation 11 of symptomatic COVID-19 patients. 12 13 Therefore, the court finds St. Joseph’s arguments unavailing that the HHS General Counsel’s Advisory Opinion 21-01 supports removal. 14 C. Preemption 15 Even assuming the PREP Act enjoys “complete preemption” status as a federal law, 9 it is 16 immaterial since the court finds that the COVID-19 safety protocol of separating out patients 17 who exhibit symptoms from the disease is not a Covered Countermeasure by a plain reading of 18 the statute. And if there is any ambiguity, the court resolves in favor of remand on this point. 19 Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (9th Cir.1992). 20 The Grable exception also does not apply since there are no significant federal issues 21 implicated by a state law tort claim over negligence in safety precautions of a Nevada nursing 22 facility to limit the spread of a viral disease.10 Federal question jurisdiction does not “lie over” 23 24 7 25 8 26 27 U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) to hold that “persuasiveness” is the only proper deference required for an agency interpretation (in Mead, a tariff classification via “customs ruling letter”) where there is “no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law.” 9 28 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The court does not comment on this point since it is unnecessary for the holding. 10 James C. Mahan U.S. District Judge Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). -7- 1 these state law claims just because the PREP Act exists. Id. Without more, the court is left 2 wanting for removal justification. A federal issue is neither “necessarily raised” nor “actually 3 disputed” since there is a debatable federal issue at base here—i.e. whether patient separation 4 techniques constitute a Covered Countermeasure. Id. Permitting removal in this case would 5 disrupt the Congressionally desired federal-state balance for plaintiffs to enjoy unique state law 6 causes of action for just such controversies. Id. 7 D. Federal Officer Jurisdiction 8 St. Joseph does not rebut Ossowski’s argument regarding lack of federal officer 9 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)(1), but this argument is equally unavailing. St. Joseph 10 does not operate under “specific direction of a federal officer” by virtue of complying with 11 federal law under the PREP Act. St. Joseph cherry picks authority again when citing to Watson v. 12 Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. 142 (2007). It is well established that Watson stands for the 13 proposition that a private firm’s compliance (or noncompliance) with federal laws and 14 regulations does not by itself fall within the scope of the phrase “acting under” a federal 15 “official.” Id at 143. Otherwise, a “contrary determination would expand the scope of the statute 16 considerably, potentially bringing within its scope state-court actions filed against private firms 17 in many highly regulated industries.” Id. 18 IV. Conclusion 19 Accordingly, and pursuant to the foregoing, 20 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiff Ossowski’s 21 22 23 24 25 26 motion to remand (ECF No. 7) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERD that St. Joseph’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED as moot. DATED October 6, 2021. __________________________________________ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28 James C. Mahan U.S. District Judge -8-
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