Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC v. Silverado Place Homeowners' Association et al, No. 2:2017cv01311 - Document 52 (D. Nev. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER Granting in part and Denying in part 40 Motion to Dismiss; Denying 41 Motion for Summary Judgment and 46 Motion for Summary Judgment. Status Conference set for 4/24/2019 at 1:00 PM in LV Courtroom 7C before Judge Richard F. Boulware, II. Signed by Judge Richard F. Boulware, II on 3/30/2019. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - BEL)
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Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC v. Silverado Place Homeowners&#039; Association et al Doc. 52 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 *** 7 8 CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiff, 9 10 11 12 13 v. Case No. 2:17-cv-01311-RFB-PAL ORDER SILVERADO PLACE HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION; SATICOY BAY LLC SERIES 10384 MIDSEASON MIST; DOE INDIVIDUALS I-X, inclusive, and ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive, Defendants. 14 15 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 Before the Court are Defendant Saticoy Bay LLC Series 10384 Midseason Mist.’s 18 (“Saticoy Bay’s”) Second Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 40), Plaintiff Carrington Mortgage 19 Services, LLC’s (“Carrington’s”) Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 41), and 20 Saticoy Bay’s Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 46). 21 In the complaint filed May 9, 2017, Carrington seeks quiet title/declaratory judgment and 22 injunctive relief based on allegations of wrongful foreclosure violating the federal constitution and 23 Nevada statutes. ECF No. 1. 24 For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Saticoy Bay’s 25 motion to dismiss. As to the theories not found to be foreclosed in the motion to dismiss analysis, 26 the Court denies both Carrington’s and Saticoy Bay’s motions for summary judgment. 27 /// 28 /// Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND a. Alleged Facts 3 The Court summarizes the facts alleged in Carrington’s complaint. ECF No. 1. 4 On or about January 21, 2009, Anthony J. Spradlin purchased a residential property located 5 at 10384 Midseason Mist Street, Las Vegas, Nevada (“the Property”). 6 ownership of the Property by way of a loan in the amount of $114,305.00 evidenced by a note and 7 secured by a senior deed of trust recorded March 3, 2009. Spradlin financed 8 On June 27, 2012, the Silverado Place Homeowners’ Association (“Silverado”), through 9 its agent Leach Johnson Song & Gruchow (“Leach Johnson”), recorded a Notice of Delinquent 10 Assessment Lien. Per the notice, the amount due to Silverado was $1,072.62. 11 On August 7, 2012, Silverado, through its agent Leach Johnson, recorded a Notice of 12 Default and Election to Sell to Satisfy Notice of Delinquent Assessment Lien. The notice stated 13 the amount due to Silverado was $1,850.28. 14 These recorded documents did not specify whether Silverado was foreclosing on the super- 15 priority portion of its lien, nor provided notice of the purported super-priority lien amount, where 16 to pay the amount, how to pay the amount, or the consequences for failure to do so. 17 On or about September 10, 2012, prior deed of trust beneficiary and loan servicer Bank of 18 America, N.A. offered to pay the super-priority portion of Silverado’s lien. Silverado ignored 19 Bank of America’s offer to tender and misrepresented the applicable law in response. 20 On November 21, 2013, Silverado, through its agent Leach Johnson, recorded a Notice of 21 Foreclosure Sale. The notice stated the amount due to Silverado was $4,069.95. This notice 22 similarly did not specify whether Silverado was foreclosing on the super-priority portion of its 23 lien, nor provided notice of the purported super-priority lien amount, where to pay the amount, 24 how to pay the amount, or the consequences for failure to do so. 25 26 27 Silverado foreclosed on the property on or about September 15, 2014. A foreclosure deed in favor of Saticoy was recorded September 25, 2014. On September 24, 2015, the senior deed of trust was assigned to Carrington. 28 2 b. Undisputed Facts1 1 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s alleged facts are undisputed. The Court further finds the 2 3 following facts to be undisputed. 4 Counsel for prior loan servicer and deed of trust beneficiary Bank of America, Rock Jung, 5 Esq. of Miles Bauer Bergstrom & Winters, LLP, sent Silverado, through Leach Johnson, a letter 6 dated September 10, 2012. Jung stated that Bank of America was offering to pay the nine months 7 of common assessments pre-dating the Notice of Default, but that the nine-month sum was 8 unknown. He requested presentation of adequate proof of the nine-month sum and asked that 9 Silverado refrain from taking further action to enforce the lien until the matter was resolved. 10 John E. Leach, Esq. of Leach Johnson, responded via facsimile dated September 27, 2012. 11 He represented that the nine-month super-priority is triggered by the foreclosure sale and survives 12 foreclosure. He denied a legal obligation to communicate the amount of the nine-month sum and 13 refused to state the amount of the lien until the entire balance due and owing was received. Following this communication, no monies were paid from Bank of America to Silverado. 14 c. Disputed Facts 15 16 It remains disputed whether Bank of America’s September 10, 2012 letter constitutes 17 tender of the supra-priority lien, and if so, whether Saticoy Bay was sufficiently on notice of the 18 tender. 19 III. 20 Carrington filed its Complaint on May 9, 2017. ECF No. 1. On June 26, 2017, Saticoy 21 22 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Bay filed a Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 9. 23 On October 6, 2017, the Court entered a scheduling order. ECF No. 17. On October 27, 24 2017, a clerk’s default was entered as to Silverado. ECF No. 23. Discovery closed on December 25 26, 2017. ECF No. 17. 26 27 28 The Court has divided the fact sections into “Alleged,” “Undisputed,” and “Disputed” so that analytically the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment may be considered separately with the appropriate alleged or undisputed and disputed facts. 1 3 On January 25, 2018, Saticoy Bay and Carrington each filed a Motion for Summary 1 2 Judgment. ECF Nos. 25, 26. 3 On March 23, 2018, the Court denied the three pending motions without prejudice and 4 issued a stay in the case pending the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision on a certified question of 5 law regarding NRS 116’s notice requirement in Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Star Hill Homeowners 6 Ass’n, Case No. 2:16-cv-02561-RFB-PAL. ECF No. 49. The Nevada Supreme Court published 7 an answer to the certified question on August 2, 2018. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of 8 New York Mellon, 422 P.3d 1248 (Nev. 2018). 9 On August 22, 2018, Saticoy Bay filed the instant Second Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 10 40. On August 23, 2018, Carrington filed the instant Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. 11 ECF No. 41. Also on this date, the Court lifted the stay in the case and extended the deadline for 12 dispositive motions. ECF No. 42. On September 13, 2018, Saticoy Bay filed the instant Counter- 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 46. 14 15 16 IV. LEGAL STANDARD a. Motion to Dismiss 17 In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a pleading must contain “a short 18 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 8(a)(2). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[a]ll well-pleaded allegations 20 of material fact in the complaint are accepted as true and are construed in the light most favorable 21 to the non-moving party.” Faulkner v. ADT Security Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 22 2013). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, 23 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” meaning that the court can 24 reasonably infer “that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 25 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 26 b. Motion for Summary Judgment 27 Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to 28 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no 4 1 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 2 law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When 3 considering the propriety of summary judgment, the court views all facts and draws all inferences 4 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 5 793 (9th Cir. 2014). If the movant has carried its burden, the non-moving party “must do more 6 than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the 7 record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there 8 is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (alteration in original) 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 11 12 V. DISCUSSION a. Motion to Dismiss 13 In its Renewed Motion to Dismiss, Saticoy Bay argues that Carrington fails to state a cause 14 of action upon which relief may be granted because Saticoy Bay is a bona fide purchaser of the 15 Property. The Court notes that certain of Saticoy Bay’s arguments are premised entirely on this 16 assertion that Saticoy Bay is a bona fide purchaser of the Property and not on the sufficiency of 17 Carrington’s complaint. These arguments are improper at the motion to dismiss stage but are 18 19 20 considered below to the extent they are reiterated in Saticoy Bay’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons below, the Court grants the motion on the theories foreclosed by law but permits Carrington’s claims to proceed on the theories not foreclosed. i. Equity Jurisdiction 21 Saticoy Bay argues that Carrington has no remedies available against Saticoy Bay 22 regarding the allegedly wrongful foreclosure sale because any wrongful foreclosure can be 23 compensated with money damages. The Court disagrees and finds that it has “inherent equitable 24 jurisdiction to settle title disputes.” See Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. New York 25 26 27 Cmty. Bancorp, 366 P.3d 1105, 1110–1111 (Nev. 2016). The Court possesses the power to invalidate the foreclosure sale and/or to make declarations as to the present interests in the Property, or lack thereof, held by the Parties. Carrington may seek equitable relief. 28 5 ii. Estoppel 1 2 Saticoy Bay argues that Carrington is estopped from bringing its claims by unclean hands 3 and the failure to mitigate doctrine because, according to the facts as pled in the complaint, it 4 argues that Carrington’s predecessor in interest did not pay the super-priority lien or take any 5 action whatsoever. The Court does not find any facts pleaded on the face of the complaint that support 6 7 8 9 10 11 estopping Carrington on the basis of either unclean hands or failure to mitigate. Unclean hands can prevent a plaintiff from pursing equitable relief where a “willful act” by the plaintiff “rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct.” Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945). Failure to mitigate, by contrast, is not a defense that bars suit; “[a]ny failure to mitigate goes to the amount of deficiency owed, not whether a deficiency exists.” Resolution Tr. Corp. v. BVS Dev., Inc., 42 F.3d 1206, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994). 12 In any event, construing the pleaded facts in the light most favorable to Carrington, these doctrines 13 14 do not apply. Indeed, Carrington specifically alleges that its predecessor in interest offered to pay the super-priority lien and was ignored. 15 iii. Bona Fide Purchaser 16 Saticoy Bay next argues that it is a bona fide purchaser, and that Carrington carries the 17 burden to show otherwise. A bona fide purchaser is one who “takes the property ‘for a valuable 18 consideration and without notice of the prior equity, and without notice of facts which upon 19 diligent inquiry would be indicated and from which notice would be imputed to him, if he failed 20 to make such inquiry.’” Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 1115 (citation omitted). Construing the 21 complaint in the light most favorable to Carrington, Carrington does allege that Saticoy Bay was 22 aware of alleged defects in the foreclosure sale and was therefore not a bona fide purchaser. See 23 ECF No. 1. (“The foreclosure sale did not extinguish the senior deed of trust because Saticoy does 24 not qualify as a bona fide purchaser for value, because it was aware of, or should have been aware 25 of, the existence of the senior deed of trust, Bank of America’s satisfaction of the super-priority 26 component of HOA’s lien, and the commercial unreasonableness of the HOA sale.”). Saticoy 27 Bay’s argument does not address the sufficiency of the complaint and is not a basis for granting a 28 /// 6 1 motion to dismiss. Whether or not Saticoy Bay was a bona fide purchaser is a question of fact, 2 discussed below. 3 4 5 iv. Lack of Super-Priority Requirement Saticoy Bay argues that Carrington’s quiet title claim necessarily fails to the extent Carrington alleges that the notices failed to provide the correct super-priority amount. 6 The Court agrees that the relevant notice statutes at the time the notices were issued did 7 not require any separate identification of a “super-priority” section with an amount. NRS 8 9 10 11 116.31162 only required identification of the “deficiency in payment.” Carrington alleges that the notices included the amounts due to Silverado. The notices as described in the complaint are consistent with the applicable statutory requirement. The Court further agrees that, on the face of Carrington’s complaint, the notices provided did not deprive Carrington of due process under the federal constitution. Before a state takes any 12 13 14 15 16 17 action that will adversely “affect an interest in life, liberty, or property . . . , a State must provide ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795 (1983) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). “The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, . . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their 18 appearance.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (citations and quotations omitted). And “if with due regard 19 for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the 20 constitutional requirements are satisfied.” Id. 21 Based on the facts alleged, Carrington’s predecessor in interest received actual and 22 constructive notice of Silverado’s lien and Silverado’s intent to sell the property long before 23 Silverado took any action to foreclose upon the its lien. Indeed, Carrington alleges that its 24 predecessor in interest actually communicated with Silverado and offered to pay the super-priority 25 portion of the lien. This occurred after the Notice of Default and Election to Sell to Satisfy Notice 26 of Delinquent Assessment Lien but well before the actual sale of the property. Carrington cannot 27 therefore claim in this case that it did not receive notice of the existence of Silverado’s lien and its 28 intended sale of the property. 7 Therefore, to the extent Carrington’s claim is based on lack of actual notice of the 1 2 foreclosure sale, Carrington’s claim is not plausible on its face and is dismissed. v. Tender 3 Saticoy Bay argues that the facts alleged in Carrington’s complaint do not constitute proper 4 5 tender. 6 Pursuant to NRS 116.31162, a homeowner has at least 90 days following notice to pay off 7 the prior nine months of unpaid HOA dues and maintenance and nuisance-abatement charges – 8 9 10 constituting the HOA’s super-priority lien – before an HOA may proceed to foreclosure sale. See NRS 116.31162; SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 411 (Nev. 2014). Tender does not always require the successful payment of actual money. Rather, “[a] tender is an offer to perform a condition or obligation, coupled with the present ability of immediate performance, so 11 that if it were not for the refusal of cooperation by the party to whom tender is made, the condition 12 13 14 15 16 17 or obligation would be immediately satisfied.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 420 P.3d 559 at *1 (Nev. 2018) (unpublished) (citation omitted). Carrington alleges in its complaint that its predecessor in interest attempted to tender payment but was ignored. The Court therefore finds that Carrington’s allegation, construed in the light most favorable to Carrington, supports satisfaction of tender. Saticoy Bay further argues that tender had to be recorded to be legally effective and was not. It is unclear why a rejected tender 18 would be required to be recorded, but even if this were true as a matter of law, whether or not the 19 alleged attempted tender was recorded is a question of fact indeterminable on the face of the 20 complaint. 21 vi. Commercial Reasonableness 22 Saticoy Bay argues that Carrington’s allegation that the sale was not commercially 23 reasonable fails as a basis to set aside the sale as a matter of law. The Court agrees. NRS Chapter 24 116 does not contain any provisions requiring that an HOA foreclosure sale be commercially 25 reasonable, nor does it provide for parties to be able to set aside foreclosure sales as being 26 commercially unreasonable. Chapter 116 does require that “[e]very contract or duty governed by 27 this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.” NRS 28 116.1113. “Good faith” is defined in the Nevada Revised Statutes as meaning “honesty in fact 8 1 and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” NRS 104.1201(t). This 2 definition only applies, however, to the extent that an action is governed by another article of the 3 Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) as adopted in Nevada. NRS 104.1102. The Nevada 4 Supreme Court has clearly held that HOA foreclosure sales are not governed by the commercial 5 reasonableness standard of the UCC as adopted in Nevada: “we hold that [commercial 6 reasonableness] has no applicability in the context of an HOA foreclosure involving the sale of 7 8 9 10 real property. As to the Restatement’s 20-percent standard, we clarify that Shadow Wood did not overturn this court’s longstanding rule that inadequacy of price, however gross, is not in itself a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee's sale absent additional proof of some element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression as accounts for and brings about the inadequacy of price.” Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 405 P.3d 641, 642–43 (Nev. 2017) 11 (internal citations omitted). 12 13 14 15 16 Therefore, to the extent Carrington’s claim is based on the alleged commercial unreasonableness of the sale, Carrington’s claim is not plausible on its face and is dismissed. vii. Constitutionality of NRS Chapter 116 Saticoy Bay argues that the Nevada Supreme Court has expressly rejected Carrington’s argument that NRS Chapter 116 is facially unconstitutional. 17 The Court agrees that Carrington’s facial constitutionality argument is foreclosed by 18 Nevada Supreme Court case law. In Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, the 19 Ninth Circuit held that the opt-in notice scheme outlined in NRS Chapter 116 did not meet the 20 minimum requirements of constitutional due process and that NRS 116.31168 did not incorporate 21 the notice requirements of NRS 107.090. 22 denied, 137 S. Ct. 2296 (2017). This holding was based upon the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 23 Nevada’s statutory scheme under NRS Chapter 116 as an “opt-in” notice statutory scheme. 24 Importantly, the Nevada Supreme Court had not yet had a direct opportunity to construe the 25 applicable statutes. The Nevada Supreme Court thereafter held that NRS 116.31168 incorporated 26 the notice requirements of NRS 107.090. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of New York 27 Mellon, 422 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Nev. 2018). Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court found notice to be 28 mandatory to interest holders like Carrington. Id. As the Nevada Supreme Court had not 832 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. 9 1 previously had an opportunity to explicitly construe the respective state statutes in terms of their 2 notice requirements and as the Nevada Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the construction of 3 Nevada statutes, this Court must follow the Nevada Supreme Court’s interpretation of Nevada 4 statutes in this case. California Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th 5 Cir. 2001) (explaining that “it is solely within the province of the state courts to authoritatively 6 construe state legislation”); Owen By & Through Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461, 1464 (9th 7 Cir. 1983) (noting that Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of state law is only binding to the extent there 8 9 10 is no subsequent indication from the state court that the interpretation was incorrect). This Court has previously found consistent with the Nevada Supreme Court’s interpretation of Nevada law that NRS 107.090 as incorporated by the Nevada HOA lien statute satisfies due process requirements. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 200 F. Supp. 3d 11 1141, 1160–61 (D. Nev. 2016). The Court incorporates that prior reasoning by reference. Based 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 upon the holding of the Nevada Supreme Court in SFR Investments Pool 1 and this Court’s prior analysis, the Court finds that Nevada’s statutory scheme in NRS Chapter 116 does not violate due process. Therefore, to the extent Carrington’s claim is based on the facial unconstitutionality of NRS Chapter 116, Carrington’s claim is not plausible on its face and is dismissed. b. Motions for Summary Judgment Saticoy Bay and Carrington have each moved for summary judgment in its favor. The Court incorporates by reference its dispositive analyses above as to equity jurisdiction, commercial unreasonableness, constitutionality of notice, and facial constitutionality of NRS Chapter 116. 21 Remaining at issue in the parties’ competing motions for summary judgment are whether 22 Carrington’s predecessor in interest tendered and thereby extinguished Silverado’s super-priority 23 lien and whether Saticoy Bay is a bona fide purchaser of the Property. 24 The super-priority component of an HOA lien consists of “the last nine months of unpaid 25 HOA dues and maintenance and nuisance-abatement charges,” while the sub-priority component 26 consists of “all other HOA fees and assessments.” SFR, 334 P.3d at 411. As explained above, 27 pursuant to NRS 116.31162, a homeowner has at least 90 days following notice to pay off the 28 10 1 HOA’s super-priority lien before an HOA may proceed to foreclosure sale. See NRS 116.31162; 2 SFR, 334 P.3d at 411. 3 Saticoy Bay argues that a mere request for information does not qualify as tender. But 4 “tender is an offer to perform a condition or obligation, coupled with the present ability of 5 immediate performance, so that if it were not for the refusal of cooperation by the party to whom 6 tender is made, the condition or obligation would be immediately satisfied.” Bank of Am., 420 7 P.3d 559 at *1. Here, Bank of America expressed in its letter an offer to pay the amount of the 8 super-priority lien in addition to inquiring what the amount was. The Court finds that whether 9 Bank of America’s letter constituted tender remains a disputed material fact. 10 The Court also finds that the issue of the tender in this case and the parties’ conduct and 11 correspondence surrounding the tender create the possibility that Carrington may prevail on its 12 equitable claim for setting aside the foreclosure sale in this case. See Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 13 1111–12. The Nevada Supreme Court in Shadow Wood held that a foreclosure sale may be set 14 aside on equitable grounds if there is “fraud, unfairness or oppression.” Id. The Court finds that 15 there are genuine issues of disputed fact regarding this equitable claim that must be decided by a 16 trial. 17 Additionally, to the extent Bank of America may have tendered, the Court finds that a 18 genuine issue remains as to whether Saticoy Bay constitutes a bona fide purchaser of the Property. 19 A bona fide purchaser is one who “takes the property ‘for a valuable consideration and without 20 notice of the prior equity, and without notice of facts which upon diligent inquiry would be 21 indicated and from which notice would be imputed to him, if he failed to make such inquiry.’” Id. 22 at 1115 (quoting Bailey v. Butner, 176 P.2d 226, 234 (Nev. 1947). Saticoy Bay argues that even 23 24 25 26 27 if the letter at issue constituted tender, Saticoy Bay was a bona fide purchaser because it was not on notice of the unrecorded tender. Carrington argues that the publicly-recorded deed of trust put Saticoy Bay on inquiry notice that the lender could pay the HOA assessments, creating a duty to inquire. Whether diligent inquiry would have revealed tender and the resultant extinguishment of Silverado’s super-priority lien, if applicable, is a question of fact for trial. 28 11 1 2 3 VI. CONCLUSION IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Saticoy Bay’s Second Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 40) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as detailed above. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as to the legal theories that remain after the dismissal 5 of claims, Carrington’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 41) and Saticoy Bay’s 6 Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 46) are both DENIED as explained. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a status conference is set in this case for April 24, 2019 8 at 1:00 PM in LV Courtroom 7C. 9 DATED: March 30, 2019. 10 ______________________________ RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRCIT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12
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