Snider v. United States of America, No. 4:2009cv01171 - Document 33 (E.D. Mo. 2011)
Court Description: OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Vacate, Set aside or Correct Sentence, [Doc. 1], is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court will not issue a Certificate of Appealability as Movant has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right.A separate judgment is entered this same date. 1 Signed by Honorable Henry E. Autrey on 12/20/11. (CLA)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION NORIEL K. SNIDER, Movant, vs. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 4:09CV1171 HEA OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Movant s Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by a Person in Federal Custody, [Doc. No. 1]. Pursuant to this Court s Order, the government has responded to the motion. Movant has also filed Supplements to his Motion, [Doc. No.'s 5 and 6 ]. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion under § 2255 is denied without a hearing. Movant s Claims Movant claims that his attorney was ineffective during the plea agreement phase of his case, as well as during the sentencing phase. Facts and Background Movant was indicted on two counts of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base on September 22, 2004. Movant was also indicted on one count of felon in possession of a firearm. On January 28, 2005, Movant plead guilty to one count, pursuant to a written plea agreement. The government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment at the time of sentencing. Specifically, the Plea Agreement provided, inter alia: The defendant has been fully apprised by defense counsel of the defendant's rights concerning appeal and fully understands the right to appeal the sentence under Title 18, United States Cod, Section 3742. However, in the event the Court accepts the plea, as part of this agreement, both the defendant and the government hereby waive all rights to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues including, but not limited to, any issues relating to pre-trial motions, hearings and discovery and any issues relating to the negotiation, taking or acceptance of the guilty pea or the factual basis for the plea. The parties also agree to waive the right to appeal whatever sentence is imposed, including any issues relating to the establishment of the Criminal History Category determined by the Court, except the parties reserve the right to appeal any issue relating to a sentence that is above or below the Guidelines range that results from a combination of the Criminal History Category determined by the Court and the Total Offense Level recommended by the parties in this document. Movant appeared in open court on January 28, 2005, at which time he formally entered his plea of guilty to Count I. The Court reviewed the terms of the plea agreement and questioned Movant as to his understanding thereof. The Court questioned Movant as to counsel s representation. Movant admitted in open court that he was fully satisfied with counsel s representation, that he understood the terms of the plea agreement, that counsel had performed all tasks and investigation requested of him, that he was entering into the plea agreement of his own free will and that it was what he wanted to do. At no time did Movant voice any dissatisfaction with defense counsel, nor did he raise any questions with respect to any of the terms of the plea agreement. -2- Standards for Relief Under 28 U.S.C. 2255 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may seek relief from a sentence imposed against him on the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or law of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Claims brought under § 2255 may also be limited by procedural default. A Movant cannot raise a nonconstitutional or nonjurisdictional issue in a § 2255 motion if the issue could have been raised on direct appeal but was not. Anderson v. United States, 25 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Belford v. United States, 975 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1992)). Furthermore, even constitutional or jurisdictional claims not raised on direct appeal cannot be raised collaterally in a § 2255 motion unless a petitioner can demonstrate (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice or (2) actual innocence. United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998)). Claims based on a federal statute or rule, rather than on a specific constitutional guarantee, can be raised on collateral review only if the alleged error constituted a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994)(quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 477 n. 10 (1962)). -3- The Court must hold an evidentiary hearing to consider claims in a § 2255 motion unless the motion, files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. Shaw v. United States, 24 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1994)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Thus, a [movant] is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when the facts alleged, if true, would entitle [movant] to relief. Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996)(quoting Wade v. Armontrout, 798 F.2d 304, 306 (8th Cir. 1986)). The Court may dismiss a claim without an evidentiary hearing if the claim is inadequate on its face or if the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which it is based. Shaw, 24 F.3d at 1043. Since the Court finds that Movant s claims can be conclusively determined based upon the parties filings and the records of the case, no evidentiary hearing will be necessary. Discussion Waiver Plea bargaining does not violate the Constitution, even though a guilty plea waives important constitutional rights. Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393, (1987). It is well-settled that a defendant may affirmatively waive particular constitutional rights. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (right to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) -4- (right to counsel). Movant waived his rights to appeal certain issues by reason of his guilty plea. By pleading guilty, Movant waived all non-jurisdictional issues. United States v. Limley, 510 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2007). When a defendant waives his appeal in a plea agreement, the waiver will be enforced if it was knowingly and voluntarily made. DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Goings, 200 F.3d 539, 543 (8th Cir.2000)). Plea agreements that include appeal waivers are enforceable. See United States v. Clayborn, 249 F.App x. 495 (8th Cir. 2007). Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel It is well-established that a petitioner s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is properly raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct appeal. United States v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir.2006); United States v. Cordy, 560 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2009). The burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel is on a defendant. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984); United States v. White, 341 F.3d 673, 678 (8th Cir.2003). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a convicted defendant must first show counsel s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). The defendant must also establish prejudice by showing there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been -5- different. Id., at 694. Both parts of the Strickland test must be met in order for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to succeed. Anderson v. United States, 393 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 882 (2005). The first part of the test requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. Review of counsel s performance by the court is highly deferential, and the Court presumes counsel s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. The court does not second-guess trial strategy or rely on the benefit of hindsight, id., and the attorney s conduct must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness to be found ineffective, United States v. Ledezma-Rodriguez, 423 F.3d 830, 836 (2005). If the underlying claim (i.e., the alleged deficient performance) would have been rejected, counsel's performance is not deficient. Carter v. Hopkins, 92 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir.1996). Courts seek to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight by examining counsel s performance from counsel s perspective at the time of the alleged error. Id. The second part of the Strickland test requires that the movant show that he was prejudiced by counsel s error, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Anderson, 393 F.3d at 753-54 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at -6- 694). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. When determining if prejudice exists, the court must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Id. at 695; Williams v. U.S., 452 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (8th Cir. 2006). The first prong of the Strickland test, that of attorney competence, is applied in the same manner to guilty pleas as it is to trial convictions. The prejudice prong, however, is different in the context of guilty pleas. Instead of merely showing that the result would be different, the defendant who has pled guilty must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Matthews v. United States, 114 F.3d 114. Where a defendant raises multiple claims of ineffective assistance, each claim of ineffective assistance must be examined independently rather than collectively. Hall v. Luebbers,296 F.3d 385, 692-693 (8th Cir.2002); Griffin v. Delo, 33 F.3d 895, 903-904 (8th Cir.1994). It is well established that entry of an unconditional guilty plea waives all challenges to the prosecution of a criminal case, except for those related to jurisdiction. See Smith v. United States, 876 F.2d 655, 657 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989). Once a defendant enters a guilty plea, collateral attack under -7- § 2255 is limited to the nature of counsel s advice and the voluntariness of the plea. Bass v. United States, 739 F.2d 405, 406 (8th Cir.1984) (citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973)). Collateral review of a guilty plea is therefore ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). Movant contends that counsel was ineffective because he allowed Movant to be deprived of his "Liberty" without properly being afforded Due Process of Law. According to Movant, it is a known fact that the underlying Missouri Revised Statute Code, § 195.020 was repealed in 1989. Movant's argument is without merit. Section 109 of Title 1 of the United States Code provides: The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. The expiration of a temporary statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the temporary statute shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. Thus, Movant may not rely on a repeal of the Missouri statute upon which his predicate convictions were based as a source of this Court's determination that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Movant's Due Process rights were -8- violated. Movant also argues that his conviction for "delivery" of a controlled substance does not equate with "distribution" of a controlled substance in order to qualify for a prior "controlled substance offense." Without determining whether or not Movant's distinction is meritorious, Movant is unable to raise this argument based on his unequivocal assurances to the Court that he was fully satisfied with the work his attorney had done for him in the proceedings. This objection to the classification of Movant's prior offenses was not raised at the time of sentencing, even though Movant was given the opportunity to raise any objections at that time. Movant once again raises the issue of the disparity between the previous sentencing guidelines regarding crack cocaine and cocaine powder. This Court has previously denied Movant's Motion to Reduce his sentence based on the amendment to the sentencing guideline in this regard by reason of Movant's ineligibility for retroactive application because of his Career Criminal status. Since Movant was ineligible, his current argument is likewise without merit. Conclusion Movant s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are groundless, as set forth herein. Movant s motion will be denied in its entirety. Certificate of Appealablity -9- The federal statute governing certificates of appealability provides that [a] certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right requires that issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings. Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997). Based on the record, and the law as discussed herein, the Court finds that Movant has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Vacate, Set aside or Correct Sentence, [Doc. 1], is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court will not issue a Certificate of Appealability as Movant has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right. A separate judgment is entered this same date. Dated this 20th day of December, 2011. _______________________________ HENRY EDWARD AUTREY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE - 10 -
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