Freeman v. Steele, No. 4:2009cv00008 - Document 84 (E.D. Mo. 2014)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner's "Motion to Correct Clerk Error" [Doc. #2], which this Court liberally construes as a motion to administratively close this case and transfer petitioners "Motion for R elief of Final Judgment Under Rule 60(b)" [Doc. #1] to the underlying habeas corpus case, is GRANTED IN PART.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioners "Motion for Relief of Final Judgment Under Rule 60(b)" [Doc. #1] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJ UDICE subject to refiling a revised motion in accordance with this order in his underlying habeas corpus action, Freeman v. Steele, 4:09CV0008 JCH (E.D.Mo.).IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall administratively close this case and shall file a copy of this Memorandum and Order in petitioners underlying habeas corpus action, Freeman v. Steele, 4:09CV0008 JCH (E.D.Mo.). Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on March 4, 2014. (MCB)

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habeas proceedings.” Id. at 532. Rule 60 motions challenging the denial of habeas relief are subject to the restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions if the prisoner is attempting to either raise a new ground for relief or attack a federal court's previous resolution of a claim on the merits. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530-32 (2005). 3 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), qualifies as “any other reason” justifying relief from the earlier judgment. In Martinez, the Court held that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may constitute “cause” necessary to excuse a procedural default. 132 S.Ct. at 1311. In light of the Martinez decision, petitioner appears to argue that this court should reconsider its previous ruling rejecting certain of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In his motion before the Court, petitioner asserts that his case should be reopened for reconsideration of a previous procedural default ruling on what appears to be two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, petitioner has failed to fully identify each of the claims for which he is seeking relief under Rule 60, such that the Court can easily discern which of his claims are perhaps second or successive, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), and were fully addressed, on the merits, by this Court or another court in a prior ruling.2 Moreover, petitioner has not asserted any basis justifying relief under Rule 60 regarding the other claims for which he is requesting relief. Rather, he has identified them under the heading of “newly discovered evidence” in his supplemental brief, which is not usually a basis for granting relief under Rule 60. Petitioner glosses over this “gatekeeping requirement” in his motion before the Court. But a Court must ensure that the requirements under § 2244(b)(1) are satisfied prior to undertaking any analysis under Rule 60. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005); Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 2009). 2 4 See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531 (noting that a claim is successive if it is proposing to bring forth “newly discovered evidence” and cannot be addressed under Rule 60). If petitioner wishes to proceed on these claims, he must revise and refile the Rule 60(b) motion. Any revised motion must be filed using the case number of the prior habeas corpus action, and must identify each and every claim he wishes to pursue before this Court under Rule 60, as well as his reasons for doing so under the Rule, and he should identify whether said claim was addressed in his direct appeal, post-conviction relief motions/appeals, prior habeas review and/or appellate review of his federal habeas corpus petition. Petitioner should do this for each and every claim he wishes to bring before this Court in his Rule 60 motion, and the claims and their arguments supporting each claim should be filed in separate paragraphs for ease of reference by the Court. In this way, the Court will be able to ascertain which, if any, of petitioner’s claims are barred as second or successive claims under § 2244.3 Last, petitioner must address in his motion, with proper evidentiary support, if necessary, whether there are “extraordinary circumstances” at work in the present case, to justify the reopening of his final judgment denying habeas corpus relief. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535. In addition to the aforementioned, and to the extent petitioner’s arguments are brought under Martinez v. Ryan, petitioner should also address, for each separate claim, his arguments regarding “the substantial showing of a denial of constitutional right” as required by Martinez. 132 S.Ct. at 1318. 3 5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s “Motion to Correct Clerk Error” [Doc. #2], which this Court liberally construes as a motion to administratively close this case and transfer petitioner’s “Motion for Relief of Final Judgment Under Rule 60(b)” [Doc. #1] to the underlying habeas corpus case, is GRANTED IN PART. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner’s “Motion for Relief of Final Judgment Under Rule 60(b)” [Doc. #1] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE subject to refiling a revised motion in accordance with this order in his underlying habeas corpus action, Freeman v. Steele, 4:09CV0008 JCH (E.D.Mo.). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall administratively close this case and shall file a copy of this Memorandum and Order in petitioner’s underlying habeas corpus action, Freeman v. Steele, 4:09CV0008 JCH (E.D.Mo.). CATHERINE D. PERRY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Dated this 4th day of March, 2014. 6

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