Pugh v. Thigpen et al, No. 4:2019cv00013 - Document 46 (N.D. Miss. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Senior Judge Glen H. Davidson on 9/29/20. (jla)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Pugh v. Thigpen et al Doc. 46 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI GREENVILLE DIVISION BRANDON PUGH(# 165014) PLAINTIFF No. 4:19CV13-GHD-RP v. LT. EDWARD THIGPEN LT. TONY FOSTER DEPUTY WARDEN LEE SIMON ASSOCIATE WARDEN MRS. STURDEVANT DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter comes before the comt on the prose prisoner complaint of Brandon Pugh, who challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the comt notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed this suit. The plaintiff has brought the instant case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal cause of action against "[e]ve1y person" who under color of state authority causes the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants denied him adequate medical care for a leg injmy and placed him in a cell with unsanitmy conditions. The defendants have moved for summmy judgment; the plaintiff has not responded, and the deadline to do so has expired. The matter is ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion for summmy judgment will be granted, and judgment will be entered for the defendants. Summary Judgment Standard Summmy judgment is appropriate if the "materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatmy answers, or other materials" show Dockets.Justia.com that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) and (c)(1). "The moving party must show that if the evidentiaty material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden." Beck v. Texas State Bd ofDental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)). After a proper motion for summaty judgment is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to set fmth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen v. Rapides Parish School Bd, 204 F.3d 619,621 (5th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Substantive law determines what is material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entty of sunm1a1y judgment. Factual disputes that are irre1evat1t or unnecessaty will not be counted." Id, at 248. If the non-movant sets fmth specific facts in suppmt of allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving patty, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. h1dus. Co. v. Zenith Radio C01p., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); Federal Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5°' Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Allen, 204 F.3d at 621; PYCA Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management Dist., 177 F.3d 351, 161 (5°' Cir. 1999); Bane One Capital Partners C01p. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir. 1995). However, this is so only when there is "an actual controversy, that is, when both - 2- pmiies have submitted evidence of contradictmy facts." Little v. Liquid Air Cmp., 37 F.3d I 069, I 075 (5 1h Cir. 1994); see Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427,432 (5tl' Cir. 1998). In the absence of proof, the court does not "assume that the nmm1oving party could or would prove the necessaty facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted). The very purpose of summmy judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Advismy Conm1ittee Note to the 1963 Amendments to Rule 56. Indeed, "[t]he amendment is not intended to derogate from the solemnity of the pleadings[;] [r]ather, it recognizes that despite the best effmis of counsel to make his pleadings accurate, they may be overwhelmingly contradicted by the proof available to his adversmy." Id The non-moving patiy (the plaintiff in this case), must come fotward with proof to suppmi each element of his claim. The plaintiff catmot meet this burden with "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd Zenith Radio Co!JJ., 475 U.S. 574,586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986), "conclusmy allegations," Lz!fan National Wildlifo Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 871-73, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3180 (1990), "unsubstantiated assetiions," Frank, 16 F.3d 92 (5tl1 Cir. 1994), or by a mere "scintilla" of evidence, Davis Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082 (5tl' Cir. 1994). It would undermine the purposes of sunmmty judgment if a pmiy could defeat such a motion simply by "replac[ing] conclusmy allegations of the complaint or a11swer with conclusmy allegations ofat1 affidavit." Lujan v. National Wildlifo Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177,3188 (1990). In considering a motion for summaty judgment, a court must determine whether the nonmoving pm·ty's allegations are plausible. Matsushita, supra. (emphasis added). "[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing comi to draw on its experience at1d cmmnon sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) - 3- (discussing plausibility of claim as a requirement to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). In considering a motion for summary judgment, once the comt "has determined the relevant set of facts and drawn all inferences in favor of the nonmoving patty to the extent supportable by the record, [the ultimate decision becomes] purely a question oflaw." Scoff v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (emphasis in original). "When opposing patties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a comt should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on the motion for summaty judgment." Id. at 380. Undisputed Material Facts Brandon Pugh, an inmate with the Mississippi Depattment of Corrections ("MDOC"), filed suit regm·ding alleged constitutionally inadequate medical care and conditions he has experienced while incarcerated at the Mississippi State Penitentiaty at Parchman, Mississippi ("MSP"). [I] Compl. Mr. Pugh seeks injunctive relief as well as compensatoty and punitive damages. [I] at I 0 (CMIECF Pagination). On July 16,2019, he gave sworn testimony clarifYing his claims against the defendants at a Spears 1 hearing. On December 12, 2019, he filed a [23] Notice of Change of Address indicating that he was transferred to the Wilkinson County Correctional Facility ("WCCF"). The factual basis for Mr. Pugh's claims is set fotth in the Magistrate Judge's Repot1 and Recommendation: On Friday July 27,2018, in Unit 29-H, Brm1don Pugh got down fi·om the top bunk, lost his balance, fell on his locker box, and cut his leg. He showed his leg to the security staff, who notified a guard named "Honorable" and Lt. Thigpen. Pugh yelled for Lt. Thigpen, who came to see and said, "Medical will come get you after shift 1 Spears v. McCof/er, 766 F.2d 179 (5 111 Cir. 1985). -4- change." He waited fi:om 4:58p.m. until shift change, but medical did not come see him. At 6:20a.m. on Saturday, Pugh was still waiting, and his leg had begun to swell. Lt. Foster came to Unit 29-L that day, saw the plaintiff's leg, and said he would report the injmy to medical, but he did not do so. Mr. Pugh repeatedly informed medical staff that he needed medical attention. He filed numerous sick call request forms, but he was not taken to medical for treatment. He saw Nurse Thompson on August 29, 2018 (about a month after he cut his leg, which had begun to turn black). A response to one of his sick call requests was that he was "placed on the Sick Call list for pick up on November 2, 2018." l-Ie did not go to medical until February 2019 (about seven months after his injmy occurred), when he saw a doctor and received pain medication. He never received a tetanus shot. His wound healed, but left a sunken scar on his leg. Pugh also alleges that his unit is filthy and infested with rats. No one cleans the toilet, and prison officials have provided chemicals for cleaning only tlu·ee times in the last year. [40] Report and Recommendation at 1-2. A review of Mr. Pugh's medical records in this matter, however, reveals a ve1y different chronology ofllis treatment after falling from his bm1k. On August 8, 2018, Mr. Pugh saw Nurse Juanita Thomas for a complaint of headaches and a cut to his left leg. (MDOC-PUGH-000280 through MDOC-PUGH-000281 ). The examination revealed a healing laceration to the lower left leg with no evidence of infection. (MDOC-PUGH-000281). Mr. Pugh submitted a Medical Service Request ("MSR") form on November 5, 2018, regarding a rash on his right leg and head. (MDOC-PUGH-000535). He also submitted an MSR regarding his left leg on November 9, 2018, and was seen by Nurse Calvin Stewmt for both requests on November 25, 2018. (MDOC-PUGH-000543; -000536). When Nurse Stewmt exmnined Mr. Pugh, she noted that there was a flat, d1y rash on his left leg, and there was no drainage or infection noted. (MDOC-PUGH-000329-330). He was given hydrocortisone cream for the rash. (MDOCPUGH-000330). The cou1t notes that Mr. Pugh continued to see medical providers between the August 8 and November 9 appointments: August 14, 2018, MSR regarding !lis right leg, seen on August 29, 2018 - 5- (MDOC-PUGH-000517); August 24, 2018, MSR regarding dental care, seen on August 29, 2018 (MDOC-PUGH-000518);August 24,2018, MSRregarding his head, seen onAugust29, 2018 (MDOC-PUGH-000519); August 30, 2018, MSR regarding his headaches, seen on October 11, 2018 (MDOC-PUGH-000528); September 22, 2018, MSR regarding his crawling sensations and sleep disturbances, seen on September 25, 2018 (MDOC-PUGH-000523). He did not mention the injmy to his left leg during these visits. He submitted another Medical Service Request Form on December 21, 2018, requesting to see a doctor about his head and his leg. (MDOC-PUGH-000543). He stated that he wanted a tetanus shot and that his scalp had been draining. (MDOC-PUGH-000335). On December 26, 2018, Mr. Pugh saw Angela Brown, APN-BC, regarding these complaints. !d. Nurse Brown noted that his scalp had folds, but was negative for scabs or drainage. !d. She also noted that his left leg had two abrasions with hyperpigmentation but there was no infection or edema in the legs. !d. Nurse Brown ordered a tetanus shot for Mr. Pugh, along with lab tests and an X-ray for his tibia and fibula. (MDOC-PUGH000336). On December 29, 2018, Pugh saw Nurse Thomas as a follow-up. (MDOC-PUGH000340). On that visit, Mr. Pugh stated that he had also received antibiotics. !d. Lab tests results were completed on January 4, 2019, and his leg was x-rayed on Februmy 15,2019. (MDOC-PUGH000343-344; -000364). Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Injunctive Relief Mr. Pugh has requested that he be moved away from Unit 29 because he fears reprisals from Lt. Thigpen; he also requests a court order for MDOC to improve the conditions in Unit 29. His trm1sfer to the Wilkinson County Correctional Facility, however, has rendered his requests moot: The transfer of a prisoner out of an institution often will render his claims for injunctive relief moot. [The plaintiff], howevet; argues that his alleged constitutional violations are capable of repetition yet evading review. - 6- [A plaintiff] must show either a demonstrated probability or a reasonable expectation that he would be transferred back to [the prison where the incidents occurred] or released and reincarcerated there. Oliver Scalf, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (Stl' Cir. 2002) (intemal citations, quotations, and footnotes omitted). In this case the plaintiff has not made such an argument, and the court finds his requests for injunctive reliefto be moot. Qualified Immunity In addition, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity regarding the allegations in the present suit. "Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818, 102 S.Ct. 2727,73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To overcome the qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must meet a two-pronged test. He must first allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 434 (5 111 Cir. 2003); CityC!fHouston, 161 F.3d 834,836-37 (Stl' Cir.1998). "To be 'clearly established' for purposes of qualified immunity, '[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."' Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503,524 (5tl' Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In addition to alleging the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, a plaintiff must also allege facts showing that the defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable in the light of the law established at the time of the incident. Heitschmidt, 161 F.3d at 836-37. Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In this case, Mr. Pugh has not shown that the defendants were plainly incompetent or that they -7- knowingly violated the law. The comt will discuss how qualified immunity applies to each of Mr. Pugh's allegations below. Denial of Adequate Medical Care In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must allege facts which demonstrate "deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners [which] constitutes 'unnecessaty and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment ... whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors or prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care .... " Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 260 (1976); Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91,91 (5°' Cir. 1992). The test for establishing deliberate indifference is one of"subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Under this standard, a state actor may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless plaintiff alleges facts which, if tme, would establish that the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to irunate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts fi·om which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." I d. at 83 8. Only in exceptional circumstances may a comt infer knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm by its obviousness. Id. Negligent conduct by prison officials does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986), Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986). In cases such as this, arising fi·om delayed medical attention rather than a cleat· denial of medical attention, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered substantial harm resulting fi·om the delay in order to state a claim for a civil rights violation. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 193 (5 111 Cir. 1993); Campbell v. McMillin, 83 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Miss. 2000). A prisoner's mere disagreement with medical treatment provided by prison officials does not state a claim against the - 8- prison for violation of the Eighth Amendment by deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Gibbs v. Grimme/fe, 254 F.3d 545 (5tl' Cir.2001), Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286,292 (5tl' Cir. 1997). "Deliberate indifference is not established when medical records indicate that [the plaintiff! was afforded extensive medical care by prison officials." Brauner v. Coody, 793 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2015). Nor is it established by a physician not accommodating a prisoner's requests in a manner he desired or the prisoner's disagreement with the treatment. !d.; Miller v. Wayback House, 253 F. App'x 399, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). To meet his burden in establishing deliberate indifference on the part of medical staff, the plaintiff"must show that [medical staff! refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs." Brauner, 793 F.3d at 498. In tllis case, Mr. Pugh's medical records reveal that he received medical treatment on an ongoing basis. The evidence shows that he saw a nurse on August 8, 2018, twelve days after sustahling !lis injuries, for a complaint regarding the cut to his left leg, and the examination revealed a healing laceration to the lower left leg with no evidence of infection. He later saw a nurse about a rash on his leg and was given medication. He also received a tetanus shot, antibiotics, lab tests, and an Xray for his tibia and fibula resulting from left leg complaints. Indeed, it appears that he was examined and treated each time he filed a medical request fonn. Thus, !lis various examhmtions, medications, lab tests, and x-rays undermine his claim of deliberate indifference. Mr. Pugh also appears to claim that someone should have taken him to medical in the absence of his filing a medical request form. However, requiring a prisoner to submit his non-emergency complaints to the correct department (in tllis case, the medical depat1ment) in accordance with the - 9- applicable jail procedures does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Haddix v. Burris, No. C-12-1674, 2013 WL 2950655, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2013) ("[P]rison officials may require inmates to comply with regulations that have established procedures for recurring issues without violating an inmate's constitutional rights."); see also Green Guid1y, Civ. Action No. 19-12052, 2019 WL 5540959, at *9 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2019) ("Here, jail officials did not ignore plaintiff's need for medical care; rather, they simply instructed him that he must submit a formal request for medical care in accordance with the jail's procedures. Requiring such a request does not violate an inmate's right to medical care."), adopted, 2019 WL 5538065 (E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2019); Alexander Texas Department ofCriminal Justice, Civ. Action No. H-16-3520, 2017 WL 5749548, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2017) ("[Prisoner]'s allegation that a nurse practitioner told him to submit a sick call request to see a physician about his need for pain medication does not establish that he was denied care with the requisite deliberate indifference for purposes of stating a claim under the Eighth Amendment."); Curtis Gonzales, Civ. Action No. SA-09-CV-0911, 2010 WL 3928521, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 201 0) (Nowak, M.J.) ("Rather than ignore [the prisoner]'s complaints, [prison] employees instmcted [the prisoner] to comply with prison procedures for seeking medical treatment. Such conduct does not evince a wanton disregard for a serious medical need.") (adopted by Garcia, J., on December 10, 2010); Epps, No. 4:04CV168, 2007 WL4287712, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 4, 2007). Mr. Pugh's leg injmy does not rise to the level of a serious medical condition. It healed on its own without infection, and he visited medical five times between August 8, 2018, and November 9, 20 I 8, but never complained about his leg injmy during any of those visits. The Constitution guarantees prisoners "only adequate, not optimal medical care." Spriggins v. LaRavia, 2012 WL 1135845, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2012), citing Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339,349 (5u' Cir. 2006). Medical records showing sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an inmate's - 10- allegations of deliberate indifference. Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995). A delay which does not aggravate or exacerbate the medical condition does not constitute a constitutional violation. Martin 1( Gentile, 849 F.2d 863,871 (4th Cir. 1988). A "delay in medical care can only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation ifthere has been deliberate indifference, which results in substantial harm." Id. at 195. However, "the decision whether to provide additional treatment 'is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment.'" Domino 1! Texas Dep't ofCrim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). None of Mr. Pugh's claims rises to the level of deliberate indifference, as he has not shown that the defendants caused "utmecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Estelle, supra, or that they "[lmew]of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety," Farmer, supra. He requested medical care, was exan1ined and treated, and his injuries healed. The defendants were not "plainly incompetent" and did not "knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). As such, the defendants are entitled to qualified inmmnity as to the plaintiff's claims of denial of medical care. Conditions in Mr. Pugh's Cell The defendants are likewise entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiff's claims regarding the conditions in his cell. "[T]he Eighth Amendment may afford protection against conditions of confinement which constitute health threats but not against those which cause mere discomfot1 or inconvenience." Wilson 1! Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5°' Cir.l989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989)(citation omitted). "Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences, and services of a good hotel." ld at 849 n.5 (citation omitted). Prison officials have certain duties under the Eighth Amendment, but these duties are only to provide prisoners with "humane conditions of confinement," including "adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care .... " Woods 1! Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, - 11 - 581 n.lO (5°' Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). Considering the "totality ofthe circumstances," McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248 (5°' Cir. 1990), the instant claims do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The plaintiff has not identified any "basic human need" which he was denied for an unreasonable period of time. See Woods, 51 F.3d at 581. Though Mr. Pugh did not mention prison conditions within Unit 29 in his complaint, he briefly alleged at his Spears hearing that his toilet was seldom cleaned, cleanings with chemicals occurred only three times per year, and there were rats in the unit. He argued that such conditions put him at elevated risk of infection of his leg. He has not, alleged any physical injmy from the alleged conditions; nor has he shown that they rose to the level of a substantial risk of serious harm to his health or safety. He thus has not shown that the defendants were "plainly incompetent" or "knowingly violate[d] the law." Malley, supra. As such, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiff's regarding the conditions in his cell. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief must be dismissed as moot because he has been transferred to another facility. In addition, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to fue plaintiff's allegations regarding denial of adequate medical care and unconstitutionally poor conditions in his cell. As such, the defendants' motion for summaty judgment will be granted, and judgment will be entered for the defendants. A final judgment consistent with tllis memorandum opinion will issue 6)fSO ORDERED, <hi•, thoZth <fuy ,v' D SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE - 12-
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
