Wisenbaugh #509894 v. Alger Maximum Correctional Facility et al, No. 2:2023cv00190 - Document 6 (W.D. Mich. 2023)
Court Description: OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Maarten Vermaat (cam)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION ______ MARK ALLEN WISENBAUGH, Plaintiff, Case No. 2:23-cv-190 v. Honorable Maarten Vermaat ALGER MAXIMUM CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al., Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a 2 consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues LMF and the following LMF officials: Warden Catherine Bauman, named as “Warden Bowman” in the complaint, and Correctional Officer Unknown Hegidus. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). 1 3 In Plaintiff’s complaint, he states that on an unspecified date, he “had a surgery to remove a lump on his testicle,” and at some unspecified time, “it got infected.”2 (Id., PageID.3.) On an unspecified date, Plaintiff “came out for chow” and asked Defendant Hegidus “for medical.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that he told Defendant Hegidus that “it was [an] emergency.” (Id.) In response, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hegidus “stated it was not necessary . . . [and] told [Plaintiff] to lock down.” (Id.) Thereafter, when Plaintiff “came back out to return the meal trays,” Plaintiff asked Defendant Hegidus “for a nurse.” (Id.) In response Defendant Hegidus told Plaintiff “to lock down before she writes [him] up and sends [him] to seg[regation].” (Id.) Non-party correctional officer Leffell was also present, “so [Plaintiff] did what [he] was told” at approximately 4:00 p.m. (Id.) When the next shift started at approximately 11:00 p.m., Plaintiff told a non-party correctional officer “about it and showed him the wound.” (Id.) The non-party correctional officer called a nurse, and “the nurse came and looked at it.” (Id.) Plaintiff was then taken to the hospital “where [he] had another surgery to remove the infection and [he] spent days on [an] antibiotics IV.” (Id.) Plaintiff then “spent several weeks having gauze shoved into an open wound.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he “was told that had medical been called [he] would not have went through so much.” (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that in the first step of the grievance process, “the officer said [he] never asked her for medical,” but then she “was found out to be lying.” (Id.) Based on the foregoing allegations, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise claims under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Id., PageID.4.) In this opinion, the Court corrects the capitalization and spelling in quotations from Plaintiff’s complaint. 2 4 Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to 5 identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A. Defendant LMF Plaintiff names LMF as a Defendant; however, LMF is not a separate entity capable of being sued. As this Court noted in Ryan v. Corizon Health Care, No. 1:13-cv-525, 2013 WL 5786934 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2013), “individual prisons named as Defendants . . . (ICF, IBC, LRF and RGC) are buildings used by the MDOC to house prisoners[;] [t]hey are not the proper public entity for suit.” Id. at *7; see also Watson v. Gill, 40 F. App’x 88, 89 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The McCracken County Jail is not a legal entity susceptible to suit . . .[; i]t is a department of the county . . . .”); Caruthers v. Corr. Medical Serv., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-274, 2010 WL 1744881, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 27, 2010) (“The Duane Waters Hospital is not an entity capable of being sued. Rather, it is a building owned by the Michigan Department of Corrections.”); Poole v. Michigan Reformatory, No. 09-CV-13093, 2009 WL 2960412, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11. 2009) (“Plaintiff names the Michigan Reformatory, the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility, and the Macomb Correctional Facility as defendants in this action. Those entities, however, are institutions operated by the MDOC and are not . . . legal entities subject to suit . . . .”). Moreover, § 1983 expressly requires that a named defendant be a “person.” See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Even if Plaintiff had named the State of Michigan or the MDOC as a Defendant, neither is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding a state is not a “person”); Parker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65 F. App’x 922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Will and holding that the MDOC is not a “person.”). And, because LMF is not an entity separate from the MDOC, it is also not a “person” under § 1983. See, e.g., Tinney v. Detroit Reentry Center, No. 2:19-CV-10894-TGB, 2020 WL 4334964, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2020) (stating “[a] state prison facility is not a 6 person . . . capable of being sued under § 1983”); Ward v. Healthcare Clinic, No. 16-10646, 2016 WL 3569562, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2016) (same); Poole, 2009 WL 2960412, at *1 (same). Finally, even if Plaintiff had identified the MDOC or the State of Michigan as the Defendant, rather than LMF, and even if those entities were “persons” under § 1983, Plaintiff’s claim would be properly dismissed because the MDOC and the State of Michigan are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against LMF are properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). B. Defendant Bauman With respect to Defendant Bauman, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing how Defendant Bauman was personally involved in the violation of his constitutional rights. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) Specifically, although Plaintiff identifies Warden Bauman as a Defendant, he fails to name Defendant Bauman in the body of his complaint. (See id., PageID.1– 7 3.) Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights). Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bauman, therefore, fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are subject to dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Further, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Bauman, the warden at LMF, liable for the actions of her subordinates, government officials, such as Defendant Bauman, may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official: “[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300); see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995)); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendant Bauman encouraged or condoned the conduct of her subordinates, or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in their conduct. Vague and conclusory allegations of supervisory responsibility are insufficient to show that Defendant Bauman was personally involved in the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege Defendant Bauman engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against her. Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Bauman. C. Defendant Hegidus 1. Eighth Amendment Claim The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Hegidus as related to Plaintiff’s receipt of medical care. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison 9 authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104–05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008). Obviousness, however, is not strictly limited to what is detectable to the eye. Even if the layman cannot see the medical need, a condition may be obviously medically serious where a layman, if informed of the true medical situation, would deem the need for medical attention clear. See, e.g., Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 446–51 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prisoner who died from a perforated duodenum exhibited an “objectively serious need for medical treatment,” even though his symptoms appeared to the medical staff at the time to be consistent with alcohol withdrawal); Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoner’s severed tendon was a “quite obvious” medical need, since “any lay person would realize to be serious,” even though the condition was not visually obvious). The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 10 (6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To prove a defendant’s subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence . . . : A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If “a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Id.; see also Rouster, 749 F.3d at 448; Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); Kellerman v. Simpson, 258 F. App’x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006); Edmonds v. Horton, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Crall, 8 F. App’x 439, 440–41 (6th Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998). “Where the claimant received treatment for his condition, . . . he must show that his treatment was ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’” Mitchell, 553 F. App’x at 605 (quoting Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). The prisoner must demonstrate that the care the prisoner received was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” 11 See Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)). a. Objective Component Plaintiff alleges that he “had a surgery to remove a lump on his testicle,” and at some unspecified time, “it got infected.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff does not describe what symptoms he experienced when “it [was] infected.” (See id.) Plaintiff contends that when he showed a non-party correctional officer “the wound he immediately called medical,” and after being seen by a non-party nurse, Plaintiff was transported to the hospital “where [he] had another surgery to remove the infection.” (Id.) Based on the facts alleged by Plaintiff, it is not at all clear that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the objective component of the relevant two-prong test. Indeed, besides alleging that “it got infected,” Plaintiff alleges no facts about the specific nature of the infection or the symptoms that he experienced in connection to the infection. Although an infection may constitute a serious medical need in some circumstances, based on the circumstances alleged by Plaintiff, it is not clear that Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions are sufficient to show a serious medical condition. Regardless, the Court will also address the subjective component of the relevant two-prong test. b. Subjective Component With respect to Defendant Hegidus, Plaintiff alleges that on an unspecified date, he “came out for chow” and asked Defendant Hegidus “for medical.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he told Defendant Hegidus that “it was [an] emergency.” (Id.) In response, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hegidus “stated it was not necessary . . . [and] told [Plaintiff] to lock down.” (Id.) Then, when Plaintiff “came back out to return the meal trays,” Plaintiff asked Defendant Hegidus “for a nurse.” (Id.) In response Defendant Hegidus told Plaintiff “to lock down before she writes [him] up and 12 sends [him] to seg[regation].” (Id.) Plaintiff “did what [he] was told” because non-party correctional officer Leffell was also present. (Id.) Thereafter, when the next shift started, Plaintiff told a non-party correctional officer “about it and showed him the wound.” (Id.) The non-party correctional officer called a nurse, and the nurse “looked at it.” (Id.) Plaintiff was then taken to the hospital where he had “surgery to remove the infection.” (Id.) As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges only that he asked Defendant Hegidus “for medical” that he told her “it was [an] emergency,” and then he asked “for a nurse.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that he previously “had a surgery to remove a lump on his testicle,” and that “it got infected,” but Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Hegidus knew that Plaintiff previously had surgery, let alone that she knew about the infection. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest that he told Defendant Hegidus about the medical issue(s) that prompted his desire for medical treatment; instead, Plaintiff alleges only that he asked Defendant Hegidus “for medical” without providing any information to her about why he wanted to be seen by medical personnel. Likewise, although Plaintiff alleges in a vague and conclusory manner that he told Defendant Hegidus “it was [an] emergency,” he alleges no facts to suggest that he told Hegidus what medical issue he was experiencing that he believed needed emergency medical attention. Instead, Plaintiff appears to ask the Court to fabricate plausibility to his claims from mere ambiguity. Based on the facts alleged by Plaintiff, he has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that Defendant Hegidus knew that Plaintiff had a serious medical need—because he alleges no facts to suggest that he told Hegidus any symptoms he was experiencing or provided any explanation as to why he wanted to see medical—let alone that she knew about the need and disregarded it. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 13 Moreover, although Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory manner that he “was told that had medical been called [he] would not have went through so much,” Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to explain what delay he is referring to. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Even if Plaintiff intended to refer to the time between when he asked Defendant Hegidus to call medical and when the non-party correctional officer called a nurse, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to suggest that he suffered harm from the delay. Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state an Eighth Amendment medical care claim against Defendant Hegidus. 2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause Claims The Court also construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding Defendant Hegidus’s allegedly false statement in response to Plaintiff’s step I grievance. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) As an initial matter, Plaintiff has no due process right to file a prison grievance. The courts repeatedly have held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Thus, although it is clear that Plaintiff disagreed with Defendant Hegidus’s response to his grievance, because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance process—including any response to his 14 grievances—Defendant Hegidus’s conduct did not deprive Plaintiff of due process. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a procedural due process claim against Defendant Hegidus. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to raise a substantive due process claim regarding Defendant Hegidus’s allegedly false response to Plaintiff’s grievance, he fails to state such a claim. “Substantive due process . . . serves the goal of preventing governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used.” Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996)). Specifically, “[s]ubstantive due process ‘prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). “Conduct shocks the conscience if it ‘violates the decencies of civilized conduct.’” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 589 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998)). In this action, Plaintiff fails to allege conduct that is sufficiently outrageous to support a substantive due process claim. Because Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of demonstrating the sort of egregious conduct that would support a substantive due process claim, he fails to state a substantive due process claim against Defendant Hegidus. Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims will be dismissed. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 15 McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: /s/Maarten Vermaat Maarten Vermaat United States Magistrate Judge November 20, 2023 16
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