Williams #750087 v. Alana et al, No. 2:2023cv00142 - Document 6 (W.D. Mich. 2023)

Court Description: OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Maarten Vermaat (cam)

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Williams &#035;750087 v. Alana et al Doc. 6 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.25 Filed 10/03/23 Page 1 of 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION ______ DIONTA WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, Case No. 2:23-cv-142 v. Honorable Maarten Vermaat UNKNOWN ALANA et al., Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.26 Filed 10/03/23 Page 2 of 17 Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a 2 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.27 Filed 10/03/23 Page 3 of 17 consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Additionally, Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 1, PageID.9) will be denied. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the following MBP staff in their individual and official capacities: Registered Nurse Unknown Alana; and Correctional Officers Unknown Anderson and Odell. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). 1 3 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.28 Filed 10/03/23 Page 4 of 17 In Plaintiff’s complaint, he states that he “accidentally broke the ring finger on [his] rightdominate hand on the evening of 12-14-2021.” (Id., PageID.5.)2 The following morning, Defendant Alana was conducting morning medication rounds, and Defendant Alana “stopped at [Plaintiff’s] cell to deliver [Plaintiff’s] medication.” (Id.) Plaintiff “stuck [his] arm out [of] the bars to give [Alana] a close look at [Plaintiff’s] broken finger,” and Plaintiff told Defendant Alana that he “was in extreme pain and needed urgent/emergent medical attention and pain medication.” (Id.) Plaintiff also told Defendant Alana that he is “right-handed and was unable to write with [his] broken finger.” (Id.) Defendant Alana then examined Plaintiff’s finger “without touching it, acknowledging how bent and swollen it was,” and Defendant Alana advised Plaintiff to submit a health care request form. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Alana “denied assisting [him] with emergency medical attention and pain medication, which [registered nurses] usually have on their person.” (Id.) Later that same day, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Plaintiff “was scheduled to attend law library,” and Plaintiff “stopped at the officer’s desk” so that Defendant Anderson could sign Plaintiff’s pass. (Id.) Plaintiff asked Defendant Anderson “to call health services for [Plaintiff’s] medical emergency.” (Id.) Plaintiff “held out [his] right hand so [Defendant Anderson] could see [the] bent and swollen finger,” and Plaintiff informed Anderson that Plaintiff had “been very patient and tolerant since the night before when [Plaintiff] accidentally broke it.” (Id., PageID.5– 6.) Plaintiff explained that “the injury to [his] right-dominate hand interfered with [him] washing up, brushing [his] teeth, tying [his] shoes and writing.” (Id., PageID.6.) Plaintiff claims that In this opinion, the Court corrects the spelling and punctuation in quotations from Plaintiff’s complaint. 2 4 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.29 Filed 10/03/23 Page 5 of 17 Defendant Anderson “refused to call,” and “refused” Plaintiff pain medication when Plaintiff asked for it. (Id.) Approximately five minutes later, at 1:35 p.m., Plaintiff “entered the law library and went to the officer’s desk.” (Id.) Plaintiff showed Defendant Odell his “broken finger, [and] told her [that he] was in extreme pain and asked her to call and send [Plaintiff] to health services for [his] medical emergency.” (Id.) Plaintiff “explained that [he had] been denied several times already[;] [his] pleas were to no avail.” (Id.) Subsequently, on January 31, 2022, Plaintiff was taken “to the Advanced Center for Orthopedics and Plastic Surgery.” (Id., PageID.7.) Plaintiff was seen by a non-party doctor, “who x-rayed [Plaintiff’s] right hand.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that this January 31, 2022, appointment occurred “1.5 months after breaking [his] finger.” (Id., PageID.8.) Between the time that Plaintiff broke his finger and his January 31, 2022, appointment, Plaintiff states that it was “time spent without the aid of pain medication—although [registered nurses] come directly to [his] cell three times daily.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiff states that “[t]he time lapse between [the] injury and [Plaintiff’s] visit to [the non-party doctor] caused [Plaintiff’s] broken finger to set/lock in a permanent deformity,” which prevented the non-party doctor “from performing surgery without first re-breaking [Plaintiff’s] finger.” (Id.) Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff avers that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights and his rights under state law. (Id., PageID.6, 8–9.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id., PageID.9) Plaintiff also requests the appointment of counsel, which the Court addresses below. (Id.) Request for Appointment of Counsel As to Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel, indigent parties in civil cases have no constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney. Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65 5 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.30 Filed 10/03/23 Page 6 of 17 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1995); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1993). The Court may, however, request an attorney to serve as counsel, in the Court’s discretion. AbdurRahman, 65 F.3d at 492; Lavado, 992 F.2d at 604–05; see Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296 (1989). Appointment of counsel is a privilege that is justified only in exceptional circumstances. In determining whether to exercise its discretion, the Court should consider the complexity of the issues, the procedural posture of the case, and Plaintiff’s apparent ability to prosecute the action without the help of counsel. See Lavado, 992 F.2d at 606. The Court has carefully considered these factors and has determined that the assistance of counsel is not necessary to the proper presentation of Plaintiff’s position. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 1, PageID.9) therefore will be denied. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 6 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.31 Filed 10/03/23 Page 7 of 17 “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A. Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official and individual capacities. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the 7 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.32 Filed 10/03/23 Page 8 of 17 United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment and monetary damages. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.9.) An official capacity defendant is absolutely immune from monetary damages. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998). Therefore, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Although damages claims against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed, an official capacity action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief constitutes an exception to sovereign immunity. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). The United States Supreme Court has determined that a suit under Ex Parte Young for prospective injunctive relief should not be treated as an action against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985). Instead, the doctrine is a fiction recognizing that unconstitutional acts cannot have been authorized by the state and therefore cannot be considered done under the state’s authority. Id. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has cautioned that, “Ex parte Young can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Past exposure to an isolated incident of illegal conduct does not, by itself, sufficiently prove that the plaintiff will be subjected to the illegal conduct again. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 8 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.33 Filed 10/03/23 Page 9 of 17 95 (1983) (addressing injunctive relief); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (addressing declaratory relief). A court should assume that, absent an official policy or practice urging unconstitutional behavior, individual government officials will act constitutionally. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102; O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96. In the present action, Plaintiff does not allege the existence of an official policy or practice, or suggest that the activities alleged in the complaint are likely to occur again. In fact, Plaintiff complains about events that occurred more than two years ago. Plaintiff’s allegations relate solely to past harm, not future risk of harm. Therefore, Plaintiff does not seek relief properly characterized as prospective. See Ladd, 971 F.3d at 581. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants will be dismissed. B. Eighth Amendment Claims Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with emergency medical care for his broken finger. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.8–9.) The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104–05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). 9 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.34 Filed 10/03/23 Page 10 of 17 A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008). Obviousness, however, is not strictly limited to what is detectable to the eye. Even if the layman cannot see the medical need, a condition may be obviously medically serious where a layman, if informed of the true medical situation, would deem the need for medical attention clear. See, e.g., Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 446–51 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prisoner who died from a perforated duodenum exhibited an “objectively serious need for medical treatment,” even though his symptoms appeared to the medical staff at the time to be consistent with alcohol withdrawal); Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoner’s severed tendon was a “quite obvious” medical need, since “any lay person would realize to be serious,” even though the condition was not visually obvious). If the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on “the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment,” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 10 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.35 Filed 10/03/23 Page 11 of 17 (6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To prove a defendant’s subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence . . . : A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). However, not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the United States Supreme Court explained: [A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Id. at 105–06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017); Briggs v. Westcomb, 801 F. App’x 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2020); Mitchell v. Hininger, 553 F. App’x 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2014). This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997). 11 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.36 Filed 10/03/23 Page 12 of 17 The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If “a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Id.; see also Rouster, 749 F.3d at 448; Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); Kellerman v. Simpson, 258 F. App’x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006); Edmonds v. Horton, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Crall, 8 F. App’x 439, 440–41 (6th Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998). “Where the claimant received treatment for his condition, . . . he must show that his treatment was ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’” Mitchell, 553 F. App’x at 605 (quoting Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). The prisoner must demonstrate that the care the prisoner received was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” See Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)). 1. Objective Component Plaintiff alleges that he “accidentally broke [his] ring finger” and that he experienced “extreme pain.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Although Plaintiff alleges that he was in “extreme pain,” Plaintiff states that he broke his finger at night, but he did not tell anyone about his broken finger until the next morning during medication rounds in his unit. Under the circumstances alleged by Plaintiff, it is not at all clear that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the objective component of the relevant two-prong test. See, e.g., Axelson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 09-12514, 2010 WL 1439005, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2020) (“[O]ther courts confronted with even longer 12 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.37 Filed 10/03/23 Page 13 of 17 delays in the treatment of broken fingers have concluded that a plaintiff’s desire for faster treatment does not establish deliberate indifference on behalf of medical professionals.” (citations omitted)); Russo v. Beaton, 234 F. App’x 725, 727 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the plaintiff’s broken finger did not constitute a serious medical condition and that the plaintiff had failed to show “that the failure to treat it at the scene of his arrest was more than an ordinary lack of due care or resulted in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” (citations omitted)). Indeed, although a broken finger may constitute a serious medical need in some circumstances, based on the circumstances alleged by Plaintiff, it appears to the Court that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show a serious medical need during the one-day period at issue in the complaint. Nonetheless, the Court will also address the subjective component of the relevant two-prong test. 2. Subjective Component In this action, Plaintiff alleges that the morning after he “accidentally broke” his ring finger, Defendant Alana came to Plaintiff’s cell to distribute morning medication. (Id.) Plaintiff “stuck [his] arm out [of] the bars to give [Alana] a close look at [Plaintiff’s] broken finger,” and Plaintiff told Defendant Alana that he “was in extreme pain and needed urgent/emergent medical attention and pain medication.” (Id.) Defendant Alana examined Plaintiff’s finger “without touching it, acknowledging how bent and swollen it was,” and Defendant Alana advised Plaintiff to submit a health care request form. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Alana “denied assisting [him] with emergency medical attention and pain medication, which [registered nurses] usually have on their person.” (Id.) Although it is clear that Plaintiff disagreed with Defendant Alana’s determination that Plaintiff’s finger did not require immediate medical care and that Plaintiff could submit a health care request form to address the matter, “a patient’s disagreement with his physicians [or other medical providers] over the proper course of treatment alleges, at most, a medical-malpractice 13 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.38 Filed 10/03/23 Page 14 of 17 claim, which is not cognizable under § 1983.” Darrah, 865 F.3d at 372 (citations omitted); Mitchell, 553 F. App’x at 605. Further, Plaintiff faults Defendant Alana for performing an examination of Plaintiff’s finger “without touching it” and for failing to provide him with pain medication when he requested it; however, it is apparent from Plaintiff’s allegations that he described his symptoms to Defendant Alana and Defendant Alana was able to visually observe the condition of the finger. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Based on Plaintiff’s symptoms and Defendant Alana’s examination of the finger, Defendant Alana made a determination that Plaintiff did not require emergency medical treatment and did not require pain medication at that time. Notably, Defendant Alana did not prevent Plaintiff from receiving treatment for his finger or prevent Plaintiff from later receiving pain medication. Instead, Defendant Alana advised Plaintiff to submit a health care request form about his finger so that he could be scheduled for an appointment to address the issue. Plaintiff simply chose not to do so. As to Defendants Anderson and Odell, administrative or custody officials, such as these Defendants, who have no training or authority to supervise healthcare officials cannot be held liable for those officials’ inadequate care. See Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 895 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that a custody officer was entitled to rely on medical provider’s judgment); Smith v. Cnty. of Lenawee, 505 F. App’x 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004))); see also Newberry v. Melton, 726 F. App’x 290, 296–97 (6th Cir. 2018) (same); Cuco v. Fed. Med. Ctr.-Lexington, No. 05-CV-232-KSF, 2006 WL 1635668, at *21–22 (E.D. Ky. June 9, 2006) (holding that prison administrative officials were not liable for overseeing and second-guessing care given by medical officials). Here, Defendant Alana made a medical determination on 14 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.39 Filed 10/03/23 Page 15 of 17 December 15, 2021, that Plaintiff’s broken finger did not require emergency medical care and that Plaintiff could instead submit a health care request form about the matter. Plaintiff does not allege that he submitted a health care request form as he was directed to do pursuant to Defendant Alana’s treatment plan. Instead, disregarding Defendant Alana’s treatment plan, Plaintiff asked Defendants Anderson and Odell to contact health services for Plaintiff, so that Plaintiff could receive the immediate medical care that he wanted. Plaintiff faults Defendants Anderson and Odell for not acting on Plaintiff’s requests, however, Plaintiff cannot manufacture an Eighth Amendment claim against these Defendants when he himself disregarded Defendant Alana’s treatment plan. Cf. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (discussing that prisoners are not entitled to “unqualified access to health care” (citation omitted)); Mitchell, 553 F. App’x at 605 (“[A] desire for additional or different treatment does not suffice by itself to support an Eighth Amendment claim.” (citations omitted)). Indeed, there is no indication in the complaint that Plaintiff ever submitted a health care request form about his finger. And, Plaintiff does not allege that he had any interactions with Defendants after December 15, 2021.3 Under these circumstances, the facts alleged by Plaintiff simply do not support an inference that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. At most, Plaintiff’s allegations may suggest that Defendants acted negligently on December 15, 2021, but an Eighth Amendment violation requires a “state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 3 To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for any alleged delay in his receipt of medical care between December 15, 2021, and Plaintiff’s January 31, 2022, appointment with an outside non-party doctor, Plaintiff fails to state such a claim because he does not allege any facts suggesting that Defendants had any knowledge of Plaintiff’s condition or further involvement in Plaintiff’s receipt of medical care after December 15, 2021. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights). 15 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.40 Filed 10/03/23 Page 16 of 17 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment medical care claim against Defendants. C. State Law Claims Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated state law and the MDOC’s policies. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendants violated state law and the MDOC’s policies fail to state a claim under § 1983. Further, in determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.” Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Therefore, Plaintiff’s state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel will be denied. Further, having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s federal claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Plaintiff’s state law claims will 16 Case 2:23-cv-00142-MV ECF No. 6, PageID.41 Filed 10/03/23 Page 17 of 17 be dismissed without prejudice because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims. The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: /s/Maarten Vermaat Maarten Vermaat United States Magistrate Judge October 3, 2023 17

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