Brown v. Chippewa County Correctional Facility et al, No. 2:2023cv00105 - Document 5 (W.D. Mich. 2023)
Court Description: OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Maarten Vermaat (cam)
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Brown v. Chippewa County Correctional Facility et al Doc. 5 Case 2:23-cv-00105-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.17 Filed 06/27/23 Page 1 of 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION ______ JOHNNY R. BROWN, JR., Plaintiff, Case No. 2:23-cv-105 v. Honorable Maarten Vermaat CHIPPEWA COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al., Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a county inmate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendant(s) is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:23-cv-00105-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.18 Filed 06/27/23 Page 2 of 10 Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way that they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a 2 Case 2:23-cv-00105-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.19 Filed 06/27/23 Page 3 of 10 consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Chippewa County Correctional Facility (CCCF) in Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the CCCF itself, the Chippewa County Sheriff’s Department, and Well Path, a company that has contracted to provide medical services for inmates at the CCCF. Plaintiff also references Sheriff Bitnar, Lieutenant Sternaway, and Doctor Webb in the portion of his complaint setting out the parties, but he did not include these individuals in the case caption. (See ECF No. 1, PageID.1– 2.) Plaintiff indicates that he is suing Defendants in their official capacities only. (Id., PageID.2.) But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). 1 3 Case 2:23-cv-00105-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.20 Filed 06/27/23 Page 4 of 10 Plaintiff alleges that he was booked into the CCCF on February 1, 2020, after being arraigned on criminal charges. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff contends that during his incarceration, he has completely lost his vision in his right eye. (Id.) He attributes his vision loss to “the jail’s negligence,” the failure to properly schedule medical appointments, and his underlying sarcoidosis. (Id.) Plaintiff also faults CCCF personnel for failing to provide him the eye drops that were prescribed by his doctor to treat inflammation. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that his vision has diminished “past the point of being fixed.” (Id.) Based on the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to assert constitutional claims alleging inadequate medical treatment. As relief, Plaintiff seeks the “correct medical treatment,” as well as a second medical opinion “about the possibility of regaining [his] vision.” (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff also seeks monetary compensation for his pain and suffering. (Id.) Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 4 Case 2:23-cv-00105-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.21 Filed 06/27/23 Page 5 of 10 “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A. Claims Against CCCF and the Chippewa County Sheriff’s Department As noted above, Plaintiff has named the CCCF and the Chippewa County Sheriff’s Department as Defendants in this matter. Plaintiff, however, cannot maintain an action against the CCCF because a county jail is a building that houses prisoners and pretrial detainees, not a “person” capable of being sued under § 1983. See Goldman v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Jail, No. 1:16-cv359, 2016 WL 3180043, at *2 (W.D. Mich. June 8, 2016) (collecting cases). For that reason alone, the Court will dismiss the CCCF from this action. Plaintiff also cannot maintain an action against the Chippewa County Sheriff’s Department because sheriff’s departments are not legal entities subject to suit under § 1983. See Rhodes v. McDaniel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991); Vine v. Cnty. of Ingham, 884 F. Supp. 1153, 1158 (W.D. Mich. 1995). Instead, the Sheriff’s Department is simply an agency of Chippewa County. See Vine, 884 F. Supp. at 1158. 5 Case 2:23-cv-00105-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.22 Filed 06/27/23 Page 6 of 10 As noted above, Plaintiff indicates that he is suing the CCCF and the Chippewa County Sheriff’s Department in their official capacities. Both are agencies of Chippewa County. Even if the Court assumed that Plaintiff intended to sue Chippewa County, the county may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees under § 1983. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). Instead, a county is liable only when its official policy or custom causes the injury. Connick, 563 U.S. at 60. This policy or custom must be the moving force behind the alleged constitutional injury, and the plaintiff must identify the policy or custom, connect it to the governmental entity, and show that his injury was incurred because of the policy or custom. See Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005). A policy includes a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the county. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has explained that a custom “for purposes of Monell liability must be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996). “In short, a ‘custom’ is a ‘legal institution’ not memorialized by written law.” Id. at 508. Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegations suggesting that his alleged constitutional injury was the result of an official policy or custom employed by Chippewa County, the CCCF, or the Chippewa County Sheriff’s Department. Thus, the Court will dismiss any intended claims against Chippewa County. See Bilder v. City of Akron, No. 92-4310, 1993 WL 394595, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 1993) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 action when the plaintiff’s allegation of custom or policy was conclusory, and the plaintiff failed to state facts supporting the allegation). 6 Case 2:23-cv-00105-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.23 Filed 06/27/23 Page 7 of 10 B. Claims Against Well Path Plaintiff has also sued Well Path, the company that has contracted with the CCCF to provide medical care for inmates incarcerated there. A private entity which contracts to perform a traditional state function like providing healthcare to inmates—like Well Path—can “be sued under § 1983 as one acting ‘under color of state law.’” Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting West, 487 U.S. at 54). The requirements for a valid § 1983 claim against a municipality apply equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for purposes of § 1983. See Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the holding in Monell has been extended to private corporations); Street, 102 F.3d at 817–18 (same); Rojas v. Alexander's Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); Cox v. Jackson, 579 F. Supp. 2d 831, 851–52 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (same). Consequently, because the requirements for a valid § 1983 claim against a municipality apply equally to Well Path, Well Path’s liability, like a governmental entity’s liability, “must also be premised on some policy [or custom] that caused a deprivation of [a prisoner’s constitutional] rights.” Starcher, 7 F. App’x at 465. Additionally, Well Path’s liability in a § 1983 action cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385 (citation omitted). As is the case with Chippewa County, Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegations from which the Court could infer that a Well Path custom or policy resulted in the deprivation of adequate medical care for Plaintiff’s vision issue. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Well Path. C. Purported Claims Against Sheriff Bitnar, Lieutenant Sternaway, and Doctor Webb As noted above, Plaintiff references Sheriff Bitnar, Lieutenant Sternaway, and Doctor Webb in the portion of his complaint setting out the parties, but has not included these individuals 7 Case 2:23-cv-00105-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.24 Filed 06/27/23 Page 8 of 10 in the case caption. (See ECF No. 1, PageID.1–2.) To the extent Plaintiff intended to name these individuals as Defendants, he has failed to state a claim against them. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (citing Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.”). Plaintiff fails to even mention Sheriff Bitnar, Lieutenant Sternaway, and Doctor Webb in the body of his complaint. His allegations fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 8 Case 2:23-cv-00105-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.25 Filed 06/27/23 Page 9 of 10 entitled to relief”). Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff intended to proceed against these individuals in their official capacities only (ECF No. 1, PageID.2), “[a] suit against an individual in his official capacity is the equivalent of a suit against the governmental entity.” See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). However, “[g]overnmental entities cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged violation of constitutional rights.” Watson v. Gill, 40 F. App’x 88, 89 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692). As discussed supra, Plaintiff has failed to describe any policy or custom maintained by either Chippewa County or Well Path that resulted in his injuries, and Plaintiff cannot maintain his suit against Chippewa County and Well Path merely because they employed Sheriff Bitnar, Lieutenant Sternaway, and Doctor Webb. Accordingly, any purported claims against Sheriff Bitnar, Lieutenant Sternaway, and Doctor Webb will be dismissed. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. 9 Case 2:23-cv-00105-MV ECF No. 5, PageID.26 Filed 06/27/23 Page 10 of 10 This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: /s/Maarten Vermaat Maarten Vermaat United States Magistrate Judge June 27, 2023 10
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