Riggins #286725 v. Cook et al, No. 2:2020cv00110 - Document 10 (W.D. Mich. 2020)

Court Description: OPINION; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc)

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Riggins &#035;286725 v. Cook et al Doc. 10 Case 2:20-cv-00110-PLM-MV ECF No. 10 filed 09/04/20 PageID.117 Page 1 of 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION ______ RAFIEL RIGGINS, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 2:20-cv-110 Honorable Paul L. Maloney R. COOK et al., Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Koskola, Durant, McCollum, Bender, Thompson, Marshall, Stratton, III, and Horton. Discussion I. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:20-cv-00110-PLM-MV ECF No. 10 filed 09/04/20 PageID.118 Page 2 of 11 The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues Corrections Officers R. Cook and Shimmel Penny, Sergeant Unknown Koskola, Hearing Investigators Unknown Durant, Unknown McCollum, and Unknown Bender, Resident Unit Manager S. Thompson, Lieutenant Unknown Marshall, Chippewa County Prosecutor Robert Stratton, and Warden Connie Horton. Plaintiff alleges that he arrived at URF on October 15, 2016. On June 21, 2019, Plaintiff, a black male, made an oral complaint to Defendants Cook and Shimmel Penny about their harassment of Plaintiff. Plaintiff also complained to Defendants Koskola and Thompson, who were aware of the harassment, but failed to take any corrective action. Later that day, Defendants Cook and Shimmel Penny planted a knife in Plaintiff’s area of control and wrote a false major misconduct ticket on Plaintiff for possession of a weapon. A contraband removal slip was completed by Defendant Cook, asserting that a piece of sheet metal, which had been sharpened on one end, had been found in Plaintiff’s footlocker and was being stored in a secure contraband locker. Plaintiff was reviewed on the misconduct ticket by Defendant Koskola, during which Plaintiff explained that he was innocent and asked Defendant Koskola to check the video. Defendant Koskola told Plaintiff that he would look into the matter but failed to actually investigate. Plaintiff filed a grievance on Defendants Cook and Shimmel Penny for retaliation. On June 13, 2019, Defendants Bender, Durant, and McCollum failed to properly investigate the misconduct. In addition, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Koskola, Marshall, Durant, Bender, McCollum, Thompson, and Horton failed to follow the proper procedures for handling a class I major misconduct. However, on June 21, 2019, Plaintiff was found not guilty of the major 2 Case 2:20-cv-00110-PLM-MV ECF No. 10 filed 09/04/20 PageID.119 Page 3 of 11 misconduct ticket by Hearings Officer O’Brien. On July 17, 2019, Plaintiff mailed a complaint to Defendant Stratton, III, against Defendants Cook and Shimmel Penny. Defendant Stratton, III, failed to pursue the matter or investigate Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff claims that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy, violated his First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for making oral complaints, and violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. II. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 3 Case 2:20-cv-00110-PLM-MV ECF No. 10 filed 09/04/20 PageID.120 Page 4 of 11 ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). III. Respondeat Superior Plaintiff fails to make specific factual allegations against Defendants Koskola, Durant, McCollum, Bender, Thompson, Marshall, and Horton, other than his claim that they failed to conduct an investigation in response to his grievances and complaints. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 4 Case 2:20-cv-00110-PLM-MV ECF No. 10 filed 09/04/20 PageID.121 Page 5 of 11 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants Koskola, Durant, McCollum, Bender, Thompson, Marshall, and Horton engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim against them. IV. Conspiracy Nor does Plaintiff state a conspiracy claim against any of the named Defendants. A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is “an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action.” See Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must show the existence of a single plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right, and that an overt action committed in furtherance of the conspiracy caused an injury to the plaintiff. Hensley, 693 F.3d at 695; Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011). Moreover, a plaintiff must plead a conspiracy with particularity, as vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (recognizing that allegations of conspiracy must be supported by allegations of fact that support a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy,” not merely a “possible” one); Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008); Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003); Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987). 5 Case 2:20-cv-00110-PLM-MV ECF No. 10 filed 09/04/20 PageID.122 Page 6 of 11 Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are wholly conclusory. He alleges no facts that indicate the existence of a plan, much less that any Defendant shared a conspiratorial objective. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations, even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, describe misconduct by Defendants Cook and Shimmel Penny, followed by the mere failure to act on the part of the remaining Defendants. He appears to rely entirely on a highly attenuated inference from the mere fact that he received a misconduct ticket that was not immediately dismissed. As the Supreme Court has held, such allegations, while hinting at a sheer “possibility” of conspiracy, do not contain “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. The Court has recognized that although parallel conduct may be consistent with an unlawful agreement, it is insufficient to state a claim where that conduct “was not only compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed . . . behavior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). In light of the far more likely possibility that the conduct of the named Defendants was unrelated, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim of conspiracy. V. Defendant Stratton, III Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Stratton, III, appears to be based on the fact that he chose not to pursue prosecution against prison officials after Plaintiff sent him a complaint. The Supreme Court embraces a functional approach to determining whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988); accord Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010); Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 1998). Under a functional analysis, a prosecutor is absolutely immune when performing the traditional functions of an 6 Case 2:20-cv-00110-PLM-MV ECF No. 10 filed 09/04/20 PageID.123 Page 7 of 11 advocate. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130; Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2003); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1137 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Lomaz, 151 F.3d at 497. Obviously, a prosecutor is also immune for the decision not to initiate a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, Defendant Stratton, III, is entitled to immunity. VI. Due process Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ conduct violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, while the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause restricts the activities of the states and their instrumentalities, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause circumscribes only the actions of the federal government. Scott v. Clay County, Tennessee, 205 F.3d 867, 873 n. 8 (6th Cir. 2000). Therefore, because the named defendants are state actors, Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims are without merit. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims asserting that the major misconduct charge against him was “false” also lacks merit. A prisoner’s ability to challenge a prison misconduct conviction depends on whether the convictions implicated any liberty interest. In the seminal case in this area, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court prescribed certain minimal procedural safeguards that prison officials must follow before depriving a prisoner of good-time credits on account of alleged misbehavior. The Wolff Court did not create a free-floating right to process that attaches to all prison disciplinary proceedings; rather the right to process arises only when the prisoner faces a loss of liberty, in the form of a longer prison sentence caused by forfeiture of good-time credits: 7 Case 2:20-cv-00110-PLM-MV ECF No. 10 filed 09/04/20 PageID.124 Page 8 of 11 It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison. But here the State itself has not only provided a statutory right to good time but also specifies that it is to be forfeited only for serious misbehavior. Nebraska may have the authority to create, or not, a right to a shortened prison sentence through the accumulation of credits for good behavior, and it is true that the Due Process Clause does not require a hearing “in every conceivable case of government impairment of private interest.” But the State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (citations omitted). The Court notes that Plaintiff states that he was found not guilty of the major misconduct ticket. However, even if Plaintiff had been found guilty, he could not allege that such a major misconduct conviction resulted in any loss of good-time credits. The Sixth Circuit has examined Michigan statutory law, as it relates to the creation and forfeiture of disciplinary credits1 for prisoners convicted of crimes occurring after April 1, 1987. In Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2007), the court determined that loss of disciplinary credits does not necessarily affect the duration of a prisoner’s sentence. Rather, it merely affects parole eligibility, which remains discretionary with the parole board. Id. at 440. Building on this ruling, in Nali v. Ekman, 355 F. App’x 909 (6th Cir. 2009), the court held that a misconduct citation in the Michigan prison system does not affect a prisoner’s constitutionally protected liberty interests, because it does not necessarily affect the length of confinement. 355 F. App’x at 912; accord, Taylor v. Lantagne, 418 F. App’x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2011); Wilson v. Rapelje, No. 09-13030, 2010 WL 5491196, at 1 For crimes committed after April 1, 1987, Michigan prisoners earn “disciplinary credits” under a statute that abolished the former good-time system. Mich. Comp. Laws § 800.33(5). 8 Case 2:20-cv-00110-PLM-MV ECF No. 10 filed 09/04/20 PageID.125 Page 9 of 11 *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2010) (R. & R) (holding that “plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing and major misconduct sanction does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause”), adopted as judgment of court, 2011 WL 5491196 (Jan. 4, 2011). Nor does Plaintiff allege facts showing that he was subjected to a significant, atypical deprivation. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). As noted above, Plaintiff indicates that he was found not guilty of the misconduct ticket. The fact that Plaintiff was charged with an allegedly false major misconduct, without more, does not constitute a significant deprivation. Finally, the Court notes that even if Plaintiff’s allegations implicated a liberty interest, Plaintiff received due process of law in this case. In all cases where a person stands to be deprived of his life, liberty or property, he is entitled to due process of law. This due process of law gives the person the opportunity to convince an unbiased decision maker that, for example, he has been wrongly or falsely accused or that the evidence against him is false. The Due Process Clause does not guarantee that the procedure will produce a correct decision. “It must be remembered that even if a state decision does deprive an individual of life, [liberty], or property, and even if that decision is erroneous, it does not necessarily follow that the decision violated that individual’s right to due process.” Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, n.9 (1980). “[T]he deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in ‘life, liberty or property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (emphasis in original). Further, an inmate has no right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974); Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1263 (6th Cir. 1986). In this case, Plaintiff’s 9 Case 2:20-cv-00110-PLM-MV ECF No. 10 filed 09/04/20 PageID.126 Page 10 of 11 allegations show that he received a hearing and that he was found not guilty. Therefore, Plaintiff’s due process claims are properly dismissed. VII. Retaliation Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). Plaintiff claims that Defendants Cook and Shimmel Penny retaliated against him by planting evidence and writing a false misconduct ticket on him after he made a verbal complained against them. An inmate has a right to file “non-frivolous” grievances against prison officials on his own behalf, whether written or oral. Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 265 (6th Cir. 2018); Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 299 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[The prisoner’s] oral grievance to [the prison officer] regarding the anti-Muslim harassment he endured at work constitutes protected activity under the First Amendment.”); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e decline to hold that legitimate complaints lose their protected status simply because they are spoken.”); see also Pasley v. Conerly, 345 F. App’x 981, 985 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that a prisoner engaged in protected conduct by threatening to file a grievance). “Nothing in the First Amendment itself suggests that the right to petition for redress of grievances only attaches when the petitioning takes a specific form.” Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 10 Case 2:20-cv-00110-PLM-MV ECF No. 10 filed 09/04/20 PageID.127 Page 11 of 11 512, 521 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that a conversation constituted protected petitioning activity) (quoting Pearson, 471 F.3d at 741). Therefore, Plaintiff alleges that he was engaged in protected conduct. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the class I misconduct ticket was written immediately following his complaint, and that he was ultimately found not guilty. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendants Cook and Shimmel Penny are not clearly frivolous and may not be dismissed on initial review. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Defendants Koskola, Durant, McCollum, Bender, Thompson, Marshall, Stratton, III, and Horton will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, the following claims against the remaining Defendants: Plaintiff’s conspiracy and due process claims. Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendants Cook and Shimmel Penny remain in the case. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: September 4, 2020 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge 11

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