Hestle #716703 v. Bauman et al, No. 2:2016cv00196 - Document 7 (W.D. Mich. 2016)

Court Description: OPINION; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc)

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Hestle #716703 v. Bauman et al Doc. 7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION KEENAN HESTLE, Plaintiff, Case No. 2:16-cv-196 v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney CATHERINE BAUMAN, et al., Defendants. ____________________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Dockets.Justia.com Factual Allegations Plaintiff Keenan Hestle, a state prisoner currently confined at the Macomb Correctional Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Warden Catherine Bauman, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Ryan D. Masters, and Corrections Officer Unknown Blough, all of whom were employed by the MDOC at the Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) during the pertinent time period. Plaintiff alleges that in late October to early November of 2015, while he was confined at LMF, Plaintiff was authorized to move into cell 138 on Pine Unit’s C-wing. After a few days of being in the cell, Plaintiff and his cellmate Terrance Greer noticed that the toilet was not functioning properly and that fecal matter remained in the toilet after being flushed. In addition, some light flooding occurred. Defendant Blough oversaw plumbing issues and moving arrangements in the unit, so Plaintiff informed him of the problems they were having with the toilet. Defendant Blough brought an inmate plumber in to fix the toilet, but he was unsuccessful. Plaintiff wrote a grievance on the issue and spoke with Defendant Masters, who reviewed the grievance with Plaintiff. Defendant Masters told Plaintiff to put in another work order, which would solve the problem. Defendant Masters sought to have Plaintiff sign off on the grievance. After attempts to fix the toilet failed, Plaintiff asked Defendants Blough and Masters to be moved to another cell. However, Defendant Blough stated that this would not solve the problem because another prisoner would have to be moved into the cell. On December 7, 2015, Plaintiff sent a kite to Defendant Bauman regarding the problems with his toilet, but he did not receive a response. On December 17, 2015, Plaintiff received a step II -2- response to his grievance from Defendant Bauman. Plaintiff asserts that the response contained false information, but that it also acknowledged that Plaintiff’s toilet was not working. On December 9, 2015, maintenance personnel worked on the toilet and told Plaintiff that the problem was that there was insufficient pressure to allow feces to be cleared out of the toilet when it was flushed. Plaintiff states that he was subjected to an improperly functioning toilet for more than 30 days, which violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as equitable relief. Discussion I. Failure to state a claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the -3- court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was deprived of a properly working toilet for a period of over 30 days. The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation -4- omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)). Allegations about temporary inconveniences, e.g., being deprived of a lower bunk, subjected to a flooded cell, or deprived of a working toilet, do not demonstrate that the conditions fell beneath the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities as measured by a contemporary standard of decency. Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); see also J.P. v. Taft, 439 F. Supp. 2d 793, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (“[M]inor inconveniences resulting from the difficulties in administering a large detention facility do not give rise to a constitutional claim.” (internal citation omitted)). But see Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 255-56 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that allegations that an inmate was deprived of toothpaste for 337 days and experienced dental health problems did not constitute a temporary inconvenience and were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim). The Court concludes that the fact that Plaintiff’s toilet did not flush properly for a period of just over 30 days is insufficient, by itself, to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff fails to allege that he was not able to use another toilet, or that he suffered any ill effects to his health as a result of -5- the improperly functioning toilet. Moreover, the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint show that Defendants took appropriate measures to repair Plaintiff’s toilet, and that the problem was corrected on December 9, 2015, a little over a month after Plaintiff moved into the cell. The fact that initial attempts to repair the toilet were unsuccessful does not support a finding of deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint is properly dismissed. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered. Dated: October 4, 2016 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge -6-

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