Sango #252200 v. Dessellier et al, No. 2:2016cv00123 - Document 4 (W.D. Mich. 2016)

Court Description: OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)

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Sango #252200 v. Dessellier et al Doc. 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION ROBERT D. SANGO, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 2:16-cv-123 Honorable Gordon J. Quist BRUCE DESSELLIER, Defendants. ______________________________/ OPINION DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS - THREE STRIKES Plaintiff Robert D. Sango, a prisoner incarcerated at Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Because Plaintiff has filed at least three lawsuits that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim, he is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court will order Plaintiff to pay the $400.00 civil action filing fee applicable to those not permitted to proceed in forma pauperis within twenty-eight (28) days of this opinion and accompanying order. If Plaintiff fails to do so, the Court will order that his action be dismissed without prejudice. Even if the case is dismissed, Plaintiff will be responsible for payment of the $400.00 filing fee in accordance with In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2002). Discussion The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), which was enacted on April 26, 1996, amended the procedural rules governing a prisoner’s request for the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the PLRA Dockets.Justia.com was “aimed at the skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners – many of which are meritless – and the corresponding burden those filings have placed on the federal courts.” Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997). For that reason, Congress put into place economic incentives to prompt a prisoner to “stop and think” before filing a complaint. Id. For example, a prisoner is liable for the civil action filing fee, and if the prisoner qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis, the prisoner may pay the fee through partial payments as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The constitutionality of the fee requirements of the PLRA has been upheld by the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 1288. In addition, another provision reinforces the “stop and think” aspect of the PLRA by preventing a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis when the prisoner repeatedly files meritless lawsuits. Known as the “three-strikes” rule, the provision states: In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under [the section governing proceedings in forma pauperis] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The statutory restriction “[i]n no event,” found in § 1915(g), is express and unequivocal. The statute does allow an exception for a prisoner who is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the “three-strikes” rule against arguments that it violates equal protection, the right of access to the courts, and due process, and that it constitutes a bill of attainder and is ex post facto legislation. Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604-06 (6th Cir. 1998); accord Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 377 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Wilson, 148 F.3d at 604-06); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1178-82 (9th Cir. 1999); Rivera -2- v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723-26 (11th Cir. 1998); Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has been an extremely active litigant in the federal courts in Michigan. In more than three of Plaintiff’s lawsuits, the Court entered dismissals on the grounds that they were frivolous or failed to state a claim. See Sango v. Lewis et al., No. 1:14-cv-342 (W.D. Mich. July 18, 2014); Sango v. Huss, No. 1:14-cv-2 (W.D. Mich. June 12, 2014); Sango v. Hammond et al., No. 1:14-cv-283 (W.D. Mich. May 6, 2014); Sango v. Novak, No. 1:14-cv-343 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2014). In addition, Plaintiff repeatedly has been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this Court because he has three strikes. See Sango v. Russell, No. 2:16-cv-45 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2016); Sango v. Place et al., No. 2:16-cv-23 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2016); Sango v. Bastain, No. 2:16cv-15 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2016); Sango v. Bastian et al., No. 2:15-cv-14 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2016); Sango v. Desselier, No. 2:16-cv-13 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2016); Sango v. Snyder, No. 2:16cv-12 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2016); Sango v. Aramark et al., No. 1:15-cv-247 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2015); Sango v. Joiner et al., No. 1:15-cv-232 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 2015); Sango v. Watkins, No. 1:15-cv-221 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2015); Sango v. Nevins et al., No. 1:15-cv-179 (Mar. 5, 2015); Sango v. Eryer et al., No. 1:15-cv-71 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2015); Sango v. Nevins et al., No. 1:15cv-179 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2015); Sango v. Mich. State Office of Admin. Hr’gs & Rules et al., No. 1:14-cv-1272 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2015); Sango v. Curtis et al., No. 1:14-cv-823 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2014); Sango v. Wakley et al., 1:14-cv-703 (W.D. Mich. July 8, 2014). Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations do not fall within the exception to the three-strikes rule for a prisoner under imminent danger of serious physical injury. The Sixth Circuit set forth the following general requirements for a claim of imminent danger: -3- In order to allege sufficiently imminent danger, we have held that “the threat or prison condition must be real and proximate and the danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed.” Rittner v. Kinder, 290 F. App’x 796, 797 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus a prisoner’s assertion that he or she faced danger in the past is insufficient to invoke the exception.” Id. at 797–98; see also [Taylor v. First Med. Mgmt., 508 F. App’x 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2012)] (“Allegations of past dangers are insufficient to invoke the exception.”); Percival v. Gerth, 443 F. App’x 944, 946 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Assertions of past danger will not satisfy the ‘imminent danger’ exception.”); cf. [Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 371 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007)] (implying that past danger is insufficient for the imminent-danger exception). In addition to a temporal requirement, we have explained that the allegations must be sufficient to allow a court to draw reasonable inferences that the danger exists. To that end, “district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed pursuant to § 1915(g) when the prisoner’s claims of imminent danger are conclusory or ridiculous, or are clearly baseless (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of irrational or wholly incredible).” Rittner, 290 F. App’x at 798 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Taylor, 508 F. App’x at 492 (“Allegations that are conclusory, ridiculous, or clearly baseless are also insufficient for purposes of the imminent-danger exception.”). Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 727 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner’s claim of imminent danger is subject to the same notice pleading requirement as applied to prisoner complaints. Id. Consequently, a prisoner must allege facts in the complaint from which the Court could reasonably conclude that the prisoner was under an existing danger at the time he filed his complaint, but the prisoner need not affirmatively prove those allegations. Id. Plaintiff alleges that on May 5, 2016, the day after the court ordered service in Sango v. Sohlden, No. 2:16-cv-18 (W.D. Mich.), Defendants Sohlden and Dessellier, who were defendants in that action, cornered Plaintiff in the porter closet and threatened to force him to drink a bottle of industrial disinfectant, unless he agreed to sign a paper stating that he was being dishonest in his allegations in Case No. 2:16-cv-18. Plaintiff agreed to sign, but only if the document was correctly typed out and only if a witness signed. Dessellier told Sohlden to have Plaintiff type out the correct form for Plaintiff’s signature. It is not clear whether Plaintiff actually signed the form, but he agreed -4- not to pursue his litigation. Since that time, Plaintiff has moved for a temporary restraining order in Case No. 2:16-cv-18, reciting the same facts and seeking injunctive relief. Id. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that he faced potential danger in the past, not that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his complaint. Moreover, to the extent that he was subjected to retaliation for filing a prior action, he already has sought relief for such retaliation in the only case that could be affected by his coerced declaration. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to allege that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his complaint. In light of the foregoing, § 1915(g) prohibits Plaintiff from proceeding in forma pauperis in this action. Plaintiff has twenty-eight (28) days from the date of entry of this order to pay the entire civil action filing fee, which is $400.00. When Plaintiff pays his filing fee, the Court will screen his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). If Plaintiff fails to pay the filing fee within the 28-day period, his case will be dismissed without prejudice, but he will continue to be responsible for payment of the $400.00 filing fee. Dated: June 10, 2016 /s/ Gordon J. Quist GORDON J. QUIST UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE SEND REMITTANCES TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS: Clerk, U.S. District Court P.O. Box 698 229 Federal Bldg. 202 W. Washington St. Marquette, MI 49855 All checks or other forms of payment shall be payable to “Clerk, U.S. District Court.” -5-

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