Eagle #525192 v. Aramark, No. 2:2014cv00193 - Document 4 (W.D. Mich. 2014)

Court Description: OPINION ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)

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Eagle #525192 v. Aramark Doc. 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION JOHNNY DAR EAGLE, Plaintiff, Case No. 2:14-cv-193 v. Honorable R. Allan Edgar ARAMARK, Defendant. ____________________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Dockets.Justia.com Factual Allegations Plaintiff Johnny Dar Eagle presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and housed at the Chippewa Correctional Facility. He sues Aramark, which has a contract with the MDOC to provide all food services to Michigan state prisons. Plaintiff complains that, since Aramark took over food services for the prisons, they have constantly tried to short prisoners of the amount of servings as stated on the MDOC approved menu. (Compl., docket #1, Page ID##2-3.) According to the complaint, Aramark is obligated by contract to provide all items on the approved menu or a substitute, if requested by the prisoners. Plaintiff alleges that Aramark is failing to meet its contract in sneaky ways. (Id. at 3.) By way of examples, Plaintiff alleges that, contrary to the contract, Aramark substitutes menu items regularly items that the prisoners do not request and actively reject. Instead, prisoners must be Aramark employees for menu items, especially vegetables and salads. He complains that Aramark failed to put lettuce in the bean salad with lettuce and onions. (Id.) On another occasion, Aramark told prisoners that the bean salad was the submarine sandwich described on the menu. The requisite half-cup serving of vegetables is usually mostly water, because Aramark uses a ladle, rather than a slotted spoon, for serving. On Sundays and Tuesdays, when scrambled eggs with toast and jelly are scheduled, Aramark has only diet jelly available. In sum, Plaintiff claims that Aramark is defrauding the State of Michigan of approximately fifteen percent of what they contracted to provide. For the breach of contract, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of fifteen percent of the contract to be paid to Michigan taxpayers. He also seeks fifteen additional special or holiday-type meals to be provided by Aramark for three years from the date of settlement, -2- which he demands be reached by a committee of two prisoners, two taxpayers, and two Aramark representatives. In addition, Petitioner seeks punitive damages in the amount of an additional five percent of the contract amount. Discussion I. Failure to state a claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ( Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. ). The court must determine whether the complaint contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged but it has not show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility -3- standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Claims under§ 1983 can only be brought for deprivation of rights secured by the constitution and laws of the United States. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). The only constitutional provision arguably implicated by Plaintiff s allegations is the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be barbarous nor may it contravene society s evolving standards of decency. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life s necessities. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation or other conditions intolerable for prison confinement. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, [n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might -4- endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. Plaintiff alleges no facts rising to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. While Plaintiff alleges that he is not receiving the precise diet ordered by the MDOC, he does not allege that he is not being fed or that he personally has lost weight, become ill, or otherwise experienced a condition intolerable for prison confinement. He therefore fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff s allegations suggest only that Defendant Aramark has violated its contract with the State of Michigan. A claim for breach of contract is not constitutional; it is a state-law claim. Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff s assertion that Defendants violated state law therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court s supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction. In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, [a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues. Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law claims. Id. Dismissal, however, remains purely discretionary. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the balance of the -5- relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff s state-law claim will be dismissed without prejudice. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff s federal claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Plaintiff s state-law claim will be dismissed without prejudice. The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the three-strikes rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered. Dated: 10/14/2014 /s/ R. Allan Edgar R. ALLAN EDGAR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -6-

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