Rogers #372900 v. Ojibway Correctional Facility et al, No. 2:2014cv00171 - Document 4 (W.D. Mich. 2014)
Court Description: OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION DEMETRIUS ROGERS, Plaintiff, Case No. 2:14-cv-171 v. Honorable Robert Holmes Bell OJIBWAY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al., Defendants. ____________________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Factual Allegations Plaintiff Demetrius Rogers presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Ojibway Correctional Facility (OCF), though the actions about which he complains also occurred at the West Shoreline Correctional Facility (MTF)1, and the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF). In the caption of his complaint, Plaintiff identifies OCF, MTF and LRF as the Defendants in this action. However, in the list of Defendants, while he names the three prison facilities, he indicates that he is unhappy with the medical staff of those facilities. Plaintiff s allegations are limited. He appears to complain about a problem with his arm that prevents him from doing weight training and causes him discomfort when he sleeps. According to the complaint, Plaintiff first complained about a problem with his arm on February 28, 20112 , while he was incarcerated at LRF. He subsequently was seen by a physician, who told him to use a warm compress and to keep trying to stretch the arm until it straightened out. After he was transferred to MTF, Plaintiff requested medical treatment three times: May 6, 2013, May 13, 2013, and May 16, 2013. Plaintiff was seen by a doctor, who flexed his arm and then ordered an x-ray. The x-ray came back normal. Plaintiff was transferred to OCF shortly thereafer. At OCF, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Lizabeth Ralles, who flexed his arm inward and outward and offered him pain medication and a heating pad. Dr. Dale Ashe apparently also 1 Plaintiff actually names the Muskegon Temporary Facility, which is the former name of the W est Shoreline Correctional Facility. 2 The complaint states that he reported his problem at LRF in February 2011, though he indicates that he was soon thereafter transferred to MTF. His complaints about MTF, however, occurred over a period of 10 days in May 2013. The Court concludes that Plaintiff mistakenly wrote 2011 rather than 2013. The dates, however, are of no relevance to the Court s disposition of the action. -2- examined his arm, but Ashe did not provide Plaintiff with an explanation of what was wrong with the arm. Plaintiff alleges that he put in seven health care requests at OCF from May 24, 2013 to October 16, 2013. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order to see a specialist about his arm. He also seeks compensatory damages for the pain he has suffered. Discussion I. Sovereign Immunity Plaintiff sues three prison facilities, OCF, MTF, and LRF. An express requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that the defendant be a person. See Monell v. Dep t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). OCF, MTF and LRF are administrative units of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Neither a prison nor a state corrections department is a person within the meaning of section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Furthermore, Plaintiff s claim against theseDefendants is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978). That amendment prohibits suits in federal court against the state or any of its agencies or departments. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Haldermann, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). A state s Eleventh Amendment immunity is in the nature of a jurisdictional defense and may be raised on the court s own motion. Estate of Ritter v. University of Michigan, 851 F.2d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has squarely held that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against state departments of corrections. Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782. Plaintiff therefore may not maintain a § 1983 action against the MDOC or its subdivisions, OTF, MTF and LRF. -3- II. Failure to state a claim Even assuming Plaintiff intended to bring his action against individual medical employees of the MDOC, his complaint fails to state a claim. A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ( Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. ). The court must determine whether the complaint contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged but it has not show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). -4- To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 102, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied [w]here the seriousness of a prisoner s need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). If, however the need involves minor maladies or non-obvious complaints of a serious need for medical care, Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the inmate -5- must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment. Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001). The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result. Id. Under Farmer, the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Id. at 837. Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court has explained: [A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Id. at 105-06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 154-55 (6th Cir. 1995); Ward v. Smith, No. 95-6666, 1996 WL 627724, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1996). This is so even if the -6- misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997). The Sixth Circuit distinguishes between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment. Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law. Id.; see also Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 448 (6th Cir. 2014); Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); Kellerman v. Simpson, 258 F. App x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196 F. App x 410 (6th Cir. 2006); Edmonds v. Horton, 113 F. App x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Crall, 8 F. App x 439, 440 (6th Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998). Where the claimant received treatment for his condition, as here, he must show that his treatment was so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all. Mitchell v. Hininger, No. 13-5315, slip op. at 4-5 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 2013) (quoting Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support either the objective or the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. First, his allegations concerning the nature of his medical condition are extremely vague, limited to a general complaint that his arm gives him pain when he tries to lift weights and when he sleeps in certain positions. His limited allegations do not support a conclusion that he is at substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Second, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff -7- makes no allegation that any individual medical official was both aware of a serious risk of harm and was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Plaintiff mentions that he was seen by four doctors at the three facilities. The first doctor ordered exercises and a warm compress to stretch-out the arm. The second doctor ordered an x-ray, which was negative. The third doctor offered him pain relievers and a heating pad. Plaintiff s only allegation about the fourth doctor is that the doctor did not explain precisely what was wrong with the arm. On these facts, Plaintiff alleges a disagreement with one or more medical providers about whether further tests are needed. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege an Eighth Amendment violation. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff s action will be dismissed on the basis of immunity and failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the three-strikes rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered. Dated: September 3, 2014 /s/ Robert Holmes Bell ROBERT HOLMES BELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -8-
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