Williams #381538 v. Ollis et al, No. 2:2010cv00282 - Document 6 (W.D. Mich. 2010)

Court Description: OPINION ; signed by Judge R. Allan Edgar (EDTN Judge R. Allan Edgar, cam)

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Williams #381538 v. Ollis et al Doc. 6 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION WARREN WILLIAMS #381538, Plaintiff, Case No. 2:10-cv-282 v. Honorable R. Allan Edgar UNKNOWN OLLIS, et al., Defendants. ____________________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has paid the initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Dockets.Justia.com Discussion I. Factual allegations Plaintiff Warren Williams #381538, an inmate at the Chippewa Correctional Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Corrections OfficersUnknown Ollis, Unknown Fielding, Unknown Sanders, and Unknown Lare. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on March 3, 2010, he was assaulted by Defendants Ollis, Fielding, Sanders and Lare. Plaintiff states that he was being escorted from a misconduct hearing and had an exchange of words with Defendants. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants then threw him face down to the floor, hogtied him, and carried him bleeding to his cell. Defendants then punched him. Prisoners observed the incident and began yelling and pounding on their doors. Plaintiff filed a grievance, which was denied at each level. Plaintiff subsequently received a major misconduct ticket for disobeying a direct order and assault and battery. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief. II. Failure to state a claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ( Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. ). The court must determine whether the complaint contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim has -2- facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged but it has not show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by assaulting him. The Eighth Amendment embodies a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of a crime. Punishment may not be barbarous nor may it contravene society s evolving standards of decency. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 34546 (1981); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Eighth Amendment also prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not physically barbarous, involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. Among unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain are those that are totally without penological justification. Id. -3- Plaintiff s claim involving the use of force against prisoners must be analyzed in the context of the constant admonitions by the Supreme Court regarding the deference that courts must accord to prison or jail officials as they attempt to maintain order and discipline within dangerous institutional settings. See, e.g., Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22. Generally, restrictions and even harsh conditions of confinement are not necessarily cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. 347. The Supreme Court has held that whenever guards use force to keep order, the standards enunciated in Whitley, 475 U.S. 312, should be applied. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010). Under Whitley, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7; Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1178. In determining whether the use of force is wanton and unnecessary, the court should evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321); accord Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 2010); McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1990). Physical restraints are constitutionally permissible where there is penological justification for their use. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346; Jones v. Toombs, No. 95-1395, 1996 WL 67750, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1996); Hayes v. Toombs, No. 91-890, 1994 WL 28606, at * 1 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 1994); Rivers v. Pitcher, No. 95-1167, 1995 WL 603313, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 1995). Plaintiff offers a copy of the hearing report to his complaint. The Hearing Officer indicated that he reviewed statements by Defendants Sanders, Fielding, and Lare, as well as by -4- Officer Severa. In the reasons for the finding, the Hearing Officer concluded that Plaintiff kicked Defendant Ollis in the leg after making comments that one of the Defendants was going to get it and that they could carry him back to his cell. Plaintiff refused to cooperate or to be subdued by staff. In addition, in the major misconduct report written by Defendant Ollis, the writer states that Plaintiff dropped to the floor and kicked him in the right leg, and that he attempted to kick at staff until he was secured. Defendant Ollis gave Plaintiff several orders to stop kicking, but Plaintiff refused to comply. (See Plaintiff s Exhibits.) The court further notes that Plaintiff fails to allege any specific injuries that he suffered as a result of the alleged excessive force, nor does he required medical treatment. The court concludes that in this case, Plaintiff s claim fails because it is clear from his allegations that there was a penological justification for the use of force, and, thus, the use of force was constitutionally permissible. Conclusion Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the three-strikes rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. -5- This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered. Dated: 12/8/2010 /s/ R. Allan Edgar R. Allan Edgar United States District Judge

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