Brim #265869 v. Prison Health Services, Inc. et al, No. 2:2010cv00064 - Document 13 (W.D. Mich. 2010)
Court Description: OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION MARCUS M. BRIM #265869, Plaintiff, Case No. 2:10-cv-64 v. Honorable Gordon J. Quist PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, et al., Defendants. _______________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e©). The Court must read Plaintiff s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff s complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Prison Health Services, Inc. and Jeannie Stephenson, R.N.. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Robert Clark, R.N. and Mary Rose Galloway, R.N. Discussion I. Factual allegations Plaintiff Marcus M. Brim #265869, a prisoner at the Alger Maximum Correctional Facility (LMF), filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants Prison Health Services, Inc., Jeannie Stephenson, R.N., Robert Clark, R.N., and Mary Rose Galloway, R.N. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on August 2, 2009, he injured his knee playing basketball and immediately submitted a health care request for treatment, explaining that he was unable to get in and out of bed or to walk well. On August 4, 2009, Plaintiff received a response to his request from Defendant Clark, stating that he would be seen by health care staff on August 9, 2009. However, Plaintiff was not seen by health care on that date. On September 11, 2009, Plaintiff filled out a second health care request, complaining that he was practically immobilized by his knee pain. On September 13, 2009, Plaintiff filed a grievance on health care staff for ignoring his medical needs. On September 15, 2009, Defendant Galloway responded to the September 11, 2009, kite by stating that she would check on an appointment and annual health screen for Plaintiff. On October 2, 2009, Defendant Clark saw Plaintiff, but did nothing more than look at his knee and tell him that she did not know what was wrong. Defendant Clark told Plaintiff that he would be given a doctor s appointment, but that she doubted that he would be given an MRI, because of the cost. Plaintiff states that on October 19, 2009, Defendant Stephenson wrote a step II response to Plaintiff s grievance, stating that he had seen health care staff on October 5, 2009, for his knee pain. Plaintiff states that this is not true, because his October 5, 2009, appointment was merely regarding his request for shoes and that staff would not address his knee injury. Plaintiff claims that Defendants conduct violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief. II. Failure to state a claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic -2- Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ( Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. ). The court must determine whether the complaint contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged but it has not show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). The court notes that liability under Section 1983 must be based on more than merely the right to control employees. Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-26 (1981); Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, Section 1983 liability cannot -3- be premised upon mere allegations of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Polk, 454 U.S. at 325. A party cannot be held liable under Section 1983 absent a showing that the party personally participated in, or otherwise authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. See e.g. Leach v. Shelby Co. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989); Hays v. Jefferson, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982). See also Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Supervisory officials can be held liable for the acts of their subordinates only if plaintiff establishes that the supervisor failed to appropriately discharge his supervisory duties, and that this failure resulted in a denial or deprivation of plaintiff s federal rights. See e.g. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246; Hayes v. Vessey, 777 F.2d 1149, 1154 (6th Cir. 1985). However, the failure of a supervisor to supervise, control or train the offending employee is not actionable absent a showing that the official implicitly encouraged, authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, or in some other way directly participated in, the offensive conduct. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246. Such a claim requires, at a minimum, that the official had knowledge of the offending employee s conduct at a time when the conduct could be prevented, or that such conduct was otherwise foreseeable or predictable. See e.g. Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 854 (6th Cir. 1992). In addition, plaintiff must show that defendant had some duty or authority to act. See e.g. Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1989) (lower level official not liable for shortcomings of building); Ghandi v. Police Dep t of City of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338, 351 (6th Cir. 1984) (mere presence at the scene is insufficient grounds to impose Section 1983 liability in the absence of a duty to act); accord Hall v. Shipley, 932 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1991). In addition, merely bringing a problem to the attention of a supervisory official is not sufficient to impose such liability. See Shelly v. Johnson, 684 F. Supp. 941, 946 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (Hillman, C.J.), aff d 849 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1988). Finally, supervisory liability claims -4- cannot be based on simple negligence. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246; Weaver v. Toombs, 756 F. Supp. 335, 337 (W.D. Mich. 1989), aff d 915 F.2d 1574 (6th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendants Prison Health Services and Stephenson were personally involved in the activity which forms the basis of his claim. The only roles that Defendants Prison Health Services and Stephenson played in this action involve the denial of administrative grievances or the failure to act. Defendants Prison Health Services and Stephenson cannot be liable for such conduct under § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff s claims against Defendants Prison Health Services and Stephenson are properly dismissed for lack of personal involvement. Conclusion Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Defendants Prison Health Services and Stephenson will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e). The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Clark and Galloway. An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered. Dated: June 29, 2010 /s/ Gordon J. Quist GORDON J. QUIST UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -5-
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