Payette #292063 v. Briggs, No. 2:2009cv00279 - Document 4 (W.D. Mich. 2010)
Court Description: OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION Michael Walter Payette #292063, Plaintiff, Case No. 2:09-cv-279 v. Honorable Robert Holmes Bell Unknown Briggs , Defendant. ____________________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff s Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendant, and will serve the complaint against Defendant with regard to Plaintiff s First Amendment claims. Discussion I. Factual allegations Plaintiff Michael Walter Payette, a prisoner at the Alger Maximum Correctional Facility (LMF), filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pro se complaint against Defendant Corrections Officer Unknown Briggs. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on April 7, 2008, Defendant Briggs put grievances into Plaintiff s cell, referring to them as petty-ass-bullshit grievances. Plaintiff asked if he had any outside mail, and Defendant responded no. However, Plaintiff noted that Defendant was carrying a letter addressed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then asked for his letter and Defendant refused, stating that Plaintiff could not have his letter because he filed so many grievances. As Defendant walked away from the cell, he yelled that Plaintiff was his girl. Defendant also stated: You ain t nothing but a fuck boy. You file all these meaningless grievances and shit. You re a piece of shit convict who I have to pay taxes for. I bet I know why you re in prison! It has something to do with diapers doesn t it? I m the one buying all of your food you stupid fuck! Your [sic] a white man trying to perpetrate [sic] a black man. Plaintiff again asked for his letter and Defendant told him to file a grievance. Plaintiff claims that the mail contained legal documents. An unknown sergeant later came to Plaintiff s cell and threatened him with a ticket. When Plaintiff told him that Defendant was the problem, the sergeant stated that he didn t care and left. Plaintiff states that later that day, Defendant challenged him to a physical fight while Plaintiff was at chow. On July 29, 2008, Plaintiff attempted to ask Defendant to stop harassing him. Defendant responded, Fuck you, go lock up! Grieve it bitch. Defendant later walked by Plaintiff s cell and called Plaintiff his girl and his slut. When Defendant let Plaintiff out for chow, he -2- threatened to fuck with Plaintiff for filing grievances on him. Defendant later called Plaintiff his sexy bitch and told him to shake his ass. On July 30, 2008, Plaintiff attempted to resolve the issue with Defendant, but Defendant merely stated, Eat my cum. Plaintiff later told Defendant that he was filing a lawsuit against him for sexual harassment, and Defendant stated, That s okay, I am still going to fuck you. Defendant again referred to Plaintiff as she and a fuck boy, and stated: You re gonna eat me up one day, you wait and see. You re gonna be my cum guzzler. Put that in your next grievance! Plaintiff states that Defendant s inappropriate comments continued the next day. Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated his rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief. II. Failure to state a claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ( Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. ). The court must determine whether the complaint contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the -3- reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged but it has not show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). As noted above, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights. [B]ecause the sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer can never serve a legitimate penological purpose and may well result in severe physical and psychological harm, such abuse can, in certain circumstances, constitute the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoted cases omitted). To prevail on a constitutional claim of sexual harassment, an inmate must therefore prove, as an objective matter, that the alleged abuse or harassment caused pain and, as a subjective matter, that the officer in question acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Freitas, 109 F.3d at 1338 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). -4- Circuit courts consistently have held that sexual harassment, absent contact or touching, does not satisfy the objective requirement because such conduct does not constitute the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Morales v. Mackalm, 278 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2002) (allegations that prison guard asked prisoner to have sex with her and to masturbate in front of her and other female staffers did not rise to level of Eighth Amendment violation); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1311 n.11 (10th Cir. 1998) (allegations that county jailer subjected female prisoners to severe verbal sexual harassment and intimidation was not sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment); Howard v. Everett, No. 99-1277EA, 2000 WL 268493, at *1 (8th Cir. March 10, 2000) (sexual comments and gestures by prison guards did not constitute unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain); cf. Seltzer-Bey v. Delo, 66 F.3d 961, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1995) (allegations that prison guard conducted daily strip searches, made sexual comments about prisoner s penis and buttocks, and rubbed prisoner s buttocks with nightstick were sufficient to withstand motion for summary judgment); Zander v. McGinnis, No. 97-1484, 1998 WL 384625, at *2 (6th Cir. June 19, 1998) (verbal abuse of mouthing pet names at prisoner for ten months failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim); Murray v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 WL 34677, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 1997) (magistrate judge correctly held that verbal abuse in the form of offensive remarks regarding a transsexual prisoner s bodily appearance, transsexualism, and presumed sexual preference cannot state an Eighth Amendment claim). Other courts have held that even minor, isolated incidents of sexual touching coupled with occasional offensive sexual remarks do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Jackson v. Madery, 158 F. App x 656, 661 (6th Cir. 2005) (correction officer s conduct in allegedly rubbing and grabbing prisoner s buttocks in degrading manner was isolated, brief, and not severe and so failed to meet -5- Eighth Amendment standards); Johnson v. Ward, No. 99-1596, 2000 WL 659354, at *1 (6th Cir. May 11, 2000) (male prisoner s claim that a male officer placed his hand on the prisoner s buttock in a sexual manner and made an offensive sexual remark did not meet the objective component of the Eighth Amendment); Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 1998) (where inmate failed to assert that he feared sexual abuse, two brief touches to his buttocks could not be construed as sexual assault); accord Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006); Boddie v. Schneider, 105 F.3d 857, 859-61 (2d Cir. 1997) (court dismissed as inadequate prisoner s claim that female corrections officer made a pass at him, squeezed his hand, touched his penis, called him a sexy black devil, pressed her breasts against his chest, and pressed against his private parts). If true, Defendant s conduct toward Plaintiff was reprehensible, but it does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant ever touched him or had form of physical contact with him. Acts of verbal sexual harassment, standing alone, are insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Morales, 278 F.3d at 132; Zander, 1998 WL 384625, at *2. Therefore, Plaintiff s allegation fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant. Plaintiff s due process claim is barred by the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Under Parratt, a person deprived of property by a random and unauthorized act of a state employee has no federal due process claim unless the state fails to afford an adequate post-deprivation remedy. If an adequate post-deprivation remedy exists, the deprivation, although real, is not without due process of law. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537. This rule applies to both negligent and intentional deprivation of property, as long as the deprivation was not done pursuant to an established state procedure. See Hudson v. -6- Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984). Because Plaintiff s claim is premised upon allegedly unauthorized negligent acts of a state official, he must plead and prove the inadequacy of state postdeprivation remedies. See Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479-80 (6th Cir. 1995); Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1993). Under settled Sixth Circuit authority, a prisoner s failure to sustain this burden requires dismissal of his § 1983 due-process action. See Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff has not sustained his burden in this case. Plaintiff has not alleged that state post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. Moreover, numerous state post-deprivation remedies are available to him. First, a prisoner who incurs a loss through no fault of his own may petition the institution s Prisoner Benefit Fund for compensation. MICH . DEP T OF CORR ., Policy Directive 04.07.112, ¶ B (effective Nov. 15, 2004). Aggrieved prisoners may also submit claims for property loss of less than $1,000 to the State Administrative Board. MICH . COMP. LAWS § 600.6419; Policy Directive, 04.07.112, ¶ B. Alternatively, Michigan law authorizes actions in the Court of Claims asserting tort or contract claims against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies. MICH . COMP. LAWS § 600.6419(1)(a). The Sixth Circuit specifically has held that Michigan provides adequate post-deprivation remedies for deprivation of property. See Copeland, 57 F.3d at 480. Plaintiff does not allege any reason why a state-court action would not afford him complete relief for the deprivation, either negligent or intentional, of his personal property. Accordingly, Plaintiff s Fourteenth Amendment claim will be dismissed. Finally, the court concludes that Plaintiff s First Amendment claims are non-frivolous and may not be dismissed upon initial review. -7- Conclusion Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will serve the complaint against Defendant with regard to Plaintiff s First Amendment claims. An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered. Dated: March 1, 2010 /s/ Robert Holmes Bell ROBERT HOLMES BELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -8-
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