Jones #109386 v. Boynton, No. 2:2008cv00215 - Document 3 (W.D. Mich. 2008)
Court Description: OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION JAMES JR. JONES #109386, Petitioner, v. Case No. 2:08-cv-215 HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELL JOHN BOYNTON, Respondent. ____________________________________/ OPINION Petitioner James Jr. Jones #109386 filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the validity of his state court conviction. Upon a review of the petition, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not exhausted his available state court remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A petitioner in a federal habeas corpus proceeding is required to exhaust his available state remedies, except when there is an absence of available state corrective process, or the existence of circumstances renders such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). Moreover, it is the Petitioner s burden to prove exhaustion. Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a District Court must dismiss a habeas corpus petition containing unexhausted claims if state remedies remain available. The Sixth Circuit has also indicated that this court must dismiss a petition for habeas corpus relief where that petition contains unexhausted claims. See Boggs v. Evitts, 818 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1987). However, exhaustion is not jurisdictional. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131, 107 S. Ct. 1671, 1673-74 (1987). As a prudential rule, exhaustion is required unless special circumstances exist. Id. at 134-136. See also Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1990); Weaver v. Foltz, 888 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1989).1 The Court concludes that such special circumstances do not exist in the instant action and therefore exhaustion of available state remedies should be required. The question remains whether there are state remedies still available to the Petitioner. Pursuant to state law, Petitioner is now foreclosed from pursuing a motion for new trial, see MCR 6.431(A)(1) (generally prohibiting motions for new trials more than 42 days from entry of judgment), or from seeking further direct appellate review, see MCR 7.205(F)(3) (generally prohibiting late appeals more than 12 months after entry of an order or judgment on the merits), in the state courts. In his application for habeas corpus relief, Petitioner states that he did file a Motion for Relief from Judgment, in the Wayne County Circuit Court on October 18, 2006. Petitioner states that he did not receive a ruling on this motion until June 18, 2008. It does not appear that Petitioner filed an appeal regarding his motion for relief from judgment in either the 1 It has been suggested that the holding in Granberry can be read as giving only appellate courts discretion to reach the merits of claims presented in mixed petitions. See for example, Ybarra v. Sumner, 678 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Nev. 1988). Cf. Plunkett v. Johnson, 828 F.2d 954, 956 (2d Cir. 1987); Campas v. Zimmerman, 876 F.2d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 1989) (dicta). Without analysis, the Sixth Circuit recently remarked that the district courts have the discretion to excuse exhaustion where the federal claim is plainly meritless and it would be a waste of time and judicial resources to require exhaustion. Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1422 (6th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 922, 112 S. Ct. 1299 (1992). Likewise a federal habeas court need not require that a federal claim be first presented to the state courts if it is clear that the state courts would hold the claim procedurally barred or efforts to exhaust would otherwise be futile. See e.g. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, n.9, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1043 n.9 (1989). -2- Michigan Court of Appeals or the Michigan Supreme Court. Petitioner is not barred from filing an application to file a late appeal, as it has been less than one year since the Circuit Court s decision. Because Petitioner has not exhausted his available state court remedies, the petition will be dismissed. In addition, if Petitioner should choose to appeal this action, a certificate of appealability will be denied as to each issue raised by the Petitioner in this application for habeas corpus relief. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A dismissal of Petitioner s action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly unlikely for this court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that an issue merits review, if the court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is somewhat anomalous for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Commissioner of Correction of the State of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (it was intrinsically contradictory to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001). Rather, the -3- district court must engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, the Court has examined each of Petitioner s claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, when a habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability may issue only when the prisoner shows, at least, [1] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and [2] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Both showings must be made to warrant the grant of a certificate. Id. The Court concludes that reasonable jurists could not debate that each of Petitioner s claims are properly dismissed because he failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the Petitioner should be allowed to proceed further. Id. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability. Dated: October 22, 2008 /s/ Robert Holmes Bell ROBERT HOLMES BELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -4-
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