Causey #108113 v. Ouellette et al, No. 1:2023cv00884 - Document 10 (W.D. Mich. 2023)

Court Description: OPINION; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc)

Download PDF

Causey &#035;108113 v. Ouellette et al Doc. 10 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.33 Filed 10/18/23 Page 1 of 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______ CHARLES CAUSEY, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:23-cv-884 Honorable Paul L. Maloney MARGARET OUELLETTE et al., Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court previously stayed proceedings in this case and referred it to the Prisoner Civil Rights Litigation Early Mediation Program. (ECF No. 5.) On September 29, 2023, Defendants Groff and Ouellette filed a statement seeking to have this matter excluded from early mediation. (ECF No. 8.) In an order (ECF No. 9) entered on October 2, 2023, the Court removed the matter from early mediation. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss the following claims for failure to state a claim: (1) Plaintiff’s Americans with Disabilities (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA) claims; (2) Plaintiff’s official Dockets.Justia.com Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.34 Filed 10/18/23 Page 2 of 14 capacity claims for damages; and (3) Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims. The following claims against Defendants remain in the case: (1) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims premised upon a denial of adequate medical care; and (2) Plaintiff’s state law claims for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Discussion I. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF) in Coldwater, Branch County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred there. Plaintiff sues medical providers Margaret Ouellette, Suzanne Groff, and Unknown Party #1, referred to as a medical provider, in their official and personal capacities. Plaintiff is serving a term of life imprisonment without parole. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) In 2007 or 2008, he was diagnosed with prostate issues. (Id.) Plaintiff was prescribed Flomax. (Id.) At some point in 2023, Plaintiff began to experience constant abdominal pain, which he believes is linked to his Flomax prescription. (Id.) Plaintiff submitted several kites, asking to see his medical providers. (Id.) He alleges, however, that Defendants have refused to call him out to see them. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he is experiencing dark yellow urine, diarrhea, a shrunken penis, inability to obtain an erection, and difficulty keeping food down. (Id.) Plaintiff has told various nurses that he needs to be seen but claims that he is “getting the runaround.” (Id.) Plaintiff has attached an affidavit to his complaint. (ECF No. 1-1.) In that affidavit, Plaintiff indicates that he was called out to see a nurse at some point in mid-2023. (Id., PageID.10.) Plaintiff also had a CT scan at McLaren Hospital in Lansing. (Id.) He received a second CT scan at the Henry Ford Allegiance Hospital to check for cancer. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he does not have 2 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.35 Filed 10/18/23 Page 3 of 14 cancer, but his “symptoms remain the same.” (Id.) He contends that despite this, none of the Defendants have seen him to discuss his symptoms. (Id.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id., PageID.4.) He also contends that Defendants have violated the ADA and RA and have retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts state law claims for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id., PageID.5.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.) II. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 3 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.36 Filed 10/18/23 Page 4 of 14 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). A. ADA and RA Claims As set forth above, Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to the ADA and RA against Defendants. The Court presumes that these claims are brought pursuant to Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the RA, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Title II of the ADA provides, in pertinent part, that no qualified individual with a disability shall, because of that disability, “be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 481–82 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132).1 In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA, Plaintiff must show: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that defendants are subject to the ADA and the RA; and (3) that he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendants’ services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by defendants, by reason of plaintiff’s disability. See Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 532–33 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 2003). The term “qualified individual with a disability” includes “an individual with a disability who, with or without . . . the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Both Title II of the ADA and the RA apply to state prisons and inmates. Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210–12 (1998) (noting that the phrase “services, programs, or 1 Similarly, § 504 of the RA provides in pertinent part: No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be 4 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.37 Filed 10/18/23 Page 5 of 14 activities” in § 12132 includes recreational, medical, educational, and vocational prison programs); Diemond v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 18-1344, 2018 WL 7890769, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 2018) (“The ADA and RA do apply to state prisons.”). The proper defendant under a Title II claim is the public entity or an official acting in his official capacity. Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 396–97 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has named Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff’s allegations, however, fail to suggest that Defendants have denied treatment because of any disability that Plaintiff may suffer. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained, “[w]here the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say . . . that a particular decision was ‘discriminatory.’” United States v. Univ. Hosp. 729 F.2d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). Indeed, that distinction explains why the ADA and the RA are not appropriate federal causes of action to challenge the sufficiency of medical treatment. See, e.g., Baldridge-El v. Gundy, No. 99-2387, 2000 WL 1721014, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 2000) (“[N]either the RA nor the ADA provide a cause of action for medical malpractice.”); Centaurs v. Haslam, No. 14-5348, 2014 WL 12972238, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 2, 2014) (“Although [Plaintiff] may have a viable civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for inadequate medical care, he has failed to state a prima facie case under the parameters of the ADA.”); Powell v. Columbus Medical Enterprises, LLC, No. 21-3351, 2021 WL 8053886, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2021) (“This dissatisfaction necessarily sounds in medical malpractice, excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “Because the ADA sets forth the same remedies, procedures, and rights as the Rehabilitation Act . . . claims brought under both statutes may be analyzed together.” Thompson v. Williamson Cnty., 219 F.3d 555, 557 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846, n. 2 (6th Cir. 1995)). 5 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.38 Filed 10/18/23 Page 6 of 14 which, ‘by itself, does not state a claim under the ADA.’”).2 Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims. B. Section 1983 Claims To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). 1. Official Capacity Claims As noted above, Plaintiff has named Defendants in both their official and personal capacities. A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit brought against the governmental entity: in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts unless 2 See also Iseley v. Beard, 200 F. App’x 137, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Iseley . . . claims that he was denied medical treatment for his disabilities, which is not encompassed by the ADA’s prohibitions.”); Nottingham v. Richardson, 499 F. App’x 368, 377 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The ADA is not violated by ‘a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners.’”); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he [ADA] would not be violated by a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medial needs of its disabled prisoners.”); Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[A] lawsuit under the Rehab Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cannot be based on medical treatment decisions.”); Fitzgerald v. Corrections Corp. of America, 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is well settled that the ADA [and the RA do] not provide a private right of action for substandard medical treatment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The Rehabilitation Act, like the ADA, was never intended to apply to decisions involving . . . medical treatment.”). 6 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.39 Filed 10/18/23 Page 7 of 14 the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, official capacity defendants are also immune from monetary damages. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998). The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Although damages claims against an official capacity defendant are properly dismissed on grounds of immunity, an official capacity action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief may constitute an exception to sovereign immunity. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that, “Ex parte Young can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that Defendants continue to deny him adequate 7 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.40 Filed 10/18/23 Page 8 of 14 medical care for his symptoms. The Court, therefore, will allow Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for declaratory relief to proceed. 2. Personal Capacity Claims a. First Amendment Retaliation Claims Plaintiff suggests that Defendants have violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). Plaintiff indicates that he filed a grievance about the lack of care and mentions that he has a right to be free from retaliation for filing a lawsuit. Filing a civil rights lawsuit constitutes protected conduct. See Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 607 (6th Cir. 2002). An inmate also has a right to file non-frivolous grievances against prison officials on his own behalf. See Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 265 (6th Cir. 2018). Further, the denial of medical treatment may constitute adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim. See O’Brien v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 592 F. App’x 338, 343 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (discussing that a “delay in treatment . . . would likely deter a prisoner”). Plaintiff, therefore, has sufficiently alleged facts to support the first and second elements for purposes of a retaliation claim. 8 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.41 Filed 10/18/23 Page 9 of 14 To satisfy the third element, Plaintiff must allege facts that support an inference that the alleged adverse action was motivated by the protected conduct. Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fall short. Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that he filed the grievance and instant lawsuit well after he began submitting kites requesting medical treatment. Moreover, Plaintiff has provided no facts from which the Court could plausibly infer that any of the Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s grievance and lawsuit and denied him medical treatment because of that protected conduct. It is well recognized that “retaliation” is easy to allege and that it can seldom be demonstrated by direct evidence. See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1987). However, “alleging merely the ultimate fact of retaliation is insufficient.” Murphy, 833 F.2d at 108. “[C]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state . . . a claim under § 1983.’” Harbin-Bey, 420 F.3d at 580 (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (6th Cir. 1987)); see also Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing that in complaints screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, “[c]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive with no concrete and relevant particulars fail to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lewis v. Jarvie, 20 F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]are allegations of malice on the defendants’ parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims [that will survive § 1915A screening].” (citing CrawfordEl v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998))). Plaintiff merely alleges the ultimate fact of retaliation in this action. His speculative, conclusory allegations are insufficient to maintain First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims. b. Eighth Amendment Denial of Medical Care Claims Plaintiff contends that Defendants have violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him adequate medical care for his prostate issues. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) 9 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.42 Filed 10/18/23 Page 10 of 14 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104–05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008). Obviousness, however, is not strictly limited to what is detectable to the eye. Even if the layman cannot see the medical need, a condition may be obviously medically serious where a layman, if informed of the true medical situation, would deem the need for medical attention clear. See, e.g., Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 446–51 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prisoner who died from a perforated duodenum exhibited an “objectively serious need for medical treatment,” even though his symptoms appeared to the medical staff at the time to be consistent with alcohol withdrawal); Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoner’s severed tendon was a “quite obvious” medical need, since “any lay person would realize to be serious,” even though the condition was not visually obvious). If the plaintiff’s 10 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.43 Filed 10/18/23 Page 11 of 14 claim, however, is based on “the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment,” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To prove a defendant’s subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence . . . : A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). However, not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the United States Supreme Court explained: [A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 11 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.44 Filed 10/18/23 Page 12 of 14 Id. at 105–06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017); Briggs v. Westcomb, 801 F. App’x 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2020); Mitchell v. Hininger, 553 F. App’x 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2014). This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997). The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If “a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Id.; see also Rouster, 749 F.3d at 448; Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); Kellerman v. Simpson, 258 F. App’x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006); Edmonds v. Horton, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Crall, 8 F. App’x 439, 440–41 (6th Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998). “Where the claimant received treatment for his condition, . . . he must show that his treatment was ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’” Mitchell, 553 F. App’x at 605 (quoting Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). The prisoner must demonstrate that the care the prisoner received was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” See Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)). 12 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.45 Filed 10/18/23 Page 13 of 14 As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges that at some point in 2023, he began to experience constant abdominal pain, which Plaintiff believed was linked to his Flomax prescription. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff also alleges that he suffers from dark urine, constant diarrhea, an inability to obtain erection, a shrunken penis, and an inability to keep food down. (Id.) Given these alleged facts, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a serious medical need for purposes of his Eighth Amendment claims. Likewise, although Plaintiff asserts that he had a CT scan that ruled out the possibility of cancer, he continues to experience the symptoms noted above. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.10.) Plaintiff has submitted numerous kites to Defendants, asking to be seen, but contends that they continue to give him the “runaround.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Although Plaintiff has by no means proven deliberate indifference, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and in the light most favorable to him, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims premised upon the denial of adequate medical care cannot be dismissed at screening. C. State Law Claims Plaintiff also asserts claims pursuant to state law for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendants violated state law fail to state a claim under § 1983. Furthermore, in determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.” 13 Case 1:23-cv-00884-PLM-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.46 Filed 10/18/23 Page 14 of 14 Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). Here, because Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants remain pending, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that the following claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c): (1) Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims; (2) Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for damages; and (3) Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims. The following claims against Defendants remain in the case: (1) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims premised upon a denial of adequate medical care; and (2) Plaintiff’s state law claims for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: October 18, 2023 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge 14

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.