Ross #408440 v. Anthony, No. 1:2023cv00527 - Document 6 (W.D. Mich. 2023)

Court Description: OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Ray Kent (fhw)

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Ross &#035;408440 v. Anthony Doc. 6 Case 1:23-cv-00527-RSK ECF No. 6, PageID.23 Filed 06/12/23 Page 1 of 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______ CLARENCE ROSS, Plaintiff, Case No. 1:23-cv-527 v. Honorable Ray Kent R. ANTHONY, Defendant. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. The Court also construes Plaintiff to assert constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 5.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendant(s) is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. Dockets.Justia.com Case 1:23-cv-00527-RSK ECF No. 6, PageID.24 Filed 06/12/23 Page 2 of 10 “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way that they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a 2 Case 1:23-cv-00527-RSK ECF No. 6, PageID.25 Filed 06/12/23 Page 3 of 10 consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility (MTU) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Food Service Director R. Anthony in his individual capacity. (ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) Plaintiff alleges that as of June 2, 2022, he was employed by the food service department at MTU. (Id., PageID.3.) Moreover, as of that date, Plaintiff was “under mental health treatment 1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). 3 Case 1:23-cv-00527-RSK ECF No. 6, PageID.26 Filed 06/12/23 Page 4 of 10 for psychological disorders.” (Id.) On the morning of June 2, 2022, during his work detail, Plaintiff “began having a mental episode and immediately reported it to Correction Officer Somers.” (Id.) Plaintiff “requested immediate medical help.” (Id.) Somers told Plaintiff to report to Defendant Anthony that he was having a mental breakdown and to request “to be released from [f]ood [s]ervice so that [Plaintiff could] be seen by the assigned Mental Health Psychologist.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Anthony became “irate” and said, “You act like a f***in child. If you don’t have a f***ing callout to see mental health, get the f*** out of my face moron.” (Id.) After Plaintiff was released from food service to see mental health, Defendant Anthony fired Plaintiff “upon unfounded and untrue reasons.” (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff claims that the reasons Defendant Anthony relied upon “did not exist until [Plaintiff’s] mental breakdown and request to be released for mental health treatment.” (Id.) After being fired, Plaintiff felt sad, had low selfesteem, was ashamed of his mental disability, and experienced “extreme emotional distress.” (Id.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Anthony violated the ADA by creating a hostile work environment. (Id., PageID.5) The Court also construes Plaintiff’s complaint to assert an Eighth Amendment claim premised upon Defendant Anthony’s verbal harassment and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim premised upon Plaintiff’s loss of his job. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.) Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The 4 Case 1:23-cv-00527-RSK ECF No. 6, PageID.27 Filed 06/12/23 Page 5 of 10 court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). A. ADA Claims As noted above, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Anthony violated the ADA by creating a hostile work environment. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Presumably, Plaintiff believes that Defendant Anthony created such an environment because of the disparaging comments he made about Plaintiff’s mental health. The ADA “forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; public services, programs, and activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered by Title III.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516-17 (2004). Moreover, to establish a hostile work environment claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA; (2) [he] was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on h[is] disability or a request for an accommodation; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of h[his] employment and to create an abusive 5 Case 1:23-cv-00527-RSK ECF No. 6, PageID.28 Filed 06/12/23 Page 6 of 10 working environment; and (5) that [his employer] knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt effective remedial action. Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff does not indicate under which title he asserts his ADA claim. Title I of the ADA, however, “does not apply to the employment of prisoners.” See Starry v. Oshkosh Corr. Inst., 731 F. App’x 517, 519 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also Cox v. Jackson, 579 F. Supp. 2d 831, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (noting that an inmate’s claim that he was denied a prison job did “not fall within the general employment discrimination provisions set forth in Title I of the ADA”); cf. McMaster v. Minnesota, 30 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that “inmates . . . who are required to work as part of their sentences and perform labor within a correctional facility as part of a state-run prison industries program are not ‘employees’ within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act”). Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA applies to state prisons and inmates. See Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 201–12 (1998). Prison employment assignments may fall within the realm of “services, programs, or activities” covered by Title II. See Williams v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 22-1033, 2022 WL 3681255, at *3–4 (10th Cir. Aug. 25, 2022). Regardless of whether Plaintiff can even assert a hostile work environment ADA claim under either Title I or Title II, his ADA claim against Defendant Anthony fails because the “ADA does not permit public employees or supervisors to be sued in their individual capacities.” Williams v. McLemore, 247 F. App’x 1, 8 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Lee v. Mich. Parole Bd., 104 F. App’x 6 Case 1:23-cv-00527-RSK ECF No. 6, PageID.29 Filed 06/12/23 Page 7 of 10 490, 493 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that the ADA does not “impose liability upon individuals”). Here, Plaintiff sues Defendant Anthony in his individual capacity only. Because Plaintiff may not pursue an ADA claim against Defendant Anthony in his individual capacity, his ADA claim will be dismissed. B. Section 1983 Claims The Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert constitutional claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). 1. Eighth Amendment Verbal Harassment The Court has construed Plaintiff to assert an Eighth Amendment claim premised upon Defendant Anthony’s verbal harassment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345– 46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with 7 Case 1:23-cv-00527-RSK ECF No. 6, PageID.30 Filed 06/12/23 Page 8 of 10 “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. “Routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). As a consequence, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id. In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner must show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that defendants acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims). The deliberate-indifference standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Anthony made the following statement: “You act like a f***in child. If you don’t have a f***ing callout to see mental health, get the f*** out of my face moron.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) While unprofessional, allegations of verbal harassment or threats by prison officials toward an inmate do not constitute punishment within the meaning of the Eighth 8 Case 1:23-cv-00527-RSK ECF No. 6, PageID.31 Filed 06/12/23 Page 9 of 10 Amendment. Ivey, 832 F.2d at 955. Nor do allegations of verbal harassment rise to the level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Id.; see Johnson v. Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that harassment and verbal abuse do not constitute the type of infliction of pain that the Eighth Amendment prohibits). The Court, therefore, will dismiss any intended Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Anthony premised upon verbal harassment. 2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process The Court has also construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim premised upon Plaintiff’s loss of his food service position. “The Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from deprivation of life, liberty[,] or property, without due process of law.” Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must show that one of these interests is at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Analysis of a procedural due process claim involves two steps: “[T]he first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s claim fails at the first step, however, because “no prisoner has a constitutional right to a particular job or to any job.” See Ivey, 832 F.2d at 955; see also Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing that prisoners have no constitutional right to rehabilitation, education or jobs); Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 374 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no constitutional right to prison employment); Moreover, “as the Constitution and federal law do not create a property right for inmates in a job, they likewise do not create a property right to wages for work performed by inmates.” See Carter v. Tucker, 69 F. App’x 678, 80 (6th 9 Case 1:23-cv-00527-RSK ECF No. 6, PageID.32 Filed 06/12/23 Page 10 of 10 Cir. 2003) (citing Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991); James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 629–30 (3d Cir. 1989)). Consequently, Plaintiff’s loss of his job assignment in food service did not trigger a right to due process, and any Fourteenth Amendment due process claim premised upon the loss of his job will be dismissed. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: /s/ Ray Kent Ray Kent United States Magistrate Judge June 12, 2023 10

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