Price #925727 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al, No. 1:2023cv00430 - Document 7 (W.D. Mich. 2023)

Court Description: OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Sally J. Berens (jln)

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Price &#035;925727 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al Doc. 7 Case 1:23-cv-00430-SJB ECF No. 7, PageID.26 Filed 05/17/23 Page 1 of 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______ JAMON PRICE, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:23-cv-430 Honorable Sally J. Berens MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 6.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is Dockets.Justia.com Case 1:23-cv-00430-SJB ECF No. 7, PageID.27 Filed 05/17/23 Page 2 of 10 fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a 2 Case 1:23-cv-00430-SJB ECF No. 7, PageID.28 Filed 05/17/23 Page 3 of 10 consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), Washington, and Rewerts. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, all claims against Defendant Gregory in his official capacity. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Gregory, individually, for failure to protect remains in the case. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the MDOC at the Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm County, Michigan. Plaintiff 1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). 3 Case 1:23-cv-00430-SJB ECF No. 7, PageID.29 Filed 05/17/23 Page 4 of 10 sues the MDOC, and Director of the MDOC Heidi E. Washington, DRF Warden R. Rewerts, and DRF Corrections Officer Unknown Gregory, each in his or her official capacity. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff alleges that, on June 9, 2021, Plaintiff was involved in a fight with non-party Inmate Page. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gregory helped non-party Corrections Officer Cupp secure the fight and put Plaintiff in handcuffs. (Id.) Defendant Gregory then walked Inmate Page toward Plaintiff and allowed Inmate Page to kick Plaintiff in the face, “[d]irected by him.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the MDOC was personally involved in the incident alleged because DRF is an MDOC facility. (Id.) He further alleges that Defendants Washington and Rewerts were personally involved because each was responsible for ensuring proper training of DRF staff. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. (Id., PageID.4.) Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer 4 Case 1:23-cv-00430-SJB ECF No. 7, PageID.30 Filed 05/17/23 Page 5 of 10 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Here, the Court will address Plaintiff’s allegations as bringing Eighth Amendment claims against all Defendants. A. Defendant MDOC and Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff sues the MDOC and all Defendants in their official capacities only. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit brought against the governmental entity: in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 5 Case 1:23-cv-00430-SJB ECF No. 7, PageID.31 Filed 05/17/23 Page 6 of 10 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a Section 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under Section 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66); Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the MDOC on grounds of immunity and for failure to state a claim. Additionally, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Defendants Washington, Rewerts, and Gregory in their official capacities. In addition to bringing a claim for damages, Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief. Although damages claims against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed on grounds of immunity, an official capacity action seeking injunctive relief may constitute an exception to sovereign immunity. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that, “Ex parte Young can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Here, Plaintiff 6 Case 1:23-cv-00430-SJB ECF No. 7, PageID.32 Filed 05/17/23 Page 7 of 10 is no longer confined at DRF, which is where he avers that Defendants Gregory and Rewerts are employed and where the harm allegedly occurred. The Sixth Circuit has held that transfer to another correctional facility moots a prisoner’s claims for injunctive relief. See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a prisoner-plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief became moot when the prisoner was transferred from the prison about which he complained); Mowatt v. Brown, No. 89-1955, 1990 WL 59896 (6th Cir. May 9, 1990); Tate v. Brown, No. 89-1944, 1990 WL 58403 (6th Cir. May 3, 1990); Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991). Underlying this rule is the premise that such relief is appropriate only where plaintiff can show a reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability that he is in immediate danger of sustaining direct future injury as the result of the challenged official conduct. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). Past exposure to an isolated incident of illegal conduct does not, by itself, sufficiently prove that the plaintiff will be subjected to the illegal conduct again. See, e.g., id.; Alvarez v. City of Chicago, 649 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Bruscino v. Carlson, 654 F. Supp. 609, 614, 618 (S.D. Ill. 1987), aff’d, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974). Plaintiff has been transferred to LMF and has not alleged facts that would show that Plaintiff will be subjected to further future conduct by the individual Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff does not seek relief properly characterized as prospective. See Ladd, 971 F.3d at 581. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims in their entirety. B. Individual Capacity Claims Given Plaintiff’s allegations of personal involvement (ECF No. 1, PageID.3), the Court will liberally construe Plaintiff’s complaint as also bringing Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Washington, Rewerts, and Gregory in their respective individual capacities. 7 Case 1:23-cv-00430-SJB ECF No. 7, PageID.33 Filed 05/17/23 Page 8 of 10 Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Thus, prison staff are obliged “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984). Because officials have “stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of self-protection[,]” “officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (citations omitted). To properly plead liability under the Eighth Amendment for a claim based on a failure to prevent harm to a prisoner, a plaintiff must show that the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm facing the plaintiff. Id. at 834; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766–67 (6th Cir. 2011); Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence and requires that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Bishop, 636 F.3d at 766–67. 1. Defendant Gregory Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gregory helped non-party Corrections Officer Cupp secure the fight between Plaintiff and Inmate Page and helped to place Plaintiff in handcuffs. (ECF No. 1, Page.3.) Plaintiff claims that, when Defendant Gregory was escorting Inmate Page, Defendant Gregory walked Inmate Page toward Plaintiff and “allowed him to kick [Plaintiff] in [the] face[,] directed by him.” (Id.) Although Plaintiff’s allegations are imprecise, considering that Defendant 8 Case 1:23-cv-00430-SJB ECF No. 7, PageID.34 Filed 05/17/23 Page 9 of 10 Gregory was aware that Plaintiff and Inmate Page had only just recently been involved in a fight that had required officer intervention and restraint, and then brought Inmate Page near Plaintiff, apparently at Inmate Page’s direction, which allowed Inmate Page to kick Plaintiff Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Gregory for failure to protect Plaintiff from harm may not be dismissed on screening. 2. Defendants Washington and Rewerts Plaintiff faults Defendants Washington and Rewerts for the wrongs he suffered at the hands of others. He sweepingly alleges that Defendants Washington and Rewerts are liable for the incident of June 9, 2021, because they are responsible for ensuring proper training. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) However, “individual liability on a failure-to-train or supervise theory ‘must be based on more than respondeat superior, or the right to control employees.’” Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 475 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official: “[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” 9 Case 1:23-cv-00430-SJB ECF No. 7, PageID.35 Filed 05/17/23 Page 10 of 10 Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300) (citing Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375–76 (1976); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege even any fact that would support his conclusory claim for failure to train. He does not describe the training program in place or its deficiencies and does not allege that Defendants Washington and Rewerts were on notice of a lack of training or of a risk to Plaintiff such that it could be said that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under Section 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678– 79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Court will therefore dismiss any claims against Defendants Washington and Rewerts individually. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Defendants MDOC, Washington, and Rewerts will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, all claims against Defendant Gregory in his official capacity. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Gregory, individually, for failure to protect remains in the case. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: May 17, 2023 /s/ Sally J. Berens SALLY J. BERENS United States Magistrate Judge 10

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