Allen #790209 v. Higgins et al, No. 1:2022cv00841 - Document 7 (W.D. Mich. 2022)
Court Description: OPINION; order to issue; signed by District Judge Jane M. Beckering (lep)
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Allen &#035;790209 v. Higgins et al Doc. 7 Case 1:22-cv-00841-JMB-PJG ECF No. 7, PageID.34 Filed 11/22/22 Page 1 of 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______ JERMAINE JAMAL ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:22-cv-841 Honorable Jane M. Beckering UNKNOWN HIGGINS et al., Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In an order (ECF No. 5) entered on October 17, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis because he had sufficient funds to pay the full filing fee. Plaintiff subsequently paid the full filing fee on November 2, 2022. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Skipper and Atkins. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, as well as any intended claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, against Dockets.Justia.com Case 1:22-cv-00841-JMB-PJG ECF No. 7, PageID.35 Filed 11/22/22 Page 2 of 10 Defendant Higgins. Plaintiff’s personal capacity Eighth Amendment claim for damages against Defendant Higgins premised upon the denial of medical care remains in the case. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Michigan Reformatory (RMI) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Deputy Warden G. Skipper, Sergeant A. Atkins, and Corrections Officer Unknown Higgins. Plaintiff sues all Defendants in their official capacities, and Plaintiff sues Defendant Higgins in his personal capacity as well. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff alleges that on June 7, 2021, he began experiencing chest pains and felt his “heart hurting.” (Id., PageID.3.) He told the regular unit officer that he was having a medical emergency and needed medical attention. (Id.) In Plaintiff’s grievance regarding the issue, which he attached to his complaint, Plaintiff states that he told Defendant Higgins that Plaintiff was experiencing chest pains. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.8.) Plaintiff claims that in response to his request, Defendant Higgins told Plaintiff that he “look[ed] fine” and continued his rounds. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Higgins did not “alert the medical staff.” (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff passed out. (Id.) When Plaintiff came to, third shift was on duty, and he “still felt the same pain in [his] chest and heart.” (Id.) Plaintiff told the unit officer that he needed medical attention. (Id.) Shift command walked him to the medical department, and he was seen by Registered Nurse Mary Eikenhout (not a party). (Id.) She was concerned about Plaintiff’s heart rate, and Plaintiff was 2 Case 1:22-cv-00841-JMB-PJG ECF No. 7, PageID.36 Filed 11/22/22 Page 3 of 10 “rushed” to the Sparrow Lansing Michigan Hospital. (Id.) After days of tests and treatment, surgery was performed to place a pacemaker in Plaintiff’s upper chest. (Id.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff contends that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when Defendant Higgins failed to obtain medical assistance for him when Plaintiff requested such. (Id.) Plaintiff does not specify what relief he seeks. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). 3 Case 1:22-cv-00841-JMB-PJG ECF No. 7, PageID.37 Filed 11/22/22 Page 4 of 10 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). As noted supra, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Higgins violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to seek medical attention for Plaintiff. A. Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff names all Defendants in their official capacities and names Defendant Higgins in his personal capacity as well. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Although an action against a defendant in his or her individual capacity intends to impose liability on the specified individual, an action against the same defendant in his or her official capacity intends to impose liability only on the entity that they represent. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). A suit against an individual in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit brought against the governmental entity: in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 4 Case 1:22-cv-00841-JMB-PJG ECF No. 7, PageID.38 Filed 11/22/22 Page 5 of 10 1986). In numerous opinions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff does not specify what relief he seeks in this action. Official capacity defendants, however, are absolutely immune from monetary damages. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998). The Court, therefore, will dismiss any claims for monetary damages Plaintiff asserts against Defendants in their official capacities. Although damages claims against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed, an official capacity action seeking injunctive relief constitutes an exception to sovereign immunity. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). The United States Supreme Court has determined that a suit under Ex Parte Young for prospective injunctive relief should not be treated as an action against the state. Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14. Instead, the doctrine is a fiction recognizing that unconstitutional acts cannot have been authorized by the state and therefore cannot be considered done under the state's authority. Id. Importantly, “Ex parte Young can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Plaintiff, however, is no longer confined at RMI, where he avers that the individual Defendants are employed. The Sixth Circuit has held that transfer to another prison facility moots a prisoner’s claims for declaratory and injunctive 5 Case 1:22-cv-00841-JMB-PJG ECF No. 7, PageID.39 Filed 11/22/22 Page 6 of 10 relief. See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996). Underlying this rule is the premise that injunctive relief is appropriate only where plaintiff can show a reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability that he is in immediate danger of sustaining direct future injury as the result of the challenged official conduct. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). Past exposure to an isolated incident of illegal conduct does not, by itself, sufficiently prove that the plaintiff will be subjected to the illegal conduct again. See, e.g., id.; Alvarez v. City of Chicago, 649 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Bruscino v. Carlson, 654 F. Supp. 609, 614, 618 (S.D. Ill. 1987), aff’d, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974). Plaintiff is now incarcerated at LRF, and the individual Defendants are not employed at that facility. Plaintiff, therefore, cannot maintain claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the individual Defendants, and any such claims will be dismissed. 1 Given the dismissal of Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, only Plaintiff’s personal capacity claim against Defendant Higgins remains. B. Personal Capacity Claim Against Defendant Higgins Plaintiff contends that Defendant Higgins violated his Eighth Amendment rights when Plaintiff asked for medical attention and Defendant Higgins told him that he “look[ed] fine” and walked away to continue rounds. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) In his grievance regarding the incident, Plaintiff stated that he told Defendant Higgins that he was experiencing chest pains, and that Defendant Higgins failed to alert medical staff. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.8.) The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 1 To the extent Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants in their individual capacities, such claims will also be dismissed for the reasons set forth above. 6 Case 1:22-cv-00841-JMB-PJG ECF No. 7, PageID.40 Filed 11/22/22 Page 7 of 10 103–04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104–05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). Deliberate indifference may be manifested by a doctor’s failure to respond to the medical needs of a prisoner, or by “prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008). Obviousness, however, is not strictly limited to what is detectable to the eye. Even if the layman cannot see the medical need, a condition may be obviously medically serious where a layman, if informed of the true medical situation, would deem the need for medical attention clear. See, e.g., Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 446–51 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prisoner who died from a perforated duodenum exhibited an “objectively serious need for medical treatment,” even though his symptoms appeared to the medical staff at the time to be consistent with alcohol withdrawal); Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoner’s severed tendon was a “quite obvious” medical need, since “any lay person 7 Case 1:22-cv-00841-JMB-PJG ECF No. 7, PageID.41 Filed 11/22/22 Page 8 of 10 would realize to be serious,” even though the condition was not visually obvious). If the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on “the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment,” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To prove a defendant’s subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence . . . : A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842)). However, not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court explained: [A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 8 Case 1:22-cv-00841-JMB-PJG ECF No. 7, PageID.42 Filed 11/22/22 Page 9 of 10 Id. at 105–06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017); Briggs v. Westcomb, 801 F. App’x 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2020); Mitchell v. Hininger, 553 F. App’x 602, 605 (2014). This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997). The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If “a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Id.; see also Rouster, 749 F.3d at 448; Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); Kellerman v. Simpson, 258 F. App’x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006); Edmonds v. Horton, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Crall, 8 F. App’x 439, 440–41 (6th Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998). “Where the claimant received treatment for his condition, as here, he must show that his treatment was ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’” Mitchell, 553 F. App’x at 605 (quoting Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). He must demonstrate that the care he received was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” See Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)). 9 Case 1:22-cv-00841-JMB-PJG ECF No. 7, PageID.43 Filed 11/22/22 Page 10 of 10 Chest pains can constitute a serious medical need for purposes of the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim. See Fennell v. Bonner, No. 2:20-cv-2844-JTF-atc, 2021 WL 3891590, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2021) (assuming, for screening purposes, that chest pains are a serious medical need). As noted supra, Plaintiff contends that he told Defendant Higgins that he was experiencing chest pains and needed medical attention, and that Defendant Higgins ignored his request and continued rounds. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff passed out. Although Plaintiff has by no means proven deliberate indifference, at this stage of the proceedings, taking Plaintiff's allegations as true and in the light most favorable to him, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim premised upon denial of medical care against Defendant Higgins may not be dismissed on initial review. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Defendants Skipper and Atkins will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, as well as any intended claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, against Defendant Higgins. Plaintiff’s personal capacity Eighth Amendment claim for damages against Defendant Higgins premised upon the denial of medical care remains in the case. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: November 22, 2022 /s/ Jane M. Beckering Jane M. Beckering United States District Judge 10
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