Harrell #678078 v. McKee, No. 1:2014cv00945 - Document 3 (W.D. Mich. 2014)

Court Description: OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)

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Harrell #678078 v. McKee Doc. 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION TRAVIS BURTON HARRELL, Petitioner, v. Case No. 1:14-cv-945 Honorable Robert J. Jonker KENNETH T. McKEE, Respondent. _______________________________/ OPINION This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court. Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to screen out petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim. Dockets.Justia.com Factual Allegations Petitioner Travis Burton Harrell presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility. He was convicted by guilty pleas of two counts of first-degree home invasion, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.110a(2). On March 3, 2008, he was sentenced to a prison term of two years and six months to twenty years. Petitioner does not challenge his underlying conviction, but instead challenges the procedures used by the Michigan Parole Board to suspend its October 8, 2010 parole decision granting Petitioner parole with a projected parole date of January 5, 2011. Petitioner asserts that, in reaching its decision, the parole board relied on inaccurate information and failed to comply with MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.233e and he vaguely asserts that false charges of alleged misconduct were used to suspend his grant of parole. (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#14.) Additionally, Petitioner challenges the Michigan Parole Board s decision to continue to deny him parole, most recently on September 27, 2013. Finally, Petitioner vaguely alleges that the denial of parole violated his right to equal protection. Petitioner seeks a new parole hearing based on accurate information and proper application of state law and immediate parole. Discussion Petitioner claims that Defendant violated his due process rights by relying on false information and failing to conduct its decisionmaking within the requirements of state law and policy. To establish a procedural due process violation, a Petitioner must prove that (1) he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) such deprivation occurred without the requisite due process of law. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Swihart v. Wilkinson, 209 F. App x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2006). -2- Petitioner fails to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude because he has no liberty interest in being released on parole. There is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Although a state may establish a parole system, it has no duty to do so; thus, the presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. Id. at 7, 11; Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather, a liberty interest is present only if state law entitles an inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991). In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-165 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Sixth Circuit, noting the broad powers of the Michigan authorities to deny parole, held that the Michigan system does not create a liberty interest in parole. In a recent published decision, the Sixth Circuit reiterated the continuing validity of Sweeton. See Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2011). In Crump, the court held that the adoption of specific parole guidelines since Sweeton does not lead to the conclusion that parole release is mandated upon reaching a high probability of parole. See id.; see also Carnes v. Engler, 76 F. App x 79, 80 (6th Cir. 2003). In addition, the Sixth Circuit has rejected the argument that the Due Process Clause is implicated when changes to parole procedures and practices have resulted in incarcerations that exceed the subjective expectation of the sentencing judge. See Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 369 (6th Cir. 2010). Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that there exists no liberty interest in parole under the Michigan system. Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Mich. 1999). As a consequence, Petitioner has no liberty interest in the Michigan parole procedures. -3- Petitioner s related allegation that Respondent relied on false information to deny his parole also fails to raise a meritorious federal claim. Because Petitioner has no liberty interest in being paroled, he cannot show that the false information was relied upon to a constitutionally significant degree. See Caldwell v. McNutt, No. 04-2335, 2006 WL 45275, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2006) ( [E]ven if the Parole Board relied on inaccurate information to deny Caldwell parole, it did not violate any liberty interest protected by the United States Constitution. ); Echlin v. Boland, No. 03-2309, 2004 WL 2203550, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2004) (prisoner could not bring a § 1983 action to challenge the information considered by the parole board because he has no liberty interest in parole); see also Draughn v. Green, No. 97-1263, 1999 WL 164915, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 1999) (in order for the Due Process Clause to be implicated, false information in a prisoner s file must be relied on to a constitutionally significant degree); Pukyrys v. Olson, No. 95-1778, 1996 WL 636140, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1996) (no constitutional violation by having false information placed in a prison file); Carson v. Little, No. 88-1505, 1989 WL 40171, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 1989) (inaccurate information in an inmate s file does not amount to a constitutional violation). Therefore, Petitioner fails to state a claim for a violation of his due process rights arising from the inaccurate information contained in his file. Petitioner s vague allegation that false charges of alleged misconduct were used to suspend his grant of parole, also fails to raise a meritorious claim. (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#14.) A prisoner s ability to challenge a prison misconduct conviction depends on whether the conviction implicated any liberty interest. In the seminal case in this area, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court prescribed certain minimal procedural safeguards that prison officials must follow before depriving a prisoner of good-time credits on account of alleged misbehavior. The -4- Wolff Court did not create a free-floating right to process that attaches to all prison disciplinary proceedings; rather the right to process arises only when the prisoner faces a loss of liberty, in the form of a longer prison sentence caused by forfeiture of good-time credits: It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison. But here the State itself has not only provided a statutory right to good time but also specifies that it is to be forfeited only for serious misbehavior. Nebraska may have the authority to create, or not, a right to a shortened prison sentence through the accumulation of credits for good behavior, and it is true that the Due Process Clause does not require a hearing in every conceivable case of government impairment of private interest. But the State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment liberty to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not allege that his misconduct convictions resulted in any loss of goodtime credits, nor could he. The Sixth Circuit has examined Michigan statutory law, as it relates to the creation and forfeiture of disciplinary credits1 for prisoners convicted of crimes occurring after April 1, 1987. In Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2007), the court determined that loss of disciplinary credits does not necessarily affect the duration of a prisoner s sentence. Rather, it merely affects parole eligibility, which remains discretionary with the parole board. Id. at 440. Building on this ruling, in Nali v. Ekman, 355 F. App x 909 (6th Cir. 2009), the court held that a misconduct citation in the Michigan prison system does not affect a prisoner s constitutionally protected liberty interests, because it does not necessarily affect the length of confinement. 355 F. App x at 912; accord, Taylor v. Lantagne, 418 F. App x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2011); Wilson v. 1 For crimes committed after April 1, 1987, Michigan prisoners earn disciplinary credits under a statute that abolished the former good-time system. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33(5). -5- Rapelje, No. 09-13030, 2010 WL 5491196, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2010) (Report & Recommendation) (holding that plaintiff s disciplinary hearing and major misconduct sanction does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause ), adopted as judgment of court, 2011 WL 5491196 (Jan. 4, 2011). In the absence of a protectible liberty interest permitting Petitioner to challenge his misconduct conviction, Petitioner has no due process claim based on the use of allegedly false misconduct charges to suspend his projected parole date. However, even in the absence of a protectible liberty interest in disciplinary credits, a prisoner may be able to raise a due process challenge to prison misconduct convictions that result in a significant, atypical deprivation. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Petitioner has not identified any significant deprivation arising from his convictions. Although Petitioner presumably would claim that the failure to receive parole is a significant deprivation, as explained above, Petitioner has no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of his prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Unless a prison misconduct conviction results in an extension of the duration of a prisoner s sentence or some other atypical hardship, a due process claim fails. Ingram v. Jewell, 94 F. App x 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2004). Until Petitioner has served his maximum sentence of twenty years, he has no reasonable expectation of liberty. The discretionary parole system in Michigan holds out no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. The Michigan Parole Board s failure or refusal to follow its own procedures, its use of false or misleading information or its use of allegedly false misconduct charges or convictions, implicates no federal right. Consequently, Petitioner fails to raise a meritorious due process claim. -6- To the extent that Petitioner seeks to challenge the suspension of his projected parole date as a parole revocation, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies in the state court. The Supreme Court has recognized a parolee s due process right to adequate procedures leading up to the revocation of parole. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 489 (1972). However, a prisoner must exhaust state remedies for these claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see Sneed v. Donahue, 993 F.2d 1239, 1241 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that petitioner had exhausted all state remedies before bringing habeas action); Brewer v. Dahlberg, 942 F.2d 328, 337 (6th Cir. 1991) (dismissing challenge to state parole revocation because state remedies arguably available). Parole revocations may be reviewed under Michigan s Administrative Procedures Act. See Penn v. Dep t of Corr., 298 N.W.2d 756, 757-58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). In addition, a parolee may attack a revocation decision by a state petition for habeas corpus. See Hinton v. Parole Bd., 383 N.W.2d 626, 629-30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Triplett v. Deputy Warden, 371 N.W.2d 862, 865-66 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); see also Caley v. Hudson, 759 F. Supp. 378, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (dismissing federal habeas corpus petition by a state prisoner for lack of exhaustion of his available state habeas corpus action to challenge revocation of parole). Until Petitioner has exhausted his claims by presenting them to all levels of state judicial review, he may not maintain a habeas corpus action challenging the alleged revocation of his parole. Finally, to the extent that Petitioner seeks to challenge the denial of parole on equal protection grounds, he fails to state a claim. The Equal Protection Clause commands that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A state practice generally will not require strict scrutiny unless it interferes with a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class of individuals. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. -7- Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Plaintiff does not suggest that he is a member of a suspect class, and prisoners are not considered a suspect class for purposes of equal protection litigation. Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir.1998). In addition, as explained above, prisoners do not have a fundamental right to parole. Because neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is at issue, Plaintiff s claim is reviewed under the rational basis standard. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 298 (6th Cir. 2006). Under rational basis scrutiny, government action amounts to a constitutional violation only if it is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that the court can only conclude that the government s actions were irrational. Id. (quoting Warren v. City of Athens, 411 F.3d 697, 710 (6th Cir. 2005)). To prove his equal protection claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate intentional and arbitrary discrimination by the state; that is, he must demonstrate that he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Petitioner fails to set forth any facts to suggest that he has been intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated prisoners. Consequently he fails to state an equal protection claim. Conclusion In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioner s application pursuant to Rule 4 because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim. Certificate of Appealability Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a -8- substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court s dismissal of Petitioner s action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is somewhat anomalous for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Comm r of Corr. of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (it was intrinsically contradictory to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this Court has examined each of Petitioner s claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. Id. A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 -9- (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner s claims. Id. The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court s dismissal of Petitioner s claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability. A Judgment and Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered. Dated: September 25, 2014 /s/ Robert J. Jonker ROBERT J. JONKER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -10-

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