Buyck v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 1:2014cv00389 - Document 17 (W.D. Mich. 2015)
Court Description: OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody (Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody, jal)
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Buyck v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION JACQUELINE BUYCK, Plaintiff, Hon. Ellen S. Carmody v. Case No. 1:14-cv-389 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. _____________________________________/ OPINION This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. On June 26, 2014, the parties agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of final judgment. (Dkt. #10). Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. 1 Dockets.Justia.com STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court’s jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner’s decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This standard affords 2 to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545. PROCEDURAL POSTURE Plaintiff was 37 years of age on her alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 130). She successfully completed high school, but has no past relevant work experience. (Tr. 20). Plaintiff applied for benefits on April 29, 2011, alleging that she had been disabled since December 1, 2002, due to bi-polar disorder, rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis, degenerative disc disease, and fibromyalgia. (Tr. 130-37, 150). Plaintiff’s application was denied, after which time she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 56-129). On October 4, 2012, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Paul Jones with testimony being presented by Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (Tr. 26-55). In a written decision dated November 30, 2012, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 13-21). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s determination, rendering it the Commissioner’s final decision in the matter. (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).1 If the Commissioner can make a 1 1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be “disabled” regardless of medical findings (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b)); 2. An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found “disabled” (20 C.F.R. 3 dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945. The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff’s shoulders, and she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from: (1) degenerative disc disease; (2) seizures; (3) anxiety disorder; and (4) hepatitis C, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment 404.1520(c)); 3. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the duration requirement and which “meets or equals” a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of “disabled” will be made without consideration of vocational factors (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d)); 4. If an individual is capable of performing work he or she has done in the past, a finding of “not disabled” must be made (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e)); 5. If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work can be performed (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(f)). 4 identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 15-16). With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform sedentary work2 subject to the following limitations: (1) she can occasionally climb ramps/stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (2) she can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel crouch, and crawl; (3) she is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks requiring only occasional changes in the work setting; and (4) she can interact with the public only occasionally. (Tr. 16). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work experience, at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform, her limitations notwithstanding. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. While the ALJ is not required to question a vocational expert on this issue, “a finding supported by substantial evidence that a claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs” is needed to meet the burden. O’Banner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 587 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). This standard requires more than mere intuition or conjecture by the ALJ that the claimant can perform specific jobs in the national economy. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. Accordingly, ALJs routinely question vocational experts in an attempt to determine whether there exist a significant number of jobs which a particular claimant can perform, his limitations notwithstanding. Such was the case here, as the ALJ questioned a vocational expert. The vocational expert reported that there existed in the lower peninsula of Michigan 2 Sedentary work involves lifting “no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 416.967. Furthermore, while sedentary work “is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties.” Id. 5 approximately 6,700 jobs which an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform, such limitations notwithstanding. (Tr. 41-43). This represents a significant number of jobs. See Born v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 923 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security, 170 Fed. Appx. 369, 374 (6th Cir., Mar. 1, 2006). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability benefits. I. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Evidence On September 14, 2012, Dr. Joel Bez completed a form assessment regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform physical work-related activities. (Tr. 447-50). The ALJ afforded “little weight” to Dr. Bez’s opinions. (Tr. 18-19). Plaintiff asserts that because Dr. Bez was her treating physician, the ALJ was obligated to afford controlling weight to his opinions. The treating physician doctrine recognizes that medical professionals who have a long history of caring for a claimant and her maladies generally possess significant insight into her medical condition. See Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). An ALJ must, therefore, give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source if: (1) the opinion is “wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and (2) the opinion “is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.” Gayheart v. Commissioner of Social Security, 710 F.3d 365, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Such deference is appropriate, however, only where the particular opinion “is based upon sufficient medical data.” Miller v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 1991 WL 229979 at *2 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1991) (citing Shavers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 232, 6 235 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987)). The ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician where such is unsupported by the medical record, merely states a conclusion, or is contradicted by substantial medical evidence. See Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528; Miller v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 1991 WL 229979 at *2 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1991) (citing Shavers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 232, 235 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987)); Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1994). If an ALJ accords less than controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion, the ALJ must “give good reasons” for doing so. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. Such reasons must be “supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” This requirement “ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the rule.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)). Simply stating that the physician’s opinions “are not well-supported by any objective findings and are inconsistent with other credible evidence” is, without more, too “ambiguous” to permit meaningful review of the ALJ’s assessment. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376-77. If the ALJ affords less than controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ must still determine the weight to be afforded such. Id. at 376. In doing so, the ALJ must consider the following factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and frequency of the examination, (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) supportability of the opinion, (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5) the specialization of the treating source, and (6) other relevant factors. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). While the ALJ is not required to 7 explicitly discuss each of these factors, the record must nevertheless reflect that the ALJ considered those factors relevant to his assessment. See, e.g., Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007); Undheim v. Barnhart, 214 Fed. Appx. 448, 450 (5th Cir., Jan. 19, 2007). Dr. Bez opined that Plaintiff suffers from extreme physical limitations. Specifically, the doctor reported that Plaintiff can sit for only 30 minutes and is unable to stand or walk for any amount of time. (Tr. 447). The doctor reported that Plaintiff can lift/carry five pounds occasionally, but can never lift/carry ten pounds. (Tr. 448). While Dr. Bez was specifically requested to “identify what factors support [his] conclusions,” the doctor failed to do so. (Tr. 450). The medical evidence, however, fails to support Dr. Bez’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s physical limitations. The results of an October 20, 2011 examination revealed limited range of motion in Plaintiff’s dorsolumbar spine, but were otherwise unremarkable. (Tr. 381-84). During this examination, Plaintiff also reported that she had not experienced any seizures in the previous six months and had only experienced 5-6 seizures during the previous two years. (Tr. 381). While Plaintiff reported experiencing back pain, such did not radiate into her extremities and examination of her extremities revealed no evidence of weakness. (Tr. 411). A March 17, 2012 MRI of Plaintiff’s thoracic spine revealed degenerative changes, but further revealed that “the thoracic spinal cord is normal in contour and signal throughout.” (Tr. 417-18). On July 9, 2012, Plaintiff reported that her neck pain was stable. (Tr. 437). While there is evidence that Plaintiff experiences fibromyalgia, the record contains no evidence supporting Dr. Bez’s opinion that Plaintiff suffers from such extreme physical limitations. The ALJ discounted Dr. Bez’s opinions on the ground that such were contradicted by the record evidence. The ALJ further noted Dr. Bez’s failure to explain or describe the basis for his extreme opinions. The ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Bez’s opinion is 8 supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff also faults the ALJ for assigning “significant” weight to the November 15, 2011 report completed by medical consultant Dr. Harris Faigel. (Tr. 377-78). Plaintiff asserts that because Dr. Faigel’s conclusions were made without the benefit of subsequent medical evidence, the ALJ improperly relied on the doctor’s opinion. Plaintiff’s argument is misplaced. Adoption of Plaintiff’s logic would compel the conclusion that the only medical opinions which can be considered or afforded substantial weight are those rendered only after all relevant evidence has been procured. Plaintiff cites to no authority supporting such a position. The ALJ was aware of the fact that certain medical evidence was obtained after Dr. Faigel rendered his opinion. Such does not automatically render the doctor’s opinion infirm, but instead obligates the ALJ to consider such in the context of all the relevant medical evidence. See, e.g., Ealy v. Commissioner of Social Security, 594 F.3d 504, 513-14 (6th Cir. 2010). It is clear that the ALJ considered all the record evidence in evaluating Plaintiff’s claim. The ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Faigel’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this argument is rejected. CONCLUSION For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. A judgment consistent with this opinion will enter. Date: June 17, 2015 /s/ Ellen S. Carmody ELLEN S. CARMODY United States Magistrate Judge 9
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