Trotter #243134 v. DeWeerd et al, No. 1:2012cv00575 - Document 14 (W.D. Mich. 2012)
Court Description: OPINION; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION JOHNNY LEE TROTTER, Plaintiff, Case No. 1:12-cv-575 v. Honorable Janet T. Neff UNKNOWN DeWEERD et al., Defendants. ____________________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has paid the initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Factual Allegations Plaintiff Johnny Lee Trotter is a state prisoner incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF), where the events giving rise to the complaint took place. Plaintiff sues the following employees of ECF: Sgt. (unknown) DeWeerd and Resident Unit Officer (RUO) Garton-Borowicz. Plaintiff alleges that on December 2, 2011, Sgt. DeWeerd took fourteen bags of coffee out of Plaintiff s property locker. DeWeerd gave the bags of coffee to RUO GartonBorowicz, who then gave them to another prisoner. Plaintiff asserts that DeWeerd failed to give Plaintiff a contraband removal record form or notice of intent to conduct an administrative hearing form, as required by prison policy. (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#4.) As evidence of DeWeerd s failure to abide by prison procedure, Plaintiff refers to a written statement prepared by DeWeerd after Plaintiff filed a grievance about the incident. In his statement, DeWeerd asserts that Plaintiff came to him saying that Acosta, Plaintiff s cell-mate, had stolen some coffee from Plaintiff. (See Ex. 3 to Compl.) Plaintiff gave DeWeerd a paper bag containing individual bags of coffee that he had taken from under Acosta s mattress. After some questioning, Acosta claimed that he was the owner of the coffee and that he and Plaintiff had set up the situation so that they could be reassigned to a new room. DeWeerd states that Plaintiff could not provide a receipt proving ownership of the coffee, and that Plaintiff indicated to him that he did not want anything processed at that point because Plaintiff admitted taking the coffee from Acosta s bunk before he reported it stolen. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Garton-Borowicz intentionally falsified a contraband removal record form stating that the fourteen bags of coffee were confiscated from prisoner Acosta, -2- and that Acosta produced a receipt for the coffee, even though Defendant knew that Acosta had stolen the coffee from Plaintiff s locker. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, his right to equal protection, and his right to avoid cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. As relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, damages, and injunctive relief. Discussion I. Failure to state a claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ( Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. ). The court must determine whether the complaint contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged but it has not show[n] that -3- the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A. Due Process Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his right to due process by depriving him of property without the process required by prison policy. Plaintiff s due process claim is barred by the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Under Parratt, a person deprived of property by a random and unauthorized act of a state employee has no federal due process claim unless the state fails to afford an adequate post-deprivation remedy. If an adequate post-deprivation remedy exists, the deprivation, although real, is not without due process of law. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537. This rule applies to both negligent and intentional deprivation of property, as long as the deprivation was not done pursuant to an established state procedure. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984). Because Plaintiff s claim is premised upon allegedly unauthorized acts of state officials, he must plead and prove the inadequacy of state post-deprivation remedies. See Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, -4- 479-80 (6th Cir. 1995); Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1993). Under settled Sixth Circuit authority, a prisoner s failure to sustain this burden requires dismissal of his § 1983 dueprocess action. See Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff has not sustained his burden in this case. Plaintiff has not alleged that state post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. Moreover, numerous state post-deprivation remedies are available to him. First, a prisoner who incurs a loss through no fault of his own may petition the institution s Prisoner Benefit Fund for compensation. MICH. DEP T OF CORR., Policy Directive 04.07.112, ¶ B (effective July 9, 2012). Aggrieved prisoners may also submit claims for property loss of less than $1,000 to the State Administrative Board. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6419; Policy Directive, 04.07.112, ¶ B. Alternatively, Michigan law authorizes actions in the Court of Claims asserting tort or contract claims against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6419(1)(a). The Sixth Circuit specifically has held that Michigan provides adequate post-deprivation remedies for deprivation of property. See Copeland, 57 F.3d at 480. Plaintiff does not allege any reason why a state-court action would not afford him complete relief for the deprivation, either negligent or intentional, of his personal property. Accordingly, Plaintiff s due process claim will be dismissed. B. Equal Protection Plaintiff asserts, in conclusory fashion, that Defendants deprived him of his right to equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause commands that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A state practice generally will not require strict scrutiny unless it interferes with a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class of individuals. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 -5- (1976). Where, as here, neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is at issue, the rational basis review standard applies. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 298 (6th Cir. 2006). Under rational basis scrutiny, government action amounts to a constitutional violation only if it is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that the court can only conclude that the government s actions were irrational. Id. (quoting Warren v. City of Athens, 411 F.3d 697, 710 (6th Cir. 2005)). To prove his equal protection claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate intentional and arbitrary discrimination by the state; that is, he must demonstrate that he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Plaintiff s allegations regarding an equal protection violation are wholly conclusory. Plaintiff does not allege that he was treated differently from others who were similarly-situated. Accordingly, he fails to state an equal protection claim. C. Eighth Amendment The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be barbarous nor may it contravene society s evolving standards of decency. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life s necessities. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with deprivations of essential -6- food, medical care, or sanitation or other conditions intolerable for prison confinement. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Not every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. There is no indication that Defendants conduct deprived Plaintiff of the minimum civilized measure of life s necessities, or threatened Plaintiff s health or safety. Cf. Hunter v. Sherman, 49 F. App x 611, 612 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that a prisoner cannot state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to the security of his property ). Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the three-strikes rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). -7- A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered. Dated: October 9, 2012 /s/ Janet T. Neff Janet T. Neff United States District Judge -8-
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
