Jackson #178642 v. Palmer, No. 1:2008cv01116 - Document 4 (W.D. Mich. 2008)
Court Description: OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION STANLEY JACKSON, Petitioner, Case No. 1:08-cv-1116 v. Honorable Robert Holmes Bell CARMEN PALMER, Respondent. ____________________________________ OPINION This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court. Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to screen out petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim. Factual Allegations Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Michigan Reformatory (RMI). Petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of armed robbery, MICH . COMP. LAWS § 750.529. On February 19, 1995, he was sentenced by the Wayne County Circuit Court to a term of incarceration of 15 to 30 years. Petitioner states six grounds for relief. The first five grounds all assert that his due process rights were violated because the Parole Board used false information to deny [Petitioner] parole. (Pet. at 6, docket #1.) Petitioner states that the following false information was placed in his file and considered by the Parole Board: (1) a letter dated June 21, 2002, stating that Petitioner has a juvenile criminal history of criminal sexual conduct (CSC) convictions (id. at 6); (2) a March 28, 2006 grievance stating that Petitioner has prior CSC convictions (id. at 8); (3) information that Petitioner committed a new crime while on parole, when Petitioner was never on parole (id. at 9); (4) information that Petitioner has a history of probation failure, which, in turn, was used to prove that he had a history or juvenile convictions and CSC convictions (id. at 10); (5) false statements that Petitioner has a history of substance abuse (id. at 11). Petitioner s sixth ground appears to assert that his due process rights were violated because the members of the Parole Board were not charged with a felony crime for placing false information in Petitioner s parole file intending to defraud Petitioner of his liberty. (Id. at 11.) Discussion Petitioner s allegations that his due process rights were violated when the Parole Board relied on false information to deny his parole fail to raise a meritorious federal claim. To establish a procedural due process violation, a petitioner must prove that (1) he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) such deprivation occurred without the requisite due -2- process of law. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir.2006); see also Swihart v. Wilkinson, 209 F. App x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff fails to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude because he has no liberty interest in being released on parole. There is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Although a state may establish a parole system, it has no duty to do so; thus, the presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. Id. at 7, 11; Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather, a liberty interest is present only if state law entitles an inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991). In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-165 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Sixth Circuit, noting the broad powers of the Michigan authorities to deny parole, held that the Michigan system does not create a liberty interest in parole. Subsequent to its 1994 decision, the Sixth Circuit has recognized the continuing validity of Sweeton and has continued to find that Michigan s parole scheme creates no liberty interest in being released on parole. See Ward v. Stegall, 93 F. App x 805, 806 (6th Cir. 2004); Martin v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 83 F. App x 114, 155 (6th Cir. 2003); Bullock v. McGinnis, 5 F. App x 340, 342 (6th Cir. 2001); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000 WL 1679478, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000); Hawkins v. Abramajtys, No. 99-1995, 2000 WL 1434695, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 2000); Irvin v. Mich. Parole Bd., No. 99-1817, 2000 WL 800029, at *2 (6th Cir. June 14, 2000); Clifton v. Gach, No. 98-2239, 1999 WL 1253069, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 1999). -3- Also, in unpublished decisions, the Sixth Circuit has held that particular parts of Michigan s statutory parole scheme do not create a liberty interest in parole. See Fifer v. Mich. Dep t of Corr., No. 96-2322, 1997 WL 681518, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1997); Moran v. McGinnis, No. 95-1330, 1996 WL 304344, at *2 (6th Cir. June 5, 1996); Leaphart v. Gach, No. 95-1639, 1995 WL 734480, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995); Vertin v. Gabry, No. 94-2267, 1995 WL 613692, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 18, 1995); Neff v. Johnson, No. 92-1818, 1993 WL 11880, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1993); Janiskee v. Mich. Dep t of Corr., No. 91-1103, 1991 WL 76181, at *1 (6th Cir. May 9, 1991); Haynes v. Hudson, No. 89-2006, 1990 WL 41025, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 1990). In addition, the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that there exists no liberty interest in parole under the Michigan system. Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Mich. 1999). Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has held that the presence of specific parole guidelines does not lead to the conclusion that parole release is mandated upon reaching a high probability of parole. Carnes v. Engler, 76 F. App x 79, 80 (6th Cir. 2003). As stated by the Supreme Court, a state s scheme may be specific or general in defining the factors to be considered by the parole authority without necessarily mandating parole. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7-8. At the time that Sweeton was decided, there were statutory factors to be considered by the parole board. See Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1165 n.1 (noting that MICH . COMP. LAWS § 791.235 listed a large number of factors to be taken into account by the board ). Although the current parole guidelines may be more detailed than the former statutory provision, they are still nothing more than factors that are considered by the board in assessing whether parole is appropriate. Carnes, 76 F. App x at 80. -4- Until Plaintiff has served his thirty-year maximum sentence, he has no reasonable expectation of liberty. In the absence of a liberty interest, even an allegation of arbitrary or capricious denial of release on parole states no federal claim. See Haynes, 1990 WL 41025, at *1. The discretionary parole system in Michigan holds out no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in being paroled, he cannot show that the false information was relied upon to a constitutionally-significant degree. See Caldwell v. McNutt, No. 04-2335, 2006 WL 45275, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2006) ( [E]ven if the Parole Board relied on inaccurate information to deny Caldwell parole, it did not violate any liberty interest protected by the United States Constitution. ); Echlin v. Boland, No. 03-2309, 2004 WL 2203550, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2004) (prisoner could not bring a § 1983 action to challenge the information considered by the parole board because he has no liberty interest in parole); see also Draughn v. Green, No. 971263, 1999 WL 164915, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 1999) (in order for the Due Process Clause to be implicated, false information in a prisoner s file must be relied on to a constitutionally significant degree); Pukyrys v. Olson, No. 95-1778, 1996 WL 636140, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1996) (no constitutional violation by having false information placed in a prison file); Carson v. Little, No. 881505, 1989 WL 40171, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 1989) (inaccurate information in an inmate s file does not amount to a constitutional violation). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of his due process rights arising from the denial of his parole. To the extent that Petitioner is requesting criminal charges be filed against the members of the Parole Board, he has not identified an appropriate basis to challenge his parole denial or for habeas relief. Additionally, Plaintiff cannot compel a criminal prosecution of the Parole Board -5- members because private citizens, whether or not they are incarcerated, cannot compel a criminal prosecution of another. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); Martin v. Koljonen, No. 03-2169, 2004 WL 445720, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2004). Conclusion In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioner s application pursuant to Rule 4 because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim. Certificate of Appealability Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court s dismissal of Petitioner s action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is somewhat anomalous for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Commissioner of Correction of the State of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (it was intrinsically contradictory to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal). -6- The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this Court has examined each of Petitioner s claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. Id. A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner s claims. Id. The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court s dismissal of Petitioner s claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability. A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered. Dated: December 18, 2008 /s/ Robert Holmes Bell ROBERT HOLMES BELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -7-
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