Hotchkiss v. MacLaren, No. 2:2014cv10618 - Document 11 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
Court Description: OPINION and ORDER granting respondent's motion for summary judgment, dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus and denying certificate of appealability. 1 9 Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet)
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Hotchkiss v. MacLaren Doc. 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION MARVIN HOTCHKISS, JR., Case Number: 2:14-CV-10618 HON. NANCY G. EDMUNDS Petitioner, v. MARY BERGHUIS, Respondent. / OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Petitioner Marvin Hotchkiss, Jr., has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections pursuant to convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He seeks habeas relief on four separate grounds. Respondent moves for summary judgment on the ground that the petition is untimely. The Court finds that the petition is untimely and grants the motion. I. Background Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court of first-degree premeditated murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On July 2, 2003, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction, 38 months to five years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession Dockets.Justia.com conviction, and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. People v. Hotchkiss, No. 250029 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2004). Petitioner did not file an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. See Affidavit of Larry Royster, 3/31/14, Doc. #10-16. On May 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion, People v. Hotchkiss, No. 03-002803-01-FC (Wayne County Cir. Ct. Feb. 2, 2012), and denied a motion for reconsideration. Id. (June 5, 2012). The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s delayed application for leave to appeal on April 25, 2013. People v. Hotchkiss, No. 311275 (Mich. Ct. App. April 25, 2013). The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on September 30, 2013. People v. Hotchkiss, 495 Mich. 865 (Mich. 2013). Petitioner filed the pending habeas petition on February 1, 2014. II. Discussion Respondent argues that the petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. A prisoner must file a federal habeas corpus petition within one year of the “date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review . . . or the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) & (D). The one-year limitation period begins at 2 the deadline for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2000). In addition, the time during which a prisoner seeks state-court collateral review of a conviction does not count toward the limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 371-72 (6th Cir. 2007). A properly filed application for state post-conviction relief, while tolling the limitation period, does not re-fresh the limitation period. Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2003). Petitioner appealed his conviction first to the Michigan Court of Appeals, but not to the Michigan Supreme Court. Michigan Court Rule 7.302(C)(3) allows a defendant fifty-six days from the date of the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision to file a delayed application for leave to appeal. Petitioner did not file an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. Thus, his conviction became final when the time for seeking such review expired, February 22, 2005. See Redmond v. Jackson, 295 F. Supp. 2d 770, 767 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (Gadola, J.) (holding that conviction becomes final when the 56-day time period for filing a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court expires); Brown v. McKee, 232 F. Supp. 2d 761, 765 (E. D. Mich. 2002) (Rosen, J.) (same); Erwin v. Elo, 130 F. Supp. 2d 887, 889 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (Tarnow, J.) (same). The limitations period commenced the following day, February 23, 2005, and continued to run uninterrupted until it expired one year later. Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment did not toll the limitations period. The motion for relief from judgment was filed on May 3, 2011, approximately five years 3 after the limitations period already expired. Vroman, 346 F.3d at 602 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the filing of a motion for collateral review in state court serves to “pause” the clock, not restart it). Equitable tolling is available to toll a statute of limitations when “‘a litigant’s failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that litigant’s control.’” Robertson v. Simpson, 624 F.3d 781, 784 (6th Cir. 2010), quoting Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 56061 (6th Cir. 2000). The one-year limitations period applicable to § 2254 is “subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). To be entitled to equitable tolling, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007), quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). A claim of actual innocence may also justify equitable tolling in certain circumstances. Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir. 2005). A petitioner bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Robertson, 624 F.3d at 784. Petitioner has not filed a response to the motion for summary judgment. To the extent that he argues actual innocence as a basis for equitable tolling, the Court finds the claim insufficient to warrant equitable tolling. To determine whether a petitioner has satisfied the requirements for establishing a cognizable claim of actual innocence to warrant equitable tolling, the Court applies “the same actual innocence standard 4 developed in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), for reviewing a federal habeas applicant’s procedurally defaulted claim.” McCray v. Vasbinder, 499 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2007), citing Souter, 395 F.3d at 596. A valid claim of actual innocence requires a petitioner “to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence – whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness account, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. “The Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only in the ‘extraordinary’ case.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (citation omitted). A court presented with new evidence must consider it in light of “all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.” Id. at 538 (citation omitted). “Based on this total record, the court must make ‘a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.’” Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). This standard does not require absolute certainty about the petitioner's guilt or innocence: A petitioner's burden at the gateway stage is to demonstrate that more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt – or, to remove the double negative, that more likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt. House, 547 U.S. at 538. Petitioner fails to present any new reliable evidence to support his claim of actual innocence. The Court finds no basis for equitable tolling and will grant the motion for summary judgment. III. Certificate of Appealability 5 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings, which was amended as of December 1, 2009, requires that a district court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. . . . If the court issues a certificate, the court must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Courts must either issue a certificate of appealability indicating which issues satisfy the required showing or provide reasons why such a certificate should not issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); In re Certificates of Appealability, 106 F.3d 1306, 1307 (6th Cir. 1997). To receive a certificate of appealability, “a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (internal quotes and citations omitted). In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate the Court’s conclusion that the petition is untimely. Therefore, the Court denies a certificate of appealability. IV. Conclusion 6 Petitioner failed to file his habeas petition within the applicable one-year limitations period and equitable tolling of the limitations period is not warranted. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. # 9) and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED. Further, the Court DENIES a certificate of appealability. s/ Nancy G. Edmunds NANCY G. EDMUNDS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE DATED: November 19, 2014 7
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