Castanon v. United Parcel Service, Inc et al, No. 1:2022cv11679 - Document 15 (E.D. Mich. 2022)
Court Description: Opinion and Order Directing Defendants to Pay 14 Attorney's Fees and Costs to Plaintiff. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (KWin)
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Castanon v. United Parcel Service, Inc et al Doc. 15 Case 1:22-cv-11679-TLL-PTM ECF No. 15, PageID.751 Filed 09/12/22 Page 1 of 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION MATTHEW CASTANON, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:22-cv-11679 Honorable Thomas L. Ludington United States District Judge UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. and ROBERT RANKIN, Defendants. ______________________________________/ OPINION AND ORDER DIRECTING DEFENDANTS TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS TO PLAINTIFF On August 26, 2022, this Court remanded the above-captioned case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and awarded Plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs related to Defendants’ objectively unreasonable removal. See generally Castanon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 1:22CV-11679, 2022 WL 3716037 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 2022); ECF Nos. 10; 11. To that end, the parties were directed to show cause for how much money Defendants must pay Plaintiffs in attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiff avers he is entitled to $3,825.00. ECF No. 141 at PageID.750. Defendants, by contrast, assert Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees or costs. ECF No. 13. Defendants first argue Plaintiff’s lack of entitlement because “Plaintiff did not submit a timely request for minimal attorney’s fees.” Id. at PageID.737. But Plaintiff filed his motion the day after Defendants’ three-day-late response. Defendants next balk at binding Sixth Circuit precedent that an original defendant in an lawsuit cannot be “joined” to it. Id. at PageID.738–40 (contesting Roberts v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 874 F.3d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 2017)). To that end, they rely on a 37-year-old district-court case. Dockets.Justia.com Case 1:22-cv-11679-TLL-PTM ECF No. 15, PageID.752 Filed 09/12/22 Page 2 of 3 See id. (citing Fletcher v. Advo Sys., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1511 (E.D. Mich. 1985)). Obviously, Roberts controls, and Fletcher “do[es] not ‘warrant’ anything in this Court.” Pratt v. KSE Sportsman Media, Inc., No. 1:21-CV-11404, 2022 WL 469075, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2022) (quoting Hillman Power Co. v. On-Site Equip. Maint., Inc., No. 1:19-CV-11009, 2022 WL 193598, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 21, 2022)). Defendants then cite Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2012), “for the proposition that a non-diverse supervisor cannot defeat diversity jurisdiction for a Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (‘ELCRA’) claim.” ECF No. 13 at PageID.739. But, as this Court explained, addressing that “argument would require opining on the merits of Plaintiff’s state-law claims, which should be avoided to respect the state court’s determination of state-law issues.” Castanon, 2022 WL 3716037, at *7 n.4 (citing Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 178 n. 131 (2002)). At the end, Defendants claim that Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent permits federal preemption of state antidiscrimination remedies. ECF No. 13 at PageID.740 (first citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988); and then citing Tisdale v. United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of U.S. & Can., Loc. 704, 25 F.3d 1308, 1312 (6th Cir. 1994)). But, like a train, those cases are confined to their tracks. To derail that controlling precedent, Defendants attempt to ballast contextomy from each case. See ECF No. 13 at PageID.740–41. The Lingle Court did, as Defendants parse, “hold that an application of state law is preempted by [the LMRA] only if such application requires the interpretation of a collectivebargaining.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413. But the previous paragraph explained why that holding does not apply to “state antidiscrimination remedies,” id. at 412–13, which the Tisdale court also -2- Case 1:22-cv-11679-TLL-PTM ECF No. 15, PageID.753 Filed 09/12/22 Page 3 of 3 explained, see Tisdale, 25 F.3d at 1312–13. Both those limitations were explained to Defendants. See Castanon, 2022 WL 3716037, at *4. Again, “the LMRA never preempts ELCRA claims.” Id. at *5. Try as they might, Defendants fail to bend that steel.1 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, ECF No. 14, is GRANTED. Further, it is ORDERED that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), Defendants are DIRECTED to pay $3825.00 to Plaintiff promptly for attorney’s fees and other costs related to their objectively unreasonable removal. This is a final order and closes the case. Dated: September 12, 2022 s/Thomas L. Ludington THOMAS L. LUDINGTON United States District Judge 1 Defendants also attempt to stake their removal on a Sixth Circuit case that found a removal to be a “close” question. See ECF No. 13 at PageID.741 (quoting Paul v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Ohio, 701 F.3d 514, 523 (6th Cir. 2012)). But Defendants miss their swing. That question might have been “close” in 2012, but a decade has passed since Paul determined that the LMRA did not preempt claims brought under Ohio’s disability discrimination statutes. Even so, Paul does not control where it conflicts with Tisdale because Tisdale was decided first. United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2021). -3-
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