Papadopoulos v. EagleBank et al, No. 8:2017cv02177 - Document 32 (D. Md. 2017)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 12/21/2017. (tds, Deputy Clerk)
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Papadopoulos v. EagleBank et al Doc. 32 ,. # 'I IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND Southern Division ZOIl DEC2 -~) I P 2: 02 * VAN PAI'ADOI'OULOS, * Plaintiff, Case No.: G.m-17-2177 * v. * EAGLE BANK, et al. * Defendants. * * * * * * * * MEMORANDUM * * * * * * OPINION Plaintiff Van Papadopoulos brings this action against Defendants EagleBank and its employees. Mark Dietz and Liza Punt. (collectively. "EagleBank Defendants"). Stacy Talbott. and the Law Office of Stacy Talbott. LLC (collectively. "Talbott Dcfendants") allcging state common law and statutory claims following Plaintiffs tcrmination Irom EaglcBank. EagleBank Defendants rcmovcd the casc to this Court on August 2. 2017. ECF No. I. Now pending bcfore thc Court is Plaintiffs Motion for Remand. ECF No. 25. which ineludes a request for attorneys' fees. A hearing was conducted on Novembcr 1.2017. Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the following reasons. Plaintifl's Motion to Rcmand is grantcd. but Plaintiffs requcst for attorneys' fces is denied. I. BACKGROUND' Plaintiff was an employee of Eaglel3ank from April 2014 until March 31. 2017. when EagleBank terminated his employmcnt. ECF No. 2 ~ 10. Starting in 2015. PlaintifT became involved in a protracted family law matter in thc Circuit Court for Montgomery County. and as a r Facts relevant to this Motion arc taken from the Complaint. Dockets.Justia.com result of the family law matter. EagleBank. as Plaintiffs employer. \Vasresponsible for withholding a portion of Plaintiffs wages for spousal and child support paymcnts. fd ~~ 14-15. As the family law mattcr progressed. Plaintiff continued to litigate against his fonner spouse regarding the maximum dollar amount that EagleBank could withhold from Plaintiffs pay. with PlaintifTarguing that such payments were capped at 55% of his pay regardless ofwhethcr that payment \Vassunicient to satisfy his $6.500 per month support obligation. Id. ~~ 17.34. Plaintiffs fomler spouse was represented by Talbott Defendants. During the course of the litigation. EagleBank received a subpoena dellces leCll1II from Talbot Defendants and had to appear at a March 24. 2017 hearing to obtain guidance Irom the Circuit Court as to the proper percentage to withhold Irom Plaintiffs wages. Id. 'i~ 34. 31. Shortly after the March 24 hearing. EagleBank Defendants terminated Plaintiff.ld. ~ 37. PlaintifTalleges that he was terminated because he asserted his legal rights in the ongoing family law matter in order to protect his income lrOln excessive withholding. fd ~ 35. PlaintilT commenced this action by filing a two-count Complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on June 30. 2017. bringing Maryland common law claims of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against EagleBank Defendants (Count I) and tortious interference with economic relations against Talbott Defendants (Count II). ECF NO.2. In his wrongful discharge claim. Plaintiff alleged that EagleBank Defendants' decision to terminate him contravened the public policy embodied in Subchapter II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act ("'CCPA "). 15 U.S.c. ~~ 1671 el self. ECI' NO.2 '1'143-44. EagleBank Defendants. with consent from Talbott Defendants. removed the case to this Court on August 2. 2017. arguing that adjudication ofPlaintifTs wrongful discharge claim turns on construction of the CCPA. thus 2 supporting federal question jurisdiction * under 28 U.S.c. 1331. ECF No. I ~i 6-7. Plaintiffs Motion to Remand followed. ECF No. 25.2 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Defendants * removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.c. 1441(b). which provides that "[alny civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction right arising under the Constitution. without regard to the citizenship Court could have originally 28 U.S.C. * Constitution. jurisdiction treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable or residence exercised founded on a claim or of the parties." Therefore. federal question jurisdiction 1331 (federal question jurisdiction removal is proper iI' the over Plaintitrs complain!. See exists over all civil actions that "arise under the laws. or treaties of the United States"). The burden of establishing is placed on the party seeking removal. and all doubts are resolved federal in favor of remand. Mulcahey \'. Columhia Organic Chems. Co" 29 F.3d 148. 151 (4th Cir. 1994). "In determining pleaded complaint whether a plaintiffs claim arises under federal law. we apply the well- rule. which holds that courts 'ordinarily [properly pleaded] complaint in determining capable of creating federal-question ... look no further than the plaintiffs whether a lawsuit raises issues of federal law jurisdiction under 28 U .S.c. * 1331 .... Pinney 1'. Nokia. Inc.. 402 F.3d 430. 442 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Cusler \'. S\l'eeney. 89 F.3d 1156. 1165 (4th Cir.1996)). If tederallaw creates Plaintiffs claim. then removal is proper. Muleahey. 29 F.3d at lSI. If federal law does not create PlaintitTs claim. there is only federal jurisdiction claim raises "a federal issue. actually disputed and substantial. entertain 2 without disturbing any congressionally FolIO\\!ing removal. Plaintiff tiled his First Amended approvcd Complaint, when Plaintiffs which a federal forum may balance of tederal and state judicial Ecr No. 13. adding three additional Maryland statutory and common law claims (Counts III-V). However. the Court will only consider the original Complaint. ECF NO.2. to determine ifrcmoval is proper. See Pinney v. Nokia. Inc.. 402 F.3d 430. 443 (4th Cir. 2005). Regardless. as Plaintiff acknowledges. "the allegations set forth in Count I arc identical in both complaints." ECF No. 27 at 4. As such. the Court will not consider Counts III-V for purposes of tile instant motion. 3 responsibilities."' Grahle & SOlISMetal Products. Inc. l'. Dame. 545 U.S. 308. 314 (2005). Thus. "a defendant seeking to remove a case in which state law creates the plaintilTs cause of action must establish two elements: (I) that the plainti ff's right to relief necessarily depends on a question of federal law. and (2) that the question of federal law is substantial:' Dixon 1'. Cohurg Daily. Inc.. 369 F.3d 811. 816 (4th Cir. 2004). While Federal courts may exercise federal question jurisdiction over state law claims that "'turn on substantial questions of federal law"' and require the "'experience. solicitude. and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers:' Grahle 545 U.S. at 312. this represents a "special and small category"' of federal question jurisdiction. Empire Healthchoice Assurance .. Inc. III. 1'. McVeigh. 547 U.S. 677. 699 (2006). DISCUSSION Plaintiff: in Count I of his Complaint. alleges that EagleBank Defendants wrongfully discharged him against public policy embodied by the CCI'A. While PlaintilTdoes not bring a claim under the CCPA itself. this federal statute is the sole source of public policy supporting his wrongful discharge claim. ECF No. 25-1 at 2_3.3 Thus. Defendants argue that Plaintitr s wrongful discharge claim depends on questions of federal law that are substantial. including whether the CCI'A provides a private right of action. which would bar Plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim under Maryland common law. and whether the CCI'A sets forth a sufficiently clear mandate of public policy related to Plaintiffs discharge. ECF No. 26 at 5-6. Therelore. the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim implicates ""afederal issue. actually disputed and substantial:' Grahle. 545 U.S. at 314. J Pin cites to documents by filed on the Court's electronic filing system (CM/ECf) refer to the page numbers generated that system. 4 A. Private Right of Action in CCPA To state a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under Maryland law. Plaintiff must show that he was discharged. that the basis for his discharge violated a clear mandate of public policy. and that there is a nexus betwecn his conduct and EagleBank's decision to discharge him. Verhall'. Giant olAId., LLC. 204 F. Supp. 3d 837. 843 (D. Md. 2016) (citing Wholey \'. Sears Roebuck. 370 Md. 38. 50-51 (2002)). Ilowever. "because the purpose of the tort is to 'provide a remedy for otherwise unremedied violations of public policy.' the tort is not viable if the statutes that establish the public policy at issue 'already provide an adequate and appropriate civil remedy for the wrong fill discharge .... Pen:1' 1'. Dil/on'.I' Bus Serl'ice. Inc., No. ELH-16-3207. 2017 WL 2537011. at * II (D. Md. June 9. 2017) (citing POrlerfield 1'. Mascari II. Inc.. 374 Md. 402. 423 (2003)) (emphasis in Pen}'). Thus. as an initial matter. the viability of Plaintifl's wrongful discharge claim depends on whether the CCPA provides a private right of action: [fit does. Plaintiffs claim for wrongful discharge cannot survive. It would appear on the surface. therefore. that Plaintiffs right to relief depcnds on a question of federal law. But the Court must still determine whether the issue is substantial. As a starting point. a review of the (CPA itself indicates that while enforcement of the statute's provisions is to be made by the Secretary of Labor. 15 U,S.c. * 1676. there is no express provision providing a private right of action, Additionally. a number of courts have considered the issue and a clear majority have determined that the CCP A does not provide a private right of action, ~ Plaintiff maintains that the Court need not interpret or construe the CCPA at all because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants actually violated the CerA. The Court disagrees. Because Plaintiff may not bring a wrongful discharge claim ifhe can obtain relief under the CePA. the COUll must consider whether a CCPA claim is viable. necessitating construction of the restrictions on garnishment in 15 U.S.c. ~ 1673 or restriction on discharge from employment by reason of garnishment in ~ I 674(a), See Franchise Tax Btl. \', Com'l, Laborer.\' "acariol1 Tr.for S. Cal" 463 U.S. I. 22 (1983) ("[Ilt is an independent corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintilT may (citation omitted). not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaintl.r) 5 For example. in Weslem \', Hodgson. the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia determined that a private right of action for violations of ~ 1673 was "neither provided for nor contemplated by Congress in enacting [the CCPAj'" and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. 359 F. Supp. 194.201 (S.D. W.V. 1973). On review. the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal because the plaintilTs did not present facts showing that they were entitled to relief under the CCPA. but "refrain[ed] from either reaching the question or expressing any view as to whether a private action may be maintained under the wage garnishment provisions of the [CCPA]:' 494 F.3d 379. 380 (4th Cir. 1974). Although the Fourth Circuit has not resolved the issue. a review of other circuits reveals a consensus that no such private cause of action exists. See Le Vick \'. Skaggs COlllpanies, /nc .. 701 F.2d 777. 779 (9th Cir. 1983) ("'[u)pon examination of Subchapter II of the [CCPA]. of which ~ 1674 is a part. we are unable to find any manifestation of congressional intent to provide a private right of action under ~ 1674(a). Indeed. what evidence there is suggests that Congress intended such a right not to be available.")5; .• McCahe \'. City (!{ El/reka . .110 664 F.2d 680. 683 (8th Cir. 1981) ("we refuse to imply a private right of action under 15 U.S.c. ~ I674(a)"); SlIIilh \'. Col/on Bros. Baking Co. /nL' . 609 F.2d 738. . 741-42 (5th Cir. 1980) (relying on Carll'. Ash. 422 U.S. 66. 95 (1975» (a cursory examination of the first three [Carl factors for detern1ining an implied private right of action) ... leads us to conclude that no private remedy is implied under Subchapter II of [the CCPA j'"); see also Presslllan \'. ,vel/hardl. No. 02 Civ. 8404(RCC). 2002 WL 31780183. at *2 (S.D.N. Y. 2002) 5111 L/frick. the Ninth Circuit revisited its earlier determination in SII!\rarf v. Travelers COIl},. 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974). which "reasoned that the implication of civil remedies under the CePA was necessary to ensure 'the full effectiveness of the congressional purpose" of the statute:" LeFick. 701 F.2d at 778 (citingSh'Wltrt. 503 F.2d at 114). Follov"'ing Stt!\rarJ. the Supreme Court set forth a new standard for determining whether a private right of action is to be implied under a federal statute. requiring courts to focus 011 whether Congress intended to create a private right ofactioll. regardless of its purpose in enacting the statute. LeVick. 701 r.1d at 779 (citing Touche Ross & Co. \'. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)). Finding that the analysis upon which Slell'arl rested had been rejected by the Supremc Court. thc Lel'ick court declined to follow Stewart and held that no privatc cause of action exists under the CCPA. LeVick, 70 I F.2d at 780. 6 ("pursuant to the express language of 28 U.S.C. implied private right of action under 28 U.S.c. matter jurisdiction'"): Stouch 1'. * 1676 and casc law rcjecting thc notion of an * 673. this Court linds that it lacks subject J Williamson f/o.lpitality COli},. 22 F. Supp. 2d 431. 433 (E.D. ra. 1998) ("Given thc mcchanism provided by Congress for enforcement of this statute in * 1676 and the persuasive reasoning of Smith and Le flick ... I eoncludc that there is no privatc cause of action under 15 U.S.c. * 1674:'). 13/11 see Ellis 1'. GloreI' & Gardner Construction Co,. 562 F.Supp. 1054 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (finding that a privatc right of action cxists under the CCrA). Given the lack of any mention of a private right of action in the tcxt of thc statutc and the fact that the statute contcmplates enforcement by the Secretary of Labor. this Court finds the majority view persuasive and agrees that thcre is no privatc right of action in the CCrA. The Court additionally finds that •.the congressional determination that thcrc should be no fcdcral remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of thc statute as an e1cmcnt of a state eausc of action is insufficiently 'substantial" to confer federal-question jurisdiction:'" Pharmaceuticals. Inc. I'. Merrell D{}\r 1I1Ompson.478 U.S. 804. 814 (1986). B. I'ublie Policy Created by CCPA Dcfendant also argucs that Plaintiffs rcference to thc public policy of the CCPA as thc foundation for his wrongful discharge claim provides a basis lor lederal question jurisdiction. but the merc mcntion of the federal statute does not automatically implicate a substantial issue of Although the Supreme Court in Grahte & Sons ,IIetotProducts. Inc. l', DOl'lle. 545 U.S, 308 (2005) placed limits on the broad language of ,\terrell Dolt' by noting that the absence of a federal private right of action is "evidence relevant to, but not dispositive or' congressional intent regarding jurisdiction. Grable presented a very different set of circumstances. As the Supreme Court later noted .'the dispute there centered on the action of a federal agency (IRS) and its compatibility with a federal statute, the questions qualified as 'substantial.' and its resolution was both dispositive of the case and would be controlling in numerous other cases:' Empire fiea/,hchoice Assurance, Inc., \.. McVeigh, 5.17 U.S. 677. 700 (2006), Similar factors do not cxiSl here and. thus. the lack ofa private remedy for CCrA merits in favor of remand. See "arca ". Tyco Electronics Corp .• No. RDfl 08-1215. 2009 WI. 728571. at '5 (D. Md. Mar. 16.2009) (finding the "unique circumstances presented in Grahle" to be absent and remanding state wrongful discharge case based on a federal statute that did not contain a private right of action). 6 7 federal law. See Empire Healthchoice. 547 U.S. at 701 ("it takes more than a federal element to' open the arising under door") (internal citation omitted). Thc public policy created by the CCI' A at issue here is easily discernabIe from the statute itself and does not present a substantial issue. See * 1671(a)(2) ("The application of gamishment as a creditors' remedy frequently results in loss of employment by the debtor. and the rcsulting disruption of employment. production. and consumption constitutes a substantial burden on interstate commerce."'). Moreover. the Suprcme Court has already evaluated the legislative history of the CCPA. noting that the CCI'A sought to mitigate the disruption of employment due to the "causal connection between harsh garnishment laws and high levcls of personal bankruptcies."' Kokoszka \'. Be(fiml. 417 U.S. 642. 650-51 (1974) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess .. 21 (1967)). As such. there is little need to have a federal court apply such policy considerations to Plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim. The issue at hand is not to determine the contours of public policy underlying the CCPA: rathcr. the issue is "whether. under state loll'. the statute is sufficiently clear to support the public policy prong ofa common law wrongful discharge claim. and. ifso. whether the evidence indicates that [Defendants'] decision to terminate Plaintiff was linked to conduct covered by the public policy."' See Varco \'. Tyco Electronics Corp .. No. RDB 08-1215.2009 WL 728571. at *4-5 (D. Md. Mar. 16.2009) (finding that the public policy considerations ofa federal statute "Iacks any additional significance other than being a necessary and disputed elemcnt in Plaintiff's state law wrongful discharge claim"). This is a situation-specific inquiry. tangentially related to a federal statute that itse!fdoes not provide PlaintilTwith a private cause of action and lacks "pure issues of law," the adjudication of which would establish a rule applicable in future CCPA actions. See Empire f1ealthchoice. 547 U.S. at 681 (distinguishing Grahle. 545 U.S. 308). 8 Finding that Plaintiff-s wrongful discharge claim does not present any substantial issues of federal law. the Court also notes that the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities weighs in filVorofremand. See Grable. 545 U.S. at314. ("Because [28 U.S.C. ~ 13311 jurisdiction to hear a state-law claim always raises the possibility of upsetting the state-federal line dra\\TI (or at least assumed) by Congress. the presence of a disputed federal issue and the ostensible importance of a federal forum are never necessarily dispositive"). While federal legislation has provided aggrieved employees with the opportunity to obtain relief in federal court under specific circumstances. such as Titlc VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.c. ~~ 2000e et seq .• "a [wJrongful discharge claim. regardlcss ofthc fedcral policy at issue. is fundamcntally a state common law cause of action:' and the federal-state balance would be "drastically upset if state public policy claims could be converted into federal actions by the simple expedient of referencing federal law as the source of that public policy."' Varco. 2009 WL 728571. at *6-7 (citing Eastman 1'. Alewine Mech. COIl)" 438 F.3d 544 (6th Cir.2006)). As such. the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim and must remand the matter to state C. Attorneys' Fees Finally. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. and the Court should therefore award Plaintiff attorneys' fees pursuant to 28 U.S.c. ~ 1447(c). ECF No. 25-1 at 10 (citing Martin ". Franklin Capi/al COil)" 546 U.S. 132. 7 EagleBank Defendants cite Par/alo v. AMol Lah.'" 850 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1988) as "binding precedent" that allows removal of wrongful discharge claims based on violations of federal public policy. ECF No. 26 at 4. but EagleBank Defendants either misinterpret or misrepresent that casco In Parlalo. the Fourth Circuit initially noted that the wrongful discharge suit was properly removed to federal court under diversity jurisdiction. 850 F.2d at n.3. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's assessmenton the viability ofa wrongful discharge claim was limited to claims that were based upon the public policy of state and/or federal statutes that themselves create ""a specific procedure and remedy for the redress of the alleged wrongs'" 1£1.at 205 (construing ,\fako\'i \'. Sherwin-William.," Co .. 75 Md. App. 58 (1988». Because the CCPA does not create an exclusive remedy for Plaintifrs alleged wrongs. Parlato does not apply. 9 \4\ (2005)). However, the absence offederal question jurisdiction here was not obviousPlaintiffs claim rests on public policy created solely by a federal statute, and there is no clear Fourth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent indicating that Plaintiff cannot obtain relief under the CCPA in lieu of his wrongful discharge claim. Thus, attomeys' fees are not appropriate. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion to Remand, ECF No. 25. is granted. and Plaintiffs request for attorneys' fees is denied. A separate Order follows. &/!- Dated: December ~ {, 20 I 7 GEORGE J. HAZEL United States District Judge 10
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