Brady v. Board of Education of Prince George's County, No. 8:2015cv02196 - Document 25 (D. Md. 2016)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 12/7/2016. (kns, Deputy Clerk)

Download PDF
Brady v. Board of Education of Prince George's County Doc. 25 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND Southern Division * MARIA BRADY, * Plaintiff, Case No.: GJH-15-2196 * v. * BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, Defendant. * * * * * * * * * MEMORANDUM OPINION This is a lawsuit brought by a retired teacher, Maria Brady (“Plaintiff”), against her * * * * * former employer, Defendant Board of Education of Prince George’s County (“Defendant” or “the Board”) for various violations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Brady claims that the Board, through the actions of its employees, failed to accommodate her chronic spinal disorder; discriminated against her because of her disability by creating a hostile workplace; retaliated against her for filing a grievance and eventually made her workplace intolerable, compelling her to resign. Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. A hearing was held on November 18, 2016. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.). For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. I. BACKGROUND Maria Brady was employed as a teacher by the Board of Education of Prince George’s County from 2002 until her retirement on November 1, 2014. 1 ECF No. 18-6 at 5. 2 Starting with the 2008-09 school year and continuing through the 2014-15 school year, Brady worked at 1 As this Opinion addresses Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, all facts herein are taken from the record as a whole, but viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. 2 Pin cites to documents filed on the Court’s electronic filing system (CM/ECF) refer to page numbers generated by that system. 1 Dockets.Justia.com Kcltering Middlc School. lei. at 11-12. During thc 20 J 2-13 and 2013-14 school years shc was superviscd by thc principal. Amin Salaam. ECF No. I at ~ 23: see a/so ECF 18-2 at ~ 5.3 Brady suffers fi'OI11 chronic spinal disordcr. ECF No. 19-1 a 'i 3. 1\s a child. shc was initially diagnoscd with childhood scoliosis and latcr with a bulging disc in hcr back. It/. 'i I. In 2000. during her adult ycars. shc was diagnosed with a degencrative disease of the neck and back as a rcsult of an automobile accidcnt. /d. Scparately from thesc chronic issues. Brady had a minor aftercation with a studcnt on January 30. 2013. which led to an additional diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndromc. lei. 'i 2. Bcginning inlhe middle of the 2012-13 school year. Brady bcgan providing doctor's notes to Principal Salaam. rcgarding her diagnoscs and thc physical limitations thcy imposed on her. It/. '\3. 1\ doctor's note. dated January 23. 2013. recommendcd that Brady "limit long term standing" and a note dated Fcbruary 4. 2013 said that "Maria Brady can no longer function in any capacity wherc risk of physical strain or i'1iury is prcscnt" duc to hcr treatment for a spinal disorder. ECF No. 19-2 at 3-4. Principal Salaam did not speak to her about a rcasonable accommodation at that time. nor did he take alternative actions such as contacting the school's compliance officer concerning her need fllr a reasonable accommodation. ECF NO.19-1 at ~ 6. According to Brady. her doctors told her that whcn shc experienced back pain she should rest. but said that hcr pain could bc managcd without coming in fllr a doctor's appointmcnt. fd 'i 9. Howcvcr. whcn Brady rcqucsted sick leave on Fcbruary 6. 2013. Principal Salaam said that she necded to supply a doctor's certificatc upon hcr return to work. lei. ~ 7: see a/so ECF No. 194 at I. The requirement to providc documentation of doctor's visits forccd hcr to take more timc olTtrom work than was ncccssary. ECF No. 19-1 ~ 9. .~ Neither side specifically states that Principal Salaalll continued 10 supervise Rrady during the 2014-15 school year. However. because Salaam continued to serve in the capacity of principal of Kettering Middle School during that time period. ECF No. 18-2 ~ 3. the Court will assume that he was her supervisor during the 2014-15 school year. 2 The Ncgotiatcd Agrccment and the Princc Gcorge's cvidcncc County Educators for thc ncccssity onc iIIncss. 1\ doctor's bctween the Board of Education certi ficate may be requircd teacher is abusiog sick leave privilcgcs:' Icavc: statcs that"a doctor's ccrtificatc of loss of timc shall bc rcquircd lelr days in cxcess ofthrcc if in thc opinion of either thc immcdiate documcntation Association of Prince George' s County requiremcnts supervisor (3) fiJr any lor periods of less than thrcc (3) days absence. or the Chief Executivc anker's dcsigncc. the ECF No. 18-7 at 20. Principal Salaam claims that the were reasonable ECF No. 18-2'i 9. Ilowcvcr. of because he belicvcd Brady was abusing her sick Brady asserts that thcrc was no basis lor this accusation since she had not exceed cd her allowed days of annual sick \cavc in cithcr thc 2012 or 2013 calendar years. ECF No. 19-1 at ~ 8. j Brady complaincd mceting on January 13.2014 rcgarding Principal Salaam's there was no follow up to her complaint. In addition Principal to thc rcquiremcnt Salaam incrcased Brady's lOCI' No. 19-1 workload publicly that hc did not belicvc Brady's 'i 16. whcnevcr she took sick leave. during thc 2013-14 school year. id. ~ II. and '113. Principal Salaam also commcnted injuries wcrc real. saying ..therc is nothing wrong with 24. 2013 and Novcmbcr her ncck bracc on October 25. 2013. It/. worc her mcdical apparatus failurc to grant hcr sick Icavc. but to provide documcntation directcd her to attend training at a distant location. id. your ncck" on Scptembcr to school officials during a union ~'i 14-15. 3. 2013 and asking cynicalqucstions about This led to studcnts mocking hcr whcn she to class. saying "Ms. Brady. Mr. Salaam said therc's nothing wrong with you so why are you wearing that collar on your ncck?" td. ~ 15. Specifically. Principal Salaam notes a correlation between Brady's submission of\\/orker's compensation claims and student allegations that she acted aggressively towards thelll. ECF No. 18-2 ~i 11.5: ECF No. I&-2 at 29. 9 ~ Brady stales that she used six days of sick leave in the 2012 calendar year and five and a half days of sick leave in the 2013 calendar year. ECF No. 19-1 at ~ 8. lieI' leave records indicate that she used slightly more sick leave than her aflidavit would sug.gest. showing that she took six and a half days of sick leave in 2012 and eight days of sick leave ill 2013. ECF No. 24~I at -l-6. The Negotiated Agreement states that employees are entitlcd to tCIl days of sick leavc a year. with cmployces accruing an additional day per year allcr cleven y'cars of cmploymcnt. ECF No. 18-7 at 19. -l 3 On July 22. 2014. Brady's doctor signed a statement to return to work" from July 10.2014 through January statement references saying that Brady "has been unable 15. 2015-" ECF No. 19-3 at 2. The the January 2013 student altercation but also notes that Brady was suffering fi"om chronic lower back pain and scoliosis not related to the incident. Id. at I. The physician's note also states that Brady was disabled fi"OIl1 March 6. 2014 through Juty 10. 2014.1d On 18.2014. Brady informed her union that she would be out on Workman's August related leave until January 5. 2015 and complained documentation. that Principal Salaam questioned more information than was required. 28.2014. Brady submitted to an independent medical evaluation leave. ECF No. 19-1 her request for extended 'i 23. The ordered by school orticials doctor concluded carpal tunnel was not caused by the January 30. 2013 student altercation hand symptoms her cervical issues and acknowledged disease.ld. at 48. Ilowever. and that her neck and certificate disc Salaam again informed Id at 50. Brady that she was required to for any sick days. or they would be considered unpaid leave. ECF 19.2014. Brady filed a grievance against Principal Salaam with her union. alleging that Principal and that he litlsefy accused degenerative was that "'t]he patient can perform her as a teacher with no limitations."' On August 18.2014. Principal No. 19.1 i 20. On August that she had a multi-level his ultimate conclusion regular and usual work activities Salaam did not require anyone else to present a doctor's certificate her of abusing sick leave. Id. ~ 22. She also shared these allegations with various school board ofticials. h that her that did rclate to that injury had healed. ECF No. 18-2 at 49. The doctor also referenced present a doctor's her medical ECF No. 18-2 at 34. On August requesting regarding Compensation Id. ~ 21. Althoug.h phrased in the past-tense. given the dates. the Court assumes the doctor intended to reference future 1I1lavaiiabi lit~ ... 4 Brady relurned 10 Kettering Middle School on Seplember 15.2014. and asserls that Principal Salaam conlinued to harass her in retaliation for filing a grievance with her union. ECF No. 19 at 7-10: see "Iso ECF No. 19-1 'i'i 22. 25. For example. her schedule lor the 2014-15 school year required her to teach belween 28 and 32 classes per week. while olher teachers only had to leach 15 to 20 classes per week. ECF No. 19-1 ~ 25. In addition. Principal Salaam eonlinued to accuse her of abusing her sick leave and requested documentation when she took sick leave on Seplember 16.2014. Jd ~ 26. Principal Salaam also rejected the doeumenlation she submitted fiJr sick leave taken on October 3. 2014 and October 8. 2014. Id. ~~ 30. 32. In addition. Brady did not receive a paycheck on October 10.2014. it!. ~ 32. and attempts 10 requesl meetings wilh school officials regarding Principal Salaam's behavior were rebuffed. it!. ~ 34. School officials issued a Notice of Leave Request Denial to Brady on September 23. 2014. stating that. per the independenl medical evaluation. her request for "FMLA/I.OA ..7 had been denied and she had been cleared to return to work. ECF No. 18-2 at 51: see "Iso ECF No. 18-5 a13. On September 27.2014. Brady submilted a l(lrInal. written request for a reasonable accommodalion. including. among other suggeslions. a request I()r extra staff in class to assist her. ECF No. 19-1 at ~~ 28. 29: see "Iso ECF No. 18-2 at 67. On October 16. 2014. Brady was assigned a cO-leaching position by Keltering Middle Sehool's Assislant Principal. ECF No. 19-1 at ~ 36: see "Iso ECF No. 18-2 al 71. However. Brady states in her affidavilthat her workload was nOI reduced and she continued to perf(JrIn lead teacher dulies. ECF No. 19-1 at ~ 36. Brady mel wilh Amana Simmons Esq .. Prince George's Counly Public Schools EEO Advisor. and Ihe meeling was memorialized in an October 22. 2014 email in which Simmons stales: Ms. Brady. 7 The record does nol indicate exactl\' what "FMLA" and "LOA" signify. but based on context. the Court believes thatlhey likely refer to the family Medical Leave A'et ("FMLA") m~da'Leave or Absence ("LOA"). 5 It was a pleasure meeting with you this aliernoon respecting your pending 4172 Request for Accommodations. During that meeting. you advised that you recently received a ncw schedule as a co-teacher and that you did not feel that you presently rcquired any accommodations. You advised that you had only been working intermittently. hut that you would allow time to work under the new schedule. Accordingly. at your request. I will not take any further action respecting your 4172 Request for Accommodation. Best regards. ECF No, 18-2 at 73. Brady respondcd by saying "Thank you for your understanding:' /d Brady's doctors advised her that stress at work was causing her additional back pain. leading her to again take sick leave in or around October 22. 2014. ECF No, 19-1 at 2014. Brady was told thatl'rincipal 'i 37. On October 22. Salaam had placed hcr on leave without pay and that she would not receive any more paychecks, /d ~ 38. Because she was not receiving paychecks and feared that she would soon be terminated. and would thus lose retirement henclits. Brady applicd fi.)rearly retirement on Octoher 25. 2014. to be effectivc Novembcr I. 2014./d at ~~ 38. 41. Brady statcs that she made a final attempt during this period to requestmcetings with school officials to discuss the situation. but the requestcd meetings nevcr occurred. /d ~~ 39-40. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is appropriate if"materials in the record. including depositions. documents. electronically storcd infi.mnation. affidavits or declarations. stipulations .... admissions. intcrrogatory answers. or other materials:' Fed. R, Civ. 1', 56(c). show thattherc is "no gcnuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law:' Fed, R. Civ. P, 56(a): see also Cl'loll'x Corp. \', CaIre/(. 477 U.S, 317. 322 (1986), The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine dispute exists as to matcrial facts.Pulliall//m'. Co. 1'. Call/eo Props .. 810 F.2d 1282. 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). II' the moving party demonstrates that there is no evidence to support the non-moving 6 party's case, the burden shins to the non-moving party to identify specific Incts showing that therc is a gcnuine issuc for trial. See Celotex. 477 U.S. at 322-23. A material fact is one that "might affcct thc outcome ofthc suit under the governing law," Sl'rig~s ,'. Diamond 242 F.3d 179. 183 (4th Cir. 200 I) (quoting Anderson,'. £111/0 Glass. Uhmy Lohhy. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242. 248 (1986)). A dispute of material fact is only "genu inc" if surticicnt evidencc fnvoring the nonmoving party cxists for the tricr of Inct to return a verdict for that party. Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248. Ilowevcr. the nonmoving party "cannot create a genuinc issuc of material lact through merc speculation or the building ofonc infcrence upon another," Beall.' 1'. Hardy. 769 F.2d 213. 214 (4th Cir. 1986). The Court may only rcly on lacts supported in the record. not simply assertions in the pleadings. in order to fulfill its "artinnative obligation ... to prevent 'Inctually unsupported claims or dcfcnses' from procecding to trial." Felty". Grm'e-Ifllmphreys Co.. 818 F.2d 1126. 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Celo/ex. 477 U.S. at 324-25). Whcn ruling on a motion for summary judgment. "[tJhe evidence of the non-movant is to bc believed. and alljustiliable infercnccs arc to be drawn in his fnvor," Anderson. 477 U.S. at 255. III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff brings all four of her claims under Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S,c. ~ 794. Thc Rchabilitation Act provides. in relcvant parl. that "lnJo otherwisc qualificd individual with a disability in the United States .... shall. solely by reason of hcr or his disability. bc cxcluded from the participation in. bc denied the benelits oJ: or bc subjected to discrimination undcr any program or activity receiving Fedcral financial assistance," 29 U.S.c. ~ 794(a) . ..[PJrogram or activity" is detined as "all of the operations of ... a department. agency ... 01' other 7 instrumentality of education of a State or of a local government." such as the Defendant. Plaintiffs Complaint (I) failure to accommodate: and thus encompasses public school boards 29 U.S.C. ~ 794(b)( I )(A). raises lour distinct causes of actions under the Rehabilitation (2) hostile workplace: (3) retaliation: and (4) constructive Act: discharge. The Court will consider each in turn. A. Count I: Failure to Accommodate To establish a prill/afi/cie Disability case of failure-to-accommodate I'lainti ITmust show that "( I) she quali lies as an . individual U.S.CA. ~ 705(20): (2) the [Defendant] essential functions accommodation:' using the same standards accommodation: Act. as defined in 29 (3) she could perfcmn the and (4) the [Delendant] relused See Re)'a= lIddill \'. MOlllgolI/e/y 0.1' .. Mlllylmlli. F.3d 407. 414 (4th Cir. 2015). "Employment arc cvaluated with a disability' had notice of her disability: of her job with a reasonable to make any reasonablc under the Rehabilitation discrimination as those 'applied 789 claims brought under Scction 504 under [Tjitle I of the Americans with Act of 1990 .... Id. at 413 (internal citation omitted). Disabilities In support of the first element of her claim. Brady argues that her chronic spinal disorder substantially Defendant constitute limited her major lile activities. ECF No. 19-1: see also ECF No. 18-2 at 68. docs not address whether or not a chronic spinal disorder could theoretically a disability. major lite activities instead arguing that Brady specifically because she was medically part of an independent medical evaluation was not substantially limited in any cleared to return to work without restriction as on August 28. 2014. ECF No. 18-1 at 14: see also ECF No. 18-2 at 44. The Rehabilitation Act adopts the ADA's delinition see 29 U.S.C ~ 705(9)(13). and has been amended of disability to incorporate 8 lor claims under ~794. the delinition in the ADA Amendments See !larrison-Kilo/alia Act 01'2008 ("ADAAA"). 'li'<msi/ All/h.. No. CIV.A. DKC 11-3715.2015 the ADAAA. disability WL 302820. at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 22. 2015). Under is detined as "(A) a physical or mental impairment limits one or more major life activities of sueh individual. (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.. statute. "[m]ajor life activities that substantially (B) a record of such an impairment ... 42 U.S.C. * or 12102(1). Pursuant to thc include. but are not limited to. caring for oneself. performing manual tasks. seeing. hearing. eating. sleeping. breathing. \'. JVasilillJ.:/olIMe/ro. Area learning. reading. concentrating. walking. standing. thinking. lifting. bending. speaking. communicating. and working," Id. at * 12102(2)(A). To prove that her chronic spinal disorder substantially activities. Brady submitted long term standing" activities," a doctor's note from January 23. 2013 noting that she should --limit and that "[patien1's] ECI' No. 19-2 at 3. Similarly. notes diagnoses limits one or morc major life of cervical disc disordcr. tolerance to pain will be limit on hours and alier school she submitted a doctor's note from July 22. 2014 which chronic lowcr back pain and scoliosis. ECI' No. 19-3. In that note. the doctor further statcd that Brady was unablc to write. bend. lili or sit lor long periods and that shc would be unable to return to work Irom July 10. 2014 through January 2015.1d. Regulations limits' phrasing implementing the ADAAA advise broad construction in the statute. noting that .. [tJhe primary object of attention under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied whether discrimination a major life activity," ..the question has occurred. 29 C.F.R. * not whether an individual's analysis," in cases brought substantially and limits 1630.2(j)( I )(iii). In that vein. the Fourth Circuit has stated that of whether an individual's demand extensive of the 'substantially with their obligations impairment 15. impairment ./acohs \'. N.c. Admin 9 is a disahility under the ADA should not Office ol'tile Cour/s. 780 F.3d 562. 572 (4th Cir. 2(15). Therefore. the Court finds that the doctor" s notes submitted by Brady provide suflicient evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude that Brady was disabled. Defendant"s reliance on the fact that Brady was medically cleared to return to work docs not alter the Court's conclusion.//arrison-Khalalla No. CIV.A. DKC 11.3715.2015 v. Washillg/olliv/e/m. Area 7i'cmsi/ Au/h.. WL 302820 (D. Md. Jan. 22. 2(15). is instructive on this poin!. There. as here. the defendant claimed that the plaintiff was not disabled because a doctor determined that she was able to return to work after a worker's compensation injury. Id at * 11. Judgc Chasanow held that such a decision "does not invalidate PlaintifTs claim that she had a disability lil[ which she needed a reasonable accommodation to perform her job:' /d at (holding thatPlaintilThad * 13. established a genuine dispute regarding whether or not her knee and back impairments substantially limited a major activity). Similarly. here. Brady has established a genuine dispute regarding the first element of her claim.x The crux of Plaintitrs claim rests on her ability to prove the third and filUrth elements of the prima facie case: that she could perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation and that the Detendant refused to make such an accommodation. The third element of the failure-to.accommodate analysis consists of two prongs: whether the specilic accommodation requested was reasonable and whether the plaintiff could per limn the essential fill1ctions of the position if the requested accommodation was provided. Jacobs \'. N.C Admin Office oj'/he CIs.. 780 F.3d 562. 580 (4th Cir. 2(15)."A reasonable accommodation is one that 'enables [a qualitied] individual with a disability ... to perform the essential functions of [a] position .... Id (quoting 29 C.F.R. ~ 1630.2(0)( I )(ii)). Reasonable accommodations may comprise "job restructuring. lor) part-time or modi lied work schedules." 42 U.S.C. ~ x Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintife the Court finds that Defendants had notice of tile disability as of January 2013 when Plaintiff began submitting notes from her doctor. thus providing sufficient evidence for the second element of her claim. 10 12111(9)(B). Howcvcr, thc Board still avoids liability if it "establishcs as a matter of law that the proposed accommodation will cause 'undue hardship in the particular circumstanccs:" \", Wake Foresl Ulli,'. lleallh Scis.. 669 F.3d 454, 464 (4th Cir.2012)(quoting ffalperll U. S. Ainmys. IIIC, \', Ba1'l1ell. 535 U.S. 391. 401-02 (2002». "Courts have reconciled and kept distinct the 'reasonable accommodation' and 'undue hardship' requirements by holding that, at the summary judgment stage, the employcc 'nced only show that an accommodation seems reasonable on its facc,' and then the employer 'must show special (typically case-spccilic) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship:" ReyazlIddill, 789 F.3d at 414( quoting Ba1'l1ell. 535 U.S. at 401-02 (2002)). Regarding the fourth c1cment. "[t]hc ADA imposes upon employers a good-faith duty to engage [with thcir employecs] in an interactive proccss to identify a reasonable accommodation:' Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 581. "However. an employer will not be liable for failurc to engage in thc interactive proccss if the employee ultimately tails to dcmonstrate the existence of a rcasonable accommodation that would allow her to per!emn the essential functions of the position:' Id As thc third and le)urth elemcnts overlap, the Court will address thcmjointly. Rcvicwing Plaintiffs submissions, the Court identificd three momcnts in which Plaintiff arguably madc a requcst tell'a reasonablc accommodation: (1) January 23, 2013: when Plaintiff bcgan submitting doctor's notes to Principal Salaam rcgarding her condition ("2013 leavc rcquesC), (2) Septcmber 27, 2014: when PlaintilTsubmittcd a !emnal rcquest for a rcasonable accommodation, suggcsting scveral accommodations including a co-tcaching position, ("formal rcquest") and (3) Plaintitrs requests lor additional leave in the lall 01'2014 ("2014 leavc requcsC). 11 I. 2013 Lcave Requcst In hcr 2013 Icavc rcquest, Plaintiff sought to use hcr accrucd sick leave to take time off fhlln work when her chronic spine condition not an unrcasonable 2013). Moreover, caused her pain. A requcst l'or leavc, on its facc, is Wilson \'. Dol/ar Gel/. accommodation. C0I11., while Principal Salaam allcgcs that PlaintifTwas this timc pcriod, Defendant does not appear to claim that Plaintiffs 717 F,3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. abusing her sick Icavc during requests for Icave during thc spring 01'2013 werc so frcqucnt that shc was unable to perform the esscntial A rcvicw of Plaintiffs Icavc rccords during this timc period show that she took five and a half days of sick leavc alier submitting that during thc spring ofthc reasonable functions ofhcr job. her doctor's notes. ECF No. 24 at 5-6. Thus, the Court finds 2013 school ycar, Plaintiffs and that by providing that accommodation, rcqucsts to usc her sick Icavc wcre she could perf'orm thc cssential functions ofhcr job. Ilowevcr, a requircment Plaintiff claims that Defcndant that shc submit documentation failed to accommodate in the f'onn of a doctor's hcr rcqucst by imposing notc whenevcr her sick Icavc. In support of this claim, she argues that per the ncgotiated school system and the teacher's rcquesting "[aJn cmploycr accommodation submitted union, she only had to provide documentation more than three days off in a row. But a rcquest for a reasonable not a onc-way street. with the cmploycr may rcasonably requested." that thc Dcfendant timc period. only that Principal automatically accommodatc that thc cmployce no cvidence agreement betwcen the if shc was accommodation ceding to all of the cmployee's an cmploycc she used without providing is rcquests: the exact Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 415. Plaintiff has failed to allow her to take hcr sick leavc during this Salaam rcqucstcd 12 additional documentation to support the requests. In short. she requested leave and it was granted. Thus. Plaintiff docs not have a viable failure to accommodate claim as it relates to this request. 2. Formal Request Any claim rclated to a failure to accommodate Plainti ff s formal September 27. 2014 accommodation request fails because. as Plaintiff conceded during oral argument. Defendant properly responded to it. Upon receiving Plaintiffs formal request. Defendant engaged Plaintiff in precisely the sort of interactive process contemplated by the ADA. Allen \'. Cil)' of'Raleigh. 140 F. Supp. 3d 470. 483 (quoting 29 C.F.R. * 1630.2(0)(3) ("The ADA contemplates an open. interactive process between the employer and employee to 'identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and the potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome the limitations"")) The parties agree that at the conclusion of the process. PlaintifTwas given the co-teaching position she was requesting but Plaintiff states in her affidavit that her work-load was not rcduced. But any suggestion that she was not satisfied at the end of the meeting is directly refuted by the email exchange between Plaintiff and Amana Simmons Esq .. Prince George's County Public Schools EEO Advisor. where Brady responded "ltJhank you lor your understanding" to an email wherein Simmons confirms that Brady (I) told her she had received a new co-teaching schedule and (2) did not presently require additional accommodation. ECF No. 18-2 at 73. Within a week of this exchange. Plaintiff retired. 3. 2014 Leave Requests Finally. PlaintifTagain made requests for sick leave in the beginning of the 2014-15 school year. which the Court will construe as an additional request for a reasonable accommodation. Defendant argues that an essential function of a teacher's job is attendance. and that as her absences increased. Plaintiff ceased to bc a "qualified individual" because there was 13 no reasonablc accommodation that could be provided that would allow I'laintiffto perform the csscntial functions ofthc position, Tyndall \', Nal'/ Edll(" ('el1fers, Inc, rd"Ca/ifiJ1'I1ia. 31 F,3d 209.213-14 (4th Cir. 1994). is instructive on this point. Thcre. the court held that despitc the fact that a teacher had thc necessary skills to perform wcll whcn she was at work her "frequent absenccs rcndered her unable to function effectively as a teachcr:' Moreover. the school's extensive accommodations did not improve her attendance Icvel. !d While Brady's absenecs arc not as extremc as those in Tyndall. hcr school was ultimately forced into the same situation, While her leave requests had been accommodated during the 2012-13 and 2013- J 4 school years. in the time procceding the 2014-15 school ycar shc requested four months of workers compensation based leave. was denied whcn a doctor deemed her fit to work. and then requestcd over two weeks of leave from September 16.2014 to October 3. 2014, While. "a Icave request will not be unreasonable on its lilce:' such a request must "( I) [belloI' a limited. finite period of time: (2) consist!] of accrued paid leave or unpaid leave: and (3) [l shown to be likely to achieve a level of success that will enable the individual to perform thc esscntial functions of the job in question:' Wilson. 717 F,3d at 345 n,7 (citing Halpc1'I1 \', Wake Foresl Uni\', lIeallh Scis .. 669 F,3d 454 at 465-66 (4th Cir. 2012): ,~~\'Cr.l'\', Ilose. 50 FJd n8. 283 (4th Cir. 1995)), Hcre. the initial leave requests that the school granted merely resulted in an increasing numbcr of additional leave requests. with Brady's usc oftive and a halfsick days in the spring of 2013 increasing to missing entire wecks of work in the 2014-15 school year. Thus. as in Wi/s'JI1. "[I'laintiftl has not identified a possible reasonable accommodation. other than leave. that would have enabled [herlto perfiJl'lll the essential functions of [her] position: nor has [Plaintiftl produced evidence that had [she] been granted such leave, [she] could have pcrl(JI'Illed the essential functions offherJ position on [her] requestcd retul'l1datc:' !d at 346, Thus. Defendant's 14 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted with regards to Plaintitrs failure to accommodate claim. B. Count II: Hostile Workplace Plaintitrs second claim alleges "disability harassmcnt"" in the workplace. ECF No. I at 3. which the Cour! will interpret as a hostile workplace claim. "In order to establish a hostile work environment claim r under the Rehabilitation AetJ. a claimant must demonstrate that the alleged conduct: I) was unwclcome: 2) resulted because of her. .. disability ... : 3) was 'sufficiently severe or pervasivc' to alter the conditions of her employment: and 4) was imputable to her employer." P/leschelv. I'elers. 577 F.3d 558. 564-65 (4th Cir. 2009)(citation omitled). As with her failure to accommodate claim. Plaintiffs hostile workplace claim is evaluated under the same standards as a hostile workplace claim under Title I of the ADA. Reyaz/lddin. 789 F.3d at 413 ( "Employment discrimination claims brought under Section 504 are evaluated using the same standards as those applied under ITJitie I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990."). Similarly. bceausc ..the ADA's eausc of action for hostile work environment is modeled aftcr the Title VII 101' the Civil Rights Act of 19641 cause of action:' S/llIIner \'. Mmy Washinglonl1eallhcare Physicians. No. 3:15CV42. 2016 WL 5852856. at *8 n9 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30. 20 I6)(citation omitled). the Court will rely on case law intcrpreting ADA and Title VII cases in evaluating PlaintitTs case. Plainti ITalleges that the following conduct created a hostile workplacc: (I) Principal Salaam's requircment to provide a doctor's note whenever Plainti 1'1' used her sick leave: (2) an increased workload in the 2013-14 and 2014-15 school years: (3) the requirement to atlend training at a distant location: (4) public comments by Principal Salaam mocking her disability (i.e ... there is nothing wrong with your neck") and questions regarding her neck brace: (5) comments by students regarding her neck bracc: (6) rejection of doctor' s notes when she took 15 sick leave in October 2014: (7) failure to hold sevcralmeetings requcstcd by Plainti!Tto discuss Principal Salaam's conduct: (8) failurc to rcceive a paycheck: (9) failure to reduce workload evcn alier assignment to co-teaehing position. foreing Plaintiff to continue to work as a lead teacher and (10) placement on leave without pay status. ECF No. 19 at 19-21; see also ECF No. As with many hostile workplacc cases. the success ofPlaintiirs to establish the third element of her primu/ilcie claim tUI11S n her ability o case: that is - can she show that the discrimination was sufticiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment'? E.E.o.C. IlIc.. 573 F.3d 167. 175 (4th Cir. 2009). On the fllcts that Plaintiff \'. Cel1/. Wholesalers. has put be!cHc the Court. she cannot. "[The third] element ofa hostile work environment claim has both subjective and objective components. Therefore. the [Plaintiff1 must show that [she] did perceive. and a reasonable person would perceive. the cnvironment to be abusive or hostile'" Id(internal citation omitted). Plaintiff establishes via her aflidavit and her complaints to school ofticials that she found the above refcrcnccd conduct to be subjectivcly abusive. ECF No. 19-1. In order to show that a rcasonable person would share this perception. the Court considers ..the !c'equeney of the discriminatory conduct: its scverity: whether it is physically threatening or humiliating. or a mere ofknsive utterance: and whether it unrcasonably intcrferes with an employee's work performance'" Md. 2015)( quoting !farris 1'. Wi/SOli \'. Cily'!lGaillu!rsl)/ox. 121 F. Supp. 3d 478.483-84 (D. Forklili .\)'.1' .. IlIc.. 510 U.S. 17. 23 (1993)). The Fourth Cireuit has repcatcdly noted that plaintiffs must "clear a high bar" in order to satisfy this test. holding that complaints prcmised on "rude treatmcnt" or "callous behavior" are not actionable. E. E. 0. C. \'. SlIlIhell Rel1/als. IlIc.. 521 F.3d 306. 316 (4th Cir. 2008)(internal citation omilled). In doing so. the Fourth Circuit observed that "[w]orkplaccs are not always 16 hamlonious locales:' concluding that "cven incidents that would objectively give rise to bruised or wounded feelings will not on that account satisfy the severe or pervasive standard:' Id. The Fourth Circuit recentlv c1arilied however that. if severe enough. even isolated incidents of harassment can constitute a hostile workplace claim. Boyer-Liher/o \'. Fon/ainehleall Corp .. 786 F.3d 264. 280 (4th Cir. 2015)(holding that supervisor's "odious" use ofa racial slur created a hostile workplace). Viewing the evidence in the light most tilVorable to thc PlaintifL it is clear that working with Principal Salaam was not a pleasant cxperience. But she has not produced evidence that her work environment was "pervaded with discriminatory conduct 'aimcd to humiliate. ridicule. or intimidate .... E.E.UC. P. Cenl. Wholesalers. Inc.. 573 F.3d 167. 176 (4th Cir. 2009)(intcmal citation omitted). Here. Salaam's actions werc not so sevcre and pcrvasive as to alter her conditions of cmploymcnt. Many of Plaintifrs claims centcred around hcr interactions with Principal Salaam regarding her ability to take Icave and are morc accurately described as disagrcemcnts with the personnel decisions of hcr supcrvisor. Disagrcemcnt with the decisions or management style of onc' s boss. while perhaps not uncommon. do not rise to the level of a hostile workplace claim. Thorn 1'. Sehelills. 766 F. Supp. 2d 585. 601 (D. Md. 20 II ). a/I'd. 465 F. J\pp'x 274 (4th Cir. 2012)(holding that allcgations of harassment including dcnial of transfer requcsts and removal Ii-om certain duties failed to establish a claim of retaliatory hostile work environment. and instead "amount[edJ to instances wherc [plaintiftl disagreed with the managcment style or deeisions ofthosc who supervised him-and that alonc is not actionablc under Titlc VII"'). Similarly. Brady's sccond eategory of c1aimcd hostile behavior. relating to increased workloads in the 2013-14 and 2014-15 school years. the requirement to.attend training at a 17 distant location and failure to decrcase workload after assigning her to a co-teaching position are "ordinary personnel decisions:' again outside the scope of the type of severe and pervasive conduct that the Fourth Circuit has said would alter a person's conditions of employment. See Hemphill r. ARAMARK Corp .. No. I: 12-CY -0 1584-ELH. 2014 WL 1248296. at Mar. 25. 2014). aII'd. 582 * 14 (D. Md. F. App'x 151 (4th Cir. 2014)(finding the assignment of additional work and placement on a performance improvement plan insufficient to state a claim for hostile workplace). Finally. a total of three specific comments by Principal Salaam questioning her disability (i.e ... there is nothing wrong with your neck") along with a vague reference to additional remarks. while discourteous. arc similarly insufficient to state a claim. Although publicly mocking an employee is surely not the example one would expect in our public schools. especially as it led to the students then mocking the teacher." such comments are closer to "a mere offensive utterance." Harris. 510 U.S. at 23. than the "odious comment"' that the Court found in Bo)'er-Liherlo. Bo)'er-Liherlo.786 F.3d at 280. See also Beshir \'. .lell'ell. 96\ F. Supp. 2d 114. 128 (D.D.C. 2013 )(holding that allegation of being yelled at on a daily to weekly basis. often in front of colleagues. and subject to threats of thwarting career advancement was not sufficient to constitute a hostile workplace claim). Therefore. thc Court !inds that Brady has failed to demonstrate a prima/ocie case of hostile workplace environment. Thus. the Court grants Defendant's Motion fill' Summary Judgment in regards to Plaintiffs hostile workplace claim. Brady notes that "students in the past have come to me laughing when J wear medical apparatus. stating. "Ms. Brady. Mr. Salaam snid there's nothing \\'rung \\lith you so \\'hy arc you wearing that collar 011 your neck'?" ECF 19I at ~ 15. While she does 110t state how onen these incidents occur. this conduct ralls into the category of"simple tcasing. oftlland comlllents, and isolated incidents" that do not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment. E.E. 0.C. \'. "/luhell RemC/Is. Inc .. 521 F.3d 306. 3 15 (4th Cir. 2008). <) 18 C. Count III: Retaliation Turning next to Plaintiffs showing "(I) that lsJhe engaged retaliation claim. Brady must establish in protected activity. (2) that the Board took an adverse action against (her]. and (3) that the adverse action was causally connectcd S. B. ex rei. A. L and quotations 1'. her prillll/jilcie case by to [her] protected activity:' Bd o(Educ. o( //arfim/ C/Y.. 819 F.3d 69. 78 (4th CiT. 2016 )(internal citations omitted). Under the burden shiliing framework meets this burden ... then the Board must articulatc a legitimate of McDonnell Doug/as. if Brady non-retaliatory actions. at which point the burden shi lis back to IPlainti f11 to demonstrate reason is a pretext for forbidden U.S. 792. 802 (1973». retaliation:' The Rehabilitation which in turn is substantially Id.(citing the ADA's anti-retaliation the ADA's identical to Titlc VII's anti-retaliation provision): that the proffered McDonllell Doug/as Corp. Act incorporates Caldera. 249 F.3d 259. 272 (4th Cir.2001) (recognizing reason for its 1'. Green. 41 I anti-retaliation provisions. that thc Rchabilitation provision. /IolII'en-L"'l'is ". Act incorporates Hoi lies \'. DOllahoe. No. CIV.A. ELH-I 0-293.2012 WI. at *10 (D. Md. Aug. 20, 2012). a{l'd 538 F. App'x 329 (4th Cir. 20 13)(comparing 3595965. rctaliation provisions of Rehabilitation Act. ADA and Title VII). Thus. as with Plaintitrs claims. the Court will look to case law developcd antiother under all thrce statutes to interpret Plaintiffs claim. "Opposition activities include not only tiling a formal discrimination 'utilizing informal gricvance procedures opinions in order to bring attention complaint. but also as well as staging infiJrmal protests and voicing one's to an employer's discriminatory activities .... Boo/h 1'. C/Y. Exec .. No. CV TDC-I 5-223 I. 2016 WL 2757367. at *5 (D. Md, May II. 2016)(quoting Laugh/in 1'. A/e/ro. Washing/oil Airports Au/h.. 149 F.3d 253. 259 (4th Cir. J 998)). Plaintiff alleges. and Defendant docs not disputc. that she engaged in protected activity by tiling a 19 gricvance against Principal Salaam with her union on August 19, 2014. Thus, she has cstablishcd thc first c1cmcnt ofhcr case. Turning to thc second c1cmcnt. Plaintiff allcgcs that she was subjccted adverse actions alier filing her gricvance: (1) she was assigned increased to the fl)lIowing teaching assignments for thc 2014-15 school year: (2) Principal Salaam rejected doctors notes that shc submitted shc took sick Icave in early October 2014: (3) school officials requested by Plaintiff to discuss Principal Salaam's paycheck on October 10,2014 failed to hold sevcralmcctings conduct and (4) shc failed to receivc a that these actions "'might havc dissuaded a charge of discrimination."' While. 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). Plaintiffs Plaintiff must cstablish a rcasonable claims still fail for lack ofbut-fllr a causal connection Plaintiff must prove "'but-for"' causation. 'but-for' Gentl)' I'. (4th Cir. 20 I6)("'The only rcmaining causation standard. 20 12)(adopting 1'. causation. bctwecn thc adverse action and thc protectcd case. that a E. IV Parlners Cluh ;\/gml. Co. IlIc" 8 J 6 F.3d question is whether the ADA's text calls for a Wc hold that it does."'): see also Staley \'. Gruellherg. 575 F. App'x 153. 156 (4th Cir. 2014 )(applying Rehabilitation worker BurlinglOn N. & Santa Fe Ny. Co. activity. The Fourth Circuit recently stated in thc context of an ADA discrimination 228.235-36 'i'i alier being placed on Icavc without pay status. ECF No. 19-1 25, 30. 32-33. 35. Even assuming from making or supporting whcn but-for causation in rctaliation case under ADA. Act and Title Vii): see also Palmquisl ". Shillseki. 689 F.3d 66. 74 (1st Cir. but-lor causation for Rchabilitation Plainti fTc1ai ms that thc tcmporal and the beginning proxi m ity, onc month, between the fi Iing of a grievancc of the advcrse actions is enough to establish argucs that ifthc Court docs not find causation based on rccurring Act claims). rctaliatory causation. based on temporal animus. To begin with, "'JtJemporal 20 in the altemative, proximity. she it could find it proximity alolle is insufficient to establish the third element of causation:' Smith \'. Strayer Ullil'. Corp .. 79 F. Supp. 3d 591. 605 (E.D. Va. 2015)(citingStaley \'. Gruellherg 575 Fed. Appx. 153. 156 (4th Cir.2014)). More importantly. however. the record shows that much of the behavior that PlaintilTcomplains of actually prc-dates the protected activity. For example. in her aftldavit shc also statcs that she was given an increased workload during the 2013-14 school year before she filed hcr grievance. ECF No. 19-1 ~ 11. Similarly. hcr complaints that school oflicials did not wish to mcet to discuss her complaints about Principal Salaam stretch back to at least January 13. 2014. See ECF o. 19-1 'i 16. Finally. Brady submits no cvidence to link hcr two most serious allegations of advcrsc action. rejection ofdoctor's notes and failure to receive a paycheck due to her placcmcnt on absencc without leavc status. to her protected action. In contrast. the evidence demonstrates that Brady's doctors notes were rejected once an independent doctor clcared her lor work and her Icave requests increased. This. in turn. led to her being in Icavc without pay status. Thus. because a reasonable jury could not concludc that. but for her filing a grievance. the school would not have taken adverse action against hcr. the Court will grant Defcndant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiff's retaliation claim. 1>. Count IV: Construetive I>iseharge l3rady's fourth and final claim alleges that she was constructivcly discharged from her job as a form of intentional discrimination against her because of her disability. ooAconstructivc discharge occurs when 'an employer deliberately makes an cmployee's working conditions intolerable and thereby forces him to quit his job .... Bristol\' \'. DaiZI' Press. /IIC .• 770 F.2d 1251. 1255 (4th Cir. 1985)(citing Holsey \'. Armour & Co.. 743 F.2d 199.209 (4th Cir. 1984). ooA plaintiff alleging constructive discharge must therefore prove two elements: deliberateness of the employer's action. and intolerability of the working conditions:' Id. 21 In support of her claim of constructive discharge. on leave without pay by Principal Salaam on October she would not receive any more paychecks: administrators terminated Plainti 1'1' states that (I) she was placed 10.2014 (2) she rcquested and on October 22.2014 meetings "Deliherateness drive the employee can be demonstrated Irom the joh. or circumstantial Delendant corrcctly position on October ECF No. 19-1 'i'i 35. 38-41. to evidencc of such intent. including a serics of treatmcnt:'jolll7soll 13 I (4th Cir. 1993 )(intcrnal citation omitted): see also DOlles 668 (D. Md. 2(13). that she would be by actual evidence of intent by the employer actions that single out a plaintiffforditTerential co-teaching with sehool but they refused to meet with her: and (3) she was concerned and would lose her medical benefits and life insurance. was told P. ,< ;halala. 991 F.2d 126. P. DOllahoe. 987 F. Supp. 2d 659. points out that the lilct that the school assigncd 16. 2014. as per her request for a rcasonable Brady a accommodation. demonstrates an intent to allow Brady to work rather than to drive her from the school. Furthcrmore. to the extent that Brady was displeascd impcrfect attempt to accommodate jolll7solll'. an employee I'laintifTs allegation discharge that the workplacc was objectively would be unable to estahlish is not established the same choices as the employee. the lirst intolerable is similarly without in denying her hostile workplace follows that the samc facts that were insufticient '''Intolerability' to establish of her concern that she fearcd that she would be these are the same facts the Court analyzed hostile workplace discharge. claim. support in the record. With the exception logically a partial or does not give rise to constructive Slut/ala. 991 F.2d 126. 132 (4th Cir. 1993). Thus. PlaintilTlilils clement of her constructive terminated. with the accommodation. by showing to establish an objectively intolerable merely that a reasonable would have viewcd resignation 22 an objectively claim. It abusive and workplace. person. confronted with as the wisest or best decision. or even that the employee subjectively telt compelled to resign; presumably every resignation occurs because the cmployee believes that it is in his best interest to resign. Rather '[i]ntolerahility by the ohjective employee's ... is assessed standard of whether a 'reasonable 1'. Donahoe. 987 l'. Supp. 2d at 668)(quoting Coli .. 74 F.3d 1459, 1468 (4th Cir.1996)(overruled See Williall/s 1'. The Gian/ Food Inc.. 370 F.3d 423. 434 (4th Cir.2004) (tindil1l.: discharged at her. told her she was a poor manager, gave her poor evaluations, where she alleged that her supervisors customers. and required allegations were true, these actions were not ohjeetively chastised yelled her in front of her to work with an injured hack heeause. even if the plaintiff's Because a reasonahle jury eould not eonelude intolerable Motion tor Summary in original). that the Fourth Circuit has previously that the plaintiff was not constructively working conditions /10 Biis/ein\'. S/. .fohn's on other grounds)(emphasis alleged here are no more severe than conditions deemed tolerahle. IV. in the position would have felt cOlI/pelled to resign: --that is, whether he would have had choice hut to resign." Dones conditions person' Judgment intolerable). that Principal Salaam deliberately made her in an effort to induce her to quit. the Court will grant Defendant's with regards to this claim. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons. Defendant's Motion t()r Summary Judgment. ECl' No. 18. is granted. A separate Order 1()lIows. Dated: Decem ber 7. 2016 GEORGE J. llAZEL United States District Judge

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.