Ferrell v. My Life, No. 8:2015cv01619 - Document 11 (D. Md. 2015)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 7/31/2015. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) (c/m 7/31/15)

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Ferrell v. My Life Doc. 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MARYLA:"D KEYONNA FERRELL, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. TDC-15-1619 MY LIFE. Defendant. MEMORANDU:\I On June 2, 2015, PlaimitT Kcyonna Complaint, Ecr NO.1, 01'11'0'101'0' Ferrell ("Ferrell") filed the above-captioned together \vith a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, ECr NO.2. Ferrell appears indigent, therefore, she is granted leave to proceed in fimna pauperis. IIACKGROUND The Complaint concerns Ferrell's claim that Defendant My Life ("My Life") has been in her "search results for the past few months," and that her full address is available on its \\o'cbsite. Compl. at 2. Ferrell alleges that she called the company to have the information taken dov"n and was told it would take 7.10 business days to have it completely removed from major search engines. IJ. She admits the information was then removed, but states that the information \\las "up for a while," and since she is "connected to celebrities" the information being available caused "obvious emotional distress and a security concern." Id. at 2-3. She seeks damages ranging from $300,000 to $500,000, and an injunction ordering that her profile and all information about her to be removed permanently. IJ. at 13. Dockets.Justia.com IlISCUSSIO:-; I. Failure to State a Claim Under 28 U.S.C. ~1915 this Court is granted the discretion to dismiss a proceeding Jiled in forma pauperis if it determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.s.C. *1915(e)(2)(B)(i).(iii). lIere, the Complaint fails to state a claim. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. a plaintiff is required to provide "a short and plain statement ufthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and each avemlcnt ofa pleading must be "simple, concise, and direct," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) & (d)(I). A pleading must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroji v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." courts have a duty to construe self.representcd Iqhal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although district pleadings liberally, a pro :se plaintiff must nevertheless allege facts that state a cause of action and provide enough detail to illuminate the nature of the claim and allow defendants to respond. See F:rickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Beaudell v. City af Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th eir. 1985) (stating that the duty to construe pro :se pleadings liberally docs not require courts to "conjure up questions never squarely presented"). In this case, the instant Complaint does not allege any actionable conduct by My Life, and "places an unjustifiable burden on defendants to determine the nature of the claim against them and to speculate on what their defenses might be." Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 123 (D. Md. 1981) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Spencer v. Hedges, 838 2 F.2d 1210, 1988 WL 9621, at *1 (4th Cif. Feb. 1, 1988). Ferrell's conclusory statement that she has suffered "obvious emotional distress" is an insufficient basis for a cause of action, making dismissal under Rule 8 appropriate. A court may dismiss a complaint that is "so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is \vell disguised." Salahllddin v. ClIomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cif. 1988). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and will be dismissed. I Ill. ~Iotion to Seal .. Ferrell also filed a Motion to Seal the case on June 10,2015. ECF NO.3. The full text of the Mution states: "Please [sJeal all civil suits filed including address, names and (dJocuments immediately [sic)." 'd. On July 6, 2015, Ferrell liled a second ~1otion to Seal, ECF NO.5, in \vhich she supplemented her original request by asserting that the Court should seal all filings in this civil case because "celebrities and [B]arack [arc] involved," making the case "substantially more noteworthy." Jd. at I. Local Rule 105.11, \vhich governs the sealing of all documents filed in the record, states 10 relevant part: "Any motion seeking the sealing of pleadings, motions, exhibits or other documents to be filed in the Court record shall include (a) proposed reasons supported by specific factual representations to justify the sealing and (b) an explanation \vhy alternatives to The Court also notes that there is a significant question whether venue is proper in this District. Venue \vould be proper if the defendant is a resident of Maryland, or if a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Maryland. 28 U.S.c. 1391(b). Ferrell has provided the Court with her addresses in Virginia and South Carolina. There is no indication that any of events in this case occurred in Maryland, and there is a substantial question whether My Life can be deemed to be a resident of Maryland. See 28 U.S.c. S 1391(c)(2) (noting that a corporation is "deemed to reside in any judicial district in \vhich such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction \",'jth respect to the civil action in question"). Thus, even if the Complaint staled a cognizable claim, this action likely should have been brought in Virginia or South Carolina, where Ferrell presumably has accessed the internet, or in \vhatever stale it can be established My Life resides. * 3 sealing would not provide sufficient protection." Local Rule 105.1\ (D. Md. 2014). The rule balances the public's general right to inspect and copy judicial records and documents, see Nixon V. Warner Comme 'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). with competing interests that sometimes outweigh the public', right, see In re Knightl'ub/'g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984). The common-law presumptive right of access can only be rebutted by showing that "countervailing interests heavily ouhveigh the public interest in access." Doe v. Pub, Citizen. 749 F.3d 246. 26566 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker ,\/oga:;ne, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988ยป. Because neither of the Motions to Seal identify such a countervailing interest, the Motions are denied. CONCLUSIOi" For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Proceed in Fonna Pauperis, EeF No.2, GRANTED. The Motions to Seal the case, ECF Nos. 3 & 5, are DENIED. DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. A separate Order follows. Date: July 31, 2015 THEODORE D. CII ' United States Distric ud 4 is The case is

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