Malebranche v. Johnson, No. 8:2015cv00452 - Document 13 (D. Md. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 7/16/2015. (aos, Deputy Clerk)
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Malebranche v. Johnson Doc. 13 __ FILED __ ENTERED __ LOGGED -_RECEIVED JUL 1 6 2015 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND AT GREENBELT CLERK, U,S, DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MARYLAND BY DEPUTY SOli/hem Dil'isioll * PHILII>PE R. MALEBRANCHE, * Plaintiff, v. * COLLEEN A. JOHNSON, * Defendant. * * Case No.: G.JH-15-"52 * * * * * * * * * * * * * MEMORANDUM OPINION This is a defamation spouse. Defendant from her residence located in New .Jersey. has tiled a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. that follow. Johnson's See Local R. 105.6 (Md.). For the reasons motion is GRANTED. BACKGROUND Malebranche and Johnson resided as a married couple in Maryland granted a divorce by the Circuit Court for St. Mary's See EeF NO.2 at Johnson arises from a in Arizona to an individual 12(b)(2). See Eel' No. 10. A hearing is unnecessary. I. against his fonner See ECF No. I. The alleged defamation Colleen A. Johnson. letter sent by Johnson Johnson case brought by Plaintiff Philippe R. Malebranche ~i& I Eel' No. II-I County. Maryland at 3. Malebranche continues now residcs in Arizona. See ECF NO.2. On Novcmber Malebranehe's supervisor. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy until they were on September to rcside in Maryland 10. 2014. Johnson [to Johnson] while sent a letter to Ilassei. who was located in New Jersey. See id. at ~ .• & lOCI' No. 10-1 at II. In the letter. Johnson wrote that Malebranehe make payments 13.2013. per court order with regard to his military pension" "is failing to and requested Dockets.Justia.com Hasse" s assistance in obtaining tbe funds. See ECf' No. 10-1 at I 1-12. Sbc also wrote that Malebranche had violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and demonstrated "unbecoming of an ofliccr:' adultery in a Maryland Malebranche court. and that Malebranchc fllcd a defamation mcntally and physically of abused her during claim in the Circuit Court lor St. Mary's County. letter. See ECF on January 9. 2015 based on Johnson's that Johnson's opportunity is a "scrial cheatcr" who was convicted See hi. & ECF NO.2 at ~~ 8-11. the marriage. Maryland that Malebranche conducl letter harmed his reputation and prospective Johnson I 0.2. Malebranche and caused him to lose a professional alleges advancemcnt income. See id. at ~ 19-20. filed a notice of removal in this Court on f'ebruary a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 18. 2015. see lOCI' NO.1. and on February 23. 2015. See lOCI' I o. 10. Thc Court will now address the motion to dismiss. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When a case has been removed to federal court. the court has pcrsonal jurisdiction party if the state court from which that case was removcd had personal jurisdiction over a over that party. Diamond Healll1care o(Ohio. Inc. \'. Hllmilily o(All/IJ' Healll1 Parlners. 229 F.3u 448. 450 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing ESAB Grollp. Inc. \'. Cell/riclI/. Inc.. 126 F.3d 617. 622 (4th Cir. 1997) C.[ A 1 feueral court may exercise personal jurisdiction by state law."». When a motion to dismiss is tiled pursuant district court determines jurisdiction over a defendant if personal jurisdiction by a prepondcrance of the evidence. 10 in the manner provided Fcd. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). the exists. and the plaintifT must establish Care/irsllI(Afl/lyland. Inc. 1". Care/irsl Pregnancy Ors .. Inc.. 334 F.3d 390. 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Mylan Lahs .. Inc. 1". Ak~o. N. V. 2 F.3d 56. 59-60 (4th Cir. 1993». The court may resolve a motion under Rule 12(b)(2) without 2 discovery hearing. See xenerally 513 Wright & Miller. Federal Practice or an evidentiary Procedure ~ 1351, at 274-313 jurisdietion as a preliminary memoranda. aflidavits. (3d ed. 2004. 2012 Supp.). The court may address matter. ruling solely on the motion and the allegations in the complaint. & personal papers. supporting legal Consllirinx Enxineers C"rp. ". Geomerric LId.. 561 F.3d 273. 276 (4th Cir. 2009). In deciding a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss. the court construes all jurisdictional allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Nell' Wellinx(()n Fin. Corp. \'. FiaxsiJip Res"rr De\'. Corp .. 416 F.3d 290. 294 (4th Cir. 20(5) (internal quotation marks omitted). III. DISCUSSION Personal jurisdiction long-arm over a nonresident statute confers jurisdiction constitutional "In applying due process:' Maryland's defendant and (2) the assertion is propcr when ..( I) an applicable of that jurisdiction long-arm statute. federal courts olien state that .[the] statutory inquiry:" Inc.. 84 F.3d 132. 135 (4th Cir.1996) (additional 892 A.2d 479.493 long-arm Sr(}\'C/'\'. () 'Connell /lssocs .. citations omitted»). proper under constitutional Iloweyer. personal statute is also required. ,\lackey \'. Compass ,l/krx. Inc.. n. 6 (Md. 2006) (stating that it is not permissible analysis under the long-arm to simply dispense \\ith statute). Indeed. there may be cases where personal jurisdiction due process but not under Maryland's long-ann will arise which will be deemed outside the scope of the Maryland 3 is statute. See Drinx. 423 F.Supp. 2d at 545 (citing Krashes \'. Whire. 341 A.2d 798. 804 (Md. 1975) ("Perhaps situations inquiry Drinx \'. SIIIIiWln. 423 F.Supp. 2d 540. 544 (D. Md. 2006) (citing Car~firsr o!,A4wyland. Inc.. 334 FJd 390. 396-97: under Maryland's with Nichols \'. G.D. Searle & Co.. 991 F.2d 1195. 1199 (4th Cir. 1993). merges with [the] constitutional jurisdiction is consistent state fact 'Iong arm' statute. although there may he a constitutional basis for jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.")). Thus, this Court first looks at Maryland's long-arm statute. A. Maryland's Lon!:-Arm Statute A plaintilTmust specitically identify the Maryland statutory provision that authorizes jurisdiction. either in his complaint or in opposition to a Rule 12(b)(2) motion. See ()l/el1heill1er Publishers. Illc. \". 1'10)"lI1ore. Il1c .. 158 F.Supp. 2d 649, 652 (D. Md. 2001). In his opposition to Johnson's motion. Malebranche argues personal jurisdiction is proper under Md. Code. Courts & Jud. Procs. Article ("CJp") ~ 6-103.1. ~ 6-103(b)(3). and ~ 6-103(b)(4). The Court will look at each provision in turn. i. ~ 6-103.1 Malcbranche argues that Maryland has jurisdiction over Johnson under Md. Code. CJI' ~ 6.103.1. Section 6-103.1 provides: A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in an)' civil proceeding arising out of the marital relationship or involving a demand for child support. spousal support. or counsel fees if the plaintiff resides in this State at the time suit is tiled and the nonresident defendant has been personally served with process in accordance with the Maryland Rules and: (I) This State was the matrimonial domicile of the parties immediately before their separation: or (2) The obligation to pay child support. spousal support. or counsel fees arose under the laws of this State or under an agreement executed by one of the parties in this State. Generally. an action "arising out ofa marital relationship" involves a dispute over a duty or right that the marriage created. Thus. common examples arc a claim Ii.lrdivorce, marital property. or support payments. In essence. "arising out of' means the marriage's existence is the basis Ii.)rthe cause of action. See A 11111011 AlllI1ol1. 282 Md. 483. 386 A.2d 766, 768 n.2 (Md. 1978) \'. (explaining that courts have fi.llmdpersonal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in alimony 4 suits where the nonresident committed marital wrongs in the limun state): G/ading \'. Fur/J/an. 383 A.2d 398. 402-03 (Md. 1978) (tinding continuing jurisdiction over nonresident defendant over claim for child support in forum where award was issued): 2d 725.401-04 Cf /'m1'ers \'. /'arish('/'. 409 S.E. (N.C. CI. ApI'. 1991) (finding personal jurisdiction over nonresident was proper where resident brought claim for child support because statute provided li)r personal jurisdiction when the action arose out of the marital relationship). Malebranche contends that his defamation suit arises out of the marital relationship because Johnson' s letter-containing the alleged delamatory remarks-references actions that Malebranche took during the marriage. See ECF No. 11-1 at 6. Johnson responds that a discussion of actions that occurred during the marriage does not cause the letter. or the resulting defamation suit. to arise out of the marital relationship. I See ECr No. 12 at 7. Johnson is correct. Malebranche's action is for delamation. an action that arose Ii'om his li1l'lner spouse's letter. not from their fonner marriage. Indeed. the alleged defamation did not even occur during the marriage. Thus. while Johnson's allegedly delamatory letter may discuss the marriage. the civil action of defamation did not arise from the marriage. As such. Md. Code. C.l1' ~ 6-103.\ does not provide the C01ll1with a basis for jurisdiction over Johnson. ii. ~ 6-103(h)(3) Malebranche also asserts that Maryland has jurisdiction over Johnson under Md. Code. CJI' ~ 6-1 03(b )(3). This subsection provides that Maryland has personal jurisdiction over a person who "[c]auses tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the Statel.]" See CJI' ~ 6-1 03(b )(3). Thus. both ..the injury and the ad' must occur in Maryland. Aphena /'ar/J/a While Johnson also states that she was not "personally served" as required by Md. Code. CJI' ~ 6-103.1. she was served via certified mail. and Maryland permits service of process through certified mail. See Md. R. 2-121 (a). I 5 Soill/iom-Maryiand LLC \'. BioZone Lahs. Inc.. 912 F.Supp. 2d 309, 316 (D. Md. 2(12) (citation omitted and emphasis added). It is not enough for Malebranche to feel the injury in Maryland when the act occurred elsewhere. See id. Although defamation occurs "wherever the oflensive material is circulated or distributed:' TELCO CO/ll/ll'.\'I'. An Apple A Day. 977 F.Supp. 40.t 408 (E.D. Va. 1997) (citing Kee10l11'.Hustler Maga::ine. Inc.. 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984». there is no allegation that the letter was circulated or distributed in Maryland. Rather. Johnson attaches the letter to her motion and the letter is clearly addressed to Hassel in New Jersey.2 See ECF NO.1 01 at 11-12. Because the alleged tortious aet did not occur in Maryland. ~ 6-103(b)(3) does not provide Maryland with personaljurisdietion iii. over Johnson. ~ 6-103(11)(4) Malebranche also invokes subsection (b)(4) of Maryland's long-ann statute. which provides for jurisdiction where the delendant eauses a tortious injury in or outside Maryland by an aet outside Maryland "ifhe regularly docs or solicits business. engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial re\'enue trom goods. food. services, or manul~lCtured products used or consumed in the state:' Md. Code. CJI' ~ 6-\ 03(b)(4). Malebranche asserts that Johnson receives substantial revenue Irom Maryland through her alimony payments (which come frOin Malebranehe in Maryland). See ECF No. 11-1 at 7-8. Ilowever. alimony is not a good. I(lod. service. or manufactured product used or consumed in 2 In his opposition to Johnson's motion. Malebranehe makes a stray. unsupported reference to a "subject email" sent to Ausley Associates in Maryland. See ECFNo. 11-1 at 10-11. There is no allegation regarding this "subject email" in the Complaint and Malebranche docs not otherwise mention this email in his opposition. By contrast. Johnson filed a declaration indicating that she sent the letter to two people in New Jersey (members of the New Jersey Air National Guard) and one person (her fanner attorney) in Virginia. See ECF No. 12-1 at 2. 6 Maryland3 Thus. * 6-103(b)(4) docs not provide a basis liJr personal jurisdiction. and Malebranche has not sufliciently alleged personal jurisdiction ovcr Johnson under Maryland's long-ann statute. Even if he had. Malebranche would still nccd to satisfy the Court that jurisdiction would be consistent with constitutional due proccss. See Nichols. 991 F.2d at 1199. For the following rcasons. Malcbranche is unable to do so. B. Constitutional Due Process Specilic personal jurisdiction is present when the claim is "related to or 'arises out 01- a defendant's contacts with the fonlln."~ Helicop/eros Nacionales de Colo/llhia. S.A. \', Ilall, 466 U.S. 408. 414 (1984) (quoting Shil/Ter \'. Heimer. 433 U.S. 186. 204 (1977)). "To dccidc whcthcr the requisites of spcci fic jurisdiction arc satisticd in this case. it is nccessary to considcr how thcy apply to the particular circumstance in which. as here. an out-of~state dcfcndant has acted outside of the forum in a manner that injures someone residing in thc fi.mlln." Care/irs/ or Millyland. Inc.. 334 F.3d at 397. In such a case. courts have applied what has bccomc known as the "efTects test." This test originated with Calder 1', Jones. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). whcre an actress brought suit in California claiming that a reporter and an editor from the National Enquirer had libeled hcr in an article written and edited in Florida. Thc Supremc Court held that a court may exercise spccitic personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who acted outside of the forum state but expressly aimed their actions at thc forum state and kncw that their Nor would one letter. that did not go to Maryland. support a finding of persistcnt course of conduct in Maryland. See Drin~. 423 F.Supp. 2d at 546 (finding that one e-mail. standing alonc. would not support a tinding of persistent conduct). ~ "The nature ofthc claim and the defendant's contacts with the forum state detcrmine whether a court may assert specific or general personal jurisdiction." Johal/Sson C"ji. \'. Bml'l1ess Coos/r, Co .. 304 F.Supp.2d 701, 703 (D. Md. 2004). General jurisdiction may be excrcised whcre a dcfCndant maintains "continuous and systematic" contact with the fi.mlln state. lIelicop/eros. 466 U.S. at 415 (quoting Perkins \'. Ben~lIe/ Conso/. Minin~ Co.. 342 U.S. 437.438 (1952)). Hcrc. Malebranchc's argument rclates to specific and not generaljurisdietion. 3 7 actions would cause harm in thc forum state. Id. at 789-90. In Care/irs! oj'Mar)'/anel. Inc.. the . . . Fourth Circuit stated that: This "effects tesC of specilic jurisdiction is typically construcd to rcquire that the plaintiff establish that: (I) the defendant committcd an intentional tort: (2) the plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum. such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the harm; and (3) the defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the Itmnn. such that the It)rum can be said to be the f(lcal point of the tortious activity. See 334 FJd at 398 n.7 (citing IMO Indas .. Inc. I'. Kieker! AG, 155 F.3d 254. 265-66 (3d Cir. 1988)). Malebranche relics on Calder to assert that personal jurisdiction exists in this case because. he argues. Johnson kncw he would feel the harm of her defamation in Maryland. See ECF No. 11-1 at 8. However. unlike in Calder. where the magazine that ran the alleged defamation had its highest circulation in Califtlrnia. see 465 U.S. at 789-90. Malebranchc has not alleged that Johnson's letter was sent or circulatcd in Maryland5 Thus. under Malebranchc' s logic. a defendant in a defamation case would have minimum contacts with any state in which the plainti ITresides. Howcver. "the effects test docs not supplant the minimum contacts analysis . . . ,'. Consul!ing Engineers Corp .. 561 F.3d at 280. Indeed. if it did then ':iurisdiction would depend on aplaimiff's decision about where to establish residence," ESAB Group. Ine.. 126 F.3d at 625-26 (emphasis in original). While plaintiff-s residence. and thereftlre his place of injury. Malebranche docs assert in his opposition that Johnson's statement that the letter was sent to New Jersey and Virginia and not Maryland is a fillse representation of the filctS. See ECF No. III at 11. However. he docs not provide any counter representation of lilcts other than the stray. unsupported comment noted earlier. Instead. he asserts that "rt jhere can be no dispute that the economic effects resulting from the defamatory communication experienced by the plaintifTha\'e taken placc and will continue to take place in Maryland," See iel. But that is not the same as alleging that the letter was sent to Maryland or that Maryland was otherwise the Itlcal point of the alleged tortious activity. 5 8 may affect the minimum contacts test. "it must ultimatcly be accompanicd by the defendant's own contacts with the state if jurisdiction over the defendant is to be upheld."' Id at 626. Malebranche cannot show that Johnson aimed her conduct at Maryland simply because Malebranche lives in Maryland. Johnson sent the letter to the commander of the I 19th Fighter Squadron of the New Jersey Air National Guard in New Jersey. with a copy sent to another offieer in New Jersey and to Johnson's lawyer in Virginia. See ECF No. 12-1 at 2 & 5. In it. she explains that Malebranche was recently hired as a pilot !4Jrthe 1I9th Fighter Squadron (presumably in New Jersey). See it!. While she discusses events that occurred in Maryland. she requests that the commander. who is located in New Jersey. aid her in receiving her alleged share of pension funds from Malebranche. See ill. at 5-6. Thus. Maryland is not the focal point of the alleged defamation. Johnson' s knowledge of Malebranehe' s residence in Maryland is not enough for the Court to inter that Johnson expressly aimed the alleged tortious conduct at Maryland. See. e.g .. Clell/ells I'. McNall/ee. 608 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Tex. 2009). (!fl"d. 615 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 20 I0) (finding the knowledge of likely harm insufficient to make a prima I~leieshowing that Texas was the focal point of the statements in a defamation case). C. Diseove'1' Request Malebranehe contends that discovery should be conducted to determine if personal jurisdiction is proper. See ECF No. 11-1 at 12. "When a plaintilTolTers only speculation or eonclusory assertions about contacts with a forum state. a court is within its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery."' Car~/irsl (JOvlwylaml. 1111'334 F.3d at 402-03 (citing ,l/cLallghlill ". .. McPhail, 707 F.2d 800. 806 (4th Cir.1983) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery when. "[ajgainst the defendants' aftidavits:' nothing beyond his bare allegations that the defendants had 9 II plaintiff"ot'lered signilicant contacts with the [forum] state of Maryland")) (internal quotation marks omitted) (additional citations omitted). Here. Malebranche does not offer anything more than speculation or conclusory assertions nor does Malebranche indicatc what additional information would be needed to establish that personal jurisdiction would be proper. Indeed. Malebranche simply states that jurisdictional discovery is necessary without reference to the purpose that such discovery would serve. See ECF No. 11-1 at 12. Discovery on the issuc of personal jurisdiction will not be permitted. IV. CONCLUSION Malebranche has tailed to properly allege personal jurisdiction under Maryland's long- arm statute or under constitutional due process. Johnson' s contacts with Maryland arc not sufficient for personal jurisdiction in this casco See Dring. 423 F.Supp. 2d 540 ("When the facts present even a close question. '[iJt would not be in the interests of the parties ... to litigatc this case in Maryland. only to have a ruling upholding the assertion of jurisdiction over [Defendant! reverscd on appeaL ... ) (citation omitted). Accordingly. this case is DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction. A separate Order follows. Dated: July I y . 2015 GEORGE J. HAZEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10
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