Malave v. Abrams et al, No. 8:2013cv01985 - Document 7 (D. Md. 2013)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 6 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/26/13. (sat, Chambers)
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Malave v. Abrams et al Doc. 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : IRMA I. DONATO MALAVE : v. : Civil Action No. DKC 13-1985 : KAREN H. ABRAMS, et al. : MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Irma I. Donato Malave commenced this action on July 9, 2013, against five Maryland judges who allegedly denied her due process in connection with state tort litigation arising from a 2009 accident involving a St. Mary’s County public bus. By an order issued July 17, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and summarily dismissed her complaint for lack of absolute judicial immunity. subject matter jurisdiction and On July 22, Plaintiff filed the pending motion for reconsideration. (ECF No. 6). A motion for reconsideration filed within twenty-eight days of the underlying order is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Courts have recognized three limited grounds for granting such a motion: (1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law, (2) to account for new evidence not previously available, or (3) to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. See United States ex rel. Becker v. Dockets.Justia.com Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Pacific Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)). A Rule 59(e) motion “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that judgment.” could have been raised Pacific Ins. Co., 148 prior F.3d at to 403 the entry of (quoting 11 Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, at 127– 28 (2d ed. 1995)). In her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff cites Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), for the proposition that “judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity, and judicial immunity is no bar to the award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” (ECF No. 6, at 3).1 She further cites Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), as holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits the prospective relief she seeks – namely, federal court intervention to compel either a re-trial in state court or removal of the action to this court. 1 Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court has never applied the immunity extended to federal judges to state judicial officers. (ECF No. 6, at 2). She overlooks Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), in which the Court held that Indiana law vested its state circuit judges with the power to entertain and act upon petitions for sterilization, rendering the judges immune from damages liability even if approval of a petition was in error. 2 In Pulliam, individuals who were arrested for non-jailable misdemeanors were nevertheless incarcerated when they were unable to post bail, based on a practice imposed by a state magistrate. Those litigants brought suit under § 1983, arguing that the magistrate’s practice was unconstitutional. United States District Court for the Eastern When the District of Virginia enjoined the practice, awarding costs and attorneys’ fees, the magistrate appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the magistrate’s claim that an award of attorneys’ fees against her should have been barred by certiorari judicial and immunity. held that The judicial Supreme immunity is Court granted not bar a to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity and that judicial immunity is no bar to an award of collateral prospective relief, such as attorneys’ fees, under the civil rights statutes. Noting the existence of limitations on obtaining equitable relief designed to prevent or curtail harassment disgruntled of litigants, judges the through Court suits relied against upon them by principles of comity and federalism (rather than judicial immunity) to find that Congress intended that the Civil Rights Act be available to enjoin state court judges from violating a litigant’s federal rights. the Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 522-23. federal district court enjoined 3 The Court observed that the state magistrate’s practice requiring bond for non-incarcerable offenses as a violation of due process and equal protection, and that it found unconstitutional a portion of a Virginia statute authorizing pretrial detention of such individuals based on the arresting officer’s belief that the arrestees might not otherwise appear for trial, awarding fees and costs under § 1988. The Court explained that Congress enacted § 1983 and its predecessor, § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, to provide an independent avenue for protection of federal constitutional rights, a remedy considered necessary because “state courts were being used to harass and injure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to stop deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights.” Id. at 540 (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972)). Since Pulliam, courts have held that § 1983 limits the type of relief available to plaintiffs who sue judicial officers to declaratory relief. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. McCuskey, 72 Fed.Appx. 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2003). While prospective relief is available against state court judges whose actions violate federally protected rights, such relief is not available here, as the facts presented are readily distinguishable from those in Pulliam. Plaintiff argues that Judge Karen H. Abrams of the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County repeatedly violated Maryland procedural, discovery, and 4 evidentiary rules, as well as state case law, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of the alleged tortfeasor. Furthermore, according to Plaintiff, the trial judge’s errors were supported by the state appellate courts, effectively Plaintiff of her right to due process[.]” Nothing rulings in the resulted complaint from the suggests kind of “stripp[ing] (ECF No. 1 ¶ 48). that systemic, the state court unconstitutional practice at issue in Pulliam, nor is there any suggestion that the rulings bias. were otherwise based on impermissible animus or Rather, it appears that Plaintiff simply disagrees with the state courts’ interpretation of Maryland law and seeks to relitigate her obtaining a tort more action in federal favorable court result. in This the hope court of lacks jurisdiction to consider such a claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars a “party losing in state court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court.” American Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)); see also Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that the doctrine bars “lower federal courts from considering not only issues raised and decided in the state courts, but also issues that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the issues that were before the state court”). 5 Accordingly, it is this 26th United States District Court day of July, 2013, by the for the District of Maryland, ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 6) BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED; and 2. The clerk is directed to transmit a copy of Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel for Plaintiff. ________/s/_________________ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge 6 this
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