Barnes v. Medical Department Washington County Jail et al, No. 8:2012cv01994 - Document 35 (D. Md. 2013)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 3/19/13 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/19/13. (sat, Chambers)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : JUAN SYLVESTER BARNES : v. : Civil Action No. DKC 12-1994 : MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON COUNTY JAIL, et al. : MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending and ready for resolution in this prisoner civil rights action are motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Washington County Sheriff s Office (ECF No. 10) and Detective Tammy Jurado of the Hagerstown, Maryland, Police Department (ECF No. 15). The relevant issues have been briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, these motions will be granted. I. Background Plaintiff Juan Sylvester Barnes, a prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced this action on July 3, 2012, by filing a complaint alleging federal civil rights violations, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Medical Department[,] Washington County Jail, the Washington County Sheriff s Office, Detective Tammy Jurado of the Hagerstown Police Department, and Sergeant John Vanhoy of the Maryland State Police. (ECF No. 1).1 Concomitantly with the complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.2 1 The complaint also alleges defamation against the Washington County Sheriff s Office based on its publication in a news bulletin that Plaintiff was a member of the Bloods [street gang]. (ECF No. 1, at 12-13). That claim was previously dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 3, at 1). The Medical Department defendant has not been served and appears to be improperly named. The intended defendant is apparently the medical services contractor at Washington County Detention Center, which, according to the Washington County Sheriff s Office, is Conmed Healthcare Management, Inc. (ECF No. 10-1, at 3). The remaining defendant, Sergeant Vanhoy, is still in the process of being served. (ECF No. 34). While the complaint does not contain any specific allegations as to him, other evidence suggests that he was a member of the arrest team. Plaintiff has filed motions for default judgment against this defendant (ECF No. 32) and the task force to which he is presently assigned (ECF No. 33). Because Sergeant Vanhoy s response to the complaint is not yet due, these motions will be denied. 2 Because that motion did not comply with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the court directed the finance officer of Washington County Detention Center to file a certificate indicating the average monthly balance and average monthly deposits in Plaintiff s prison account over a six-month period. Based on the verified inmate account certification that was subsequently filed, the court determined that Plaintiff was able to contribute and directed that he pay an initial, partial payment within twenty-one days and, thereafter, on a monthly basis. The finance officer was directed to forward these payments to the clerk when sufficient funds were available in the account. On August 20, 2012, Plaintiff moved for an extension of time in which to pay the initial filing fee. The court granted that motion on December 6, providing twenty-one days for Plaintiff either to make the initial payment or show cause why the fee should be waived. Plaintiff responded on December 17, requesting waiver based on a change of circumstance namely, that his family members were no longer depositing funds into his prison account on a regular basis. On February 8, 2013, he renewed his motion for leave to proceed in forma 2 The complaint recites that, on January 31, 2012, at approximately 9:27 p.m., in Greenbelt, Maryland, Plaintiff was tased about 3 times by a team of police officers effecting his arrest. (Id. at 5). screamed in He immediately fell to the ground and pain. (Id.). As Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs, he advised the officers that he fell on [his] leg that contains a surgical rod and hospital, but was told to shut up. Approximately one hour later, asked to be taken to a (Id. at 5-6). the officers transported [Plaintiff] to Detective Tammy Jurado of the Hagerstown Police Department. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff was completel[]y almost out of it because he was under the influence of [a] controlled substance. (Id.). As Detective Jurado transported him to central booking in Hagerstown, Plaintiff passed out in the car and had to be awakened upon arrival. (Id.). Detective Jurado released Plaintiff to the custody of the booking officer at the Washington County Detention Center. (Id.). When she advised the officer that Plaintiff had been tased, he asked where the arrest had occurred. Detective Jurado responded that it occurred in Prince George s County, and the officer allegedly stated, as long as the assault [did not] happen in Hagerstown. pauperis. (ECF No. 30). Considering that no payments have been received from the finance office and that a more recent account statement filed in a separate case confirms Plaintiff s claim of reduced funds in his prison account (see Civ. No. DKC 13-0281), the renewed motion will be granted. 3 . . [they were] not taking [Plaintiff] to the hospital. at 7). Plaintiff was then booked into jail. (Id. (Id.). At approximately 1:00 p.m. the following day, Plaintiff was taken to the medical department to be processed. (Id. at 9). During this examination, he advised [the] nurses of the tasing incident and they asked [him] to pull up [his] shirt so they could inspect the taser marks. (Id.). Plaintiff was purportedly shocked when they told him there [were] none. (Id.). He also advised medical department personnel that he was concerned about [his] leg because he felt the surgical rod moving[,] . . . shifting[,] and clicking. (Id.). At some point, Plaintiff asked to go to the hospital to get [an x-ray] or surgery to remove [the] rod, but the jail would not even [attempt] (Id.). to find Instead, out what[] [t]he [was] doctor wrong [kept] with giving [his] [him] Tylenol, which was ineffective in abating his pain. 10). leg. . . . (Id. at 9- Plaintiff asserts that he asked medical staff to obtain his medical records in order to demonstrate that he should be receiving pain [medications] that the jail considers a narcotic, but the staff has deemed his injury not emergent. (Id. at 10). According to continuing to deteri[or]ate. On August 27, the Plaintiff, his condition is (Id.). Washington County Sheriff s Office ( WCSO ) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 10). On October 12, Detective Jurado moved to dismiss on the same basis. (ECF No. 15).3 Plaintiff filed multiple opposition papers in response to both motions (ECF Nos. 12, 13, 14, 17, 31), and neither defendant filed a reply. II. Standard of Review The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Presley v. City of Cir. 2006). A plaintiff s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a), which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. 8(a)(2). Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n. 3 (2007). Bell Atl. Corp. That showing must consist of more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action or naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 3 Detective Jurado moved, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Because the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, it will be considered only as a motion to dismiss. 5 268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal allegations not need be accepted. Revene Comm rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989). v. Charles Cnty. Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). Francis v. [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but it has not show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to relief. 8(a)(2)). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. Thus, [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing experience and common sense. court to draw on its judicial Id. III. Analysis While the complaint is far from a model of clarity, it appears to allege § 1983 violations against Sergeant Vanhoy, apparently a member of the arrest team, based on excessive force 6 and denial of medical treatment, and against the remaining defendants based on the denial of medical care after the arrest. Because neither Plaintiff s Detective arrest, the Jurado nor excessive WCSO force was involved claims will not in be addressed. The constitutional protections afforded a pre-trial detainee by the Fourteenth Amendment are co-extensive with those provided by the Eighth Amendment. 520, 535 (1979). and wanton See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. The Eighth Amendment prohibits unnecessary infliction of pain by against cruel and unusual punishment. virtue of its guarantee See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). Scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment is not punishments limited to those imposed by a criminal judgment. authorized by statute and De Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). To state a claim for denial of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must set forth facts which, if proven, would demonstrate that the actions of the defendants, or their failure to act, amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. (1976). Deliberate requires a showing See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 indifference that, to a objectively, serious medical need the plaintiff was suffering from a serious medical condition and, subjectively, 7 the defendants were aware of the need for medical attention, but failed either to provide it or to ensure that the care was available. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Objectively, the medical condition at issue must be serious. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (there is no expectation that prisoners will be provided with unqualified access to health care). A alone, showing of an however, is not requires medical subjective condition. objectively dispositive. recklessness See serious Farmer, in 511 the condition subjective The medical component face U.S. at of a serious 839-40. True subjective recklessness requires knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that risk. 1997). Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n. 2 (4th Cir. Actual knowledge or awareness on the part of the alleged inflicter . . . becomes essential to proof of deliberate indifference because prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment. Brice v. Virginia Beach Correctional Center, 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). actions must be judged in light defendant at the relevant time. of Reasonableness of the the risk known to the See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1998) (the focus must be on precautions actually 8 taken in light of suicide risk, not those that could have been taken). Here, the only conceivable claim against Detective Jurado is that she was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff s serious medical condition Detention Center. during the transport to Washington County The complaint, however, does not set forth any facts suggesting that she knew or should have known that Plaintiff was in need of medical treatment, much less that she was deliberately indifferent to such need. To the contrary, Plaintiff asserts that he was out of it while in her custody due to the fact that he was under the influence of [a] controlled substance, and that he was asleep for most, if not all, of the trip to Hagerstown. in delivering custody to (ECF No. 1, at 6). Washington County Moreover, Detention Center, Detective Jurado advised the booking officer that Plaintiff had been tased, and medical staff at that facility evaluated him approximately twelve hours later. Thus, even if Plaintiff was in need of medical care, the complaint reflects that Detective Jurado took reasonable steps to ensure that it was available. Accordingly, Plaintiff s claims against Detective Jurado cannot be sustained. WCSO complaint is expressly alleging named in defamation. only As the noted, portion that of the claim was previously dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 9 To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on WCSO for the acts or omissions of the medical staff at Washington County Detention Center, WCSO contends that it is not responsible for providing medical care to prisoners, and that it could only be liable, based on its general responsibility for conditions at the facility, under a respondeat superior theory. As WCSO observes, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Monell v. Dep t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Accordingly, Plaintiff s § 1983 claims against WCSO are also subject to dismissal. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss will be granted. A separate order will follow. ________/s/_________________ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge 10
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