Harrison-Khatana v. Cannon et al, No. 8:2011cv03715 - Document 14 (D. Md. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 10/31/12 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 10/31/12. (sat, Chambers)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : DEBORAH HARRISON-KHATANA : v. : Civil Action No. DKC 11-3715 : S. CANNON, et al. : MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending and ready for review in this employment discrimination case is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Summon Cannon (ECF No. 10). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Rule 105.6. Local For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted. I. Background Harrison-Khatana complaint. alleges (ECF No. 1). the following facts in her Plaintiff is a disabled veteran who was formerly employed as a fare box puller by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ( WMATA ). In addition to her military disability, Harrison-Khatana suffered a disabling injury during her time as a WMATA employee. Harrison-Khatana asserts that WMATA s disability rules and regulations require metro buses to be kneeled upon the request of any employee who is disabled. Although WMATA accommodated Harrison-Khatana s kneeling requests when she first returned to work after her jobsite injury, Cannon a district manager with WMATA allegedly instructed his employees to stop kneeling the buses, which made [Plaintiff s] job harder to do. also purportedly refused a request (Id. at 3).1 from WMATA Harrison-Khatana s physician to place her on light duty, even though similarly situated male employees were given lighter workloads during the same time period. (Id.). Harrison-Khatana further alleges that she applied for other positions within WMATA but that Cannon selected less senior employees instead of her. Plaintiff also contends that, after she complained to the union about WMATA s failure to make reasonable accommodations, Cannon against her by making [work] harder for [her]. retaliated (Id.). At some point in time, WMATA terminated Plaintiff. After filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Harrison-Kathana received a right to sue letter on September 28, 2011. se complaint defendants. the Civil in On December 23, 2011, Plaintiff filed a pro this court naming WMATA and Cannon as Harrison-Khatana asserts claims under Title VII of Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ( Title VII ), and the Americans with Disability Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. ( ADA ). 1 Plaintiff seeks back pay, The page numbers listed represent those assigned by the CM/ECF system. 2 reinstatement, costs and compensatory attorneys damages, fees. On pain January Khatana s motion for leave to proceed and 6, suffering, 2012, and Harrison- in forma pauperis was granted. (ECF No. 3). On March 5, 2012, WMATA answered the complaint (ECF and No. 9), Cannon Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 10). moved to dismiss under Harrison-Khatana filed an opposition on March 8, 2012 (ECF No. 12), and Cannon did not file a reply. II. Legal Standard The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Presley v. City of Cir. 2006). A plaintiff s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a), which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. 8(a)(2). Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n. 3 (2007). Bell Atl. Corp. That showing must consist of more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action or naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 3 268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal allegations not need be accepted. Revene Comm rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989). v. Charles Cnty. Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). Francis v. [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but it has not show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to relief. 8(a)(2)). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. Thus, [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing experience and common sense. court to draw on its judicial Id. III. Analysis Cannon correctly argues that he must be dismissed from this lawsuit because, as an individual, he is not a proper defendant to a Title VII or ADA lawsuit. 4 It is well-settled that supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII violations because they are not employers within the meaning of the statute. Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998). Likewise, the Fourth Circuit has held that the ADA do[es] not provide for causes of individual capacities. action against defendants in their Jones v. Sternheimer, 387 F.App x 366, 368 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Baird ex rel. Baird Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, Harrison-Khatana s ADA and Title VII claims cannot be maintained against Cannon in his individual capacity. Assuming, arguendo, that Harrison-Khatana is attempting to sue Cannon in his official capacity, claims against him would still fail. her Title VII and ADA The Fourth Circuit has held that suing a public employee in his official capacity is the practical itself. equivalent of suing the governmental entity Love Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004). Because Harrison-Kathana is also pursuing relief against WMATA under Title VII and the ADA, any claims against Cannon in his official capacity would be subject to dismissal as redundant. See Bradley v. Baltimore Police Dep t, Civ. No. JKB 11 1799, 2012 WL 4321738, at *2 (D.Md. Sept. 19, 2012) (dismissing claims against individual defendants because it would be pointless to [sue them in their official capacities] since a suit brought in 5 that manner Baltimore would still Police be, in effect, Department, which a suit against the is already a defendant . . . ). Hence, the Title VII and ADA claims against Cannon must be dismissed, regardless of whether he is being sued in his individual or official capacity.2 IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Summon Cannon will be granted. A separate order will follow. /s/ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge 2 In light of this conclusion, Cannon s second argument (i.e., that he cannot be held liable under Title VII or the ADA because he was not named as a respondent in Harrison-Khatana s EEOC charge) will not be reached. 6
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