Wonasue v. University of Maryland Alumni Association, Inc. et al, No. 8:2011cv03657 - Document 9 (D. Md. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 6/1/12. (sat, Chambers)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : SYLVIA WONASUE : v. : Civil Action No. DKC 11-3657 : UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND ALUMNI ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. : MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment discrimination action is a partial motion to dismiss filed by Defendants University of Maryland Alumni Association, Inc. ( UMAA ), and Danita D. Nias. (ECF No. 3). The issues are fully briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted. I. Background According to the complaint, Plaintiff Sylvia Wonasue was employed as the executive manager of UMAA from September 17, 2007, to January 19, 2010. On or about January 13, 2010, she informed UMAA s executive director, Defendant Danita D. Nias, that she was pregnant. receiving treatment At around the same time, Plaintiff was for associated with her pregnancy. severe medical (ECF No. 1 ¶ 18). complications She requested medical leave and reasonable changes to her work schedule to facilitate this treatment (id. at ¶ 20), but her requests were denied. Ms. Nias suggested that Plaintiff resign instead. Plaintiff refused to do so, Defendants showed When their clear intent . . . to force her out of her position by, among other examples, changing accommodating, her giving work her schedule impossible to sets make of it less tasks and timeframe[s] to perform them in, [and assigning] duties that she clearly could not perform given her medical condition. ¶ 23). (Id. at Plaintiff attempted to keep working, but her health deteriorated and she was ordered by doctors to go on bed rest and take other medically necessary actions to carry [her] baby to term. (Id. at ¶ 26). On or about January 19, 2010, Plaintiff was constructively terminated from her position due to Defendants refusal [to] accommodate her disability, refusal to change work schedules, and their intent and actions that would and did jeopardize the health of the baby and mother. (Id. at ¶ 27). After exhausting administrative remedies, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint alleging disability discrimination (counts I-III), retaliation (count IV), denial of due process rights (counts V-VII), violation of the Family Medical Leave Act ( FMLA ) (count VIII), and wrongful discharge (count IX). In response, Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim as 2 to counts V-VII and count IX. papers, Plaintiff (ECF No. 3). voluntarily withdrew In her opposition counts V-VII as duplicative and unnecessary, but maintained, as to count IX, that she had adequately asserted a claim based upon state remedies for common law wrongful discharge and for interference with state rights that originate in federal FMLA law. 7, at 1-2). (ECF No. Defendants filed reply papers on March 9, 2012. (ECF No. 8). II. Standard of Review The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. to Rule Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a), which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. 8(a)(2). Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 8(a) (2) still requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n. 3 (2007). Bell Atl. Corp. That showing must consist of more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action or naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). At this stage, the court must consider all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 3 266, 268 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). In evaluating the complaint, the court need not accept unsupported legal allegations. Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989). Nor must it agree allegations, with legal conclusions couched as factual Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but it has not show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 78 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Thus, [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing experience and common sense. court to draw on its judicial Id. at 679. III. Analysis The ninth count of the complaint recites that Defendant[s] interfered with Plaintiff s exercise of her Maryland rights promulgated by its enforcement of the public policy and rights 4 to leave expressed in the FMLA, and terminated for requesting leave. the right [not to] (ECF No. 1 ¶ 115). be In her opposition papers, Plaintiff clarifies that her claim in this regard is based upon state remedies for common law wrongful discharge and for interference with state rights that originate in FMLA law. (ECF No. 7, at 2). Defendants contend that this count must be dismissed because there is no clear mandate of public policy to support [Plaintiff s] claim. (ECF No. 3-1, at 10 (internal marks omitted)). Under Maryland law, an at-will employment relationship can be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party at any time. Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 609 (1989) (internal marks omitted). 291 Md. adopted 31, In Adler v. American Standard Corp., (1981), exception an 35-36 to the this Court of general Appeals rule, of Maryland holding that an employee who has been discharged in a manner that contravenes public policy may maintain a cause of action for abusive or wrongful discharge against [her] former employer. Such liability typically arises where an employee refuses to violate a statutory policy or duty or engage where he or she exercise of a legal right[.] 59, 77 (2011). exception to in conduct is that terminated violates because public of the Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 421 Md. Thus, [t]he tort of wrongful discharge is [an] the well-established 5 principle that an at-will employee may be discharged by [her] employer for any reason, or no reason at all. Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 49 (2002). It is, however, a narrow exception. As the Fourth Circuit explained in Szaller v. American Nat. Red Cross, 293 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 2002): An employee asserting that he was wrongfully discharged must specifically identify the clear mandate of Maryland public policy that was violated by his termination. See, e.g., Adler, 432 A.2d at 470 72. Maryland s legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions, and administrative regulations serve as the primary sources of the state s public policy. See, e.g., id. at 472. Due to a concern with opening the floodgates of litigation, however, Maryland has not found a mandate of public policy sufficiently clear for purposes of a wrongful discharge action in every state statute or regulation. See, e.g., Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg l Med. Ctr., 106 Md.App. 470, 665 A.2d 297, 310 (1995). Maryland courts have stressed that in order for a mandate of public policy to be well-established enough to form the basis of a wrongful discharge action, there must be a preexisting, unambiguous, and particularized pronouncement, by constitution, enactment, or prior judicial decision, directing, prohibiting, or protecting the conduct in question so as to make the public policy on the relevant topic not a matter of conjecture or interpretation. Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 142 Md.App. 134, 788 A.2d 242, 245 (2002); see also, e.g., [Lee v. Denro, Inc., 91 Md.App. 822, 830 (1992)]. Maryland has placed these limits on what constitutes a clear mandate of public policy because it 6 limits judicial forays into the wilderness of discerning public policy without clear direction from a legislature or regulatory source. Milton, 138 F.3d at 523. One limiting factor with respect to adopting a new public policy mandate for a wrongful discharge claim is derived from the generally accepted purpose behind recognizing the tort in the first place: to provide a remedy unremedied violation of public policy. for an otherwise Wholey, 370 Md. at 52 (emphasis in original) (citing Chappell v. S. Md. Hosp., Inc., 320 Md. 483, 493 (1990) (unnecessary to apply a tort remedy where employee had other civil remedies available under state and federal unavailable law); where Makovi, public 316 policy Md. sought at to 626 be (tort remedy vindicated expressed in a statute that carried its own remedy)). was Thus, the tort of wrongful discharge is not available where statutory remedies exist. Ervin v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., Civil Action No. RDB-09-03476, 2011 WL 4566112, at *6 (D.Md. Sept. 29, 2011); see also Porterfield, 142 Md.App. at 140 ( if the relevant public policy is contained in a statute and the statute provides a remedy, the tort of wrongful discharge is not available ); Glynn v. EDO Corp., 536 F.Supp.2d 595, 615 (D.Md. 2008) ( the Maryland tort is unavailable when the statute relied upon as the source of public policy provides its own remedial scheme for vindication of that policy ). 7 In this case, the source of public policy identified by Plaintiff originate[s] in FMLA law. (ECF No. 7, at 2). The FMLA, however, is a federal statute that provides its own remedy for any violation. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617. Thus, [a]s a matter of law, the FMLA cannot be a source of public policy on which to base a wrongful discharge claim under Maryland law. Cooper v. Harbour Inns of Baltimore, Inc., No. L-98-2173, 2000 WL 351373, at *8 (D.Md. 2000). In arguing otherwise, Plaintiff relies on Danfelt v. Board of County 1998). Com rs of Washington Co., 998 F.Supp. 606 (D.Md. That case had been removed to federal court after the plaintiff filed a complaint in state court alleging breach of contract and wrongful discharge based Disabilities Act ( ADA ) and the FMLA. on the Americans with While the complaint in Danfelt raised a similar claim to that raised by the plaintiff here, the case is otherwise distinguishable. The issue in Danfelt was whether federal jurisdiction over a state-created claim with an embedded federal component will lie when the federal statute at issue does create a private cause of action. Id. at 608. The court explained that it could only have removal jurisdiction if the ADA and/or FMLA so completely pre-empt [state wrongful discharge laws] that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character, id. at 610 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 8 Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987) (internal marks omitted)), and held that neither the ADA nor the FMLA completely pre-empts Maryland wrongful discharge law, id. at 611. At no point did it address whether a claim of wrongful discharge may be premised on the FMLA, which is the issue presented here. Because the FMLA is a federal statute that provides its own remedial scheme, it cannot serve as a basis for Plaintiff s wrongful discharge claim. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants partial motion to dismiss will be granted. A separate order will follow. _________/s/________________ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge 9
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