Fuese v. Broan-Nutone, LLC, No. 8:2010cv02174 - Document 10 (D. Md. 2010)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/31/10. (sat, Chambers)
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Fuese v. Broan-Nutone, LLC Doc. 10 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : JAMIE FUESE : v. : Civil Action No. DKC 10-2174 : BROAN-NUTONE, LLC : MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case is Plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Paper 5). The court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion will be granted. I. Background Plaintiff Jamie Fuese originally filed suit against Defendant Broan-Nutone, LLC in the District Court of Maryland for Charles County. Plaintiff alleges that a bathroom fan manufactured by Defendant caused a fire at the home in which Plaintiff lived. (Paper 2 ¶¶ 4-5). Plaintiff’s complaint seeks damages of $10,000 plus court costs, premised on theories of strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and negligence. (Id. at 3-4). On August 9, 2010, Defendant removed this case from state court, reasoning that a related action by the homeowner already pending in this court provided supplemental jurisdiction over Dockets.Justia.com this case. (Paper 1, at 2 (citing Sloan v. Broan-NuTone LLC, Case No. 8:09-cv-03040-DKC (removed Nov. 16, 2009))). Defendant apparently intends to seek to consolidate the present case with Sloan. (Paper “opposition” 6 to ¶ 6). After Defendant’s removal, removal Plaintiff and filed requested an remand. (Paper 5). II. Analysis Because removal jurisdiction raises “significant federalism concerns,” the removal statutes, and resulting subject matter jurisdiction, must be strictly construed. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Mulcahey v. Columbia Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th 1994)). “[T]he party seeking removal bears the Cir. burden of proving that the requirements for federal jurisdiction have been met.” In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 332 F.Supp.2d 890, 892 (D.Md. 2004) (citing St. Paul Reins. Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, jurisdiction is 1253-54 doubtful, (5th the Cir. 1998)). case must Where be federal remanded. Id. (citing Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151). A defendant may remove a state action that could have been filed in Caterpillar federal Inc. court v. pursuant Williams, Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151. 482 to U.S. 28 U.S.C. 386, 392 § 1441. (1987); Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), however, 2 only a “civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants to the district court.” (emphasis added). This court cannot exercise original jurisdiction over this case. There is no hint of a federal question. And while the parties are diverse, the amount in controversy does not meet the statutory threshold necessary for diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (requiring an amount in controversy of more than $75,000). Recognizing that the court lacks federal question or diversity jurisdiction, Defendant recites that this is an action jurisdiction over which pursuant to the 28 court U.S.C. would § have 1367. supplemental Obviously, by definition, then, this is not an action over which this court would have original jurisdiction. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Indeed, the United States Circuit recently rejected a similar attempt to remove an action from state court, where the action was arguably based on the same catastrophic event (a flood and fire) as a pending federal claim. See generally Halmekangas v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 603 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2010). That court explained: Where, as here, the plaintiff files an action in state court with no federal question or complete diversity, the original jurisdiction necessary for removal under 3 § 1441 does not exist. Congress specified that federal courts have removal jurisdiction under § 1441 only if the district court otherwise has “original jurisdiction” over the “civil action.” . . . [Section] 1367, by its own terms, cannot fill the void. Section 1367 grants “supplemental jurisdiction” over state claims, not original jurisdiction. Id. at 294 (footnotes omitted); accord Motion Control Corp. v. SICK, Inc., 1367(a) 354 does F.3d not 702, mention 705-06 removal (8th at Cir. all. 2003) . . . (“Section While this statute does allow factually related state law claims to be joined with the claim over which the federal district court has original jurisdiction, it plainly does not provide a separate basis for removal of independent state law actions.”); Ahearn v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 456 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The supplemental-jurisdiction original subject-matter therefore may not base statute jurisdiction, is and subject-matter not a a source removal jurisdiction of petition on the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, even if the action which a defendant seeks to remove is related to another action over which the federal jurisdiction, and district even if court already removal has would be subject-matter efficient.”) (citations omitted). Here, Defendant stretches to concoct removal jurisdiction past the breaking point. 4 a rationale for Defendant cites, for example, Sayre v. Potts, 32 F.Supp.2d 881 (S.D.W.Va. 1999), as a case that it asserts is “directly on point.” 4). In Sayre, a husband and wife asserted (Paper 9, at claims against defendants that related to a single automobile accident. The wife asserted claims against the defendants that exceeded the jurisdictional limit, while the husband’s claims did not clear the limit. Id. at 888-89. The court correctly supplemental jurisdiction over the husband’s claim. 90. exercised Id. at 889- This case is inapposite to the present one, however, as Defendant overlooks one critical distinction: Sayre were court. action filed together, Id. at 883. it was Plaintiff’s had a single complaint, in state Because the matter was filed as a single removable claim in the two claims in as been a single brought action. or Likewise, consolidated with if the Sloan action in state court prior to removal to this court, it might have been removable along with the larger Sloan claim. But, it was not consolidated in state court and cannot independently removed so that it can be consolidated here. be See, e.g., In re Estate of Tabas, 879 F.Supp. 464, 467 (E.D.Pa. 1995) (“[T]he supplemental jurisdiction statute does not allow a party to remove an otherwise unremovable action to federal court for consolidation with a related federal action.”). the case was improperly removed by Defendant. 5 Accordingly, III. Conclusion For the foregoing will be granted. reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to A separate order will follow. /s/ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge 6 remand
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