Adams v. Montgomery College (Rockville), No. 8:2009cv02278 - Document 13 (D. Md. 2010)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 7/15/10 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/15/10. (sat, Chambers)
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Adams v. Montgomery College (Rockville) Doc. 13 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : SHERRI D. ADAMS : v. : Civil Action No. DKC 09-2278 : MONTGOMERY COLLEGE (ROCKVILLE) : MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending and ready for review in this action is a motion to (Paper 9). dismiss filed by Defendant Montgomery College. The issues are briefed and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, Defendant s motion will be granted. I. Background Plaintiff Sherri D. Adams is a resident of Maryland. case relates campus of to Plaintiff s Defendant September Montgomery 25, College 2008 fall (the on the College ). Plaintiff s complaint alleges the following facts. Plaintiff was a student at the College. This In 2008, Plaintiff has multiple sclerosis, which made her unable to walk long distances around the College s campus. (Paper 1 ¶ 4). Plaintiff registered with the College s Office of Disability Support Services. Plaintiff complained to College handicapped parking spaces. officials (Id. at ¶ 2-3). about a (Id.). lack of On September 22, Dockets.Justia.com 2008, College Dean Monica Brown resolved with Plaintiff that College security classes and otherwise would back drive Plaintiff to her vehicle accommodate her. On from until her vehicle the September College 25, 2008, to could College security drove Plaintiff to her first class, but then told her that they were advised by the College to not drive Plaintiff back to her vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 5). While walking back to her vehicle, plaintiff fell and injured her head, back, and several muscles, and subsequently was taken to Shady Grove Hospital. (Id. at ¶ 1, 6). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against the College on August 28, 2009. [a]s a incurred result of medical the (Paper 1). defendant s expenses and injuries and mental distress. $100,000 or action. the (Paper maximum 1, at legal 2). Plaintiff claimed that negligence, has suffered severe (Id. at ¶ 8). rate, and The civil plaintiff has physical Plaintiff seeks the cost cover of this sheet for Plaintiff s complaint cited the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 504, as the bases Attach. 3). for Plaintiff s cause of action. (Paper Plaintiff s complaint also alleged that Plaintiff filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education and an investigation was conducted and on or about June 5, 2009 the college was found to be in violation of 2 1, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504), 29 U.S.C. Section 794, and its implementing regulation, 34 C.F.R. Part 104; as well 42 U.S.C. Sections 12131, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. Part 35. (Paper 1 ¶ 7). investigation Plaintiff letter Education, which sufficient number from stated of attached the that United the designated to her States College did accessible complaint an Department of not parking provide a spaces to persons with disabilities, in violation of 34 C.F.R. § 104.21 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.149. (Paper 1, Attach. 1, at 3). Plaintiff also attached to her complaint a resolution agreement between the College and the United States Department of Education, which indicated that the College would designate the appropriate number of disabled parking spaces consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act by September 1, 2009. (Paper 1, Attach. 2, at 1). On January 19, 2010, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff s complaint. II. (Paper 9). Motion to Dismiss A. Standard of Review The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff s complaint. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th 1999). Cir. Except in certain 3 specified cases, a plaintiff s complaint need only satisfy the simplified pleading standard of Rule 8(a), Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002), which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing Fed.R.Civ.P. requires a that the 8(a)(2). is Nevertheless, showing, rather entitlement to relief. 544, 555 n.3 (2007). pleader than a entitled Rule to relief. 8(a)(2) blanket still assertion, of Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. That showing must consist of more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action or naked assertion[s] Ashcroft v. Iqbal, devoid of 129 further S.Ct. 1937, factual 1949 enhancement. (2009)(internal citations omitted). In its determination, the court must consider all well-pled allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). The court need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County Comm rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, 4 United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. See also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th 1979). Cir. 2009). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but it has not show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to relief. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 Thus, [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Finally, pleadings drafted that courts less stringent lawyers, they to by lack while a cognizable generally should standards may legal than nonetheless theory Id. or hold pro formal dismiss that fail sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. se pleadings complaints to allege Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Turner v. Kight, 192 F.Supp.2d 391, 398 (D.Md. 2002), aff d, 121 Fed.Appx. 9 (4th Cir. 2005)(unpublished). B. Analysis Defendant asks the court to dismiss Plaintiff s complaint for three reasons: (1) Defendant is a state entity that is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, (2) Plaintiff has not alleged discriminatory 5 intent, which is necessary to state a claim for compensatory damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act ( ADA ) and the Rehabilitation Act, and (3) Plaintiff has not alleged how she was denied access to a public benefit. (Paper 10, at 3-6). Plaintiff counters that Defendant is not a state agency and asks for leave to file an amended complaint if her complaint does not state a cause of action. (Paper 12 ¶¶ 1, 4). 1. Sovereign Immunity As immunity recently stated questions are by Judge better Titus, addressed Eleventh under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1): [T]he Eleventh Amendment limits the ability of a federal district court to exercise its subject-matter jurisdiction over an action brought against a state or one of its entities. Roach v. West Virginia Reg l Jail & Corr. Auth., 74 F.3d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1996). As such, although Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a true limit on this Court s subject matter jurisdiction, id., the Court concludes that it is more appropriate to consider this argument under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) because it ultimately challenges this Court s ability to exercise its Article III power. Verizon Maryland Inc. v. RCN Telecom Servs., Inc., 232 F.Supp.2d 539, 546 (D.Md. 2002); see also, e.g., Coastal Holding & Leasing, Inc. v. Maryland Envtl. Serv., 420 F.Supp.2d 441, 443-44 (D.Md.2006). But see Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 525 n. 2 (4th Cir. 2000)(noting that the [United States Court of Appeals for the] Fourth Circuit cases have been unclear as to whether Eleventh Amendment immunity should be evaluated under Rule 6 Amendment 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6), and citing cases that have addressed the issue under both rules). Beckham v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 569 F.Supp.2d 542, 547 (D.Md. 2008). beyond the Under 12(b)(1), a court may look at material complaint itself to determine questions of fact. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. U.S., 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Evans, 166 F.3d at 647. State agencies and state instrumentalities are entitled to sovereign immunity from suits brought by individuals in federal court, unless the suit is brought pursuant to a statute passed by Congress containing a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity. See U.S. Const. amend. XI; Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. V. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). Similarly, individuals sued in their official capacity as state agents are entitled to the same immunity. As a general matter, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for damages against state officers, so long as those officers are sued in their individual capacities. Sales v. Grant, 224 F.3d 293, 297 (4th Cir. 2000)(citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1020 (2001)). Determining whether an entity is synonymous with the state is not always an easy endeavor. The nature of the entity and its relationship with the state are critical to a determination of the entity s sovereign 7 immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The primary factor to be considered is whether a judgment against the governmental entity would be paid from the state s treasury. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994). Generally, if the judgment would be paid from the state treasury, the inquiry is at an end. Id. at 50. If the judgment would not be paid from the state treasury, the factors to be considered in determining whether suit against the entity would nonetheless be an affront to the State s sovereign dignity are (1) the degree of control that the State exercises over the entity or the degree of autonomy from the State that the entity enjoys; (2) the scope of the entity s concerns - whether local or statewide - with which the entity is involved; and (3) the manner in which State law treats the entity. Cash v. Granville County Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2001). If the judgment would not be paid from the state treasury, the sovereign dignity factors may sufficiently tie the entity to the state so that against the entity would amount to suit against the state. suit Id. Here, Defendant has only argued that Maryland law treats the College as a state entity, with citation to opinions of the Maryland Attorney General. Defendant states that Without citation to any authority, Montgomery College 8 receives extensive funding from the State. Otherwise, Defendant only cursorily mentions the other factors. Nonetheless, Maryland statutes and case law establish that the College is a state entity. The Maryland Education Code provides degree the College. state with a high of control over the See Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 16-411(a)( The Board of Community College Trustees for Montgomery County consists of 10 members appointed by the Governor from nominees submitted by the Nominating members Committee. are Senate. ). Except appointed with Furthermore, for the the student advice Maryland and state law member, consent treats the of the community colleges as state entities and applies sovereign immunity to them. See Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md.App. 483, 521 (2000)( The [Baltimore City Community] College, along with its governing Board, is a State agency afforded the protections of sovereign immunity. ). Defendant points out that the Maryland Attorney General wrote an opinion in 2002 that accepted the view expressed Trustees by v. the John Court K. of Ruff, Appeals 278 Md. of Maryland 580, 586-87 in Board (1976) of that community colleges are state agencies for purposes of sovereign immunity. 2002). 87 Md.Op.Atty.Gen. 17, 2002 WL 337609, at *4 (Md.A.G. Finally, other Maryland community colleges have been treated as entitled to sovereign immunity by another judge in 9 this court. See Williams v. Board of Trustees of Frederick Community College, No. Civ.A. CCB03CV2123, 2004 WL 45517, at *4 (D.Md. Jan 8, 2004)( Because a Maryland community college and its board of trustees are state agencies, the Eleventh Amendment precludes a retrospective federal court remedies suit against seeking damages [Frederick officials. )(internal citation omitted). or Community other College] Therefore, Defendant is a state entity for the purpose of sovereign immunity. This court has previously determined that Congress did not validly abrogate entities for Eleventh education Amendment claims under immunity Title Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Educ. of Calvert County, No. entity, it is shielded Civ.A. from of the state ADA or See McNulty v. Board of DKC 1554401, at *11-12, 19 (D.Md. 2004). state II against 2003-2520, 2004 WL Because Defendant is a this suit for monetary damages. On the other hand, an individual can be sued, albeit in his or her Plaintiff individual, names a and not official, party who is not capacity. entitled to Even if sovereign immunity, she must still state a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. To state a claim for discrimination under the ADA, Plaintiff must allege: (1) that [s]he has a disability; (2) that [s]he is otherwise qualified for the benefit 10 in question; and (3) that [s]he was excluded from the benefit due to discrimination solely on the basis of the disability. Baird ex rel. 1999)(internal Baird v. citations Rose, 192 omitted). F.3d 462, Section 467 504 (4th Cir. of the Rehabilitation Act runs parallel to the ADA and prohibits a federally funded state program from discriminating against a handicapped individual solely on the basis of his disability. School (1987). Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 275 29 U.S.C. § 794 states: No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. For Plaintiff to establish a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, she must allege: (1) [s]he has a disability; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified; (3) [s]he was excluded from participation in, was denied the benefits of, or was subjected to discrimination solely by reason of his disability; and (4) [Defendant] receives federal financial assistance. 11 Proctor v. Prince George s Hospital Center, 32 F.Supp.2d 820, 826 (D.Md. 1998)(citing Doe v. University of Maryland, 50 F.3d 1261, 1265 (4th Cir. 1995)). Additionally, under either to ADA the state or a claim for compensatory Rehabilitation Act, damages Plaintiff allege that Defendant had discriminatory intent. must The remedial section of Title II of the ADA incorporates by reference the remedies of the Rehabilitation Act. Rehabilitation procedures, Act, and rights Rights Act of 1964. compensatory in and turn, 42 U.S.C. § 12133. incorporates provisions of Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. punitive damages are the VI The remedies, of the Civil Under these acts, available only showing of intentional discrimination by the defendant. v. Am. Dental Ass n, 527 U.S. 526, 533-4 (1999). on a Kolstad The Fourth Circuit has stated that intentional discrimination requires only disparate treatment, not discriminatory animus. Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 830 n.9 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has not alleged the elements of an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim, and certainly not that the College intentionally discriminated against her, so she has not stated a claim for compensatory damages. to dismiss will be granted. Therefore, Defendant s motion Once the only possible federal 12 claims are dismissed, the court has discretion to dismiss any supplemental state law claims. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Under the circumstances here, any state law negligence and contract claims will also be dismissed, if ultimately Plaintiff cannot plead a sufficient federal claim. Plaintiff has requested leave to amend her complaint if it does not state a federal cause of action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. prejudice and Plaintiff s complaint will be dismissed without Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend complaint within twenty-one days. A separate Order will follow. /s/ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge 13 her
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