Rockwell et al v. United States of America, No. 1:2016cv00355 - Document 14 (D. Md. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting United States' 9 Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 8/2/2016. (dass, Deputy Clerk)
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Rockwell et al v. United States of America Doc. 14 NITED STA ATES DIST TRICT COU URT THE UN FOR THE DIST TRICT OF MARYLAND D WELL, et al. DAVID C. ROCKW ffs Plaintif * vs. v * D ICA UNITED STATES OF AMERI * * CI IVIL ACTI ION NO. M MJG-16-03 355 * Defendan nt * * * * * * * * * DUM AND O ORDER MEMORAND The Court has bef t fore it the Unite States Motion to t ed s' n Dismiss and Mo otion for Summary Judgmen [ECF N r y nt No. 9] an the nd mitted re elating thereto. t materials subm The Cou urt has h held a ng ad enefit of the arg f guments o counse of el. hearin and ha the be I. BACKGROUN B ND In March 2009, Ru umsey Roa ad, LLC, a Maryla and Limit ted pany ("Ru umsey Roa ad"), exe ecuted a promisso ory note Liability Comp e hing a li iability to Plain ntiff Dav vid C. ("the Note") establish Rockwell in th princi he ipal amou unt of $4 450,000.0 00, to be paid on e n the ma aturity date of March 1, 2016. d M I Interest, at the rate of 6% , per an nnum, was to be paid as follows: p f $27,000.00 on execu ution of the note e. o irst day of each month fr rom April l $2,250.00 on the fi 10 rch 2016. 201 to Mar Dockets.Justia.com As of May 30, 2014, Plaintiffs, David and Kathie Rockwell, had the following unpaid principal balances1 of assessments outstanding against them: § 6672 liabilities, 2008 and 4Q 2010 (Mr. Rockwell only) $317,322.18. Form 1040, 2005 (Mr. Rockwell only) $150,563.22. Form 1041, 2007, 2010, 2011 (Mr. & Mrs. Rockwell) $295,254.82. On May 30, 2014, the I.R.S. served a Form 668-W(ICS) "Notice of Levy on Wages, Salary and Other Income" on Rumsey Road with regard to the Rockwell's tax liabilities. The form stated that the levy required Rumsey Road "to turn over to us: (1) this taxpayer's wages and salary that have been earned but not paid, as well as wages and salary earned in the future until this levy is released, and (2) this taxpayer's other income that you have now or for which you are obligated.2 Mot. Ex. B, ECF No. 9-4 (emphasis added). In response, Rumsey Road paid the I.R.S. the $2,250.00 of interest then owed and stated3 that additional checks in that amount would be sent monthly.4 1 Plus interest. Another levy was served with regard to the principal due on the Note. 3 By Norman E. Rockwell. 4 Such monthly payments were made through the March 1, 2016 maturity date. 2 2 On or about November 20, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an Offer in Compromise, Form 656, proposing to settle all their tax liabilities for a total payment of $150,000.00 of which $6,250.00 was paid with the offer and the balance of $143,750.00 was to be paid from the principal of the Note5 when paid. The I.R.S. returned the Offer in Compromise by letter of April 23, 2015, stating the following reasons for the return: The initial payment made was less than 20% of the offered amount. The offer was made in regard to two types of tax liabilities whereas separate offers were required for each type. The source of the offered payment was identified as the principal debt due on the Note, but that asset was already subject to an outstanding levy. Mot. Ex. C, ECF No. 9-5. Plaintiffs have filed the instant suit presenting claims in three Counts: 1. Violation of I.R.C.6 § 7122 (Compromises) 2. Violation of I.R.C. § 6331 (Levies) 3. "Improper Treatment of Levy on Fund Restricted by Promissory Note" 4. There is no Fourth Count. 5. Attorneys' Fees and Costs Compl., ECF No. 1. 5 6 Already subject to an outstanding levy. I.R.C. references are to Title 26 U.S.C. 3 By the in B nstant mo otion, th Govern he nment see eks dismi issal of Count One pursuant to Rules7 12 2(b)(1) a and 12(b b)(6), su ummary ounts Two and Thr o ree pursu uant to R Rule 56, and deni ial judgment on Co of the request for an award of fees an costs. t f nd . II. DISMISSAL D L/SUMMARY JUDGMEN STANDA Y NT ARD A. A Dism missal 1. Rule 12 2(b)(6) A motion to dismi iss filed under F d Federal R Rule of C Civil Proced dure 12(b b)(6) tes sts the legal suf l fficiency of a co y omplaint. . A comp plaint ne eed only contain "a short and pla t ain state ement of the claim show wing that the ple t eader is entitled to reli d ief, in endant fa air notic of wha the .. claim is ce at .. order to give the defe and th ground upon which it rests." he ds w Bell At tl. Corp. v. . Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (20 U 007) (cit tations o omitted). . When evalua ating a 12(b)(6) motion to dismis t ss, a pla aintiff's wells pleaded allega ations ar accept re ted as tr rue and t the compl laint is viewed in the light mo d ost favor rable to the plai intiff. , However, conclu usory sta atements or a "fo ormulaic recitati ion of th elemen he nts of a cause of action" will not suffice c t e. Id. A compla aint must t allege suffici ient fact to "cr ts ross 'the line be e etween po ossibilit ty and plausibili ity of en ntitlemen to rel nt lief.'" 7 Francis v. the Federal Rule of Civ All "Rule" re " eferences herein are to t s es vil Proced dure. 4 Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 2. Rule 12(b)(1) A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a court's jurisdiction to hear the matter brought by a complaint. See Davis v. Thompson, 367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005). It is well established that "[t]he burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction on a [Rule 12(b)(1)] motion to dismiss is on the plaintiff, the party asserting jurisdiction." Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). The court may "consider evidence outside the pleadings" in a 12(b)(1) motion to determine if it has jurisdiction. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the pleadings and supporting documents "show[] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 56(a). 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. III. DISCUSSIO D ON A. A Coun One nt 1. Jurisdi iction In the Re esponse to the in t nstant mo otion,8 P Plaintiff assert fs t rt urisdicti ion over their Co ount One claim by y that this Cour has ju virtue of I.R.C. § 743 33. In this Coun t nt, Plain ntiffs se eek relie ef due to the I.R R.S.' all legedly wrongfull return w ly ning – wi ithout formally rejec cting – their Off t fer in Co ompromise 9 e. The Unite States is immu ed s une from suit exc cept to t the exten nt it has consent ted to su ubject it tself to jurisdic ction of a court. . d S. 608 (1990 0). United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S 596, 6 I.R.C. § 7433 is a statut tory waiv ver of so overeign immunity y. a es t t ited Stat tes if an n This statute authorize a suit against the Uni ee essly, in ntentiona ally, or negligen ntly I.R.S. employe reckle gards the Interna Revenu Code o its as e al ue or ssociated d disreg regula ations "i connec in ction wit any co th ollection of Fede n eral tax. ." § 7433(a). Ho owever, an I.R.S. rejecti a ion or re eturn wit thout n mise is n not an ac ction tha is tak at ken processing an Offer in Comprom n t ection of tax. Se Shaw v United f ee v. d "in connection with" the colle States, 20 F.3d 182, 184 (5th Cir. 199 1 94)("to p prove a c claim for r improp per colle ection pr ractices, the tax xpayer mu ust demon nstrate 8 Plain ntiffs di not al id llege a jurisdict j tional b basis in the Compla aint. 9 Plain ntiffs as ssert tha a reje at ection wo ve ed to ould hav enable them t pursue an admi inistrati ive appea of the denial of the o al e offer. 6 that the IRS did not follow the prescribed methods of acquiring assets."). 2. Adequacy of Pleading Even if I.R.C. § 7433 were to provide jurisdiction for a reckless, intentional, or negligent return or rejection of an Offer in Compromise, Plaintiffs have not alleged a factual basis for a plausible claim. First, I.R.C. § 7433 does not provide for a cause of action as Plaintiffs claim. "Since compromising tax liabilities is purely discretionary, even if the IRS had summarily rejected plaintiffs' offer, [this action] would not give rise to a claim for intentional or reckless violation of the Code." Addington v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 2d 520, 524 (S.D.W. Va. 1999). Second, as in Addington, the I.R.S. did not summarily reject this offer. Rather, the April 23, 2015 I.R.S. letter10 provided for a resubmission after correction of the defects stated in the letter. Third, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts presenting a plausible claim that failure to process the Offer in Compromise was by any means unjustified. In addition to the absence of a 10 The genuineness of the letter was agreed upon at the motion hearing. 7 20% down payment,11 the Offer in Compromise was defective because it pertained to separate types of tax liabilities and, perhaps most significantly, called for payment from an asset upon which the I.R.S. had already levied. Finally, Plaintiffs presented no plausible ground to believe that they would have succeeded on an administrative claim based on the Offer in Compromise. In sum, Plaintiffs have not established jurisdiction for their Count One claim and, if there were jurisdiction, the claim is not adequately pleaded. B. Count Two In Count Two, Plaintiffs seek to assert a claim for violation of I.R.C. § 6331, alleging that there was an impermissible continuing levy because the interest payments were not "salary or wages." Complaint ¶ 26. The assertion is baseless. The levy sought "wages, salary and other income." B, ECF No. 9-4 (emphasis added). Mot. Ex. The interest due under the Note was income other than salary and wages, i.e., other income. "An IRS levy is generally a one-time occurrence rather than a continuing event, seizing property in existence at the time 11 That could have been waived. 8 the levy is served." Bowers v. United States, 861 F. Supp. 2d 921, 923 (C.D. Ill. 2012), aff'd, 498 F. App'x 623 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing I.R.C. §§ 6331(a) and (b)). "However, a one-time levy may seize a future stream of payments if the taxpayer's right to the payments is fixed and determinable without any requirement for the provision of future services." Treas. Reg. § 301.633–1; Rev. Rul. 55–210). Id. (citing See also Melton v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America, 114 F.3d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that a stream of annuity payments was properly remitted to the I.R.S. in response to a one-time levy). The right to the interest income stream was fixed by the Note. Therefore, the single levy validly attached future payments. The Government is entitled to summary judgment on Count Two. C. Count Three Plaintiffs claim in Count Three was "explained" at the motion hearing. As best can be understood, Plaintiffs' counsel seem to contend – with no supporting facts, authority or persuasive rationale – that since, at the time of the levy, Rumsey Road could obtain a loan at less than 6% interest, the interest payments required by the Note were invalid. 9 This appears to be based upon the concept that, despite the terms of the Note, Rumsey Road did not owe Mr. Rockwell the $2,250.00 monthly interest payments. Hence, it is contended, the I.R.S. wrongfully obtained the interest payment remitted in response to the levy. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that Mr. Rockwell did not, at the time of the levy, have a legal right to the interest payments. The I.R.S., of course, succeeded to that right by virtue of the levy. While Mr. Rockwell may have been able to choose to waive his right to interest payments, the I.R.S. was entitled to assert it. Furthermore, even if, for some reason, the I.R.S. had obtained by levy a $2,250.00 payment that Rumsey Road was not required to make, Plaintiffs would have no claim against the I.R.S. Rather, Rumsey Road would have a claim for wrongful levy12 that would be within the jurisdiction of this Court if timely13 filed and, of course, if it had any plausible merit. Moreover, Plaintiffs present no basis to find that if Mr. 12 "If a levy has been made on property or property has been sold pursuant to a levy, and any person (other than the person against whom is assessed the tax out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest in or lien on such property and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil action against the United States in a district court of the United States." I.R.C. § 7426(a)(1). 13 See I.R.C. § 6532(c). 10 Rockwell chose to pay Rumsey Road the $2,250.0 paid t e R 00 the I.R.S S., that payment would res p w sult in his obtai h ining Rum msey Road d's right t to bring a wro ongful le evy actio on. The Gover rnment is entitle to sum s ed mmary jud dgment in regard to n Count Three. D. D Coun Four nt There is no Count Four in the Com t n mplaint. E. Coun Five nt In Count Five, Pl laintiffs seek co s osts and legal fe ees ant to I.R.C. § 7430(a). 7 pursua This st tatute pr rovides f for an award of costs, includ ding lega fees, for a pr al revailing party. g e, p ng es. Plaintiffs are by no means, prevailin partie IV. CONCLUSIO C ON For the foregoing reasons F f g s: 1. The Uni ited Stat tes’ Moti ion to Di ismiss an Motion nd n for Sum mmary Jud dgment [E ECF No. 9 is GRA 9] ANTED. 2. Judgmen shall be enter nt red by se eparate O Order. ED, this Tuesday, August 02, 2016 6. SO ORDERE / /s/______ _____ Marvin J. Garbi is Unit ted State Distri es ict Judge e 11
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