Engler et al v. Harris Corporation et al, No. 1:2011cv03597 - Document 36 (D. Md. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 10/18/2012. (aos, Deputy Clerk)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : SUSAN ENGLER, et al., : Plaintiffs, : v. Civil Action No. GLR-11-3597 : HARRIS CORP., : Defendant. : MEMORANDUM OPINION THIS MATTER is before the Court on Harris Corporation s ( Harris ) Motion to Sever Plaintiffs Susan Engler, Jacqueline Hamrick, and Antoanna Romaniuk s (collectively the Plaintiffs ) remaining gender discrimination and retaliation claims.1 (ECF No. 12). This is a Title VII employment discrimination case in which the Plaintiffs allege they were terminated or forced to resign as a result of Harris failure to end discriminating, harassing, and retaliatory behavior by male employees in its Columbia, Maryland, office. The issue before the Court is whether the Court should grant Harris Motion to Sever Plaintiffs claims where Harris asserts that the risks of prejudice and jury confusion resulting from a joint trial of Plaintiffs claims outweigh any benefits 1 Plaintiffs remaining claims include Ms. Hamrick s and Ms. Engler s gender discrimination claims and all three Plaintiffs retaliation claims. (See ECF No.11 at 1; and ECF No. 30). of maintaining briefed and no (D.Md. 2011). consolidation. hearing is The issues necessary. See have been fully Local Rule 105.6 For the reasons that follow, Defendant s Motion to Sever is granted. I. A. BACKGROUND2 Ms. Engler In September of 2006, Harris RF Communications Division ( Harris RFCD ) hired Ms. Engler as a Contract Manager in its Columbia, Maryland, office. Ms. Engler complains that throughout her time at Harris, male employees were hostile, rude, and demeaning. The Amended Complaint alleges instances such being as Ms. Engler excluded from meetings, having information withheld from her, and being chastised and treated with disrespect and contempt. Ms. Engler also contends that she did not receive the same administrative assistance as other similarly situated male managers. Ms. Engler further asserts that male employees often questioned her knowledge of contracts. Additionally, Ms. Engler maintains that Senior Programs Manager, Mark Cates, repeatedly and unnecessarily monitored the comings and goings of her and other female employees. In August of 2008, Ms. Engler spoke with her boss, Paul Wilson, Contracts Director-1, regarding her concerns about the 2 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint. 2 conduct of male Wilson spoke employees with Dana in Harris Mehnet, Columbia President of office. Harris Rochester, New York, regarding Ms. Engler s concerns. of 2009, Harris concerns at an Columbia office. the launched investigation As a into RFCD in In April the result, Mr. gender Cortland Davidson, the local Humans Relations representative, accused Ms. Engler of instigating charges of harassment and discrimination through a Women in Business group that Ms. Engler had organized in Columbia. After being told by Mr. Wilson that things are not going to improve [in the Columbia office], Ms. Engler received word that Harris was laying off employees. On June 25, 2009, the day after a debriefing about the results from the investigation into the gender concerns at the Columbia office, Ms. Engler was laid off.3 On July 6, 2009, John White, a male Harris compliance officer, replaced Ms. Engler. B. Ms. Hamrick In January of 2007, Ms. Hamrick transferred from a Harris office in Annapolis Columbia, Maryland. during her tenure Junction, Maryland, to Harris RFCD in Ms. Hamrick worked as a Program Manager at Harris Columbia office. She first reported to Mr. Cates, until Mr. Cates was laid off in 2009; 3 Harris also laid off Mr. Cates and Bruce Florack, a Level 3 Program Manager, in June 2009. 3 then she reported to Dick Rzepkowski. sex discrimination and harassment Ms. Hamrick alleges that from her male colleagues resulted in undesirable assignments that were less important than those given to male colleagues. qualified male Program complicated projects. Managers She also argues that less received the lucrative and Ms. Hamrick asserts that Mr. Rzepkowski made it clear . . . that he would continue to assign her insignificant programs while she worked in his group. Additionally, Ms. Hamrick maintains that two men from Harris Rochester, New York, office subjected [her] to verbal harassment and hostility. Ms. Hamrick alleges, for instance, that Mr. Rzepkowski made comments that Hillary Clinton and a female manager at the National Security Agency ( NSA ) got their positions because of their husbands influence. Ms. Hamrick further asserts that no one ever informed her of [a] rumor alleging that she was having an affair with Mr. Cates. Ms. Hamrick also contends that male managers at Harris repeatedly accused female employees of not working their hours, and that, prior to his termination, Mr. Cates accused Ms. Hamrick of not working her hours. Ms. Hamrick claims that Mr. Cates raised his voice and interrupted her when she tried to address comments about her performance, but that Mr. Cates did not act this way with male employees. Finally, Ms. Hamrick maintains that she complained to Harris human resources, but they did not take any 4 action. Subsequently, on December 21, 2009, Ms. Hamrick resigned due to continued sex-based discrimination and [the] hostile work environment. C. Ms. Romaniuk In November of 2008, Harris RFCD hired Ms. Romaniuk as an Engineering Manager in the Columbia, Maryland, office. Several months after she was hired, Ms. Romaniuk was assigned as an Engineering Manager for the JTT program. that she hardware did not problems receive she the support found with Ms. Romaniuk alleges she the needed program to correct and that [m]anagement shifted the blame over the project from the male employees to [her] and placed her on a Position Performance [sic] Plan ( PIP ). Ms. Romaniuk also argues that [a]s a result of male hostility and harassment, she was excluded from meetings and assigned projects already assigned to others which were behind schedule and cost. Further, Ms. Romaniuk contends that while all male engineering managers were directed to report to Mark Turner, Director of forced [by Engineering the CSP Software management] Manager, to despite Department, remain under Ms. Romaniuk Ms. Len Romaniuk was Lally, Senior repeatedly asking management to transfer her from Mr. Lally s supervision. Ms. Romaniuk asserts that [d]espite [her] repeated objections, Mr. Lally entered [her] office every day after hours (6:00 PM) and 5 closed the door so they could have a private conversation. Ms. Romaniuk maintains that having the door closed made her feel extremely uncomfortable and threatened. Additionally, condescending Ms. and Romaniuk repeatedly accent was a problem. alleges commented that Mr. that Lally her was Bulgarian Ms. Romaniuk argues, for example, that Mr. Lally told her he could not understand her and that she was the worst person with a foreign accent that he ever had to deal with. Ms. Romaniuk contends that Mr. Lally viewed her accent as the reason for her poor communication skills. Ms. Romaniuk representative complained about Mr. to a Lally s company hostile human relations treatment of her. After six months of complaining to human resources, Ms. Romaniuk was allowed to attend the meetings from which she had previously been excluded. to male reports. Romaniuk Additionally, Ms. Romaniuk argues that, compared colleagues, on her Ms. Romaniuk was placed on a PIP in March 2009. Ms. contends, she received however, that harsher her criticism performance was equal and/or superior to similarly situated male colleagues. After Harris conducted its investigation into gender issues at the Columbia office, Harris management removed the PIP and all other adverse reports in Ms. Romaniuk s file and placed Ms. Romaniuk under the supervision Engineering. 6 of Dan Pierce, Director of By November 2009, Ms. Romaniuk was placed back on a PIP, which contained the same performance allegations as the March 2009 PIP. Ms. Romaniuk alleges, however, that Mr. Pierce dredged up the adverse reports which had been removed after the investigation. November 2009 superior to Ms. Romaniuk claims that at the time of the PIP, her her performance similarly situated was again male . . equal . and/or colleagues. Subsequently, on December 14, 2009, Ms. Romaniuk resigned due to her inability to tolerate the alleged discrimination and harassment. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review Plaintiffs may join together in one lawsuit if: (A) they assert any right alternative with to relief jointly, to occurrence, transaction, respect or or severally, arising series of out or of in the the same transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs Neither obtaining will a arise plaintiff or in nor defending the action. a defendant against all Fed.R.Civ.P. need the be relief 20(a)(1). interested in demanded. The court may grant judgment to one or more plaintiffs according to their rights, and against one or more defendants according to their liabilities. Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(3). A court may also order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or 7 prejudice. Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(b). any claim against a party. Further, a court may sever Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. Similarly, [i]f actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may . . . consolidate the actions . . . . Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). Under Rules 20, 21, and 42, district courts are given broad discretion. Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 1982), on reh'g, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983); A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi v. Tidewater Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d 928, 933 (4th Residential, CVI/Beta Cir. 483 Ventures, 1977); F.Supp.2d Inc. v. Equal 482, Custom Rights 489 Ctr. (D.Md. Optical v. 2007) Frames, Equity (citing Inc., 896 F.Supp. 505, 506 (D.Md. 1995)(internal citation omitted)). In determining a motion to sever, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has identified the threshold inquiry a court should consider: [W]hether the specific risks of prejudice and possible confusion were overborne by the risk of inconsistent adjudications of common factual and legal issues, the burden on parties, witnesses and available judicial resources posed by multiple lawsuits, the length of time required to conclude multiple suits as against a single one, and the relative expense to all concerned of the single-trial, multiple-trial alternatives. Arnold, 681 F.2d at 193. Recently, this Court has recognized: [A] presumption in favor of the nonmoving party that all claims in a case will be resolved in a single trial and not be severed, placing the burden on the party moving for severance to show that (1) it will be 8 severely prejudiced without a separate trial; and (2) the issue to be severed is so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of that issue alone may proceed without injustice. Equal Rights Ctr., 483 F.Supp.2d at 489 (internal citations omitted). B. Analysis The Court grants Harris Motion to Sever because the risk of jury confusion and prejudice is greater than any potential benefit to maintaining consolidation of the claims. The Fourth Circuit has emphasized that when evaluating a motion to sever, the risk of prejudice and jury confusion needs to be weighed against four factors: (1) the risk of inconsistent adjudications of common factual and legal issues ; (2) the burden on parties, witnesses and available judicial resources posed by multiple lawsuits ; (3) the length of time required to conclude multiple suits as against a single one ; and (4) the relative expense to all concerned of the singletrial, multiple-trial alternatives. Arnold, 681 F.2d at 193. When faced with severance issues concerning discrimination claims, the Fourth Circuit has found that when the misconduct in all of the identical, plaintiffs severance is cases in a lawsuit is inappropriate because the virtually need for judicial economy outweighs the risk of prejudice and possible 9 jury confusion. See Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F3d. 978, 980 82 (4th Cir. 1997). For brought example, age in Duke discrimination v. Uniroyal claims in Inc., two violation plaintiffs of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( ADEA ) against the defendant. 928 F.2d discharged 1413, 1416 from (4th employment Cir. on 1991). the defendant s reduction in force. Id. same Both day plaintiffs as part of were the Both plaintiffs were the oldest and longest tenured representatives in their regions. Id. The defendant applied the same employee performance criteria to both plaintiffs in order to determine whether each plaintiff would be terminated. Id. at 1416 17, 1420. In Duke, the force reduction was also implemented by the same individuals employed by the defendant. Id. at 1420. Accordingly, in Duke, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court s denial of the defendant s motion to sever because the plaintiffs claims arose from the same transaction, and the record presented no basis on which to conclude that evidence was confusing or prejudicial to the defendant. Id. at 1421. Conversely, when the misconduct in each plaintiff s allegations in a discrimination lawsuit is based on different sets of facts, courts have found severance to be appropriate because the risk of prejudice and jury confusion outweighs any 10 benefit to judicial economy. See Arroyo v. Chardon, 90 F.R.D. 603, 605 06 (D.P.R. 1981). For example, in Watkins v. Hospitality Grp. Mgmt. Inc., No. 1:02CV00897, 2003 WL 22937710 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 2003), two plaintiffs brought different discrimination claims against their employer. Watkins, 2003 WL 22937710 at *1. One plaintiff alleged age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, while the other plaintiff Title VII. supervisor alleged Id. in the different position. at race discrimination *1 4. Both company; each Id. at *1 3. in plaintiffs plaintiff, violation had the however, of same held a The court in Watkins observed that the case involved two entirely separate sets of events and two separate causes of action. Id. at *11. Concluding that there would be significant risk of prejudice and jury confusion in a joint allegations trial, of a the court series of stated that offensive [a] comments jury hearing toward both [p]laintiffs may view the evidence in the aggregate, prejudicing them against [the defendant], or they may confuse the evidence in some other manner when looking towards one [p]laintiff alone. Id. for discriminatory intent Additionally, the court concluded that the risk of inconsistent adjudications of fact or law was minimal. Id. The court emphasized that even though some witnesses would overlap, there would be little overlap of facts. Id. Thus, the court reasoned, finding discrimination 11 against one inconsistent efficiency, plaintiff and adjudication. the Watkins not Id. court the other Finally, concluded would not regarding that having cause judicial separate trials was not an undue burden on the parties or inefficient because separate trials were needed to ensure fairness. *12. Id. at Accordingly, the court granted defendant s motion to sever because plaintiffs claims rested on different facts. Id. at *11 12. In the present case, the Court grants Harris Motion to Sever because (1) Plaintiffs claims rest on different sets of facts; (2) the similarities between Plaintiffs claims are not compelling; and (3) additional factors and concern for judicial economy do not outweigh the risk of jury confusion or prejudice. 1. Plaintiffs Claims Rest on Different Sets of Facts First, similar to the circumstance presented in Watkins, Plaintiffs claims rest on different sets of facts and would likely lead to jury confusion and/or prejudice. Specifically, each Plaintiff in the present case was employed for a different length of time, held a different position, had different job duties, and reported to different supervisors. Not only was the alleged discrimination perpetrated by different individuals, but the circumstances surrounding each Plaintiff s allegations also vary from Plaintiff to Plaintiff. 12 Moreover, Plaintiffs left Harris under different circumstances Ms. Engler was laid off, but Ms. Hamrick and Ms. Romaniuk resigned. 2. Similarities Compelling Second, Between Plaintiffs Plaintiffs assert a Claims multitude of are not unrelated allegations that could easily confuse the jury or cause the jury to view the evidence of discrimination in the aggregate. there are similarities between Plaintiffs claims While (e.g., all three Plaintiffs have remaining retaliation claims; two of the Plaintiffs have remaining gender discrimination claims; all three Plaintiffs worked in the same division at Harris; the time period during which Plaintiffs worked at Harris overlaps; and all three Plaintiffs are represented by the same attorney), each Plaintiff submitted claims under a separate and distinct set of facts. Unlike the situation in Duke, the misconduct in the present case is neither virtually identical from Plaintiff to Plaintiff, nor did the claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence. Thus, similar to Watkins, the present case carries a significant risk of jury confusion or prejudice if the claims remain consolidated. 3. Additional Factors and Concern for Judicial Economy do not Outweigh the Risk of Jury Confusion or Prejudice Third, the other Fourth Circuit factors emphasized in Arnold do not outweigh the significant risk of jury confusion or prejudice. There is little risk of inconsistent adjudications 13 of fact between or the law because claims. there Thus, are very similar to inconsistent adjudications is minimal. on the parties significant risk consolidation of and/or of jury witnesses claims facts Watkins, in the common risk of Additionally, the burden does confusion Plaintiffs few not outweigh and prejudice. may lessen the While the burden because some of the witnesses for each Plaintiff s claim may be the same, this benefit is minimal. Therefore, even assuming the parties and/or witnesses would be burdened by separate trials, the significant risk of jury confusion and prejudice to Harris outweighs any benefit of maintaining consolidation of the claims. As to the remaining factors concerning judicial economy, it is unclear whether time maintaining consolidation. and resources would be saved by On one hand, a consolidated trial could arguably take less time and use fewer resources because discovery would not be duplicated. is unlikely to be duplicated different sets of facts. On the other hand, discovery because the claims involve Moreover, it is unclear whether a single consolidated trial would take less courtroom time than separate trials, especially given that Plaintiffs claims all stem from different sets of facts. judicial economy favored Again, even assuming that maintaining consolidation, the significant risk of potential jury confusion and prejudice to 14 Harris outweighs any potential benefit or convenience that may result from maintaining consolidation. Accordingly, the Court grants Harris Motion to Sever. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant s Motion to Sever (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED. Entered this 18th day of October, 2012 _____/s/______________ George L. Russell, III United States District Judge 15
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