Engler et al v. Harris Corporation et al, No. 1:2011cv03597 - Document 30 (D. Md. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 8/28/2012. (aos, Deputy Clerk)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND SUSAN ENGLER, et al., : Plaintiffs, : v. : HARRIS CORP., et al., : Defendants. Civil Action No. GLR-11-3597 : MEMORANDUM OPINION THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Harris Corporation ( Harris ) and Harris RF Communications Division s ( Harris Dismiss RFCD ) (collectively Plaintiffs Susan the Engler, Defendants ) Jacqueline Motion Hamrick, to and Antoanna Romaniuk s (collectively the Plaintiffs ) Complaint. (ECF No. 11). This is a Title VII employment discrimination case in which the Plaintiffs allege they were terminated or forced to resign or retire as a result of Harris failure to end discriminating, harassing, and retaliatory behavior by male employees in its Columbia, Maryland, office. The issues before the Court are (1) whether Plaintiffs sexual harassment based on hostile environment claims include sufficiently pled facts showing that Harris conduct was either (a) sex-based, or (b) severe or pervasive;1 (2) whether Mss. Hamrick s and Romaniuk s Title VII gender and national origin discrimination claims include sufficiently pled facts showing that either suffered adverse employment action; and (3) whether Mss. Hamrick s include and Romaniuk s sufficiently materially adverse pled Title facts employment VII showing action. fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. (D.Md. 2011). retaliation that The either issues claims suffered have been See Local Rule 105.6 For the reasons that follow, Defendants Motion is granted in part and denied in part. 1 Plaintiffs Amended Complaint does not use the term hostile environment under the Causes of Action section (as it did in the original pleading), and instead appears to substitute this with allegations concerning a pattern and/or practice of discrimination. Given Plaintiffs numerous references in the Amended Complaint to a hostile work environment and hostile working conditions, however, it is unclear whether Plaintiffs intend to proceed with the hostile work environment claims. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 46, 49, 54, 130, 132, 159, 171). Accordingly, Defendants, out of an abundance of caution, retained the hostile environment count in their Motion to Dismiss, and the Court will, likewise, address Plaintiffs hostile environment claims. Secondly, to the extent that Plaintiffs are attempting to assert a pattern or practice theory of discrimination, the Court summarily dismisses this claim because it is well established that a nonclass complaint of discrimination may not rely on an alleged pattern and practice claim. Pueschel v. Veneman, 185 F.Supp.2d 566, 574 (D.Md. 2002) (citing Settle v. Balt. Cnty., 34 F.Supp.2d 969, 986 (D.Md. 1999), aff d, 203 F.3d 822 (4th Cir. 2000)). 2 BACKGROUND2 I. A. Ms. Engler In September of 2006, Harris RFCD hired Ms. Engler as a Contract Manager in its Columbia, Maryland, office. Ms. Engler complains that throughout her time at Harris, male employees were hostile, alleges rude, instances meetings, and such having demeaning. as Ms. information The Engler withheld Amended being from Complaint excluded her, and from being chastised and treated with disrespect and contempt. Engler also contends administrative managers. that assistance she as did other not receive Ms. same situated similarly the male Ms. Engler further asserts that male employees often questioned her knowledge of contracts. Additionally, Ms. Engler maintains that Senior Programs Manager, Mark Cates, repeatedly and unnecessarily monitored the comings and goings of her and other female employees. In August of 2008, Ms. Engler spoke with her boss, Paul Wilson, Contracts Director-1, regarding her concerns about the conduct of male Wilson spoke employees with Dana in Harris Mehnet, Columbia President of office. Harris Rochester, New York, regarding Ms. Engler s concerns. of 2009, Harris launched an investigation 2 into Mr. RFCD in In April the gender Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint and are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. 3 concerns at the Columbia office. As a result, Cortland Davidson, the local Humans Relations representative, accused Ms. Engler of instigating charges of harassment and discrimination through a Women in Business group that Ms. Engler had organized in Columbia. After being told by Mr. Wilson that things are not going to improve [in the Columbia office], Ms. Engler received word that Harris was laying off employees. On June 25, 2009, the day after a debriefing about the results from the investigation into the gender concerns at the Columbia office, Ms. Engler was laid off.3 On July 6, 2009, John White, a male Harris compliance officer, replaced Ms. Engler. B. Ms. Hamrick In January of 2007, Ms. Hamrick transferred from a Harris office in Annapolis Columbia, Maryland. during her tenure Junction, Maryland, to Harris RFCD in Ms. Hamrick worked as a Program Manager at Harris Columbia office. She first reported to Mr. Cates, until Mr. Cates was laid off in 2009; then she reported to Dick Rzepkowski. sex discrimination and harassment Ms. Hamrick alleges that from her male colleagues resulted in undesirable assignments that were less important than those given to male colleagues. 3 She also argues that less Harris also laid off Mr. Cates and Bruce Florack, a Level 3 Program Manager, in June 2009. 4 qualified male Program complicated projects. Managers received the lucrative and Ms. Hamrick asserts that Mr. Rzepkowski made it clear . . . that he would continue to assign her insignificant programs while she worked in his group. Additionally, Ms. Hamrick maintains that two men from Harris Rochester, New York, office subjected [her] to verbal harassment and hostility. Ms. Hamrick alleges, for instance, that Mr. Rzepkowski made comments that Hillary Clinton and a female manager at the National Security Agency ( NSA ) got their positions because of their husbands influence. Ms. Hamrick further asserts that no one ever informed her of [a] rumor alleging that she was having an affair with Mr. Cates. Ms. Hamrick also contends that male managers at Harris repeatedly accused female employees of not working their hours, and that, prior to his termination, Mr. Cates accused Ms. Hamrick of not working her hours. Ms. Hamrick claims that Mr. Cates raised his voice and interrupted her when she tried to address comments about her performance, but that Mr. Cates did not act this way with male employees. Finally, Ms. Hamrick maintains that she complained to Harris human resources, but they did not take any action. Subsequently, on December 21, 2009, Ms. Hamrick resigned due to continued sex-based discrimination and [the] hostile work environment. 5 C. Ms. Romaniuk In November of 2008, Harris RFCD hired Ms. Romaniuk as an Engineering Manager in the Columbia, Maryland, office. Several months after she was hired, Ms. Romaniuk was assigned as an Engineering Manager for the JTT program. that she hardware did not problems receive she the support found with Ms. Romaniuk alleges she the needed program to correct and that [m]anagement shifted the blame over the project from the male employees to [her] and placed her on a Position Performance [sic] Plan ( PIP ). Ms. Romaniuk also argues that [a]s a result of male hostility and harassment, she was excluded from meetings and assigned projects already assigned to others which were behind schedule and cost. Further, Ms. Romaniuk contends that while all male engineering managers were directed to report to Mark Turner, Director of forced [by Engineering the CSP Software management] Manager, to despite Department, remain under Ms. Romaniuk Ms. Len Romaniuk was Lally, Senior repeatedly asking management to transfer her from Mr. Lally s supervision. Ms. Romaniuk asserts that [d]espite [her] repeated objections, Mr. Lally entered [her] office every day after hours (6:00 PM) and closed the door so they could have a private conversation. Ms. Romaniuk maintains that having the door closed made her feel extremely uncomfortable and threatened. 6 Additionally, condescending Ms. and Romaniuk repeatedly accent was a problem. alleges commented that Mr. that Lally her was Bulgarian Ms. Romaniuk argues, for example, that Mr. Lally told her he could not understand her and that she was the worst person with a foreign accent that he ever had to deal with. Ms. Romaniuk contends that Mr. Lally viewed her accent as the reason for her poor communication skills. Ms. Romaniuk representative complained about Mr. to a Lally s company hostile human relations treatment of her. After six months of complaining to human resources, Ms. Romaniuk was allowed to attend the meetings from which she had previously been excluded. to male colleagues, on her Ms. Romaniuk was placed on a PIP in March 2009. reports. Romaniuk Additionally, Ms. Romaniuk argues that, compared Ms. contends, she received however, that harsher her criticism performance was equal and/or superior to similarly situated male colleagues. After Harris conducted its investigation into gender issues at the Columbia office, Harris management removed the PIP and all other adverse reports in Ms. Romaniuk s file and placed Ms. Romaniuk under the supervision of Dan Pierce, Director of Engineering. By November 2009, Ms. Romaniuk was placed back on a PIP, which contained the same performance allegations as the March 2009 PIP. Ms. Romaniuk alleges, 7 however, that Mr. Pierce dredged up the adverse reports which had been removed after the investigation. November 2009 superior to Ms. Romaniuk claims that at the time of the PIP, her her performance similarly situated was again male . . equal . and/or colleagues. Subsequently, on December 14, 2009, Ms. Romaniuk resigned due to her inability to tolerate the alleged discrimination and harassment. II. A. DISCUSSION Standard of Review A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion should be granted unless an adequately stated claim is supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. naked A complaint is also insufficient if it relies upon assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted). In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content 8 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 555 U.S. at 556. In considering construe the a Rule complaint 12(b)(6) in the light motion, most the Court favorable must to the plaintiff, read the complaint as a whole, and take the facts asserted therein as true. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). court may also examine In addition to the complaint, the documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Conclusory allegations regarding the legal effect of the facts alleged need not be accepted. v. Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1995). purpose of the complaint is to provide Labram Because the central the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff s claim is and the grounds upon which it supported rests, by some the plaintiff s factual legal basis allegations sufficient defendant to prepare a fair response. to must allow be the Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3. While a plaintiff asserting a discrimination claim is not required to plead a heightened level of factual support, [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level in order to survive a motion to 9 dismiss. Id. at alleged facts, 555. Dismissal taken discrimination claim. as is true, appropriate cannot where the substantiate a Myers v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, No. CCB-09- 3391, 2010 WL 3120070, at *3 (D.Md. Aug. 9, 2010). B. Analysis4 1. Mss. Engler s, Hamrick s, and Romaniuk s SexualHarassment Based on a Hostile Environment Claims The Court Plaintiffs grants sexual Harris harassment Motion based to on Dismiss all hostile three environment claims because Plaintiffs fail to allege that (1) the harassment was based on their gender, and (2) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of their employment and create an abusive work environment. Title VII states that [i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for individual an employer with . respect . . to to discriminate [her] against compensation, any terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of . . . sex. 42 U.S.C.A. harassment § 2000e-2 claim based (West on 2012). a 4 To hostile establish work a sexual environment, a Plaintiffs Complaint appears to assert thirteen causes of action. Harris moved to dismiss eleven of the thirteen causes of action. Plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their three age discrimination claims, leaving the following eight causes of action for the court to consider on this Motion to Dismiss: (1) three claims for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; (2) one claim for national origin discrimination under Title VII; (3) two claims for sex/gender discrimination under Title VII; and (4) two claims for unlawful retaliation under Title VII. 10 plaintiff must show that (1) she experienced unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on her sex; (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment; and (4) there employer. is some basis for imputing liability to the Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 940 (2003); Riley v. Buckner, 1 F.App x 130, 134 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Spicer v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Corrections, 66 F.3d 705, 709-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Harris Motion to Dismiss challenges only the second and third elements of Plaintiffs prima facie case: that the conduct complained of pervasive. (Def. s Mot. to Dismiss at 5-7, 10-12, 16-17). To was establish not the sex-based second and element was of a not severe sex-based or hostile environment claim, a plaintiff must show that but for her gender she would discrimination. not have been victim of the alleged Gilliam v. S.C. Dep t of Juvenile Justice, 474 F.3d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). In other words, a plaintiff needs to show that they were a target of the conduct because of their gender. Smith v. First Union Nat l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242-43 (4th Cir. 2000). need not show that sexual advances 11 or A plaintiff propositions were involved. Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). To establish environment environment the claim, was third a element plaintiff permeated with of sex-based show must a that discriminatory hostile the work intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [their] employment and create an abusive working environment. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., (internal citation omitted). The plaintiff must show that she subjectively felt that the work environment was hostile or abusive and that the work environment was objectively hostile Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. work environment, circumstances, or to a reasonable person. To determine the severity of a hostile courts which abusive look include: at (1) the totality the frequency the of of the discriminatory conduct ; (2) its severity ; (3) whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance ; and (4) whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sets a high bar that must be cleared in order to establish the severe and pervasive element. E.E.O.C. Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008). v. Sunbelt Rentals, Intermittent acts of harassment are insufficient to establish that a hostile work 12 environment is severe or pervasive. Greene v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 371 F.Supp.2d 759, 762-63 (D.Md. 2005) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)). does not mandate civility in the Indeed, Title VII workplace. Id. Further, a supervisor s strict management style or degree of supervision is not evidence of actionable harassment. Thorn v. Sebelius, 766 F.Supp.2d 585, 601 (D.Md. 2011) aff'd, 465 F.App'x 274 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Webster v. Johnson, 126 F.App x 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting actionable that stern harassment)). considered hostile intimidate, ridicule, women. supervision However, if it and is a does work evidence environment consumed maliciously not by demean can remarks the be that status of First Union Nat l Bank, 202 F.3d at 242. Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs sexual harassment based on hostile work environment claims fail to meet the pleading requirements for the second and third elements of the prima facie conclusory test. First, recitations of all general three Plaintiffs statements rely regarding on the nature of the environment, but fail to point to any specific factual allegations that the harassment was based on their sex. The Amended Complaint provides no factual allegations that lead to a reasonable inference that any conduct occurred because of sex. To conclusory be sure, the allegations Amended that male 13 Complaint employees is at replete with Harris were hostile, rude, demeaning, disrespectful, given more important projects on which to work, and treated preferentially. The Amended Complaint does not, however, provide specific instances of harassment that lead to a reasonable inference that the conduct of male supervisors and employees was based on sex. Showing that a work environment is unfriendly is simply not enough to state a claim. Under the pleading standard established in Iqbal and Twombly, the pleadings, on their face, must be plausible, not merely possible. was sex-motivated is unclear. The Here, that the conduct Court also finds the allegations implausible because they do not logically exclude other non-sex related reasons for the allegations. the different treatment of the three Plaintiffs occurred because of personality differences. are no concrete stating that facts the on the alleged face of harassment For example, the could have Moreover, there Amended occurred Complaint because the Plaintiffs were women. None of the Plaintiffs have pled one example of male supervisors or employees stating a specific remark to them that is demeaning to women. Similarly, none of the Plaintiffs have pled one example of the male supervisors or employees being overheard making demeaning remarks about women.5 5 the Simply stating The allegations in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint regarding lack of a breast feeding room and Mr. Pierce s alleged 14 that demeaning remarks were made, without identifying what the remarks were, is not enough to allow this Court to infer that the remarks, and thus Plaintiffs are females. the harassment, occurred because the Treating fellow employees rudely and without respect, chastising fellow employees, challenging the work of fellow demonstrate an employees, unhappy work and being environment. condescending Indeed, have alleged working conditions that are unfair. all Plaintiffs Nevertheless, the fact that all three Plaintiffs are women and were treated differently, and arguably unfairly, from male colleagues is an insufficient basis to reasonably infer that the alleged conduct occurred because of gender. Accordingly, reading all allegations the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the pleading requirement for the second element of a gender-based hostile work environment claim. Second, assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs hostile work environment claims survived the second element of a prima facie case, the claims nonetheless fail on the third element because comments that he was not the engineering manager of the lactating facility do not support Plaintiffs claim because the statements did not target, nor were they specific to, the Plaintiffs since none of the Plaintiffs pled that they had any need to use a breast feeding room. Likewise, the allegations in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint asserting that Mr. Rzepkowski commented that Hillary Clinton and a female Project Manager at the NSA got ahead because of their husbands does not support Plaintiffs claims because the comments were not targeting or specific to the Plaintiffs, nor does the Amended Complaint allege that these comments were spoken to the Plaintiffs. 15 Harris conduct is not sufficiently severe and pervasive. Amended Complaint subjectively all three the work environment facts must also demonstrate, The would severe Amended that viewed abusive. be demonstrates and Complaint pervasive vaguely from states an that as Plaintiffs hostile however, objective the The that view. conduct and it The repeatedly occurred throughout the Plaintiffs time at Harris and fails to provide dates, the number of instances, or why the instances would be viewed as severe and pervasive from an objective point of view. These bare insufficient pleading and pleading leads only conclusory that to assertions the the court conclusion are cannot that a prototypical accept. The a and severe pervasive hostile work environment is possible, not plausible. Even so, Harris conduct, while unwelcome and perhaps unfair, fails to rise to the level recognized as a hostile and abusive work environment within the meaning of the law. This Court s review of cases that considered a hostile work environment claim in both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment contexts, confirms that Plaintiffs allegations do not present facts that would satisfy a prima facie case.6 6 Thus, the Court finds that See Myers v. Md Auto. Ins. Fund, No. CCB-09-3391, 2010 WL 3120070, at *6 (D.Md. Aug. 9, 2010) (finding that allegations of employer micro-managing, harassing, and belittling employee was unwelcome but not severe and pervasive); Cole v. Hillside Family 16 all three Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege severe and pervasive conduct, and therefore, grants Harris Motion to Dismiss all three Plaintiffs sexual harassment based on hostile environment claims. 2. Mss. Hamrick s and Romaniuk s Discrimination Claims on the basis of Gender and National Origin The Court denies Harris Motion to Dismiss Ms. Hamrick s gender discrimination claim because Ms. Hamrick s allegations sufficiently demonstrate that she suffered adverse employment action. Conversely, the Court grants Harris Motion to Dismiss Ms. Romaniuk s gender and national origin discrimination claims because Ms. Romaniuk s allegations do not sufficiently demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action. Title VII forbids an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such of Agencies, Inc., No. PJM-10-3326, 2011 WL 2413928, at *7 (D.Md. June 9, 2011) (finding that being forced to work without pay, being forced to redo assignments, being denied professional development opportunities, unjustifiably removing job duties, and isolating from co-workers is not sufficiently severe and pervasive for a hostile work environment claim); Fleming v. MaxMara USA, Inc., 371 F.App x 115, 119 (2d Cir. 2010)(finding that excluding employee from meetings and criticizing employee s work did not support hostile work environment claim); Patton v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch. Bd., 276 F.3d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that supervisor s rude, abrupt, and arrogant behavior and stern and severe criticism did not support employee s hostile work environment claim). 17 individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. evidence § of discrimination 2000e-2 (a)(1) (West discrimination, claim must a 2012). Absent plaintiff s establish a prima direct Title facie case VII by showing (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class. Coleman v. Md. C.A., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.Ct. 3059 (2011), and aff'd sub nom. Coleman v. C.A. of Md., 132 S.Ct. 1327 (2012) (Supreme Court only addressed Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity issue) (internal citation omitted). Harris Motion to Dismiss challenges only the third element of Plaintiffs prima facie case, namely suffered no adverse employment action. that the Plaintiffs (Def. s Mot. to Dismiss at 12-13, 17-18). An adverse employment action is a discriminatory act that adversely affect[s] the terms, conditions, or benefits of the plaintiff's employment. F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 2007). Examples of typical adverse employment actions are discharge, demotion, decrease in pay or benefits, loss of job title or supervisory responsibility, or reduced opportunities for promotion. 253, 255 (4th Cir. 1999). 18 Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d While ultimate action, conduct that employment a must not rise to the level action can constitute adverse effect tangible employment does on the and still be terms shown. Thorn of employment conditions v. an Sebelius, of 766 F.Supp.2d 585, 598 (D.Md. 2011), aff'd, 465 F.App'x 274 (4th Cir. 2012) review or (internal reprimand citation is employment action. if generally Id. work duties, even omitted). not A poor considered performance an adverse Likewise, changes in assignments or unappealing to an employee, do not constitute an adverse employment action unless the change is accompanied by a decrease in salary or work hours, or a similar significant detrimental effect. Thorn, 766 F.Supp.2d at 599; Holland, 487 F.3d at 219. Here, Ms. discrimination Hamrick s claim employment action. undesirable show allegations that she in her suffered gender an adverse Ms. Hamrick s allegation that she received assignments of lower value, importance and visibility (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 94-95, 126) does not qualify as an adverse employment action effect under the law. that has a significant detrimental Similarly, Ms. Hamrick s allegation that her male supervisor told her that he would continue to assign her insignificant programs does not entitle her to relief. Ms. Hamrick s allegation that she was removed from the important position of VACM P[rogram] M[anager] , however (Am. Compl. ¶ 19 125), constitutes a demotion or loss of job title. Accordingly, taking this allegation as true and construing it in the light most favorable to Ms. Hamrick, her allegation sufficiently demonstrates that she suffered an adverse employment action. As to Ms. Romaniuk s allegations, both her gender and national origin discrimination claims fail to sufficiently show that she suffered adverse employment action. Ms. Romaniuk does not allege that she suffered a demotion or loss of job title. Instead, Ms. Romaniuk alleges that she received unappealing work assignments, was required to work with a certain supervisor, was criticized for her work, and was placed on a PIP. None of these allegations constitute adverse employment action. Ms. Romaniuk also alleges that she was excluded from weekly meetings for approximately six months. Exclusion from meetings does not, by itself, constitute an adverse employment action, as the issue in a discrimination claim is whether the exclusion had a significant detrimental effect. Aside from alleging that Ms. Romaniuk was harassed for not completing assignments from these meetings allege (Am. any Compl. adverse ¶169), action the or Amended significant Complaint does detrimental not effect resulting from Ms. Romaniuk s inability to attend the weekly meetings. demonstrate Thus, Ms. Romaniuk s allegations fail to sufficiently that she suffered an 20 adverse employment action. Accordingly, the Court grants Harris Motion to Dismiss Ms. Romaniuk s gender and national origin discrimination claims. 3. Mss. Hamrick s and Romaniuk s Retaliation Claims The Court denies Harris Motion to Dismiss both Mss. Hamrick s and Romaniuk s retaliation claims because both claims sufficiently demonstrate that Mss. Hamrick and Romaniuk each suffered a materially adverse employment action. A plaintiff s prima facie retaliation claim must show (1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the employment important action to note for qualifies claim. action. a as that Coleman, what retaliation adverse 626 qualifies claim employment is F.3d at 190. It is as adverse employment less onerous than action for a what discrimination See Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (concluding that Title VII s anti-retaliation provision is not coterminous discrimination provision). with Title VII s substantive Protected activities include showing opposition, or complaining, to an employer about discriminatory practices, or participating in an employer s informal grievance procedure or in a Title VII hearing. Kubico v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 1999). 21 investigation, proceeding, or Harris Motion to Dismiss challenges only the second element of Mss. Hamrick s and Romaniuk s prima facie retaliation case, namely that the Plaintiffs suffered no adverse employment action. (Def. s Mot. to Dismiss at 13-14, 17-18). To show adverse employment action in a retaliation claim, a plaintiff only needs to show that the action was materially adverse, meaning reasonable that worker discrimination. that from making might or have supporting dissuaded a charge of a Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). specific. action This objective standard is context Id. at 69; Smith v. Vilsack, 832 F.Supp.2d 573, 585 (D.Md. 2011). Excluding an employee from a weekly [meeting] that contributes significantly to the employee s professional advancement might well deter a complaining about discrimination. (internal citation omitted). effect of reasonable alleged person reasonable employee from Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69 Courts may consider the combined events when standard. employing Vilsack, 832 the objective F.Supp.2d at 585 (internal citations omitted). Here, the Court finds that, as to Plaintiffs retaliation claims, both sufficiently Mss. Hamrick s demonstrate that and each Romaniuk s of them allegations suffered adverse employment action. First, Ms. Hamrick easily satisfies the less onerous standard objective required 22 to demonstrate adverse employment action in her retaliation claim. Hamrick alleged that she was removed Specifically, Ms. from the important position of VACM P[rogram] M[anager]. (Am. Compl. ¶ 125). This removal adverse could have demonstrates discouraged discrimination. a materially Ms. the Thus, Hamrick Court from finds action claiming that Ms. that workplace Hamrick s retaliation claim sufficiently demonstrates adverse employment action. Second, Ms. Romaniuk s allegations in her retaliation claim also sufficiently show action. An following combination subjected, that objectively as of materially she suffered reasonable events, person to adverse: adverse which (1) employment could being the Romaniuk Ms. view was restricted from attending weekly meetings where she received assignments; (2) having two former transferred after male supervisors, completion of from an whom she internal had been investigation concerning gender issues, inform her new male supervisor that she was a troublemaker ; and (3) having old, adverse, reports that were previously removed after an internal investigation dredged up again by her new supervisor. In sum Ms. Romaniuk has alleged actions that, when considered cumulatively, constitute material adversity under the objective standard. Thus, under the less onerous objective standard employed in retaliation claims, the Court finds that 23 Ms. Romaniuk s retaliation claim sufficiently demonstrated adverse employment action. Accordingly, the Court denies Harris Motion to Dismiss Mss. Hamrick s and Romaniuk s retaliation claims. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth below: First, hostile Harris environment Motion and to Dismiss sexual all harassment three Plaintiffs claims is GRANTED. Secondly, Harris Motion to Dismiss Ms. Romaniuk s gender and national origin discrimination claims is GRANTED. Thirdly, Harris Motion to Dismiss Ms. Hamrick s gender discrimination claim is Hamrick s DENIED. and Accordingly, gender the Lastly, Romaniuk s only discrimination Harris Motion retaliation surviving claim, claims and to claims include all three Dismiss is Ms. DENIED. Hamrick s Plaintiffs retaliation claims. Entered this 28th day of August, 2012 /s/ _____________________________ George L. Russell, III United States District Judge 24 Mss.
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