Giles v. ACE American Insurance Company et al, No. 2:2018cv06090 - Document 49 (E.D. La. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS: For the foregoing reasons, defendant's 22 motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff's direct negligence claims against it is GRANTED. Those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 6/26/2019. (mm)
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Giles v. ACE American Insurance Company et al Doc. 49 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ASHLEY GILES CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 18-60 90 ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL. SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is defendant Werner Enterprises Inc.’s m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent on plaintiff Ashley Giles’s direct negligence claim s against it. 1 Because plaintiff cannot pursue both respondeat superior and direct negligence claim s against defendant sim ultaneously, the Court grants the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises from a car accident. 2 Plaintiff alleges that she was traveling on Interstate 59 in St. Tam m any, Louisiana on May 12, 20 18 when another vehicle struck her car. 3 The vehicle was allegedly owned by defendant Werner Enterprises and operated by its employee, defendant 1 2 3 R. Doc. 22. R. Doc. 1. Id. at 1 ¶ 2. Dockets.Justia.com Matthew Melton. 4 Plaintiff contends that Melton negligently caused the accident. 5 On J une 19, 20 18, plaintiff filed a com plaint against Melton, Werner Enterprises, and Werner’s alleged insurance company, ACE Am erican Insurance Com pany, in this Court. 6 Plaintiff claim s that Melton negligently caused the accident by, inter alia, following too close, failing to keep a lookout, traveling too fast, and failing to m aintain control of his vehicle. 7 She further alleges that Werner is liable for Melton’s negligence under a theory of respondeat superior. 8 Plaintiff also claim s that Werner was directly negligent by negligently hiring Melton, negligently training and supervising Melton, negligently entrusting the vehicle to Melton, and failing to adequately maintain and inspect the vehicle, failing to warn Melton of alleged defects in the vehicle, and failing to develop adequate safety policies and procedures with respect to the vehicle. 9 On J uly 25, 20 18, defendants filed an answer to plaintiff’s com plaint in which they adm itted that Melton was acting in the course and scope of his 4 5 6 7 8 9 Id. Id. at 3 ¶ 7. R. Doc. 1. Id. at 3 ¶ 8. Id. at 4 ¶ 9; R. Doc. 22-2 at 1 ¶ 1. Id. at 3-4 ¶ 8; R. Doc. 22-2 at 1 ¶ 1. 2 em ploym ent with Werner at the tim e of the accident. 10 Defendants have since filed a first am ended answer and a second amended answer, both of which include the sam e adm ission. 11 Defendant Werner has now filed a m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent. 12 Werner argues that, because it conceded that Melton was acting in the course and scope of his employm ent, plaintiff cannot bring direct negligence claim s against it. 13 Plaintiff opposes the m otion. 14 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD Sum m ary judgment is warranted when “the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 10 69, 10 75 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any m aterial fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from m aking credibility determ inations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationw ide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 10 11 12 13 14 R. Doc. 6 at 1-2 ¶¶ 3-4. R. Doc. 21 at 1-2 ¶¶ 3-4; R. Doc. 48 at 1-2 ¶¶ 3-4. R. Doc. 22. Id. R. Doc. 32. 3 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonm oving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultim ate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am . Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75. A dispute about a m aterial fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could return a verdict for the nonm oving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If the dispositive issue is one on which the m oving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m oving party “m ust come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally ’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonm oving party can then defeat the m otion by either countering with evidence sufficient to dem onstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of m aterial fact, or “showing that the m oving party’s evidence is so sheer that it m ay not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the m oving party.” Id. at 1265. If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonm oving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the m oving party m ay satisfy its burden by m erely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with 4 respect to an essential elem ent of the nonm oving party’s claim . See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonm oving party, who m ust, by subm itting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonm ovant m ay not rest upon the pleadings, but m ust identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 10 75 (“Rule 56 m andates the entry of sum m ary judgment, after adequate tim e for discovery and upon m otion, against a party who fails to m ake a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elem ent essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)). III. D ISCU SSION Defendant argues that plaintiff’s direct negligence claim s against it m ust be dism issed because a plaintiff cannot sim ultaneously claim negligence under a theory of respondeat superior and direct negligence by an em ployer for the same incident when the employer stipulates that the em ployee acted in the course and scope of his em ployment. 15 As defendant points out, several federal courts in Louisiana have recently determ ined that, when it is undisputed that an employer is vicariously liable for the negligent 15 R. Doc. 22-1 at 1-2. 5 acts of its em ployee, the plaintiff cannot also m aintain a direct negligence claim against the em ployer. See Dennis v. Collins, No. 15-2410 , 20 16 WL 6637973, at *7 (W.D. La. Nov. 9, 20 16); W right v. N at’l Interstate Ins. Co., No. 16-16214, 20 17 WL 5157537, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 20 17); Franco v. Mabe Trucking Co., Inc., No. 17-871, 20 18 WL 60 720 16, at *4 (W.D. La. Nov. 20 , 20 18); Vaughn v. Tay lor, No. 18-1447, 20 19 WL 171697, at *3 (W.D. La. J an. 10 , 20 19). This Court addressed the issue two m onths ago in Thom as v. Cham bers, No. 18-4373, 20 19 WL 1670 745 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 20 19). As in this case, Thom as involved a car accident in which the plaintiff sued both the em ployee driving at the tim e of the accident and his em ployer. In that case, the Court determ ined that plaintiff could not m aintain both types of claim s. Id. at *7. The Court relied on the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Libersat v. J & K Trucking, Inc., 772 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 3 Cir. 20 0 0 ), to m ake an Erie guess as to how the Louisiana Supreme Court would decide the issue. Thom as, No. 18-4373, 20 19 WL 1670 745, at *6. The Third Circuit in Libersat upheld the trial court’s decision not to include a jury instruction that the defendant had a duty to exercise care in hiring and training its em ployee when there was no dispute that the driver was operating the vehicle in the course and scope of his em ploym ent. Libersat, 6 772 So. 2d at 179. It reasoned that if the em ployee was found negligent, the em ployer was autom atically liable, while if the em ployee was not negligent, then no am ount of negligence in the hiring or training of him would render the em ployer liable. Id. This Court reasoned that, if a jury charge on the em ployer’s standard of care is unnecessary under the scenario at issue, then sum m ary judgm ent on direct negligence claim s is also appropriate. Thom as, No. 18-4373, 20 19 WL 1670 745, at *7. Further, the Court found that prudential considerations such as stream lining the litigation process and avoiding unnecessary confusion for the jury weighed in favor of granting sum m ary judgment on the plaintiff’s direct negligence claim s against the em ployer. Id. The facts of this case are directly analogous to Thom as, and the same principles necessitate sum m ary judgment here. Plaintiff argues that the Court should disregard the many federal courts that have held that she cannot bring both types of claim s because Louisiana Civil Code Article 2324 requires that a jury allocate fault between the parties. 16 Plaintiff contends that rem oving her direct negligence claim s against Werner “inappropriately withholds consideration of an actor’s alleged legal fault.”17 This argument does not follow, because there is no need 16 17 R. Doc. 32 at 7-8. Id. at 7. 7 to allocate fault between the parties when plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim s m ake Werner entirely responsible for Melton’s negligence. If Melton is found to be negligent, the principle of respondeat superior autom atically m akes Werner responsible for the entirety of Melton’s liability. See Quebedeaux v. Dow Chem . Co., 820 So. 2d 542, 547 (La. 20 0 2) (Weimer, J ., concurring) (“When vicarious liability based on respondeat superior applies, the responsibility of the em ployer is coextensive with the responsibility of the em ployee who comm itted the tort.”). Werner will therefore be held to full account for any potential liability via its stipulation and plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim s. An allocation of fault under the principles of com parative negligence is not necessary under the facts of this case. Plaintiff also argues that public policy considerations weigh in favor of allowing plaintiffs to bring both types of claim s sim ultaneously. 18 As already noted, the Court finds that public policy considerations such as stream lining the litigation process and avoiding unnecessary confusion for the jury weigh in favor of granting sum m ary judgment. Elim inating the direct negligence claim s does not im pinge upon plaintiff’s right to be fully com pensated for any injury she suffered that was caused by defendants’ negligence. The Court finds that, on balance, a rule disallowing sim ultaneous vicarious and direct 18 Id. at 9-10 . 8 negligence claim s serves the public good. Accordingly, plaintiff’s direct negligence claim s are properly dism issed. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s m otion for partial sum m ary judgm ent on plaintiff’s direct negligence claim s against it is GRANTED. Those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJ UDICE. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _26th _ _ _ day of J une, 20 19. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 9
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