Michel v. Ford Motor Company, et al, No. 2:2018cv04738 - Document 203 (E.D. La. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 174 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 2/20/2019. (cg)
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Michel v. Ford Motor Company, et al Doc. 203 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA VICTOR MICHEL CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 18-4738 FORD MOTOR CO., ET AL. SECTION “R” (4) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is plaintiffs’ m otion to am end their complaint to add prem ise and em ployer liability claim s, as well as survival and wrongful death claim s. 1 Because plaintiffs have shown good cause and any prejudice to defendants is cured by a continuance, the Court grants the m otion. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of Victor Michel’s asbestos exposure during his work as a m echanic and generator service technician. 2 Michel contracted peritoneal m esotheliom a after a career that included perform ing work as a m echanic on engines and brakes. 3 He filed this action in state court on J uly 28, 20 17 against Ford Motor Com pany and m any other asbestos suppliers, 1 2 3 R. Doc. 174-2. R. Doc. 1-2 at 10 -12 ¶¶ 6, 10 ; R. Doc. 134 at 15. Id. Dockets.Justia.com claim ing negligence and that defendants’ products were unreasonably dangerous. 4 Defendants rem oved the case to federal court on May 8, 20 18. 5 On J une 12, 20 18, Michel died. 6 The Court substituted his survivors as plaintiffs on J uly 10 , 20 18. 7 As of J anuary 25, 20 19, the only defendant rem aining in the case is Ford. Plaintiffs have filed a m otion seeking to am end their com plaint. 8 Ford opposes the m otion except as to plaintiffs’ survival claim s. 9 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD A party seeking to am end its complaint after the deadline for am endments to pleadings in the Court’s scheduling order m ust show “good cause” for the am endm ent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b). S&W Enters., LLC. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., N A, 315 F.3d 533, 53-36 (5th Cir. 20 0 3). “The good cause standard requires the ‘party seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be m et despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.’” Id. at 535 (quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., 4 5 6 7 8 9 R. Doc. 1-2 at 13-14 ¶ 14. R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 21. Id. R. Doc. 174. R. Doc. 179. 2 Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 (2d ed. 1990 )). Whether to grant or deny a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Alix, 86 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 1996). The Court’s “judgment range is exceedingly wide” when making scheduling decisions, for it “m ust consider not only the facts of the particular case but also all of the dem ands on counsel’s tim e and the court’s.” Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 70 1, 736 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (quoting HC Gun & Knife Show s, Inc. v. City of Houston, 20 1 F.3d 544, 549-50 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 )). Courts specifically consider “(1) the explanation for the failure to [tim ely m ove for leave to am end]; (2) the im portance of the [am endm ent]; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the [am endm ent]; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.” S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536 (quoting Reliance Ins. Co. v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 110 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1997)) (alternations in original). If the Court finds that plaintiff has dem onstrated good cause to m odify the scheduling order, it then applies the m ore liberal standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) to determine whether to grant the m otion. Id. Under Rule 15(a), the Court “freely give[s] leave [to am end] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Suprem e Court has held that “[i]f the underlying facts or circum stances relied upon by a plaintiff m ay be a proper 3 subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the m erits.” Fom an v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Leave to amend, however, “is by no m eans autom atic.” Halbert v. City of Sherm an, 33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court considers m ultiple factors, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory m otive on the part of the m ovant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by am endm ents previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of am endm ent.” Fom an, 371 U.S. at 182. III. D ISCU SSION A. Su rvival an d W ro n gfu l D e ath Claim s Plaintiffs seek to am end their complaint to add survival and wrongful death claim s that arose when Victor Michel died on J une 12, 20 18. 10 Ford has been on notice of these claim s from the tim e that the Court substituted Michel’s survivors as plaintiffs on J uly 10 , 20 18. 11 In addition, Ford does not contest plaintiffs’ request to amend its com plaint to add these claims on the basis of Rule 16(b). 12 The claim s are essential to plaintiffs’ case. The Court therefore finds good cause to am end the Court’s scheduling order under Rule 10 11 12 See R. Doc. 174-1 at 3-4. See R. Doc. 21. See R. Doc. 179 at 1 n.5. 4 16(b), and it finds that allowing plaintiffs to add these claim s is in the interest of justice under Rule 15(a). Ford argues that plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim s are barred by the Louisiana Worker’s Com pensation Act (LWCA). 13 A “wrongful death action does not arise until the victim dies,” Tay lor v. Giddens, 618 So. 2d 834, 840 (La. 1993), and m esotheliom a is a covered disease under the current LWCA. See Austin v. Abney Mills, Inc., 824 So. 2d 1137, 1140 (La. 20 0 2). But whether Michel was covered by the LWCA depends on whether he was Ford’s statutory employee. em ployee. 14 Ford contests whether Michel was indeed its The Court therefore cannot definitively say whether the wrongful death claim s are barred by the LWCA. Accordingly, the Court grants plaintiffs leave to add wrongful death claim s. B. Em p lo ye r Liability an d Pre m is e s Liability Claim s Plaintiffs argue that they should be allowed to amend the petition to add em ployer liability and prem ises liability claim s because plaintiffs only learned of Ford’s ownership of the business where Michel was em ployed 13 Id. at 16. See R. Doc. 179 at 17-18 (“Plaintiffs appear to confuse Ford’s ownership of the stock of the legal entity ‘Crescent Ford Trucks Sales, Inc.’ with Ford’s ownership and operation of the actual building and em ployment of the people who worked there.”) 5 14 partway through discovery. 15 Ford argues that allowing plaintiffs to add strict liability premise and em ployer liability claim s at this stage of the case would be prejudicial because Ford has not prepared its case to defend these claim s. 16 The Court recognizes that prem ises claim s m ay require discovery on issues beyond the scope of product liability claim s. But these claims are im portant to plaintiffs’ case, and prejudice to Ford can be cured by a continuance to allow an opportunity for additional discovery. The Court therefore finds good cause to m odify the scheduling order under Rule 16(b). In addition, the Court finds no evidence of bad faith or dilatory m otive, and it finds that plaintiffs have shown a strong factual basis for the claim s. Plaintiffs ought to be afforded an opportunity to test these claims on the m erits under Rule 15(a). The stipulation that the parties entered into on October 26, 20 17, which states that plaintiffs are asserting “a product liability cause of action against Ford,” does not prohibit this am endm ent. 17 Plaintiffs explicitly “reserve[d] the right to am end the Petition . . . in the event that discovery 15 16 17 R. Doc. 174-2 at 2. R. Doc. 179 at 13. R. Doc. 179-1 at 1. 6 reveal[ed] the basis for additional allegations pertaining to Ford.”18 The parties’ stipulation explicitly contemplates the discovery of inform ation giving rise to new claim s, and allows plaintiffs’ the opportunity to am end. Plaintiffs’ are entitled to exercise their rights under that provision of the agreement. While Ford shaped its defense to respond to plaintiffs’ product liability claim s up to this point, the Court has continued the trial date to allow Ford adequate time to investigate and defend against the new claims. Am endm ent is therefore appropriate despite the parties’ stipulation. Finally, Ford argues that am endm ent is futile because it did not own Crescent Ford where Michel worked, and it thus cannot be held liable as an em ployer or prem ise defendant. The Court cannot assess the m erits of this argument without additional facts and legal briefs by both parties. Consideration of these m aterials is beyond the scope of a m otion to am end, for which the Court evaluates the futility of am endment under “the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (quoting Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 )). At the m otion to dism iss stage under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court m ust take all facts alleged as true. See Lorm and v. U.S. Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). 18 Id. 7 Ford acknowledges that “a Rule [12](b)(6) m otion is not the appropriate procedural vehicle” to evaluate whether Ford owned Crescent Ford. 19 It is equally inappropriate for the Court to consider these arguments when evaluating futility of am endment. C. Strict Pro d u ct Liability Claim s Finally, Ford argues that plaintiffs have not pled any strict liability claim s against it. 20 But plaintiffs’ original petition for dam ages alleges that Victor Michel was exposed to asbestos-containing products “m anufactured, sold, designed, supplied, distributed, m ined, m illed, re-labeled, re-sold, processed, applied, or installed” by defendants. 21 The petition provides that, when inhaled or ingested, asbestos causes irreparable and progressive dam age that can result in m esotheliom a and other cancers, 22 and that plaintiff suffered m esotheliom a as a result of exposure to defendants’ asbestos products during the court of his work. 23 The petition further provides that “[t]he products m anufactured, distributed, supplied, sold, and/ or used by the Defendants were defective, unreasonably dangerous, and 19 20 21 22 23 R. Doc. 179 at 16. R. Doc. 179 at 9. R. Doc. 1-2 at 9 ¶ 2. Id. at 11 ¶ 8. Id. at 12 ¶ 10 . 8 understandably dangerous per se to Petitioner.”24 It then lists the defects of the products as, inter alia, “unreasonably dangerous per se,” and “inherent and known properties that m ake them unreasonably dangerous by presenting high potential for causing serious injury, such as respiratory disease, cancer, and other health problem s.”25 These allegations adequately assert strict product liability claim s against Ford and the other defendants nam ed in the petition. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires only “a short and plain statem ent of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Suprem e Court has interpreted this standard to require that a plaintiff plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7). But “factual allegations alone m ay state a claim for relief—even without referencing the precise legal theory (or statute) upon which the plaintiff seeks relief.” Sm ith v. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, L.L.P., 735 F. App’x 848, 854 (5th Cir. 20 18 ). Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that Ford’s products were unreasonably dangerous per se, which Ford itself identifies as a strict liability claim under the applicable Louisiana law. 26 See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 24 25 26 Id. at 16 ¶ 18. Id. R. Doc. 179 at 9. 9 484 So. 2d 110 , 115-16 (La. 1986). The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs adequately pleaded strict products liability claim s in the original petition for dam ages. 27 Because Ford was on notice of plaintiffs’ strict liability claim s from the m oment the case was filed, the Court will not re-open discovery on this issue. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ m otion is GRANTED. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ 20th _ _ _ _ day of February, 20 19. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 27 The Court also notes that this action was filed in Louisiana state court and was not rem oved to federal court until after the close of discovery. Louisiana operates under a system of fact pleading, such that plaintiffs m ust plead only the facts giving rise to their claim s, and need not state the legal claim s they intend to pursue. See La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 854, 891; Montalvo v. Sondes, 637 So. 2d 127, 131 (La. 1994) (“Louisiana retains a system of fact pleading.”). Thus, as a practical m atter, Ford was on notice for m ore than nine m onths in state court that plaintiffs could pursue both strict liability and negligence claim s when Michel alleged that their products were unreasonably dangerous. See Robertson v. W . Carroll Am bulance Serv. Dist., 892 So. 2d 772, 777 (La. App. 2 Cir. 20 0 5) (“Under the fact pleading utilized in Louisiana, a party m ay be granted any relief to which he is entitled under the pleadings and the evidence so long as the facts constituting the claim are alleged.”). 10
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