Thomas et al v. Chambers et al, No. 2:2018cv04373 - Document 37 (E.D. La. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 21 Motion to Alter Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration ; denying 22 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental and Amending Counterclaim. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 2/7/2019. (cg)
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Thomas et al v. Chambers et al Doc. 37 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA KIERRA THOMAS, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 18-4373 RANDALL CHAMBERS, ET AL. SECTION “R” (4) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendants have moved under Federal Rules of Procedure 59 and 60 for the Court to reconsider its Order dism issing their counterclaim with prejudice. 1 Defendants separately seek leave to file a supplemental and am ending counterclaim . 2 Because defendants’ newly uncovered evidence in support of their counterclaim does not remedy the fact that their claim is not legally cognizable, their m otions are denied. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of a m otor vehicle accident in Orleans Parish. 3 According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, on April 24, 20 17, plaintiff Kierra Thom as was driving an autom obile westbound on Interstate 10 in the right- 1 2 3 R. Doc. 21; R. Doc. 20 . R. Doc. 22. R. Doc. 1-4. Dockets.Justia.com hand lane with plaintiffs Antoine Clark and Shirley Harris as passengers. 4 Defendant Randall Cham bers was allegedly driving a tractor-trailer next to plaintiffs in the m iddle lane. 5 Cham bers was allegedly driving the tractortrailer in the course of his em ploym ent with defendant God’s Way Trucking, LLC. 6 Plaintiffs allege that Thom as was driving “straight in a cautious fashion” when Cham bers negligently attem pted to m ove into the right-hand lane without “keep[ing] a proper lookout.”7 Cham bers’ vehicle allegedly struck plaintiffs’ vehicle, causing all three plaintiffs to be “violently jolted.”8 All three plaintiffs allege that the accident caused serious injuries to their necks and backs, and that their injuries require continuing m edical care and treatm ent. 9 On April 6, 20 18, plaintiffs filed suit against Chambers, God’s Way Trucking, and defendant Canal Insurance Com pany. 10 Canal Insurance allegedly insured the vehicle Chambers drove on the day of the collision. 11 Plaintiffs allege that Cham bers’ negligence caused their injuries, and that 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Id. at 3 ¶¶ 7-8. Id. ¶ 9. Id. at 2 ¶ 3. Id. at 3 ¶ 10 . Id. ¶¶ 10 -11. Id. at 5 ¶ 16; 6 ¶¶ 19, 22. Id. at 2 ¶ 3. Id. 2 God’s Way Trucking is liable for their dam ages as Cham bers’ employer under the doctrine of respondent superior. 12 Plaintiffs also allege causes of action for negligent entrustm ent and negligent hiring against God’s Way Trucking. 13 Defendants rem oved the action to federal court on April 27, 20 18, asserting diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 14 On J uly 3, 20 18, defendants filed a counterclaim against plaintiffs. 15 Defendants alleged, in conclusory fashion, that plaintiffs intentionally caused the collision and/ or that plaintiffs suffered no injuries as a result of the accident. 16 Defendants asserted that plaintiffs’ petition for dam ages constitutes a fraudulent m isrepresentation under Louisiana law. 17 Defendants further asserted that as a result of plaintiffs’ alleged m isrepresentations, they have suffered dam ages to be shown at trial, including attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses. 18 On J uly 11, 20 18, plaintiffs filed a m otion to dism iss defendants’ counterclaim and a m otion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Id. at 4 ¶¶ 13-14. Id. ¶ 14. R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 13. Id. at 2 ¶ 4. Id. Id. ¶ 5. 3 Procedure 11. 19 On October 24, 20 18, the Court granted plaintiffs’ m otion to dism iss, and dism issed defendants’ counterclaim with prejudice. 20 The court held that defendants’ counterclaim for fraud was not legally cognizable because the claim was incom patible with an assertion that they justifiably relied on plaintiffs’ alleged m isrepresentations. 21 The Court noted that defendants did not allege that they ever believed plaintiffs’ representations were truthful, considering defendants were contesting them in litigation. 22 The Court also held that defendants failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for fraud under Federal Rule of Procedure 9(b). 23 The Court denied plaintiffs’ m otion for sanctions. 24 On October 26, 20 18, two days after the Court issued its order, defendants filed a m otion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60 , requesting that the Court reconsider the dism issal on the grounds that they uncovered new evidence supporting their fraud claim . 25 They separately filed a m otion seeking leave to file an am ended counterclaim . 26 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 R. Doc. 14. R. Doc. 20 . Id. at 8. Id. Id. Id. at 9-11. R. Doc. 21. R. Doc. 22. 4 The proposed am ended counterclaim explains in greater detail the basis for defendants’ assertion that plaintiffs’ com plaint m isrepresents what took place on the day of the alleged collision. 27 Defendants assert (1) that Cham bers “did not experience any type of im pact consistent with a m otor vehicle accident,” (2) that Cham bers only m erged into the right lane after “an unknown third vehicle swerved directly in front of him into his lane 2-3 tim es,” and (3) that shortly after merging, plaintiffs “flagged” Chambers down and indicated that they had been in a collision. 28 Defendants further allege that there is circum stantial evidence supporting their allegation that plaintiffs’ claims are fabricated. 29 Defendants assert that they have connected plaintiffs to approxim ately fifteen other lawsuits where the plaintiffs alleged they were side-swiped by an 18-wheel truck on Interstate 10 under very sim ilar circum stances. 30 Defendants have attached police reports associated with these other lawsuits to their m otions. 31 On J anuary 17, 20 19, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a m otion to withdraw as counsel-of-record, which the Court granted. 32 27 See R. Doc. 22-4. Id. at 2 ¶ 3. 29 Id. at 2-9. 30 Id. Defendants generally assert that the individuals involved in these other accidents are either the plaintiffs’ relatives or “associates.” Id. 31 See generally R. Doc. 21. 32 R. Doc. 34; R. Doc. 35. 5 28 II. D ISCU SSION Defendants’ m otions are all prem ised on the argum ent that their newly discovered evidence entitles them to the relief they seek. Both Rule 59(e) and Rule 60 allow a party to m ove for reconsideration of a judgm ent based on newly discovered evidence. See W right’s W ell Control Servs., LLC v. Oceaneering Int’l, Inc., No. 15-1720 , 20 18 WL 814187, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 9, 20 18) (m oving party can prevail on Rule 59(e) motion by presenting “newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b)(2) (a court m ay relieve a party from a final judgm ent or order on the basis of “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered” at the tim e the order was issued). But “[a] m otion to reconsider [under Rule 59(e)] based on an alleged discovery of new evidence should be granted only if . . . the facts discovered are of such a nature that they would probably change the outcom e.” Ferraro v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 796 F.3d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 20 15). That sam e standard applies to m otions brought under Rule 60 . See Com pass Tech., Inc. v. Tseng Labs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Rule 59 and Rule 60 (b)(2) share the same standard for granting relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence.”). Defendants’ m otion to am end their counterclaim likewise cannot be granted if the proposed am endment does not rem edy the 6 deficiencies in their previous pleading. See Fom an v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (courts consider the “futility of [the] am endment” on a m otion to am end a com plaint); Carm ouche v. N at’l Flood Ins. Program , No. 17-11479, 20 18 WL 5279121, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 20 18) (denying m otion to file am ended com plaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) because am endment would be futile). Because defendants’ newly discovered facts would not change the outcom e of the Court’s Order dism issing their fraud claim , their m otions are denied. The Court dism issed defendants’ counterclaim with prejudice principally because their claim was incom patible with a plausible assertion that they justifiably relied upon plaintiffs’ alleged m isrepresentations. 33 J ustifiable reliance is an element of an intentional m isrepresentation claim under Louisiana law. See Kadlec Med’l Ctr. v. Lakeview Anesthesia Assoc., 527 F.3d 412, 418 (5th Cir. 20 0 8) (“The elements of a claim for intentional m isrepresentation in Louisiana are: (1) a m isrepresentation of a m aterial fact; (2) m ade with intent to deceive; and (3) causing justifiable reliance with resultant injury.”); Becnel v. Grodner, 982 So. 2d 891, 894 (La. App. 4 Cir. 20 0 8). None of defendants’ new evidence is relevant to the Court’s analysis. 33 R. Doc. 20 at 8 (“Any assertion that defendants depended upon or trusted plaintiffs’ alleged m isrepresentations is facially absurd, because defendants are contesting them in this litigation.”). 7 Defendants remain unable to state a cognizable claim for fraud because they do not assert that they ever relied upon plaintiffs’ alleged m isrepresentations. Defendants argue that Louisiana law does not require a showing of justifiable reliance when alleging a claim for delictual fraud. 34 Defendants correctly point out that Louisiana courts have been inconsistent with explicitly nam ing justifiable reliance as an element of this claim . Com pare W illiam son v. Hay nes Best W estern of Alexandria, 688 So. 2d 120 1, 1239 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1997) (“Two elem ents are necessary to prove fraud: an intent to defraud and actual or potential loss or dam ages.”), w ith Becnel, 982 So. 2d at 894 (“To recover under a cause of action in delictual fraud, a plaintiff m ust prove three elem ents: (1) a m isrepresentation of m aterial fact, (2) m ade with the intent to deceive, (3) causing justifiable reliance with resultant injury.”). Federal courts applying Louisiana law, by contrast, routinely include justifiable reliance as a distinct elem ent of the claim . See, e.g., 34 R. Doc. 32 at 2-3. Defendants’ em phasis on the fact that they state a claim for delictual, rather than contractual, fraud is irrelevant. Id. at 3. There has never been any confusion that defendants’ claim is for delictual fraud. Indeed, in both is order dism issing defendants’ counterclaim and in this order, the Court has applied the Louisiana standard for alleging delictual fraud. 8 Kadlec, 527 F.3d at 418; Abbott v. Equity Grp., Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir. 1993); Abell v. Potom ac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 110 4, 1131 n.33 (5th Cir. 1988). But defendants wrongly conclude from these slight discrepancies that they are not required to assert that they at one point believed plaintiffs’ alleged m isrepresentations, and acted to their detrim ent because of that belief. The court in Sun Drilling Products Corporation v. Ray born, 798 So. 2d 1141 (La. App. 4 Cir. 20 0 1) explained: Two elem ents are necessary to prove fraud: (1) an intent to defraud and (2) actual or potential loss or dam age. Federal courts applying Louisiana law indicate that reliance is an elem ent of a claim for fraud. Moreover, for fraud or deceit to have caused plaintiff’s dam age, he m ust at least be able to say that had he known the truth, he would not have acted as he did to his detrim ent. Whether this element is labeled reliance, inducem ent, or causation, it is an element of a plaintiff’s case for fraud. Id. at 1152-53 (internal citations om itted). As this quotation m akes clear, it is im m aterial whether Louisiana courts always explicitly list justifiable reliance as an element. They nonetheless recognize that a party asserting fraud is required to allege that it was unaware that the opposing party’s representation was false, and that the m isrepresentation caused it to act differently than it would have had it known the truth. Defendants have not m ade this assertion here. They do not allege that they were fooled by plaintiffs’ alleged m isrepresentations, so they therefore cannot allege that they would have acted differently had they “known the truth.” Id. 9 Defendants assert that they have been dam aged by being forced to spend m oney on “attorney’s fees and litigation expenses” to defend them selves from plaintiffs’ alleged lies. 35 If defendants can prove their allegations, there are other avenues by which they can recover the relief they seek. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), (b)(3), (c)(1), (c)(2). But defendants’ factual assertions are incom patible with a claim for delictual fraud under Louisiana law, and their m otions m ust therefore be denied. III. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ (1) m otion to alter the judgment and/ or m otion for relief from judgm ent, and (2) defendants’ m otion to file an am ended counterclaim , are DENIED. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _7th _ _ _ day of February, 20 19. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 35 R. Doc. 22-4 at 10 ¶ 27. 10
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