Deaton v. Glaser et al, No. 2:2018cv04066 - Document 17 (E.D. La. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Michael J. Glaser and the Kenner Police Department's 14 motion to dismiss is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Cary J. Deaton's federal claims against Defendants be and hereby are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's state law claims be and hereby are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 7/30/2018. (jls)
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Deaton v. Glaser et al Doc. 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIAN A CARY J. DEATON, Plain tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 18 -4 0 6 6 MICH AEL J. GLASER, ET AL., De fe n dan ts SECTION: “E” ( 1) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is a renewed m otion to dism iss filed by Defendants Michael J . Glaser and the Kenner Police Departm ent seeking dism issal of Plaintiff Cary J . Deaton’s rem aining claim s against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 1 The m otion is unopposed. 2 For the following reasons, the m otion is GRAN TED . I. BACKGROU N D In his am ended com plaint, Plaintiff alleges he was falsely arrested on Septem ber 21, 20 17, following an incident that occurred at a Kenner Walm art. 3 Plaintiff contends that David Michel, who is not a party to this suit, falsely accused Plaintiff of pointing a gun at him in the Walm art parking lot, thereby leading the Kenner Police Departm ent to arrest Plaintiff. 4 Plaintiff alleges that both video footage and the police report of the incident confirm ed that he did not “elevate a gun at the defendant,” yet he was still arrested and detained until 5:0 0 p.m . that day. 5 Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Kenner Police officers threaten ed to “taze” him . 6 Fin ally, Plaintiff alleges that record of his arrest 1 R. Doc. 14. Defendants filed their ren ewed m otion to dism iss on J uly 10 , 20 18, with a subm ission date of J uly 25, 20 18 . R. Doc. 14. Thus, Plaintiff’s opposition was due by not later than J uly 17, 20 18. As of this date, J uly 30 , 20 18, no opposition has been filed. 3 R. Doc. 1 at 1. 4 Id. 5 R. Doc. 11 at 2. 6 Id. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com is now viewable on the internet, even though the Kenner Police Departm ent knew it was “false and defam atory.”7 Based on these facts, Plaintiff brings claim s pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Chief Glaser in his personal capacity an d the City of Kenner as well as several state law based claim s against Defendants, specifically: false im prisonm ent, entrapm ent, stalking, aggravated assault, m alicious prosecution, loss of reputation, defam ation, intention al infliction of em otional distress, m ental anguish, and pain and suffering. 8 On May 14, 20 18, Defendants filed a m otion to dism iss. In their m otion, they argued that: (1) the Kenner Police Departm en t is not a legal entity capable of being sued; 9 (2) Plaintiff’s claim s against Chief Glaser in his official capacity are in truth claim s again st the City of Kenner; (3) the claim s against Chief Glaser in his individual capacity m ust be dism issed, as Plaintiff does not allege he had any personal involvem ent in the incident form ing the basis of Plaintiff’s claim ; 10 and (4) Plaintiff’s rem aining claim s m ust be dism issed because Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief. 11 Plaintiff filed an opposition on J une 13, 20 18. 12 On J une 15, 20 18, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ m otion to dism iss, and further ordered that Plaintiff file an am ended com plaint. 13 On J une 21, 20 18, Plaintiff tim ely filed an am ended com plaint, reasserting his claim s under 42 U.S.C. § 198 3 against the City of Kenner and Michael J . Glaser as well as his state law based claim s. 14 On J uly 10 , 20 18 , Defendants filed a renewed m otion to dism iss, arguing: (1) 7 Id. Id. at 1– 2. 9 R. Doc. 5-1 at 3. 10 Id. at 5. 11 Id. at 6– 14. 12 R. Doc. 9. 13 R. Doc. 10 . 14 R. Doc. 11. 8 2 Plaintiff’s claim s are redundant, as any claim s asserted against Mr. Glaser “in his official capacity are treated as claim s against the City of Kenner,” (2) the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s am ended com plaint do not cure the defects in his original com plaint, and (3) that Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 15 II. D ISCU SSION Plaintiff failed to tim ely file an opposition to Defendants’ renewed m otion to dism iss. The Court nevertheless reviews Plaintiff’s claim s to determ ine whether he has stated a plausible claim for relief. Ultim ately, the Court dism isses Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim s with prejudice, and declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s rem aining state law based claim s, dism issing them without prejudice. A. Plain tiff’s Claim s again s t Ch ie f Glas e r in h is Pe rs o n al Cap acity In his am ended com plaint, Plaintiff has not provided any additional facts necessary to state a personal capacity claim against Chief Glaser. To state a personal capacity claim under § 1983, a plaintiff m ust allege that, while acting under color of state law, the defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of a right secured by the laws or Constitution of the United States, or that the defendant’s wrongful actions were causally connected to such a deprivation. 16 Absent personal involvem ent or notice, supervisors cannot be held liable for subordinates’ actions. 17 Because Plaintiff has not alleged Chief Glaser had any personal involvem ent in this case, or that his actions had any causal connection to his claim s, the Court will dism iss Plaintiff’s rem aining claim s against Chief Glaser. 18 15 R. Doc. 14. Jam es v. Tex. Collin Cty ., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). 17 Id. (citing Doe v. Tay lor In dep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 1994) (en ban c)). 18 To the extent Plaintiff reasserts his official capacity claim against Chief Glaser, the Court dismissed this claim with prejudice in its order on Defendants’ first motion to dismiss. R. Doc. 10 at 3. 16 3 B. Pla in tiff’s Claim s again s t th e City o f Ke n n e r A municipality may be liable under § 1983 if it “subjects a person to a deprivation of rights or causes a person to be subjected to such deprivation.”19 To prevail on a § 1983 claim against a local government or municipality, a plaintiff must establish: (1) an official policy or custom, of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is that policy or custom. 20 An “official policy” for purposes of § 1983 includes: (1) ”[a] policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority”; (2) a persistent and widespread practice of city officials or employees, “which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy”; 21 and (3) in some circumstances, “a final decisionmaker’s adoption of a course of action ‘tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations.’”22 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff has failed to point to any alleged policy or custom that led to a violation of his constitutional rights. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the City. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Kenner. C. Plain tiff’s State Law Claim s Having dismissed each of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. District courts have discretion not 19 Connick v. Thom pson , 563 U.S. 51, 60 (20 11) (internal quotation m arks om itted). Valle v. City of Hous., 613 F.3d 536, 541– 42 (5th Cir. 20 10 ). 21 Brow n v. Bry an Cty ., 219 F.3d 450 , 457 (5th Cir. 20 0 0 ). “Actual or constructive knowledge of such [a] custom m ust be attributable to the govern ing body of the m unicipality or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-m akin g authority.” W ebster v . City of Hous., 735 F.2d 838, 8 41 (5th Cir. 1984). 22 Bry an Cty ., 520 U.S. at 40 6 (quotin g Pem baur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)). 20 4 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim when all claims over which the court had original jurisdiction have been dismissed. 23 Although the “‘general rule’ is to decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims” under such circumstances, the “rule is neither mandatory nor absolute.”24 Rather, a court must consider “both the statutory provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the balance of the relevant factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”25 Having considered the applicable law, the complexity of Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims, and the fact that the trial of this matter has not yet been set, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims and dismisses Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims without prejudice. 26 Accordingly; CON CLU SION IT IS ORD ERED that Defendants Michael J . Glaser and the Kenner Police Departm ent’s m otion to dism iss is GRAN TED . 27 IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that Plaintiff Cary J . Deaton’s federal claim s against Defendants be and hereby are D ISMISSED W ITH PREJU D ICE. 23 42 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 42 U.S.C. § 1367(c) reads: The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if: (1) the claim raises a novel or com plex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predom inates over the claim or claim s over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dism issed all claim s over which it has original jurisdiction , or (4) in exceptional circum stances, there are other com pelling reasons for declinin g jurisdiction . 24 Batiste v. Island Records Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 227 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting McClelland v. Gron w aldt, 155 F.3d 50 7, 519 (5th Cir. 1998 )). 25 Id. (citations om itted). 26 See Carnegie-M ellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988 ) (statin g that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claim s are elim inated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrin e . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the rem ain ing state-law claim s”); Batiste, 179 F.3d at 227 (reversing the district court for declin in g to retain supplem ental jurisdiction over the state law claim s that rem ain ed following the district court’s grant of sum m ary judgm ent on all of the plain tiff’s federal claim s because “the rem aining [state law] claim s d[id] not in volve any ‘novel or com plex’ issues of state law,” and “[t]he case had been pending in the district court for alm ost three years”). The Court dism isses without prejudice all of Plaintiffs’ rem ain ing state law claim s against each Defendant in this case. 27 R. Doc. 14. 5 IT IS FU RTH ER ORD ERED that Plaintiff’s state law claim s be and hereby are D ISMISSED W ITH OU T PREJU D ICE. N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 3 0 th d ay o f J u ly, 2 0 18 . ________________________________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 6
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