Peddy v. Aaron's Inc., No. 2:2018cv01625 - Document 20 (E.D. La. 2019)

Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting in part and denying in part 18 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 2/20/2019. (cg)

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Peddy v. Aaron&#039;s Inc. Doc. 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA HARMONY V. PEDDY VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-1625 AARON’S INC. SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is defendant’s m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), on the grounds that plaintiff released defendant from any liability for her claim s in a prior settlement agreement. The Court grants defendant’s m otion with respect to the claim s plaintiff asserts against it and dism isses those claims with prejudice. The Court also grants the m otion as it relates to defendant’s counterclaim for breach of contract, but denies the m otion as it relates to defendant’s counterclaim for indem nification. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of allegations of workplace discrim ination. 1 Plaintiff Harm ony V. Peddy alleges that she was hired by defendant Aaron’s 1 R. Doc. 1-1. Dockets.Justia.com Inc. on August 22, 20 0 0 , as a Divisional Sales Manager supervising over 10 0 stores owned and operated by defendant. 2 On J une 5, 20 0 9, a 50 -pound beam allegedly fell on Peddy’s head while she was working in defendant’s store in New Iberia, Louisiana. 3 Peddy allegedly lost consciousness and sustained a severe concussion. 4 These injuries have allegedly caused her to suffer perm anent disabilities. 5 According to Peddy, after the J une 5, 20 0 9 accident, defendant at first accom m odated her disabilities. 6 Defendant allegedly allowed her to delegate com puter tasks and to take extra tim e to com plete other tasks. 7 Defendant also allegedly lim ited the am ount of tim e Peddy spent driving, and gave her tim e to seek medical treatm ent. 8 Peddy asserts that these accom m odations “worked well” for a num ber of years after the incident, but that the accom m odations ceased once nonparty J ustin Hafer was hired as her im m ediate supervisor. 9 Hafer allegedly began to “com plain[] that [Peddy] had not com pleted spreadsheets as directed.”10 Peddy alleges that once 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Id. at 4 ¶ 9. Id. ¶ 11. Id. Id. Id. at 5 ¶ 12. Id. Id. Id. Id. ¶ 13. 2 Hafer began to rem ove the accom modations that were previously in place, her work product suffered and she experienced increased anxiety attacks and m igraine headaches. 11 Defendant allegedly discharged Peddy on March 24, 20 16. 12 On J anuary 8, 20 18, Peddy filed this lawsuit against defendant in state court. 13 Peddy asserts that defendant has discrim inated against her on the basis of her disability, subjected her to a hostile work environm ent, and failed to accom m odate her disability, in violation of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Louisiana Em ploym ent Discrim ination Law (LEDL), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). 14 Peddy further asserts a state law claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress. 15 She seeks com pensatory and punitive dam ages, as well as attorney’s fees. 16 On February 16, 20 18, defendant rem oved the action to this Court and filed an answer to the com plaint. 17 Defendant was granted leave to file an am ended answer and counterclaim on Septem ber 12, 20 18. 18 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Id. ¶ 14. Id. ¶ 15. See generally id. Id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 16-17. Id. at 6 ¶ 19. Id. at 6-7 ¶¶ 20 -22. R. Doc. 1; R. Doc. 3. R. Doc. 13; R. Doc. 14. 3 In its counterclaim , defendant asserts that on J anuary 9, 20 18, the parties executed a J oint Petition to settle a workers’ com pensation claim that Peddy had brought in connection with the J une 5, 20 0 9 workplace accident. 19 The J oint Petition was allegedly approved on J anuary 10 , 20 18. 20 Defendant further alleges that on J anuary 30 , 20 18—after Peddy filed the instant com plaint in state court but before that complaint was served on defendant 21—Peddy signed and agreed to the terms of a Receipt, Release, and Indem nity Agreement (the Release). 22 The agreement released defendant from “all liability of any nature whatsoever, whether past, present, or future, . . . including all claim s arising under . . . the laws of Louisiana . . . the law of the United States . . . [or] the Louisiana tort law, as a result of the injuries which occurred on or about J une 5, 20 0 9.”23 The agreem ent also contained a provision whereby Peddy agreed to “indem nify, hold harm less, and defend” defendant “from all actions [or] claims . . . by any person . . . that has arisen or m ay arise, directly or indirectly, out of the injuries” Peddy sustained “due 19 R. Doc. 14 at 10 ¶¶ 5-6. Id. at 11 ¶ 12. 21 R. Doc. 14-1 at 22 (reflecting that the Release was executed J anuary 30 , 20 18); R. Doc. 1-1 at 1 (reflecting that defendant was served process on February 2, 20 18). 22 R. Doc. 14 at 12 ¶ 17. 23 Id. ¶ 19; R. Doc. 14-1 at 20 . 4 20 to the accident of J une 5, 20 0 9.”24 Finally, the Release contained a provision prohibiting Peddy from filing any claim s against defendant arising from the J une 5, 20 0 9 accident. 25 Defendant asserts in its counterclaim that Peddy has breached the terms of the Release, and that it is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs as dam ages. 26 Defendant separately asserts that Peddy is obligated to indem nify it for its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred defending this lawsuit, pursuant to the term s of the Release. 27 On October 9, 20 18, Peddy answered defendant’s counterclaim . 28 Peddy’s answer does not directly adm it or deny each of defendant’s allegations in the counterclaim . 29 Instead, Peddy reasserts that she was discharged in violation of the ADA, and that she followed all of the procedures required of her before she could bring this claim . 30 Peddy “adm its” she entered into a settlem ent agreem ent, but asserts that the agreement pertained to only the worker’s com pensation claim against defendant and that it does not prohibit her from bringing this lawsuit. 31 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 R. Doc. 14 at 12 ¶ 20 ; R. Doc. 14-1 at 21. R. Doc. 14 at 13 ¶ 21; R. Doc. 14-1 at 22. R. Doc. 14 at 15 ¶ 38. Id. at 16. R. Doc. 15. Id. Id. at 1 ¶¶ 3-5. Id. at 2 ¶¶ 6-11. 5 On Novem ber 2, 20 18, defendant filed a m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings. 32 Defendant seeks a judgment dism issing Peddy’s claim s with prejudice, and granting defendant’s counterclaim s for breach of contract and indem nification. 33 Peddy did not oppose defendant’s m otion. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD A m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is appropriate if the m atter can be adjudicated by deciding questions of law rather than factual disputes. Brittan Com m c’ns Int’l Corp. v. Sw . Bell Tel. Co., 313 F.3d 899, 90 4 (5th Cir. 20 0 2). It is subject to the same standard as a m otion to dism iss under Rule 12(b)(6). Doe v. My Space, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 20 0 8). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff m ust plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9). A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable 32 33 R. Doc. 18. Id. 6 inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lorm and v. U.S. Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that plaintiff’s claim is true. Id. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiff’s claim . Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, the claim m ust be dism issed. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. III. D ISCU SSION As a prelim inary m atter, the Court m ust determ ine whether defendant’s m otion can be properly adjudicated as a m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings. The pertinent question is whether Peddy’s answer to defendant’s counterclaim raises a factual dispute that would render a judgm ent on the pleadings inappropriate, or whether the pleadings present 7 only legal disputes. See Brittan Com m c’ns, 313 F.3d at 90 4. Peddy adm its in her answer that she entered into the Release that defendant attached as an exhibit to its counterclaim . 34 She does not allege that the Release is somehow invalid because of fraud, duress, m aterial m istake, or any other defense that the Fifth Circuit has recognized in this context. See W illiam s v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930 , 935 (5th Cir. 1994) (listing possible defenses to release of federal claim s). Peddy instead sim ply denies that the language of the Release precludes her from pursuing her claim s in this action. 35 The disputes before the Court are therefore (1) whether the Release should be interpreted as prohibiting Peddy’s claim s, (2) whether Peddy has breached the term s of the Release, and (3) whether the Release’s indem nification provision requires Peddy to reim burse defendant for its expenses in defending this litigation. These are questions of contractual interpretation that constitute legal—not factual—disputes, which can be adjudicated in a m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings. See Reliant Energy 34 R. Doc. 15 at 2 ¶¶ 6-7. In adjudicating defendant’s m otion, the Court m ay consider the agreements defendant attached to its counterclaim . See Wright & Miller, 5C Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 (3d ed. 20 18) (Rule 12(c) m otion can be adjudicated by “focusing on the content of the com peting pleadings, exhibits thereto, m atters incorporated by reference in the pleadings, whatever is central or integral to the claim for relief or defense, and any facts of which the district court will take judicial notice”). 35 R. Doc. 15 at 2-3 ¶¶ 7-11. 8 Servs., Inc. v. Enron Can. Corp., 349 F.3d 816, 821 (5th Cir. 20 0 3) (“A determ ination of whether a contract is am biguous and the interpretation of a contract are questions of law. . . .”); Brittan Com m c’ns, 313 F.3d at 90 4 (“[J ]udgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of m aterial fact and only questions of law rem ain.”). Having answered this prelim inary question, the Court will now determ ine whether the term s of the Release require dism issal of Peddy’s claim s. The Court finds that they do, and dism isses her claim s with prejudice. The Court m ust apply federal principles of contractual interpretation to Peddy’s release of her federal claims and state law principles to the release of her state claim s. See, e.g., Sm ith v. Am edisy s Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 443-44 (5th Cir. 20 0 2) (applying federal law to release of Title VII claim s and Louisiana law to release of claim s brought under the Louisiana em ploym ent discrim ination statute and Louisiana tort law). But the federal and state principles that the Court m ust apply are consistent with one another. Under federal law, when a contract is expressed in unam biguous language, its terms are given their plain m eaning and will be enforced as written. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 349 F.3d at 822. A contract is am biguous only if its m eaning is susceptible to m ultiple interpretations. Id. at 821-22. Under 9 Louisiana law, a release, or “com prom ise,” “m ust be interpreted according to the parties’ true intent.” Sm ith, 298 F.3d at 444 (quoting Brow n v. Drillers, Inc., 630 So. 2d 741, 748 (La. 1994)). Like the federal interpretative principles, Louisiana law requires that if the provisions of the com prom ise are “clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation m ay be made in search of the parties’ intent.” Id. (quoting Brow n, 630 So. 2d at 748). The agreem ent the parties signed unam biguously releases defendant from liability in this action. It states that defendant is released from all liability of any nature w hatsoever, w hether past, present, or future, including . . . wrongful term ination from em ploym ent, retaliatory discharge . . . and also including . . . all actions arising in dam ages, tort, workers’ com pensation, including all claim s arising under the Louisiana Workers’ Com pensation Act, the laws of Louisiana, the laws of any State of the United States, or the law of the United States, . . . as a result of the injuries w hich occurred on or about June 5, 20 0 9. 36 By its clear term s, this provision encom passes any potential liability, pursued by way of any state or federal claim , that arises “as a result of” Peddy’s injury. 37 Peddy’s disability discrim ination and tort claim s plainly arise “as a result of” her injuries sustained on J une 5, 20 0 9, because she fram es her injuries as a “but-for” cause of her claims. She alleges that the 36 37 R. Doc. 14-1 at 20 (em phasis added). Id. 10 accident caused her to suffer “perm anent disabilities,”38 and that defendant created a hostile work environm ent and discrim inated against her because of her disabilities. 39 The Release therefore covers the claim s Peddy brings in this lawsuit. See Garcia v. Lum aCorp, Inc., 429 F.3d 549, 552-53 (5th Cir. 20 0 5) (work election form releasing em ployer from “all claim s of action . . . that arise out of or are related to injuries” plaintiff sustains at work barred plaintiff’s discrim ination and state law tort claim s against em ployer after plaintiff was severely injured); Broussard v. Brow n’s Furniture of Lafay ette, Inc., 128 So. 3d 640 , 643-44 (La. App. 3 Cir. 20 13) (settlem ent of workers’ com pensation claim that included waiver of any liability “arising out of or in any way connected with any accidents or injuries” barred later claim in state court). This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the Release explicitly includes claim s for “wrongful term ination” and “retaliatory discharge,” which are sim ilar to the claim s Peddy brings in this lawsuit. By explicitly including these claim s, the Release unam biguously covers m ore than sim ply tort actions against defendant for the occurrence of the accident, and applies to claim s that m ight arise as a result of Peddy’s injuries and disabilities. 38 39 R. Doc. 1-1 at 4 ¶ 11. Id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 12-19. 11 Peddy argued in her answer that if the parties had intended to release defendant from this lawsuit, the Release agreement could have specifically “reflected that requirem ent.”40 This argum ent is rem arkably disingenuous, considering defendant was not yet served with Peddy’s com plaint when the parties executed the Release. 41 There is thus no indication that defendant was even aware that Peddy had filed this lawsuit before the parties signed the Release. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Release did not include language specifically addressing these claim s. More im portantly, the Release need not specifically mention Peddy’s discrim ination and tort claim s to release defendant from any liability in this action. See Sm ith, 298 F.3d at 443 (“There is no obligation . . . under Title VII or federal com m on law, that a release m ust specify Title VII or federal causes of action to constitute a valid release of a Title VII claim .”); Garcia, 429 F.3d at 552-53. And as already discussed, the Release specifically states that it encom passes claim s sim ilar to the discrim ination claim s Peddy brings here. 42 In all, because the Release covers all claim s arising under “the Laws of Louisiana,” 40 R. Doc. 15 at 2-3 ¶ 11. R. Doc. 14-1 at 22 (reflecting that the Release was executed J anuary 30 , 20 18); R. Doc. 1-1 at 1 (reflecting that defendant was served process on February 2, 20 18). 42 See R. Doc. 14-1 at 20 (including claim s for “wrongful term ination from em ploym ent” and “retaliatory discharge”). 12 41 “the law of the United States,” and “Louisiana tort law,” it covers all of Peddy’s claim s in this lawsuit. 43 Next, defendant seeks a judgment on its counterclaims for breach of contract and indemnification. 44 Defendant is entitled to a judgm ent on the pleadings for its breach of contract counterclaim . When Peddy agreed to release defendant from “all liability of any nature whatsoever” as a result of her J une 5, 20 0 9 injuries, she was obligated to cease her pursuit of her claim s in this lawsuit. 45 By m aintaining this lawsuit after signing the release, Peddy breached that contractual provision. See W idener v. Arco Oil & Gas Co., Div. of Atl. Richfield Co., 717 F. Supp. 1211, 1217-18 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (plaintiff breached release agreem ent by bringing federal discrim ination suit, entitling defendant to “the am ount of its costs and attorneys’ fees expended in defending th[e] action” (citing Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Team sters, 70 0 F.2d 10 67, 10 71-72 (6th Cir. 1983))); see also Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 957 F.2d 130 2, 130 5-0 6 (5th Cir. 1992) (district court properly awarded defendant its litigation expenses as dam ages for plaintiff’s breach of settlement agreement). Defendant m ay recover as 43 44 45 Id. R. Doc. 18-1 at 6. R. Doc. 14-1 at 20 . 13 dam ages its attorneys’ fees and the costs it has incurred defending this litigation. See id. Defendant is not entitled to a judgm ent on the pleadings for its indem nification counterclaim . The indem nification provision in the Release provides, in relevant part: “Harm ony Peddy[] expressly agrees to indem nify, hold harm less and defend Aaron’s Inc. . . . from all actions [and] claim s . . . by any person, firm or corporation that has arisen or may arise, directly or indirectly out of the injuries herein described due to the accident of J une 5, 20 0 9. . . . [Peddy] further agree[s] to have any such claim . . . investigated, handled, responded to and defended at no cost to the parties released, even if such claim , dem and or suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.”46 Because this provision applies to claim s brought by “any person” that “ha[d] arisen” at the tim e the Release was executed, it could conceivably apply to Peddy’s com plaint. But the provision does not unam biguously provide that Peddy m ust indem nify and defend defendant from claim s that she herself brings. Indem nification provisions are generally used to require the indem nitor to defend the indem nitee against claim s brought by third parties. See, e.g., Soverign Ins. Co. v. Tex. Pipe Line Co., 488 So. 2d 982, 984-85 (La. 1986) (discussing a broadly worded indem nification provision in term s of claim s by third parties against the indem nitee). Interpreting this 46 Id. at 21. 14 provision as defendant does would require Peddy to “investigate[], handle[], respond[] to, and defend[]” against her own claim against defendant. 47 A provision that leads to such an absurd result is am biguous. See Sm ith, 298 F.3d at 444; 84 Lum ber Co. v. Paschen, No. 12-1748, 20 18 WL 1479221, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 27, 20 18) (ruling that indem nification provision was am biguous because it would be “absurd to read the contracts as requiring [plaintiff] to defend [defendant] against [plaintiff’s] own claim ” (emphasis in original)). Because the provision is am biguous, a determ ination of the parties’ intent requires looking to extrinsic evidence outside of the pleadings, and the Court m ust therefore deny defendant’s m otion as to its indem nification counterclaim . See Greenberg v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 478 F.2d 254, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1973) (judgm ent on the pleadings was im proper when contract was “facially am biguous” and “could be clarified only by the introduction of evidence from which the finder of fact could determ ine the true intent of the parties”). Although the Court denies defendant’s m otion with respect to its indem nification counterclaim , the Court is awarding defendant the com plete relief it seeks by granting its m otion with respect to its breach of contract counterclaim . 47 Defendant’s pursuit of its indem nification counterclaim Id. 15 would thus be redundant. Accordingly, if defendant does not intend to pursue its indem nification counterclaim further, it is advised to dism iss the claim within 14 days of the entry of this Order, after which the Court will enter a final judgment on the other claim s. 48 IV. CON CLU SION For the reasons stated above, defendant’s m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s com plaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJ UDICE. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _20th _ _ _ day of February, 20 19. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 48 The Court notes that an indem nitee is not entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees or costs incurred attem pting to enforce an indem nification provision, unless the agreement specifically perm its such recovery. Becker v. Tidew ater, Inc., 586 F.3d 358, 375 (5th Cir. 20 0 9) (noting that an “indem nitee enjoys no right to recover its legal fees incurred in establishing its right to indem nification”). 16

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