Dotson v. Price, et al, No. 2:2017cv14063 - Document 101 (E.D. La. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that motion in limine to limit testimony of Dr. Stewart is DENIED IN PART as to Dr. Stewart offering testimony regarding Dotson's physical limitations and whether those limitations would preclude him from doing certain jobs, and GRANTED IN PART as unopposed as to Dr. Stewart offering testimony more appropriately given by a vocational rehabilitation expert. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan on 06/13/2019. (am)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Dotson v. Price, et al Doc. 101 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT EASTERN D ISTRICT OF LOU ISIAN A D AVID H . D OTSON , Plain tiff CIVIL ACTION VERSU S N O. 17-14 0 6 3 J OH N PRICE, ET AL., D e fe n d an ts SECTION : “E” ( 3 ) ORD ER AN D REAS ON S Before the Court is a m otion in lim ine to lim it testim ony of Plaintiff’s expert witness Gregory M. Stewart, M.D., filed by Defendant Atlantic Specialty Insurance Co. (“Atlantic”). 1 Plaintiff opposes the m otion as to Dr. Stewart’s testim ony regarding Plaintiff’s physical and occupational lim itations, but not as to Dr. Stewart’s testim ony regarding the labor m arket. For the following reasons, the Court D EN IES IN PART Defendant’s m otion as to Dr. Stewart’s testim ony regarding Plaintiff’s physical an d occupational lim itations, and GRAN TS IN PART as unopposed Dr. Stewart’s testim ony regarding the labor m arket. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of a J anuary 19, 20 15 auto accident between Dotson and J ohn Price. 2 Dotson seeks to recover dam ages resulting from personal injuries he alleges he sustained in the accident. On J anuary 19, 20 16, Dotson filed the instant suit against J ohn Price and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com pany. 3 Progressive Casualty Insurance Com pany, Dotson’s underinsured m otorist insurer, was joined to the suit on Septem ber 1 R. Doc. 60 . R. Doc. 1. 3 Id. 2 1 Dockets.Justia.com 6, 20 17. 4 Atlantic was nam ed as an additional Defendant on Novem ber 3, 2o17. 5 The only rem aining Defendants are Atlantic and Progressive. Dotson has nam ed as an expert witness Gregory M. Stewart, M.D. 6 In his witness list, Dotson states: Dr. Stewart is expected to testify as to his treatm ent and care of David Dotson, his original treatm ent of Mr. Dotson’s left shoulder prior to the J anuary 20 15 m otor vehicle accident, as well as his treatm ent of Mr. Dotson’s left shoulder following the J anuary 20 15 m otor vehicle accident and ensuing surgery, and the cause of his shoulder pain following the accident. Dr. Stewart m ay also be asked to opine as to the reasonableness of Mr. Dotson’s actions in endeavoring to treat or m onitor his ailm ents. Dr. Stewart m ay also be asked to opine as to whether or not David Dotson would have been able to return to his em ploym ent of any other work following the accident in 20 15. 7 Atlantic filed the instant m otion on April 16, 20 19. 8 Atlantic argues Dr. Stewart should be precluded from testifying regarding Dotson’s ability to have returned to “any other work” following the accident and that Dr. Stewart’s testim ony should be lim ited to the field of m edicine pursuant to Rule 70 2 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 Plaintiff opposes the m otion as to Dr. Stewart testifying regarding Plaintiff’s physical and occupational lim itations, but not as to Dr. Stewart testifying regarding the labor m arket. 10 RU LE 70 2 STAN D ARD Rule 70 2 of the Federal Rules of Eviden ce governs the adm issibility of expert witness testim ony: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education m ay testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determ ine a fact in issue; 4 Id. Id. 6 R. Doc. 51. 7 Id. 8 R. Doc. 60 . 9 Id. 10 R. Doc. 67. 5 2 (b) the testim ony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testim ony is the product of reliable principles and m ethods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the prin ciples and m ethods to the facts of the case. 11 The United States Suprem e Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm aceuticals, Inc., 12 provides the analytical fram ework for determ ining whether expert testim on y is adm issible under Rule 70 2. Under Daubert, courts, as “gatekeepers,” are tasked with m aking a prelim inary assessm ent of whether expert testim ony is both relevant and reliable. 13 The party offering the expert opin ion m ust show by a preponderance of the eviden ce that the expert’s testim ony is reliable and relevant. 14 The reliability of expert testim ony “is determ ined by assessing whether the reasoning or m ethodology underlying the testim ony is scientifically valid.”15 In Daubert, the Suprem e Court enum erated several non-exclusive factors that courts m ay consider in evaluating the reliability of expert testim ony. 16 “These factors are (1) whether the expert’s theory can or has been tested, (2) whether the theory has been subject to peer review an d publication, (3) the known or potential rate of error of a technique or theory when applied, (4) the existence and m aintenance of standards and controls, and (5) the degree to which the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific com m unity.”17 The Suprem e Court has cautioned that the reliability analysis m ust rem ain flexible: the Daubert factors “m ay or m ay not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on 11 F ED . R. E VID. 70 2. 50 9 U.S. 579 (1993). 13 See Pipitone v. Biom atrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 243– 44 (citing Daubert, 50 9 U.S. at 592– 93). 14 Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 30 2 F.3d 448, 459– 60 (5th Cir. 20 0 2). 15 Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 48 2 F.3d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 20 0 7). See also Burleson v. Texas Dep’t of Crim inal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 20 0 4); Bocanegra v. Vicm ar Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 581, 584– 85 (5th Cir. 20 0 3). 16 Daubert, 50 9 U.S. at 592– 96. 17 Bocanegra, 320 F.3d at 58 4– 85 (citin g Daubert, 50 9 U.S. at 593– 94). 12 3 the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testim ony.”18 Thus, “not every Daubert factor will be applicable in every situation . . . and a court has discretion to consider other factors it deem s relevant.”19 The district court is offered broad latitude in m aking expert testim ony determ in ations. 20 As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an expert’s opinion affect the weight of the eviden ce rather than its adm issibility and should be left for the finder of fact. 21 “Unless wholly unreliable, the data on which the expert relies goes to the weight an d not the adm issibility of the expert opinion.”22 Thus, “[v]igorous crossexam ination, presentation of contrary evidence, an d careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate m eans of attacking shaky but adm issible eviden ce.”23 The Court is not concerned with whether the opinion is correct but whether the preponderance of the eviden ce establishes that the opinion is reliable. 24 “It is the role of the adversarial system , not the court, to highlight weak eviden ce.”25 LAW AN D AN ALYSIS In his deposition, Dr. Stewart states that Dotson is unlikely to be pain free or able to perform sustained activities with either shoulder due to the pathology of his shoulders and the m ultiple shoulder surgeries he has undergone. 26 Specifically, Dr. Stewart opined that Dotson m ay be able to work in a call center, but that he would have difficulty “because 18 Kum ho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carm ichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999). Guy v . Crow n Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320 , 326 (5th Cir. 20 0 4). 20 See, e.g., Kum ho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151– 53. 21 See Prim rose Operating Co. v. N at’l Am . Ins. Co., 38 2 F.3d 546, 562 (5th Cir. 20 0 4). 22 Rosiere v. W ood Tow ing, LLC, No. 0 7-1265, 20 0 9 WL 982659, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 20 0 9) (citing United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 10 74, 10 77 (5th Cir. 1996)) (em phasis added); W olfe v. McN eil-PPC, Inc., No. 0 7-348, 20 11 WL 167380 5, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 4, 20 11). 23 Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 250 (quoting Daubert, 50 9 U.S. at 596) (internal quotation m arks om itted). 24 See Johnson v. Arkem a, In c., 685 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 20 12). 25 Prim rose, 38 2 F.3d at 562. 26 R. Doc. 60 -2. 19 4 of what he’d have to do with his shoulders and typing and those types of things.”27 He also opined that Dotson’s lim itations m ade him “unem ployable.”28 Stewart further testified that while one m ight be able to “concoct a job” Dotson could perform , he did not believe that such jobs and em ployers existed. 29 Dr. Stewart then testified that while he would allow a vocational rehabilitationist to present job descriptions to Dotson, he would not defer to a these experts regarding Dotson’s ability to perform jobs. Atlantic argues that Dr. Stewart’s testim ony should be lim ited to the field of m edicine, and that he should not be allowed to testify on m atters typically reserved for vocational rehabilitationists, such as the availability of certain jobs in the m arket. 30 Dr. Stewart is Dotson’s treating physician and has personal knowledge of Plaintiff’s m edical condition and his physical lim itations. As a result, the Court will allow Dr. Stewart to testify on m atters related to his treatm ent of Dotson, including any physical lim itations he believes Dotson has and Dotson’s ability to perform certain tasks. Dr. Stewart will be allowed to give his opinion as to whether Dotson’s physical condition and lim itations would preclude him from perform ing the duties of certain occupations. Whether a patient can m eet the physical dem ands of perform ing certain jobs, including driving a truck, is within the knowledge of a patient’s treating physician. 31 Treating physicians m ay not testify regarding issues not involved in their diagnosis and treatm ent unless they have produced a report detailing their findings that fall outside 27 Id. Id. 29 Id. 30 R. Doc. 60 -1. 31 See Robert v . Conti Carriers & Term inals, Inc., 692 F.2d 22, 25– 26 (5th Cir. 198 2) (allowing orthopedists and an occupational therapist to testify regardin g a plaintiff’s future ability to work as a deckhand, m arin e shop operator, or construction worker; see also Theriot v. Allstate Ins. Co., 625 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (La. 1993) (allowing m edical doctors to testify about plaintiff’s in ability to work as a pilot, carpenter, or electrician ). 28 5 the scope of their treatm ent. 32 Dr. Stewart has not produced such a report. As a result, he will not be allowed to testify on m atters unrelated to his treatm ent of Dotson. Dotson has acknowledged that Dr. Stewart is not a vocational rehabilitation expert and conceded that he m ay not testify on issues related to that field, such as the availability of jobs in the labor m arket. 33 Dr. Stewart will not be allowed testify there are no jobs Dotson could perform or that Dotson is unem ployable. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORD ERED that m otion in lim ine to lim it testim ony of Dr. Stewart is D EN IED IN PART as to Dr. Stewart offering testim ony regarding Dotson’s physical lim itations and whether those lim itations would preclude him from doing certain jobs, and GRAN TED IN PART as unopposed as to Dr. Stewart offering testim ony m ore appropriately given by a vocational rehabilitation expert. N e w Orle a n s , Lo u is ian a, th is 13 th d ay o f J u n e , 2 0 19 . ______________________ _________ SU SIE MORGAN U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT J U D GE 32 See Mattingly v. Hom e Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:0 8-CV-341, 20 0 9 WL 10 676568, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20 , 20 0 9). 33 R. Doc. 67. 6
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
