Joseph v. Taco Bell of America, LLC, No. 2:2017cv11460 - Document 32 (E.D. La. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's retaliation claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to amend within 21 days. The Court grants plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. Because plaintiff has already amended her complaint twice, any further amendment must be limited to her retaliation claim. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 3/6/2018. (cg)
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Joseph v. Taco Bell of America, LLC Doc. 32 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LATEISHA J OSEPH CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 17-11460 TACO BELL OF AMERICA, LLC SECTION “R” (5) ORD ER AN D REASON S Before the Court is defendant Taco Bell of Am erica, LLC’s m otion to dism iss. 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion. I. BACKGROU N D Plaintiff Lateisha J oseph was a general m anager at a Taco Bell in Kenner, Louisiana, from March 20 12 to August 20 15. 2 In J uly 20 15, she allegedly informed her supervisor, Paula Shoem aker, of her pregnancy, and requested certain accom m odations. 3 Plaintiff asserts that on August 7, Shoem aker told her that she would need to take early leave, and that on August 18, Shoem aker gave plaintiff a thirty-day action plan. 4 On the next 1 R. Doc. 9. R. Doc. 31 at 1 ¶¶ 5-6, 4 ¶ 48. 3 Id. at 2 ¶ 18. 4 Id. at 2 ¶ 24, 3 ¶¶ 29-32. Plaintiff’s com plaint does not describe the content of this action plan. 2 Dockets.Justia.com day, August 19, plaintiff’s doctor allegedly placed her on permanent home rest. 5 Plaintiff has not returned to work since then. According to plaintiff, she inquired about her return date, but never heard back from defendant. 6 Plaintiff alleges that she called a Taco Bell hotline to complain about Shoem aker’s conduct on August 19, 20 15. 7 Later, on November 12, 20 15, she allegedly filed a charge of discrim ination with the EEOC. 8 After receiving her right to sue letter, plaintiff filed this Title VII suit on October 29, 20 17. 9 Defendant then moved to dism iss plaintiff’s racial discrim ination and retaliation claim s. 10 Plaintiff am ended her complaint on J anuary 5, 20 18, and again on February 28, 20 18. 11 II. LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, plaintiffs m ust plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 547 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Id. at 4 ¶ 46. Id. ¶ 48. Id. ¶ 44. Id. ¶ 47. R. Doc. 1. R. Doc. 9. R. Docs. 16, 31. 2 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lorm and v. U.S. Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff’s claim is true. Id. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each elem ent of the plaintiff’s claim. Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (20 0 7); Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 20 0 7), the claim m ust be dism issed. 3 III. D ISCU SSION A. Racial D is crim in atio n Defendant first m oves to dism iss plaintiff’s racial discrim ination claim . Plaintiff clarifies in her opposition that she does not assert a claim of discrim ination based on race, 12 and her am ended complaint om its any m ention of racial discrim ination. Thus, even if plaintiff earlier asserted this claim , she has since abandoned it. B. Re taliatio n Defendant next m oves to dism iss plaintiff’s retaliation claim . In order to state a retaliation claim , a plaintiff m ust allege “(1) that [she] engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse em ployment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Raggs v. Miss. Pow er & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471 (5th Cir. 20 0 2). Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to plausibly infer an adverse em ploym ent action. The only adverse em ployment action that potentially could have resulted from plaintiff’s protected activity relates to defendant’s alleged failure to respond to her inquiries about returning to work. 13 If 12 R. Doc. 14-1 at 2. While forcing an em ployee to take early maternity leave could constitute an adverse em ploym ent action, see Stew art v. Miss. Transp. 4 13 defendant actually term inated plaintiff while she was on leave, that would constitute an adverse employment action. See EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 20 13) (em ployer’s term ination of wom an who was on m aternity leave but desired to return to work constituted adverse em ploym ent action). But plaintiff does not allege that she was actually discharged, either form ally or constructively. Nor does she allege to whom she inquired about returning to work, when she m ade the inquiries, and what she said. An em ployer’s failure to respond to an inquiry, without m ore, is not a retaliatory act. Moreover, if plaintiff believed she was entitled and able to return to work, it is unclear why she did not do so and instead sought perm ission from defendant. The Court grants plaintiff leave to am end her com plaint. Because plaintiff has already amended her complaint twice, any further amendment m ust be lim ited to her retaliation claim . Com m ’n, 586 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 20 0 9), this action did not precede—and therefore could not have been caused by—plaintiff’s alleged protected activities. 5 IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s m otion to dism iss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJ UDICE, with leave to amend within 21 days. 6th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of March, 20 18. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 6
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