Davis v. Hager et al, No. 2:2017cv10118 - Document 21 (E.D. La. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS granting MOTIONS 9 10 to Dismiss. Plaintiff's claims against NOPD and Judge Lee are DISMISSED.. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 3/6/18. (jjs)
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Davis v. Hager et al Doc. 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA SHEILA DAVIS CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 17-10 118 J ULIE HAGER ET AL. SECTION “R” (4) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendants New Orleans Police Departm ent and J udge J ohn Lee have m oved to dism iss plaintiff’s claim s against them. 1 For the following reasons, the Court grants the m otions. I. BACKGROU N D This case arises out of a dispute over ownership of a dog, Ms. Minnie the Chihuahua. Plaintiff Sheila Davis alleges that she purchased the dog, and that Hom e Again im planted a m icrochip in the dog in 20 0 8. 2 According to plaintiff, the dog was stolen in October 20 12. 3 Defendant J ulie Hager later purchased the dog from an unknown person. 4 Hager allegedly registered and re-m icrochipped the dog on August 14, 20 15, at which point Hom e Again 1 2 3 4 R. Doc. 9. R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶¶ 12-13. Id. ¶ 14. Id. ¶ 16. Dockets.Justia.com notified plaintiff that Ms. Minnie was found. 5 While Hager rem ained in possession of the dog, a dispute arose between plaintiff and Hager as to who was its rightful owner. In August 20 15, plaintiff’s m other, Barbara Davis, filed a civil action in a J efferson Parish J ustice of the Peace Court to determ ine ownership of the dog. 6 The J ustice of the Peace ruled in favor of Barbara Davis, but Hager refused to surrender the dog and the J efferson Parish Police Departm ent declined to seize it. 7 Hager then appealed the case to the First Parish Court. 8 J udge J ohn Lee, who is also a defendant in this case, reversed the J ustice of Peace and ruled in favor of Hager. 9 Plaintiff alleges that Hager and her attorney, defendant Andrew Christenberry, fraudulently m isrepresented facts to J udge Lee. 10 Plaintiff further asserts that Hager, Christenberry, and J udge Lee conspired to deprive plaintiff of her property on the basis of race, and that J udge Lee lacked jurisdiction over the case. 11 5 Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Id. at 4 ¶ 19; see also R. Doc. 10 -2 at 11. The Court takes judicial notice of the Parish Court records. 7 R. Doc. 1 at 4 ¶¶ 20 -21. 8 Id. ¶ 23; see also R. Doc. 10 -2 at 1. 9 R. Doc. 10 -2 at 58. 10 R. Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 24. 11 Id. at 5 ¶ 28, 30 . Plaintiff also alleges that J udge Lee “deprived and denied plaintiff of her property in violation of Louisiana and Federal constitutional and civil rights.” Id. ¶ 28. 2 6 On August 11, 20 16, according to plaintiff, Ms. Minnie ran away from Hager, and eventually cam e into the custody of defendant J efferson Parish Anim al Shelter. 12 Defendant Robin Beaulieu, the director of the anim al shelter, gave the dog to Hager. 13 Ms. Minnie allegedly ran away again. 14 This tim e, the dog was taken to Hom e Again, which gave it to plaintiff on J uly 1, 20 17. 15 After Hager filed a police report, New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) officers allegedly entered Barbara Davis’s residence and seized Ms. Minnie without a warrant. 16 The dog rem ains in Hager’s possession. 17 Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on October 4, 20 17. 18 NOPD and J udge Lee now m ove to dism iss plaintiff’s claim s against them under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 19 Plaintiff has not responded to these m otions. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Id. at 5 ¶ 32, 6 ¶ 34. Id. at 6 ¶ 38. Id. ¶ 41. Id. Id. at 7 ¶ 43. Id. ¶ 50 . R. Doc. 6. R. Docs. 9, 10 . 3 II. STAN D ARD OF REVIEW Rule 12(b)(1) requires dism issal of an action if the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject m atter of the plaintiff’s claim . Motions subm itted under Rule 12(b)(1) allow a party to challenge the court’s subject m atter jurisdiction based upon the allegations on the face of the com plaint. Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) m otion to dism iss, the court m ay rely on “(1) the com plaint alone; (2) the com plaint supplem ented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the com plaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Moore v. Bry ant, 853 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 20 17) (quoting Barrera-Montenegro, 74 F.3d at 659). The plaintiff bears the burden of dem onstrating that subject m atter jurisdiction exists. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 , 1547 (20 16). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dism iss, a plaintiff m ust plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 547 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable 4 inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lorm and v. U.S. Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff’s claim is true. Id. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each elem ent of the plaintiff’s claim. Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (20 0 7); Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 20 0 7), the claim m ust be dism issed. 5 III. D ISCU SSION A. Plain tiff Fails to State a Claim Again s t N OPD Be cau s e N OPD Is N o t an En tity Capable o f Be in g Su e d NOPD argues that it m ust be dism issed as a party because it is not a juridical entity capable of suing or being sued. 20 Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the capacity to sue or be sued is determ ined by “the law of the state where the court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). Under Louisiana law, “an entity m ust qualify as a juridical person” to be sued. Dugas v. City of Breaux Bridge Police Dep’t, 757 So. 2d 741, 743 (La. App. 3 Cir. 20 0 0 ). A juridical person, in turn, “is an entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a corporation or a partnership.” La. Civ. Code art. 24. NOPD is simply a department of the City of New Orleans. See La. R.S. § 33:361 (vesting police power in m unicipalities); New Orleans Home Rule Charter § 4-10 2 (establishing Departm ent of Police). Accordingly, the Court finds that NOPD is not a juridical person capable of being sued. See, e.g., W inn v. N ew Orleans City , 919 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750 (E.D. La. 20 13); Barrios-Barrios v. Clipps, 825 F. Supp. 2d 730 , 741 n.5 (E.D. La. 20 11); Dugas, 757 So. 2d at 744. 20 R. Doc. 9-1 at 2-3. 6 B. Plain tiff Lacks Stan d in g to Su e Ju d ge Le e To satisfy Article III’s standing requirem ent, a plaintiff m ust show that (1) she suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant; and (3) the plaintiff’s injury will likely be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defs. of W ildlife, 50 4 U.S. 555, 560 -61 (1992). An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or im m inent. Id. at 560 . J udge Lee argues that plaintiff lacks standing to sue him for constitutional torts allegedly com m itted in the Parish Court proceeding because plaintiff was not a party in that proceeding. 21 Barbara Davis was the sole plaintiff in that suit, and there is no indication in the record that she asserted her daughter’s property rights. 22 Thus, J udge Lee adjudicated the property rights over Ms. Minnie only between Barbara Davis and Hager. Even if J udge Lee lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, or unlawfully awarded the dog to Hager rather than Barbara Davis, 23 plaintiff had no legal stake in 21 R. Doc. 10 -1 at 6-7. See, e.g., R. Doc. 10 -2 at 1, 3, 11, 58. 23 The Court notes that the com plaint is utterly devoid of factual support for these allegations. Nonetheless, because the Court resolves this m otion under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court does not decide whether plaintiff states a plausible claim against J udge Lee. Nor does the Court address J udge Lee’s assertion of judicial im m unity. 7 22 the dispute. A generalized com plaint about state court proceedings does not suffice to establish standing to sue the state court judge. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Bom er, 274 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 20 0 1); see also Machal, Inc. v. Jena Band of Choctaw Indians, 387 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (W.D. La. 20 0 5) (holding that because plaintiff was “not a party to the state court proceeding,” it did “not have standing to contest its validity”). Therefore, plaintiff did not suffer an invasion of a legally protected right and lacks standing to sue J udge Lee. IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the m otions to dism iss. Plaintiff’s claim s against NOPD and J udge Lee are DISMISSED. 6th New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of March, 20 18. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 8
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