Garcia v. Algiers Charter Schools Association et al, No. 2:2017cv08126 - Document 21 (E.D. La. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and 10 Motion to Dismiss Party. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS ACSA's motion to dismiss, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Green 's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's claims for assault and battery against both ACSA and Green, intentional infliction of emotional distress against ACSA, and negligence against ACSA are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 3/9/2018. (cg)
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Garcia v. Algiers Charter Schools Association et al Doc. 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LINDSAY GARCIA CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 17-8126 ALGIERS CHARTER SCHOOLS ASSOCIATION, INC. ET AL. SECTION “R” (3) ORD ER AN D REASON S Defendants m ove to dism iss several of plaintiff’s claims. 1 For the following reasons, the m otions are granted in part and denied in part. I. BACKGROU N D Plaintiff Lindsay Garcia is a teacher at the William J . Fisher School in Algiers, Louisiana. 2 Plaintiff alleges that Stanley Green, the school’s principal at the tim e, began sexually harassing her in August 20 16. 3 Green allegedly made unwanted sexual overtures and com m ents in person, in notes he left on plaintiff’s desk, in text m essages, and during telephone calls. 4 Plaintiff asserts that she com plained to her im m ediate supervisor and to the 1 2 3 4 R. Docs. 7, 10 . R. Doc. 1 at 2-3 ¶ 3. Id. at 3 ¶ 5. Id. Dockets.Justia.com hum an resources department of Algiers Charter Schools Association (ACSA), but that no action was taken. 5 Green left the William J . Fisher School in early 20 17. 6 Plaintiff sued ACSA, the William J . Fisher School, and Green on August 22, 20 17. 7 She seeks dam ages under Title VII, and also asserts claims for negligence, intentional infliction of em otional distress (IIED), and assault and battery. ACSA now m oves to dism iss plaintiff’s assault and battery, IIED, and negligence claim s, and Green m oves to dism iss the assault and battery and IIED claim s. II. LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss, plaintiffs m ust plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 547 (20 0 7)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff 5 Id. at 4 ¶¶ 7-8. ACSA operates the William J . Fisher School and is plaintiff’s em ployer. Id. at 2-3 ¶¶ 2-3. According to plaintiff, ACSA investigated Green’s behavior after a third party brought it to the attention of ACSA hum an resources personnel and plaintiff confirm ed the allegations. See R. Doc. 1-4 at 5-6. 6 R. Doc. 7-1 at 2. 7 R. Doc. 1. Attached to the com plaint is a detailed affidavit by plaintiff describing her interactions with Green and her conversations with hum an resources personnel. R. Doc. 1-4. 2 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court m ust accept all well-pleaded facts as true and m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lorm and v. U.S. Unw ired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 20 0 9). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A legally sufficient com plaint m ust establish m ore than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff’s claim is true. Id. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it m ust go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or form ulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555. In other words, the face of the com plaint m ust contain enough factual m atter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each elem ent of the plaintiff’s claim. Lorm and, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the com plaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (20 0 7); Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 n.9 (5th Cir. 20 0 7), the claim m ust be dism issed. 3 III. D ISCU SSION A. As s au lt an d Batte ry Under Louisiana law, “[a]ssault is an attem pt to com m it a battery, or the intentional placing of another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery.” La. R.S. § 14:36; see also Rice v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 770 F.3d 1122, 1135 (5th Cir. 20 14) (defining assault as “the im minent threat of a battery” (citation om itted)). A battery, in turn, is defined as “harm ful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from an act intended to cause the plaintiff to suffer such a contact.” Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389, 391 (La. 1987); see also La. R.S. § 14:33 (defining battery as “the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another”). Plaintiff fails to state a claim of either assault or battery. She does not allege any actual physical contact between her and Green. Plaintiff does allege that on Septem ber 12, 20 16, Green told her—while she was walking a group of students to the restroom —that he wanted to “kidnap” or “snatch” someone, “subdue” them , and “keep them for a period of tim e.”8 He also allegedly stated that he was “planning it out,” but did not want to hurt or bruise the person. 9 According to plaintiff, she nervously laughed and told 8 9 R. Doc. 1-4 at 4. Id. 4 him that “he can’t do that to kids,” and Green responded that it was not a kid he wanted to kidnap and subdue. 10 Later that day, Green asked plaintiff if she would like to be kidnapped or subdued. 11 This incident allegedly occurred in a school hallway, with groups of children nearby. 12 Generally, “[m ]ere words do not constitute an assault.” Groff v. Sw . Beverage Co., 997 So. 2d 782, 787 (La. App. 3 Cir. 20 0 8). But “a com bination of threats, present ability to carry out the threats, and reasonable apprehension of harm ful or offensive contact m ay suffice.” Id.; see also McVay v. Delcham ps, Inc., 70 7 So. 2d 90 , 93 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1998) (“To constitute an assault, threats, coupled with the present ability to carry out the threats, are sufficient when one is placed in reasonable apprehension of receiving an injury.”). The threat of harm ful or offensive contact, however, m ust be im m inent. Rice, 770 F.3d at 1135; see also Groff, 997 So. 2d at 787 (affirm ing summ ary judgm ent on assault claim partially because coem ployee “had no weapon” and “did not m ove toward [plaintiff] in a m anner that would indicate a threat of im m inent harm ful or offensive contact”). Even if Green’s statem ents constituted a threat to kidnap or subdue plaintiff, plaintiff pleads no facts upon which the Court m ay infer that Green 10 11 12 Id. Id. Id. 5 was able to kidnap her when he made those statem ents, or that the threatened kidnapping was im m inent. That Green m ade the statements in public, with groups of children nearby, suggests otherwise. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim of assault or battery against Green. Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim s against ACSA are predicated on its vicarious liability for Green’s conduct. Because plaintiff fails to state a claim for either assault or battery against Green, her claim s against ACSA m ust also fail. Moreover, plaintiff pleads no facts suggesting that any threatened kidnapping would be “within the am bit of [Green’s] assigned duties and also in furtherance of [ACSA’s] objective.” Baum eister v. Plunkett, 673 So. 2d 994, 996 (La. 1996) (quoting Scott v. Com m ercial Union Ins. Co., 415 So.2d 327, 329 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1982)). Thus, even if plaintiff stated a claim for assault against Green, her factual allegations would not support an assault claim against ACSA based on vicarious liability. B. In te n tio n al In flictio n o f Em o tio n al D is tre s s To state a claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress, a plaintiff m ust allege that: (1) the defendant’s conduct was extrem e and outrageous; (2) the em otional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and (3) the defendant intended to inflict severe em otional distress, or knew that such distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from his 6 conduct. W hite v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 120 5, 120 9 (La.1991). To satisfy the first elem ent, the defendant’s conduct m ust “go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and . . . be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized com m unity.” Id. Such conduct “does not extend to m ere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Persons m ust necessarily be expected to be hardened to a certain am ount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.” Id. “[I]n a workplace setting,” Louisiana courts have “lim ited the cause of action to cases which involve a pattern of deliberate, repeated harassment over a period of tim e.” N icholas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 10 17, 10 26 (La. 20 0 0 ). At the same tim e, “[a] plaintiff’s status as an em ployee m ay entitle him to a greater degree of protection from insult and outrage by a supervisor with authority over him than if he were a stranger.” W hite, 585 So. 2d at 1210 . 1. Pla in t iff’s IIED cla im a g a in s t Gr e e n Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to support an IIED claim against Green. Plaintiff argues that Green’s repeated harassment constituted extreme and outrageous conduct. Plaintiff points to several examples of Green’s alleged harassment, including his allusions to kidnapping and subduing her, 7 discussed earlier. She also points to a m eeting on November 29, 20 16, when Green stared at plaintiff’s vagina and asked, “Why you keep m aking m e beg for it? Why don’t you just give m e that pussy?”13 In addition, whenever Green saw plaintiff in the hallway, he allegedly bit his lip, grinned, and shook his head while following and staring at her, and constantly badgered her with the phrase, “why you keep m aking me beg for it.”14 Further, she attests that Green repeatedly called her out of class to m ake sexual com m ents and overtures. 15 According to plaintiff, Green’s harassment m ade her feel uncom fortable, anxious, and frightened, caused her to cry on several occasions and vom it once, and led her to seek counseling. 16 Plaintiff argues that because Green was a principal and received sexual harassm ent training, Green should have known that plaintiff’s severe em otional distress would be substantially certain to result from his harassment. 17 First, Green’s alleged conduct rises to the level of extrem e and outrageous. The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that “a pattern of on-going, repeated harassment” in the workplace m ay constitute outrageous conduct. Bustam ento v. Tucker, 60 7 So. 2d 532, 538 (La. 1992). While mere 13 14 15 16 17 R. Doc. 1-4 at 5. Id. at 3. Id. Id. at 3, 5, 6, 8 R. Doc. 12-1 at 5. 8 “dem onstrations of affection” cannot support liability under Louisiana law, N oto v. Regions Bank, 84 F. App’x 399, 40 3 (5th Cir. 20 0 3) (per curiam ), frequent comm ents and gestures of a sexual nature m ay, see, e.g., Prunty v. Arkansas Freightw ay s, Inc., 16 F.3d 649, 654 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying Texas law). Plaintiff alleges a pattern of ongoing, repeated harassment in the form of frequent sexual com m ents and gestures. Moreover, plaintiff alleges that Green im plicitly threatened to kidnap and subdue her. This alleged conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to satisfy the first elem ent of an IIED claim . Second, plaintiff has alleged that she experienced severe em otional distress. In Sm ith v. Am edisy s Inc., 298 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 20 0 2), the Fifth Circuit noted that “there is no bright-line test for determ ining whether [a plaintiff’s] emotional distress meets the level of severity necessary” to establish the second elem ent of an intentional infliction of em otional distress claim . Id. at 450 . But “the threshold is high.” Id. According to the Louisiana Suprem e Court, “[t]he distress suffered m ust be such that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Liability arises only where the mental suffering or anguish is extreme.” W hite, 585 So. 2d at 1210 . In Bustam ento, for exam ple, the Louisiana Suprem e Court found the second elem ent of an IIED claim satisfied because the plaintiff’s “psychiatrist diagnosed her as 9 being on the verge of a nervous breakdown” from the defendant’s harassment. 60 7 So. 2d at 535. But in Sm ith, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s depression, for which she did not seek medical treatm ent, and feelings of anger, disgust, and em barrassment were insufficient to satisfy this element. 298 F.3d at 450 . Here, the facts alleged in plaintiff’s affidavit perm it the plausible inference that her m ental suffering or anguish was extrem e. Green’s behavior allegedly caused her to feel uncom fortable, anxious, and scared over the course of several m onths, impairing her perform ance at work. 18 Plaintiff broke down in tears while recounting Green’s behavior to hum an resources personnel on Novem ber 30 , 20 16, and cried and vom ited after a December 5, 20 16 m eeting about Green’s behavior. 19 These reactions clearly constitute em otional distress. See Restatem ent (Second) of Torts § 46 cm t. j (Am . Law Inst. 1965) (“Em otional distress . . . includes all highly unpleasant m ental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, sham e, hum iliation, em barrassm ent, anger, chagrin, disappointm ent, worry, and nausea.”). Moreover, unlike in Sm ith, this emotional distress led plaintiff to seek 18 19 R. Doc. 1-4 at 10 . Id. at 5, 8. 10 psychiatric help. 20 These facts raise the reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal sufficient evidence of severe em otional distress. Third, the facts alleged in plaintiff’s affidavit perm it the plausible inference that Green intended to inflict severe em otional distress, or knew that such distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct. Direct evidence of such intent is not necessary to establish liability. See Tay lor v. State, 617 So. 2d 1198, 120 4-0 5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1993); see also Boutte v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 17-787, 20 17 WL 3917144, at *8 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 20 17) (inferring intent to cause severe emotional distress from defendant’s conduct). Here, Green’s alleged pattern of sexual advances— including his im plicit threat to kidnap and subdue plaintiff—continued long after plaintiff told Green that she did not want a relationship with him . Moreover, Green was plaintiff’s boss and should have known that a sexual relationship with plaintiff would have been inappropriate. That Green received sexual harassm ent training further suggests his awareness of the severe em otional distress caused by a pattern unwanted sexual advances. These facts give rise to the plausible inference that Green knew his allegedly harassing conduct would be substantially certain to result in plaintiff’s severe em otional distress. 20 Id. at 3, 6, 8 11 2. Pla in t iff’s IIED cla im a g a in s t ACSA Plaintiff fails to state an IIED claim against ACSA. At m ost, plaintiff’s allegations support the inference that ACSA investigated Green’s conduct, but that this investigation was inadequate. Plaintiff argues that because of the investigation’s inadequacy, plaintiff continued to suffer from Green’s harassment until Green’s separation from the school in early 20 17. 21 “An em ployer’s continued inaction” after receiving an em ployee’s com plaints of harassm ent “m ay give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress.” Martin v. Bigner, 665 So. 2d 70 9, 712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1995). But plaintiff points to no authority suggesting that a m erely inadequate investigation rises to the level of outrageous and extrem e conduct. To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit rejected a similar argum ent in McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 20 0 7) (per curiam). There, the plaintiff had internally com plained of harassment by a coem ployee. The employer reviewed the com plaint and determ ined that it was not substantiated. Id. at 555. Although the plaintiff experienced em otional distress after learning the outcom e of the em ployer’s investigation, the Fifth Circuit held that the em ployer’s conduct was not outrageous or extrem e. Id. at 563. Here, ACSA allegedly conducted an investigation but determ ined 21 R. Doc. 13-1 at 3. 12 that plaintiff’s complaint could not be corroborated. 22 As in McCoy , this conduct cannot support a claim of intentional infliction of em otional distress. Plaintiff’s IIED claim against ACSA m ust be dismissed. C. N e glige n ce Plaintiff’s negligence claim is based on ACSA’s failure to term inate Green, which allegedly “plac[ed] her in danger of a sexual predator” at her workplace. 23 This claim is barred by the Louisiana Workers’ Com pensation Act (LWCA). The LWCA provides the exclusive rem edy for personal injuries caused by an em ployer’s or coworker’s negligence when those injuries arise out of and in the course of em ployment. La. R.S. §§ 23:10 31, 10 32; see also Duncan v. W al-Mart La., L.L.C., 863 F.3d 40 6, 40 8 n.1 (5th Cir. 20 17); Hilliard v. Jefferson Par., 991 F. Supp. 2d 769, 778 (E.D. La. 20 14) (LWCA bars negligent retention claim s against em ployers). This exclusive remedy extends to dam ages for em otional distress. See Tum bs v. W em co, Inc., 714 So. 2d 761, 764-65 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998). Because plaintiff’s alleged injuries arise out of and in the course of her em ploym ent, plaintiff fails to state a claim for negligence against ACSA. 22 23 R. Doc. 1-4 at 9. R. Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 10 . 13 IV. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS ACSA’s m otion to dism iss, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Green’s m otion to dism iss. Plaintiff’s claim s for assault and battery against both ACSA and Green, intentional infliction of em otional distress against ACSA, and negligence against ACSA are DISMISSED WITH PREJ UDICE. New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _9th _ _ _ day of March, 20 18. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 14
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